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
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LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW

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THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR

[Reprinted from the *Political Quarterly*, September 1914]

THE evidence as to the immediate causes of the European war has so far been made public by the issue of the German White Book and the British White Papers.¹ These documents are already of historic value, and it is important that all who would grasp clearly the development of the situation in the critical days before the outbreak of hostilities should examine closely the materials of information which have been thus officially presented. It will be found by students that these documents require very careful collation, for the situation which they reflect was highly complex and developing very rapidly. It is well to give this warning. But a study and restudy of the materials thus available will enable the action of the several States in the crisis to be more clearly appreciated and the comparative responsibility of the various parties to be in certain important respects determined.

Behind the proximate or immediate acts which led

¹ The edition in English of the German White Book was issued from Berlin. It is reproduced (Appendix I) in *Why we are at War* (Clarendon Press, Oxford. 2s. net). The British White Papers are [Cd. 7467] and [Cd. 7445]. The Russian Orange Book has also been issued (*Why we are at War*, Appendix VI); a translation of some of the more important documents in it appeared in the *Manchester Guardian*, Sept. 11.

to the rupture of diplomatic relations and the outbreak of war lie large and deep issues. The development of the rival Teuton and Slav ambitions—the expansion of German influence in south-east Europe and in Asia Minor, the recovery and pressure of Russian political and military policy, the activity of Servian agitation in the southern Slav provinces of Austria-Hungary, the jealousies and fears raised and unallayed by the Balkan settlement, the mutual suspicions of Germany and France and of Germany and England—these and other factors underlie the rapid ripening of the crisis which has convulsed Europe. Many other more immediate circumstances affecting the barometer of political and military opportunity have also to be taken into account by the student of the situation—such as the industrial unrest in Russia, the military revelations in France, the political crisis over the Irish question in England. But important as are the large underlying forces which mould the foreign policies of the European States, and significant as are internal conditions at the time of an international crisis, the immediate actions which precipitate a war are often of peculiar value in estimating the responsibility of nations and in judging their standard of action. It is so in the present case. The events which preceded and precipitated war were such as reveal swiftly and clearly the character of States, and in themselves raised questions of the highest significance in the history of international relations.

In the complex situation which developed so suddenly between July 23, when Austria-Hungary presented its Note to Serbia, and the last step in the crisis, when on August 4 England joined France, Russia, Serbia, and Belgium by declaring war on Germany, it is important to distinguish as clearly as may be the main question

on which a judgement has to be formed. These may be stated as follows :

1. The Austro-Hungarian Note to Servia.
2. The responsibility of Russia.
3. The intervention of England.

I. THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE TO SERVIA

The Austro-Hungarian Note, with the Servian reply and the Austrian comments thereon,¹ is the first matter which claims attention. These documents should be read in the full text, so as to appreciate the character of the original Note and the extent of the Servian reservations. It will be clear to most people that the Austrian Note was not simply a humiliating demand, but one which no sovereign State could be expected to accept. The humiliating conditions might be endured, but to accept the dictation that Austro-Hungarian officials should take part *in Servia* in the suppression of the movement against the territorial integrity of the monarchy was a demand which threatened the independence of Servia. Sir Edward Grey told the Austrian Ambassador that he had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character.² The German Secretary of State himself admitted to the English Ambassador at Berlin that there were some things in the Austrian Note that Servia could hardly be expected to swallow.³ The Austrian Government required a reply in forty-eight hours.

¹ These will be found in the German White Book, pp. 23-32. The Austrian Note and the Servian reply—but not the Austrian comments—are also in Cd. 7467.

² Cd. 7467, p. 9.

³ Ibid., p. 16.

The Servian reply, on July 25, accepted the ten points of the Note with reservations, and, as Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador, went further than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. They promised to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs were forthcoming,¹ and they declared that

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready as always to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on March 18 (31), 1909.

Austria summarily declared the Servian reply unsatisfactory, and on July 27 the British Ambassador at Vienna informed Sir Edward Grey that the impression left on his mind was that the Austro-Hungarian Note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable.²

There are three charges against Austria, from which there seems no acquittal—*first*, that the Note was one which no self-respecting independent Power could accept; *second*, that Austria refused to meet Servia's offer in any way, or to entrust the matter to an impartial tribunal—and in this connexion it must be borne in mind that the evidence accepted by the Austro-Hungarian court of inquiry had not been submitted for examination; *third*, that by requiring unconditional acceptance within forty-eight hours, Austria greatly aggravated the situation. The action of Austria was

¹ Cd. 7467, p. 24.

² Ibid., p. 41

nothing short of a crime against the peace of Europe. Austria meant war.

But this is not all. Austria and Germany were both quite aware of the fact that the Austrian Note to Servia might lead to a European war. Whether the Kaiser or the German Ambassador at Vienna or the German Government had or had not seen the actual terms of the Note is unproved, and is not important. What is important is, that the Austrian Government informed the German Government of their 'conception' of the situation and asked their opinion. The German White Book states this plainly, and proceeds :¹

With all our heart we were able to agree with our ally's estimate of the situation, and assure him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Servia directed against the conservation of the monarchy would meet with our approval.

We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might, therefore, involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies.

It is clear that Austria and Germany plunged into this step with the consciousness that it might provoke a European war, and the direct responsibility for war falls first on Austria and Germany, both on account of the Note and the conditions attached thereto, as well as on account of their subsequent diplomacy in relation to the discussion of the Note by the Powers.

II. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF RUSSIA

The second question is the responsibility of Russia. This is the burden of the German White Book. Time and again it is argued that Russia is responsible for the

¹ German White Book, p. 4.

European war, and that in particular its act of mobilization is that which made war inevitable. It is therefore very important that the evidence on this matter should be carefully and dispassionately considered.

The question of mobilization cannot, however, be treated apart from the prior question of Russia's intervention in the Austro-Servian dispute. It was throughout the claim of Austria and Germany that the dispute of Austria with Serbia was a matter in which no other Power had a right to interfere. Hence up to the eleventh hour Austria refused, and Germany supported her, to accept any mediation or reference to an outside tribunal of the dispute with Serbia. Russia, on the other hand, made it clear at once that she could not allow Austria to dictate to Serbia. On July 24, the day after the presenting of the Austrian Note to Serbia, M. Sazonof informed the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg 'most positively' that Russia would not accept non-intervention.¹ An urgent appeal from the Crown Prince of Serbia to the Czar, dated July 24, appears among the recently published Russian documents. It is indeed very difficult to think that the Austrian or German authorities believed that Russia could simply stand apart. In any case, considering the relations of Russia and Serbia, it would have been unlikely. The terms of the Austrian Note now made it practically impossible. Anticipating trouble, and some days before the Austrian Note had been presented, the German Ambassador in London privately asked Sir Edward Grey to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburg, and had even suggested Russia as 'mediator'. On the 24th Sir Edward Grey, reminding the German Ambassador of his request, said that in view of the extraordinarily stiff

¹ German White Book, p. 37.

character of the Austrian Note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Serbia, he felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and did not believe any Power could exercise influence alone. The only chance he considered to lie in all the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and England, working simultaneously at Vienna and at St. Petersburg.

Nevertheless, despite the character of the Austrian Note, Russia counselled Serbia to meet in as conciliatory a manner as possible the Austrian demands, and, even after Austria had summarily rejected the Servian advances and proceeded with its military preparations, the diplomatic efforts of Russia were persistently directed to avoiding a conflict. On July 27 the Russian Ambassador at Vienna informed the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he advised his Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Meanwhile the Russian Government showed themselves ready to take any diplomatic steps which would settle the crisis. They were anxious to discuss matters directly with Vienna, and they were willing to stand aside and leave the dispute to the four neutral Powers. Vienna blocked the one proposal, Berlin the other. Even at the eleventh hour Russia was ready to negotiate. At an interview which the German Ambassador had with M. Sazonof in the early morning of July 30, the latter made the following offer :

If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Serbia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum

points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations.

This formula was subsequently modified, on the suggestion of England, to run as follows :

If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory ; if recognizing that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude.

On July 31 M. Sazonof telegraphed that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. It must therefore be remembered that it was with this declaration before it that the German Government, while avowedly mediating at Vienna, presented its ultimatum at St. Petersburg requiring general demobilization within twelve hours.

With regard to the question of Russian mobilization and what must also be considered with it, the mobilization of the other Powers, it may be long, if ever, before the whole truth is sifted out.

There seems to be a good deal of diplomatic play with the term ' mobilization ', and in studying the documents this question should be attended to. There is a conflict of evidence as to when the several armies mobilized, and it is not clear how much reality is to be attached to the term ' mobilization '. The French Ministry of War stated that the Germans did what was in effect mobilization under another name.¹ Thus, by July 30 the German

¹ Cd. 7467, p. 70.

reserves had been called in and the troops were being massed on the French and Russian frontiers.¹ It was not until August 1, the day on which Germany declared war, that the order for mobilization was published to take effect on August 2.²

The difficulty of dealing with the evidence regarding mobilization being kept in mind, the following points should be remembered :

(a) That Russia began military preparations because it was evident that Austria-Hungary intended to attack Servia.

(b) That on July 26 the German military attaché at St. Petersburg reported as follows :

I deem it certain that mobilization has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable elsewhere.³

(c) That on the same day the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government: ⁴

Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilizing the army.

But mobilization means war.

As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. . . .

It will be observed that this strong Note from Berlin to St. Petersburg was sent the day after the Servian reply to Austria.

(d) That on the day following (July 27) the Russian Secretary of War gave the German military attaché his

¹ Ibid., p. 58.

² Ibid., p. 72.

³ German White Book, p. 38.

⁴ Ibid., p. 7.

word of honour that no order to mobilize had yet been issued :

Though general preparations are being made, no reserves were called and no horses mustered. If Austria crossed the Servian frontier such military districts that are directed towards Austria, viz. Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilized. Under no circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilna, St. Petersburg.¹

(e) That on July 29 the Chief of the Russian General Staff informed the German military attaché on the authority of the Secretary for War that everything remained as two days ago, and he offered confirmation in writing and gave his word of honour that up to 3 P.M. there had been no mobilization—adding the important statement :

He could not assume a guaranty for future, but he could emphasize that in the fronts directed towards our frontier His Majesty desired no mobilization.

The German attaché informed his Government that he considered the conversation an attempt to mislead.²

(f) That on the same day, the 29th, Russia, on the news of the Austrian invasion of Servia, issued mobilization orders for four districts towards Austria and informed Berlin of this action.³

(g) That on the 30th M. Cambon reported to Sir Edward Grey that Germany was massing troops on the French frontier.⁴

(h) That on the 31st (Russia having offered on the 30th to cease military preparations if Austria would modify her ultimatum to Servia) it was decided at St. Petersburg to issue orders for general mobilization.

¹ German White Book, p. 40.

² Ibid., pp. 10, 11.

³ Cd. 7467, p. 7.

⁴ Ibid., p. 58.

The British Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported as follows :

This decision was taken in consequence of the Report received from the Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia. Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.¹

(i) That on the same day, July 31, the Czar telegraphed to the Kaiser that 'as long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon.'²

At midnight (July 31) the German Ambassador presented the ultimatum requiring Russia to stop every measure of war against Germany and Austria-Hungary within twelve hours. An ultimatum was presented to France allowing eighteen hours. . With these steps all hope of a peaceful settlement vanished.

The German White Book asserts that before the declaration of war Russian troops had crossed the frontier—'Thus Russia began the war against us'. So again, a few lines later, it adds, 'on the morning of the next day France opened hostilities'—though there is abundant evidence that the first acts of aggression came from Germany, the French troops having been purposely kept at a distance of 10 kilometres from the frontier. Thus, too, Servia is charged with acts of aggression before the Austrian declaration of war. Little store can be placed on any of these statements, and indeed the counter-evidence seems

¹ Cd. 7467, p. 61.

² German White Book, p. 12

overwhelming. But such points must be left for full investigation—when this becomes possible. What stands out clear is the fact that Germany cannot lightly shift on to Russia the responsibility for the European war. A study of the documents which so far have seen the light will leave with most people the conviction that such a responsibility falls more on the Kaiser and his Government than on any other party. Not unlike the act of the violation of the neutrality of Belgium, the precipitate step of Germany in delivering its ultimatum to Russia was dictated by ideas of military exigencies which in the German mind dominated all other considerations.

、 III. THE INTERVENTION OF ENGLAND

Thanks to the documents of the White Paper and the full statements in Parliament, it is possible to get a clear view of the line followed by England throughout the crisis. At this time of day no proof is needed that from the outset every effort was made by Sir Edward Grey to reach a basis of settlement. It is admitted on all sides.

The question of greater interest and importance was that of England's position with regard to neutrality. Russia and France urged that England should declare her solidarity with them. But it was clear at the time when these requests were made that such a step would not have been justified, though Germany was repeatedly warned that she must not count on England's neutrality. On July 31 Sir Edward Grey put the matter in a very plain light, and his statement is of great importance in view of later developments :

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward

which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences ; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.

This statement furnishes the true reply to the question which has been asked, why England did not meet the German Ambassador's request for England to state the terms of her neutrality. The terms were already stated, and equally plain was the warning that otherwise, if France became involved, we should be drawn in. So long as there was any hope of restricting the Austro-Servian dispute, England maintained her neutrality.

But war between the Great Powers raised questions of obligation—first towards France, and second towards Belgium. With regard to France, (1) it was plain that for some time there had been an understanding as to the disposition of the French and British fleets ; (2) there had been the Agadir crisis, in which England openly stood by France ; and (3) there had been the assurance given by the Prime Minister that England was not bound to France, but was free to choose her course.

But Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 3 revealed much more clearly the real position. It was summed up in the interchange of letters between M. Cambon and Sir Edward Grey on November 22 and 23, 1912. Therein three things were stated and agreed to : (1) that the French and English naval and military experts had from ' time to time in recent years ' consulted together ; (2) that such consultations had been understood not to restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at

any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force ; and (3) that in the event of either Government having grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and if so what measures they would be prepared to take in common. This most important statement defined and determined England's obligation. It was clearly understood that the consultations, and what was more, the arrangements arising out of such consultations, did not restrict the freedom of either Government. 'The disposition, for instance, of the French and British Fleets respectively at the present moment', wrote Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, 'is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.' But if an agreement as regards the fleets did not create an obligation, it was something very like it, and presently it was felt to be an obligation. Further, there was an explicit obligation to consult together on certain contingencies named, and clearly such a contingency had now arisen. If in such a contingency England was not going to stand by France when she was threatened, when would she do so ? There was now, if ever, a clear obligation. The Cabinet decided that under the circumstances it was its duty to help France, and it was announced to the French Ambassador that, subject to the approval of Parliament, the British Fleet would give all the protection in its power to the shipping and to the north and west coasts of France. Thus, apart altogether from the question of Belgium, there was a clear obligation facing England with regard to France, and that obligation was honoured.

But if there had been no obligation to France, there

was a clear obligation to Belgium. England, France, and Germany were all guarantors of the neutrality of Belgium. Belgium declared on August 1 her determination to defend her neutrality to the utmost of her power; France stated that she would respect it; Germany would give no undertaking, and violated it. There could only be one course.

Thus it is doubly clear that the decision for England rested on a basis of obligation, and it is important that this position should be plainly understood and firmly held.

The Issues of the War

The issues of this great war cannot yet be seen in their fullness. But this much is already clear, that they are comparable with the magnitude of the war, and that the paramount issue is the question of freedom. The present struggle is first and foremost a struggle of freedom against militarism. Men have seen with anxiety the growing domination in Germany of the military power. It has controlled the life of the nation. Prussia has mastered Germany, and Germany has become a strong armed camp in the centre of Europe—not simply on the defensive but avowedly with aggressive ideas. More than anything else the militarism of Germany is responsible for the race of armaments in Europe. The strong hand of the military Power has been behind all the acts of State and has sought to crush opposition whether in east or west—in Prussian Poland or in Alsace-Lorraine. The first issue in this war is to free Europe from this military menace. It is said that this is to crush one military Power only to raise up another, and that a military France and still more a militant Russia will take the place of Germany.

That is not the belief of those who have engaged in this war. They believe that France is essentially pacific, and that, relieved from the dread which has been for years overhanging their country, the French democracy will show themselves one of the greatest bulwarks of European peace. The call of President Poincaré to rally to the defence of 'France the eternal, the pacific, the resolute', voiced that sentiment which is deep in the hearts of all democracies—the love of peace.

The future of Russia is unknown, but in Russia there are also great internal forces that make for peace ; and once the Slav peoples are free from the rule of the Teuton, there are hopes for peace such as have not been before possible. But with German militarism threatening and thwarting the 'natural rights' of Slavdom peace for Russia was impossible. The great foundation of peace is liberty, and the war to-day is to Englishmen a war of liberty. It is this belief which is at the bottom of that fervid union of men in all parts of the Empire to crush the growing military power of Europe. Great fundamental feelings are those which move large masses of people, and with all its differences of race and feeling the common bond which is uniting men to-day throughout the British Empire is the love of liberty. For what is the outstanding mark of the British Empire ? It is the freedom of the people in it and the security which union gives. Among the self-governing States of the Empire that freedom is complete, and to-day, if any one of those self-governing States determined to end its membership of the Empire, it would be free to go. The Empire is one of freemen who are conscious of that membership of Empire as not only giving them the rights of freemen, but as securing

also for others such rights. Everywhere throughout the Empire this spirit is rising, and it is the highest ambition of those who love the Empire to see all parts of it working forward towards freedom. It is because the Germans have, despite their great efficiency and wide culture, never realized that full sense of political freedom and self-government, best expressed in the common law of England and in its responsible parliamentary and local institutions, that men who have known what such freedom means are determined at all costs not to let the domination of Germany spread.

And closely connected with this is the question of the rights of the smaller nations. The sense of nationality has always been deep in England, and men have felt the strongest sympathy with the small nations of Europe in their struggle for independence and their right to live their own life and make their contribution to civilization. The greatness of a nation is not measured by its size but by its spirit, and one of the desires of England to-day—quickenened powerfully by recent events—is to see the smaller nations of Europe secure from domination by the larger Powers. This war is one for the liberty of the smaller States—Belgium, Holland, Denmark—as well as the States of South-East Europe. Nations must be free to enter into alliance or union, but the end of such alliance or union must be national self-realization. And where, as in the Scandinavian States, in Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, the democratic spirit is strongly developed, there men have freedom and the desire for peace and culture. Every additional such State is a guarantee of peace, and England sees in such States nations which have with her a great bond of common interest.

There is a third ground which played a large part at

the outbreak of the controversy, and which is no minor issue—the maintenance of international obligations. If a matter such as the neutrality of Belgium is to be treated as ‘a scrap of paper’, there is an end to the security of international agreements. What guarantee can there be that any agreement will be found of value if the plea of ‘necessity’ can be put forward to justify its disregard? It is perfectly true that circumstances may arise which justify the denunciation of an agreement. But if a country ceases to regard an agreement as binding upon it, it must give full and proper notice. So again, if there has to be war, at least some progress has been made by the conventions of civilized nations to conduct war on lines which mitigate as far as may be the sufferings of non-combatants and neutrals. But by German methods on land and sea, both non-combatants and neutrals have suffered. The war must punish the breaking of agreements and establish on a firmer basis than before the sanctity of international regulations.

This war will have many far-reaching consequences, and not only in Europe. It brings with it complex problems of national boundaries, of the rights of States, and of new relationships between races eastern and western. But behind it all the great question is that of securing the future of peace. And to this end the main object in view must be that of requiring disputes between sovereign States to be the subject of arbitration before there is recourse to war, and of securing international action to punish the disregard of arbitration. To prevent a recurrence of the swift appeal to the sword, such as has been seen in the history of the present war, is the first task of the peoples who claim to be democratic.

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The War and the World's Wheat

THE RISKS OF
A SHORTAGE
NEXT HARVEST

By

ALFRED AKERS, F.S.S.

October, 1914

LONDON :

SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, HAMILTON, KENT & CO., Ltd.,

4, STATIONERS' HALL COURT

THE WAR AND THE WORLD'S WHEAT

THE RISKS OF A SHORTAGE NEXT HARVEST

UNDER the heading, "The Farmer's Duty," a striking appeal was made in the Press by Lord Milner a few weeks ago on the question of the probable effects of the European War upon the supply of bread-corn available after next harvest. His appeal was of a twofold character—to the Government, to take practical steps to help the farmers to sow the maximum amount of wheat, and to the farmers, begging them to act promptly and increase their wheat acreage in any event. The wheat supply up till next harvest is not in question, and present prices are low enough, owing chiefly to the diversion

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to this country of a larger proportion than usual of the oversea supply.

Unfortunately, Lord Milner's seed seems to have fallen upon stony ground. The Government has so far declined to hold out any financial inducement to the farmers, though the latter are officially advised that wheat appears likely to be a profitable crop next year—a somewhat ominous statement. This attitude of the Government has led to much discussion in the Press and otherwise, showing very great divergence of opinion. The Secretary of the Central Chamber of Agriculture is reported, upon the refusal of State assistance, to have advised a meeting of agriculturists not to increase their usual wheat area, on the ground (*inter alia*) that if the price of wheat should rise to any extent the Government would take power to commandeer all wheat at their own price. Another authority, a County Secretary for Agriculture, advises every farmer to grow as much wheat as he can, giving his reasons.

But a study of the widely differing published views upon this most vital, but difficult,

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question, discloses that there is apparently a lack of full knowledge of the essential facts and figures. This is not surprising, as the Official Statistics are not light literature, and the results are not handily summarised; and even old friends, such as the otherwise trusty "Whitaker," are not in this matter to be depended upon. As a consequence, the figures of production and destination are often innocently misstated by the public, and arguments based upon them fail. For example, an authority has recently made the astonishing statement that if the acreage under wheat in the country were doubled, we should produce ten months' supply and be nearly self-supporting, the fact being, as explained below, that we require to grow five times our present crop to achieve that result. Again, a leading article in a great London daily paper recently declared that about half of our wheat supply comes from the countries which are actually at war. In 1912 less than one-eleventh and in 1913 less than one-eighteenth came from these countries.

It is evident from such statements as these samples, which obtain wide publicity, and do

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not appear to be questioned, that the country should have attention drawn to the actual position. The prospects of our bread supply next year, and the policy best fitted to secure it at reasonable price, are matters of the most vital importance; but before they can be discussed the statistics must be considered and appreciated. Below are given some of the most salient figures, extracted or compiled from the Agricultural Statistics of our Board of Agriculture, the Statistical Abstracts, and the Bulletins of the International Institute of Agriculture. Except where otherwise stated, throughout this statement the average of the two years 1912 and 1913 is taken where possible, and where the Returns for either year are not yet available, the Official Estimates or the average figures of previous years are used. Rye, of course, forms a very large proportion (over 31%) of the total bread-corn grown. Fractions of thousands are omitted.

The average annual world's crop of wheat and rye, 1912-13, was 736,603,000 quarters (excluding a number of countries from which no reliable figures are obtainable), viz. :—

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		Quarters.	Per Cent. of Total.
Russia (including Finland)	231,832,000	..	31.5
Germany	75,389,000	..	10.3
Austria-Hungary ..	50,239,000	..	6.8
France	45,935,000	..	6.2
Belgium	4,387,000	..	.6
Servia	1,759,000	..	.2
<hr/>			
Total from Euro- pean area at pre- sent physically affected by the war	409,541,000	..	55.6
Italy.. ..	24,386,000	..	3.3
United Kingdom ..	7,131,000	..	1.0
Canada	27,248,000	..	3.7
India	44,399,000	..	6.0
Australia	12,830,000	..	1.7
New Zealand	718,000	..	.1
United States	96,169,000	..	13.1
Argentina	20,878,000	..	2.8
24 other Countries producing an aggre- gate of	93,303,000	..	12.7
<hr/>			
	736,603,000	..	100
<hr/>			

Of this great harvest of the wheat and rye of the world, nearly 737 million quarters, the bulk, 654 million quarters, is consumed in the countries where grown, and the balance, 82½ million quarters, or only 11.2% of the whole, is exported by those having that aggregate surplus to countries growing insufficient for their needs. It must be borne

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in mind that it is this surplus only, and not the whole crop, which is available for purchase by countries, such as ours, which rely on it to make good their deficiency in bread supply, and upon the ebb and flow of this annual surplus the price of our wheat depends.

Here are the round figures of the exports from those countries whose production exceeds consumption. Note how few these are. Exports of flour have been converted into their approximate equivalent in grain before milling. Quintals have been converted at the rate of 220 lbs.

20 lbs.		Average Nett Exports		Per Cent. of Total.
		Wheat and Rye, 1912-13. Quarters (of 480 lbs.).		
Russia	15,977,000	.. 19.38
Roumania	6,654,000	.. 8.06
United States	16,590,000	.. 20.11
Argentina	13,249,000	.. 16.06
Algeria	530,000	.. .64
Total Foreign		..	53,000,000	.. 64.25
Canada	16,000,000	.. 19.40
India	7,595,000	.. 9.21
Australia	5,870,000	.. 7.12
New Zealand	20,000	.. .02
Total British Pos- sessions		..	29,485,000	.. 35.75
Total Exports				
Wheat and Rye			82,485,000	.. 100

Small and irregular amounts are exported from a few other countries.

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Below is a summary of the destination of these exports, showing the chief countries which consume more than they grow, and the quantities and proportion taken by each :—

			Average Nett Imports Wheat and Rye, 1912-13. Quarters.		Per Cent. of Total.
Germany	5,617,000	..	6.81
Belgium	7,123,000	..	8.63
France	5,340,000	..	6.47
Austria-Hungary	50,000	..	.06
Total in War area			18,130,000	..	21.97
United Kingdom	28,923,000	..	35.06
Italy..	7,796,000	..	9.46
Netherlands	4,223,000	..	5.12
Switzerland	2,412,000	..	2.92
Denmark	1,851,000	..	2.24
Sweden	1,348,000	..	1.64
Egypt	1,120,000	..	1.36
All other importing countries in small lots, aggregating			16,682,000	..	20.23
Total Imports					
Wheat and Rye			82,485,000	..	100

In certain cases small re-exports might vary to a slight extent some of the above figures, but would not appreciably affect the position.

Attention is drawn to the very large proportion of the whole world's exportable surplus imported into this country, over 35% of the whole. Excluding the rye figures, we take over 36% of the world's exportable

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wheat ; no other single country takes more than one-fourth of the amount we import, except Italy, which just exceeds that proportion.

Of the 28,923,300 quarters of bread-corn so imported into the United Kingdom, only a very small amount consisted of rye, the average annual amount for the two years of the wheat imported (including flour in equivalent of grain) being 28,728,000 quarters. This came from :—

		Quarters.		Per Cent. of Total.
Russia	1,635,500	..	5.6
Germany	223,000	..	.8
France	114,000	..	.4
<hr/>				
Total from the fighting countries	1,972,500	..	6.8
Roumania	104,000	..	.4
United States	7,985,500	..	27.8
Argentina	3,960,000	..	13.8
Other Foreign countries (mostly non-European and re-exports) in small lots aggregating	394,000	..	1.5
<hr/>				
Total Foreign	14,416,000	..	50.3
<hr/>				
Canada	6,380,500	..	22.2
India	5,152,500	..	17.9
Australia	2,739,500	..	9.5
New Zealand	39,500	..	.1
<hr/>				
Total from British Possessions	14,312,000	..	49.7
<hr/>				
Total U.K. Wheat Imports	28,728,000	..	100
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Small amounts (included in above) came to us from France and Germany, though these are importing countries without surpluses for export. The same remark applies to still smaller amounts (included in "Other Foreign Countries") from Belgium and Austria-Hungary.

It will be noted that about 12-13ths of our wheat imports are of extra-European origin. On reference back to the previous table of total exports of the above countries, it will be seen that although we take very varying proportions of their whole exports, we get from our Dominions a larger proportion of their total exports than in the case of most of the foreign countries: for instance, about 5-7ths of India's exports came here, $\frac{1}{2}$ of the Australian, and $\frac{3}{8}$ ths of the Canadian, as against about 1-10th of the Russian exports, $\frac{1}{3}$ rd of the Argentine, and 1-64th of the Roumanian, though nearly $\frac{1}{2}$ of the United States' exports came here. The proportions we take of the whole crops of all are, of course, very much smaller than in above table, but are not material to this issue.

But it must be borne in mind that the figures of crop and consequently of imports and exports vary largely each year—in many countries the variation, owing to climatic conditions, is excessive—and for that reason

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the average of two years has been taken.

Taking the average crop of wheat of the United Kingdom for the two years, 7,131,000 quarters, and the imports, as above, 28,728,000, our total consumption is 35,859,000 quarters ; that is, we grow only 1-5th, and rely on finding grown for us outside these islands, and being able to purchase, 4-5ths of our bread supply, that quantity being 35% of the whole surplus supply available in normal times for the needs of all of the importing countries, including the United Kingdom, such surplus being only 11% of the normal world's crop.

In no other country of the world has the primary duty of seeing that the homeland produces as much as possible of the staff of life been so neglected. The position in normal times is dangerous enough ; but these are *abnormal* times, and the spectre of famine may quite possibly follow in the footsteps of this war. In the countries which have hitherto grown 55½% of the world's bread, practically the whole adult male populations, except the elderly and physically unfit, are not merely withdrawn from their agricultural and other pursuits, but they are engaged in doing their best to destroy the products of others. In addition, there is the enormous waste of stores always inseparable from war. Great numbers of the agricultural

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horses of the fighting countries are employed on the war, and will never return, and an ever-widening proportion of the tillage land of Europe is being ruined so far as the crop for 1915 is concerned; that crop, if and when it comes, and the war lasts, will be liable to devastation in all stages of its growth and storage. A considerable proportion of the farmers in the fighting area must be crippled financially, and many entirely ruined, and the whole financial situation must react on the cultivators. Germany and Austria-Hungary employ annually a very great quantity of nitrates and other foreign manures to aid the growth of their corn crops; in the case of Germany alone it is alleged that the imports of nitrate are about ten times as great as those of the United Kingdom; 33% of the total annual export of Chilian nitrate is normally taken by Germany, and 28% by the other belligerent powers. The holding up of these fertilisers cannot fail to prejudicially affect the yield next year.

For all these reasons, and others which will occur to readers, it seems fairly obvious that if the war lasts over the present sowing time, and even if it ceased now, there is certain to be a deficiency in the next harvest of the European fighting countries. If the war con-

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tinues over the spring, when a class of wheat can still be planted (though with a prospect inferior, except in Russia, to that of the autumn sown), so much the worse. The problem is, what may that deficiency be? No man can say. But if a reduction of only 10 per cent. in the crops of Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France and Servia, and of 50 per cent. in the small Belgium production takes place, that reduction, on the basis of the average of the harvests of 1912-13, would amount to the huge total of 42,708,900 quarters, or more than half the exportable surplus of the world. Maybe such an estimate of loss is excessive; quite possibly it may prove, under developments which no man can foresee, to be totally inadequate. There is no experience on which to base calculations in face of the present unparalleled situation, but the Somerset County Secretary for Agriculture has recently stated in the Press that he considers the warring nations will find the utmost difficulty in producing in 1915 one-half of their usual crop. If so, there will, of course, be famine, not mere scarcity and price upheaval.

In the event of only a modest 10 per cent. all round deficiency in the fighting countries, Russia would become an importer instead of exporter, every nation in Europe which felt

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any risk of scarcity would prohibit corn exports, and, unless we grew much more, we, with our huge requirement of 29,000,000 quarters per annum, should experience such a fierce competition for grain among the nations of the world, other than the Transatlantic and Southern Hemisphere exporters, as would drive prices up to levels such as would perhaps make it impossible for the small wage-earners of this country, who are in the enormous majority, to buy their bread, and the risk of civil commotion would be great ; we should want three-fourths of the exporters' surplus.

There is no real alternative to the use of bread among the masses ; substitutes to a moderate extent could be found, but all such substitutes might be expected to rise in price more or less proportionately with bread.

It should never be forgotten that in 1812, during the Napoleonic Wars, at a time when it is believed we grew here our full annual requirements instead of only one-fifth as at present, the average price of wheat for the year was 126s. 6d. per quarter, nearly three and a half times the present price.

(Of course, if we lose command of the Atlantic, all would speedily be over, but this is not the place to discuss such a contingency.)

What can be done to lessen this risk ?

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Storage in advance of any great bulk, with the necessity for constant fresh purchases, and sale of the stale grain, is impracticable, as every one who has handled bulks of corn in such a climate as ours knows. Proper storage accommodation would also have to be provided or hired at great cost. Besides, the grain could not be got in any quantity, except at the cost of raising present prices unduly.

If we could arrange that the whole surplus of Empire-grown wheat (instead of about one-half as at present) should come here, and none of it go to the other importing countries, it will be seen, on reference to above figures, that we should, if our Dominions' harvests were maintained, just get enough; but such a scheme, which has advocates, seems chimerical, and, if adopted, the Dominions might experience difficulty in settling their accounts on balance with other nations supplying them with necessary goods. There would be risk enough even under such an arrangement, for the harvests of Canada, India and Australia are liable to extraordinary fluctuations, such as are never experienced here. For instance, it was announced in a telegram from the Canadian Department of Trade and Commerce, published on September 16th last, that owing to heat and drought the estimated production of wheat in Canada for 1914 would show a deficiency of

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no less than 9,007,000 quarters compared with the yield of 1913, a deficiency equal to more than one-half the total average Canadian export of the previous two years. This liability to heavy fluctuation in yield applies also to many foreign countries; a case in point is the Argentine, where in some provinces the yield last harvest only reached about 50 per cent. of expectation.

The one certain method of alleviating the risk of shortage is to grow more wheat in this Kingdom. In order to produce on the spot *all* our requirements for 1915-16 we should require to raise five times the wheat at present grown, and that of course would not be done, except under compulsion. But there are no insuperable reasons, though many difficulties exist, why a very greatly increased area should not be devoted to wheat. In the United Kingdom we had under cultivation in 1913, excluding permanent grass land, just under 20,000,000 acres. Of this area only 1,790,376 acres were under wheat—less than one-tenth. In 1866, the earliest year of the official statistics, we grew 3,661,351 acres of wheat, more than double the 1913 area, with only two-thirds of the population to feed. The average price that year was 49s. 11d. per quarter. Why has our wheat area so fallen off? There are many reasons, but the chief, of course, is that

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the economic policy of this country, the persistency with which the interests of the producers have been entirely subordinated to those of the consumers, who form the majority, has made the farmers realise that it is not to their interest to gamble in the price of wheat, which is entirely regulated by the foreign crops, and was for many years so low that wheat could not be grown here at a profit. In 1894 the average price of British wheat for the year was only 22s. 10d. per quarter. The farmer has turned his attention to oats and barley crops with less precarious prospects. He is raising also other crops of fodder, meat, milk, etc., which it can be proved do not add so much to the prosperity of the nation as wheat, though, with their reduced cost for labour, they pay him personally better. That, however, is a long story, and this is no place for it. But it is a troublesome matter for the farmer to put in more wheat, involving the recasting of his plans, which have to be made well ahead so that his succession of fodder crops for his stock may be assured.

However, there are indications that the British farmers will this season plant a somewhat larger area of wheat in spite of the difficulties caused by the commandeering of horses, and the reduction of the labour supply by enlistment. If the farmer can be satisfied

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that instead of gambling in wheat futures he can be reasonably secured against loss of the profits (and they are small enough) he would otherwise expect, and of capital, he will be only too glad to give all his help. It has been urged that he should be guaranteed a fixed minimum price for his 1915 wheat crop. That might meet the case, but such a course is open to much reasonable official objection, though it may be desirable or necessary. It would involve either fixing beforehand some arbitrary price, or the agreeing to take as basis the price at some given date next autumn, or the average price over a period of next year. Difficulties would probably arise in settling on what basis the farmer should get his guaranteed difference, questions of estimated yield, etc., unless he threshed out and marketed all his wheat at once, and that might only add to the difficulties of the national food supply at a later stage.

But why cannot the Government cut the knot of all these complications at one blow, and agree to pay a definite bonus *per acre* upon the land seeded to wheat this year in excess of that of the previous year? The machinery for settlement under such a scheme is already partly in existence. Every farmer returned last June to the Board of Agriculture a statement, which would prove to be reason-

The War and the World's Wheat

ably accurate, of his wheat acreage. He will do the same next June, and the official local investigators, who handle these Returns in the first instance, could with a minimum of trouble and expense verify them. Quite a moderate bounty per extra acre would secure great results, it is certain. Perhaps, if thought fit, no bounty need be given upon the first 10% extra wheat acreage; the farmer would probably take that risk, and the extra trouble and difficulties involved in altering his scheme of culture. Preferably a sliding scale of bounty should be arranged, giving better terms for each increase of, say, 10% above the minimum acreage ranking for the bounty. If a Committee of responsible farmers could confer at once with the Government officials such a scheme could be arranged at a cost small out of all proportion to the extra security for the bread supply and for its reasonable price given to the nation; and if perchance the result should be the doubling or trebling of our wheat area, a great stride forward would have been made. Half a loaf is better than no bread; 2-5ths or 3-5ths of home production in these times is infinitely better than 1-5th.

It is not so widely known as it should be that the yield per acre of wheat in this country exceeds that of any other, except Denmark,

The Risks of a Shortage Next Harvest

Holland and Belgium, neither of which devotes a large proportion of their land to this crop. The average yield per acre in this country is $32\frac{3}{4}$ bushels, in Germany 30 bushels, France $19\frac{1}{2}$ bushels, Austro-Hungary 18, Russia $9\frac{1}{2}$, United States $13\frac{1}{2}$, Argentina $10\frac{1}{2}$, Canada $18\frac{1}{2}$, and Australia and India $11\frac{1}{2}$ bushels respectively. It is pointed out above that in this country only 1-10th of the total arable land is employed in growing bread-corn. Notwithstanding the inferior yields, in Germany, France and Austro-Hungary the proportion so employed is about 1-3rd, in Russia 11-20ths, in United States (excluding cotton land) 1-5th, in Argentina 2-5ths, in Canada 5-12ths, in Australia 3-4ths, and in India (including rice land as arable) 1-10th.

If our acreage of wheat can be increased, it might be partly by using land intended for oats. The farmer has good ground for his faith in this crop. The world's annual produce of oats, in quarters (though not in weight), equals that of wheat, but a far larger proportion of this great oat crop is used for home consumption where grown than in the case of wheat and rye—less than 3%, or an average of nearly $15\frac{1}{2}$ million quarters per annum for the two years 1912-13, being exported, against over 11% in the case of wheat and rye. This perhaps largely accounts for the greater

The War and the World's Wheat

stability of the market price of oats from year to year, and in face of ordinary crises and shortages. But while the "Gazette" price of British wheat (week ended October 16th, 1914) shows a rise of 18.3% on the previous year's price, that of oats shows a rise of 25.7. It is not necessary to speculate as to the causes of this, but it may be observed that nearly $\frac{1}{3}$ rd of the total average exports of oats for 1912-13 from all the surplus-producing countries, and the same proportion of our own imports, came from Russia and Germany. Whatever may be the grounds for the faith that is in them, British farmers feel that to sow wheat on their land otherwise intended for oats may entail some sacrifice. We grew in 1913 just under 4,000,000 acres of oats, yielding a crop of about 20,000,000 quarters. Of this acreage about one-half was in Scotland and Ireland, on land much of which is unsuited for wheat. We imported only 6,381,000 quarters (calculating the official figures, given in cwts., at 40 lbs. per bushel). This excludes our importation of oatmeal and groats, which, in equivalent of grain, would not exceed 500,000 quarters. Canada grows nearly the same acreage of oats as of wheat, and only about 1-5th of her arable land is not growing one of these crops. To enable Canada to grow appreciably more wheat the

The Risks of a Shortage Next Harvest

paying oat crop would have to be reduced.

It may not be out of place to point out that whatever may be put forward in favour of the small-holdings policy from some points of view, every farmer knows that it must be detrimental to our national wheat culture, for reasons too many to be here entered upon.

Any action taken must be immediate to be effective, as seed time is upon us. This is no time to rest on precedent, for the crisis is unprecedented, as has already been well recognised by the Government in the case of the railways, and of sugar.

As Lord Milner truly says, a great responsibility rests on the farmers. But a greater rests on the Government.

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October 19th, 1914.

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FIGHTING A PHILOSOPHY

I

SOME people who profess to know Germany well are trying to make out that the temper of the ruling caste has not been influenced in any considerable degree by Friedrich Nietzsche. They point out that Treitschke, whose influence has certainly been enormous, would have nothing to say to Nietzsche, whom he trenchantly described as 'a madman, bitten to the marrow by the *folie des grandeurs*'. They prove that Nietzsche repaid the Professor's contempt with interest. They show without difficulty that Nietzsche's writings abound in sentiments which cannot be pleasing in high quarters, that he was no flatterer of the Hohenzollerns, and that he even, on occasion, criticized the German character and culture and disparaged the State. How, they ask, can the author of such heresies, the man who claimed the title of 'Good European' in contradistinction to Prussian Patriot, be thought to have inspired the makers of the present war?

If we take the 'ruling caste' in a strict and narrow sense, it is very likely true that its members are not much addicted to the study of Nietzsche. One cannot imagine the Kaiser, for instance, giving his days and nights to *Zarathustra*. Nevertheless the exact agreement between the precepts of Nietzsche and the policy and practice of Germany cannot possibly be a matter of chance. There is not a move of modern Prussian statecraft, not an action of the German army since the

outbreak of the war, that could not be justified by scores of texts from the Nietzschean scriptures. In many cases, no doubt, it would also be possible to find texts of an opposite tendency; for few philosophical rhapsodists have been more fertile than Nietzsche in self-contradictions. But the dominant ideas of his philosophy, the ideas most frequently and emphatically expressed,—the ideas, in a word, that get home to the mind of nine readers out of ten—are precisely those which might be water-marked on the protocol-paper of German diplomacy and embroidered on the banners of German militarism.¹ This is certainly no mere coincidence.

It is no doubt the case that, among active politicians, Treitschke has had much more direct influence than Nietzsche. Moreover it would be an error to regard either writer as a true originator of the ideas associated with his name. They are not the causes, but rather the most conspicuous symptoms, of the modern German temper. They are co-ordinate effects of that great disaster to civilization, the war of 1870. The German people were 'overtaken', as our forefathers used to say, with the inebriation of victory, and the writings of the two German-Poles reek of its fumes. Each in his own way—the one with an imposing air of stolid sanity, the other with a freakish emphasis of insanity that for some time hindered his acceptance—they constructed a theoretical justification of the practical example of triumphant force that had startled and fascinated the world. Bismarck is the true author, no less of Nietzsche's philosophy, than of Treitschke's history. Nietzsche, of

¹ Bernhardt's notorious *Germany and the next War* bears on its title-page the motto from Nietzsche: 'War and courage have done greater things than love of one's neighbour. Not your pity but your bravery has hitherto saved the unfortunate.'

course, would have denied it with imprecations, but it is none the less true. Treitschke more or less consciously, and Nietzsche more or less unconsciously, gave articulate voice to the colossal swagger in stone and bronze with which the record of 1870 is written all over Germany.

Owing to the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine—as to which even Bismarck had misgivings—it became a political necessity to perpetuate and live up to the gospel of power. The present war is the logical outcome of the material and spiritual forces set in motion in 1871; and Nietzsche, more or less unconsciously I repeat, has provided for the average, intelligent, uncritical public—the Culture-Philistines as he himself called them—a philosophic justification of the spiritual development. That is where his direct influence is surely unmistakeable. The ruling caste troubles little about philosophic justification; but the average man hugs to his heart the philosopher's violently dogmatic asseverations, in semi-biblical rhythms, that force, rapacity, unscrupulousness, pitilessness, are indispensable parts of the higher ethics of the future. By proving that conscience, as a whole, is a despicable survival of 'slave morality', Nietzsche offers a potent anodyne to uneasy consciences. Is it to be doubted that millions of Germans¹ have recourse to this soothing drug when some trait of political or military 'master morality' affects them with a momentary qualm?

It may be argued that the Germans who enlist Nietzsche on the side of Prussian Imperialism flagrantly misread him. That is possible; but the trouble is that no human being can say how he is to be read aright.

¹ Nietzsche's works have had an enormous sale during the past twenty years, and the influence of his trenchant phrases of course extends far beyond the circle of those who have actually studied his works.

To extract a coherent system from his contradictions is impossible. He recklessly flung forth wave upon wave of thought : those waves which were tuned to harmony with the prevailing vibrations of the national spirit carried their message far and wide ; those which were not keyed to the right pitch were idly dissipated in space. Wherever his ideas are clear, definite, and easily translated into action, they are aggressively inhuman ; wherever they stray in the direction of humanity (as, for instance, in the conception of a united Europe), they are vague, visionary, and irreconcilable with the general trend of his doctrine.

‘ Shall I prove to you ’, says Dr. Oscar Levy, who seems to be accepted by the English Nietzscheans as little less than a reincarnation of the master spirit, ‘ Shall I prove to you that a new philosophy may be a more powerful enemy than all the navies in the world ? ’ The proof is now being attempted on a world-wide scale. Whether it will reach its Q.E.D. remains to be seen ; but if not the most powerful thing on earth, the Nietzschean philosophy is certainly one of the most redoubtable.

Dr. Levy wrote in 1906. Gerhart Hauptmann, in 1914, boasts that *Zarathustra* is one of the classics which the cultured German soldier carries in his knapsack—the others being Homer, *Faust*, and the Bible. To judge by results, we may say with confidence ‘ The greatest of these is *Zarathustra* ’.

II

Let me now show by a few quotations how strong is Nietzsche’s claim to a posthumous Iron Cross of the first class, as the inspired apologist and eulogist in advance of Germany’s assault upon all that the non-Nietzschean understands as civilization. My quotations shall be

chosen from the four works of his complete maturity—written at a time when his ideas had attained their full development, yet before any unmistakeable symptoms of insanity had set in. They are *The Joyful Wisdom*, *Thus spake Zarathustra*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, and *The Genealogy of Morals*. As Nietzsche seldom pursued a sustained argument, but chose rather to write in staccato aphorisms, he suffers less than almost any other author by the detachment of quotations from their context. In no case, so far as I am aware, does the context of the following passages modify their meaning in any favourable sense: From other portions of his writings, inconsistent and even contradictory passages might no doubt be selected; but, as I have already pointed out, they are far vaguer, far feebler, far less characteristic. It may safely be asserted that the Nietzschean thought-germs which inhere and rankle are those which are barbed with inhumanity.

If we look for the key-note of the whole war, where shall we find it but in this aphorism :

The time for petty politics is past : next century ¹ will bring the struggle for World-Dominion—the compulsion to great politics. (*Beyond Good and Evil*, § 208.)

It is perhaps worth noting that the term rendered ‘World-Dominion’ is not ‘Welt-Herrschaft’, which might be taken in a more or less figurative sense, but ‘Erd-Herrschaft’, dominion over the earth or globe.² Can it be doubted that such a philosophic-historic

¹ Written in the eighteen-eighties.

² In another place Nietzsche writes : ‘The refrain of my practical philosophy is, “Who is to be master of the world ?”’—and this phrase is taken by one of his English disciples as the title of a book expounding the Zarathustrian gospel.

prophecy, reverberated a thousandfold during the past twenty years, is calculated to bring about its own fulfilment, and that millions of minds in Germany have been steeped in the idea that their racial mission was, in the next war, to secure such a rearrangement of the world

As should to all their days and nights to come
Give solely sovereign sway and masterdom ?

Now let us look for the moral arguments whereby it is declared not only permissible but imperative to inflict any amount of agony upon mankind in pursuit of your self-aggrandizement, or, more technically, in gratification of your Will to Power. Here a dual principle is invoked : first, that what moralists have pusillanimously called ' evil ' is just as necessary a factor in evolution as what they have called ' good ' ; second, that ' good ' and ' evil ' are mere question-begging terms, cunningly employed by groups of men in order to prejudice other groups of men, whose Will to Power runs counter to their own. The following are a few of the numberless passages in which these ideas are developed :

Hatred, mischievousness, rapacity, love of domination, and whatever else is called evil, belong to the astounding economy of race-conservation—a costly, wasteful, very foolish economy, indeed, but *demonstrably* one which has hitherto conserved our species. (*The Joyful Wisdom*, § 1.)

According to this [the English] theory, the term ' good ' is applied to whatever tends to race-conservation, the term ' evil ' to whatever tends in the opposite direction. But in truth the evil impulses are just as expedient, race-conserving and indispensable as the good—only their method of action is different. (*The Joyful Wisdom*, § 4.)

It may seem incredible that such transparent sophistries should for a moment impose on intelligent people ;

but that they have done and still do so is unfortunately beyond dispute. The idea is expanded in the following passages :

We . . . believe that [man's] Will to Life had to be intensified into unconditional Will to Power : we hold that hardness, violence, slavery, danger in the street and in the heart, secrecy, stoicism, arts of temptation and devilry of all kinds : that everything evil, terrible, tyrannical, wild-beast-like and serpent-like in man, contributes to the elevation of the species ' man ' just as much as its opposite—and in saying this we do not even say enough. (*Beyond Good and Evil*, § 44.)

To refrain from mutual injury, from violence, from exploitation, to reduce one's will to a level with that of others ; this may, in a certain rough sense, be reckoned as good conduct between individuals when the necessary conditions are present (that is to say, an actual similarity in strength and worth, and a participation in some common citizenship). But as soon as an attempt is made to carry this principle further, and even to find in it *the fundamental principle of society*, it discloses itself as what it is—namely, a Will to the *denial* of life, a principle of dissolution and decay. Here one must . . . resist all sentimental weakness : life is *in its essence* appropriation, injury, the overpowering of whatever is foreign to us and weaker than ourselves, suppression, hardness, the forcing upon others of our own forms, the incorporation of others, or, at the very least and mildest, their exploitation. (*Beyond Good and Evil*, § 259.)

Verily, even for what is evil there is still a future ! And the hottest south hath not yet been discovered for man.

How much passes now for the height of evil that is only twelve shoes broad and three months long ! But one day mightier dragons will come into the world.

For in order that the Superman may not lack his dragon, the Superdragon that is worthy of him, much hot sunshine must blaze over the reeking jungle !

Out of your wild cats tigers must grow and crocodiles

out of your poison-toads : for the good hunter shall have a good hunt.

And verily, ye good and just ! much in you is laughable, and most of all your fear of what hath hitherto been called ' devil ' !

.

This is my doubt regarding you, and the source of my secret mirth : I guess that you will call my Superman—devil ! (*Zarathustra* : ' Of Human Shrewdness '.)

The dear sympathetic soul wishes to help, and gives no thought to the fact that misfortune is a personal necessity : that, both for me and you, terror, renunciation, impoverishment, sleepless nights, adventures, perils and mistakes are as necessary as their opposites, and that even, to put it mystically, the path to one's own heaven always leads through the raptures of one's own hell. (*The Joyful Wisdom*, § 338.)

If these reflections had been jotted on the tablets of a philosophic Tartar in the camp of Tamburlaine they need have occasioned no surprise ; but in fact they are addressed by an ex-professor of philology, at the end of the nineteenth century, to a people which boasts itself the most cultured in the world. Is it possible to ignore the direct relation between them and the bludgeoning of Belgium, to look no further in the German programme ? How many Germans, I wonder, have soothed the pricks of conscience with this satanic optimism, and told themselves that Belgium's path to heaven lay through the raptures (*Wollust*) of Louvain, Malines, and Aerschot ? That Nietzsche was sincere, in his brainsick fashion, there can be no doubt : but the moment you think of applying such principles in justification of actual deeds of brutality, they have a sickening air of cant whereof one would imagine that even the German mind could not be wholly unconscious.

Now for a passage in which it is proved that ' good '

and 'evil' are exactly the same thing, viewed from the standpoint of masters and slaves respectively, the 'evil' of the humble and downtrodden being the 'good' of the proud and domineering :

How different is the sense of the two words 'bad' (*schlecht*) and 'evil' (*böse*)! They are both apparently opposed to the same idea, 'good': but *not* to the same conception of good. Let us ask ourselves who is actually the 'evil' man, from the point of view of the resentment morality [the morality of the slaves]? To answer in all strictness: it is precisely the 'good' man of the other morality, precisely the noble, the powerful, the dominating man, but reversely coloured, reversely interpreted, reversely regarded by the envenomed eye of resentment. Let us in nowise deny that he who learns to know these 'good' men only as enemies, learns to know only *evil enemies*. Those very men who are so strictly kept within bounds by good manners, respect, usage, gratitude and still more by mutual watchfulness, by jealousy *inter pares*, who, moreover, in their behaviour to one another show themselves so inventive in consideration, self-control, delicacy, loyalty, pride and friendship—those very men are to the outside world, to things foreign and to foreign countries, little better than so many uncaged beasts of prey. Here they enjoy liberty from all social restraint . . . they revert to the beast of prey's innocence of conscience, and become rejoicing monsters, who perhaps go on their way, after a hideous sequence of murder, conflagration, violation, torture, with as much gaiety and equanimity as if they had merely taken part in some student gambols . . . Deep in the nature of all these noble races there lurks unmistakably the beast of prey, the *blond beast*, lustfully roving in search of booty and victory. From time to time, the beast demands an outlet, an escape, a return to the wilderness. (*Genealogy of Morals*, i. 11.)

One cannot but conceive that the German Nietzschean of to-day must find this passage a little inconveniently

frank, and must wish that the master had not been quite so explicit on the subject of the ' blond beast '. As for the non-Nietzschean, who argues *a priori* that the German army cannot have been guilty of barbarous excesses, because it contains a large percentage of cultured and kindly men to whom brutality is odious, they must surely feel some slight uneasiness when it is pointed out that the popular philosopher of the day, the man whose works the cultured soldier carries in his knapsack, sets it down as a characteristic of the victorious and ' dominating ' warrior that he should regard murder, violation and torture ¹ as ' student gambols '. If it be said that such writing is not sane, and cannot be seriously accepted by sane men as a rule of conduct, I agree to the first proposition, but demur to the second. This philosophy of the aristocratic ' blond beast ' is quite seriously regarded as an epoch-making revelation by men who (though I should be sorry to guarantee the quality of their intelligence) cannot be set down as positively insane.

Let us look, now, at some other characteristics of the aristocratic race, for whose sake the world exists—the soil from which the Superman is, in the fullness of time, to spring :

The essential point in a good and healthy aristocracy is that it shall *not* regard itself as a function (whether of the kingship or of the commonwealth), but as their *meaning* and highest justification—that it should therefore accept with a good conscience the sacrifice of untold numbers of men and women, who *for its sake*

¹ I do not imply belief in the worst crimes laid to the charge of the German soldiery. We know that hideous fables have been put about by heated imagination and mischievous mendacity. But there is not the least doubt that the principle of deliberate ' frightfulness ' has, in the general treatment of Belgium and northern France, been carried to shocking extremes.

must be depressed and reduced to imperfect human beings, to slaves, to instruments. Its fundamental belief must be precisely that society ought *not* to exist for its own sake, but only as a basis and scaffolding on which a selected race of beings may be able to elevate themselves to their higher mission, and in general to a higher *existence*. (*Beyond Good and Evil*, § 258.)

The noble type of man feels *himself* to be the determiner of values; he looks for no approval from others, but takes his stand on the judgement, 'What is hurtful to me is hurtful in itself'; he knows it to be his prerogative to confer honour on things, to be a *creator of values*. . . . A ruling-class morality is, however, particularly strange and disagreeable to the prevailing taste of the day, by reason of the sternness of its principle that one has duties only to one's equals: that one may act towards beings of a lower order, and towards everything that is foreign, just as seems good to one . . . and in any case 'beyond good and evil'. (*Beyond Good and Evil*, § 260.)

If we did not know that this was written more than a quarter of a century ago, might we not suppose it a fresh-coined paradox, designed to justify retrospectively the Prussian policy of 1914? The great German state 'has duties only to its equals'; but as it has no equals, it follows that it has no duties. Especially to Belgium, a 'foreign' state 'of a lower order', it is more than justified in behaving with a total disregard of moral prejudices. If the philosophical education of that hapless little country had not been neglected, she would have bethought her of the following 'principle', and let Germany trample over her unopposed:

At risk of wounding innocent ears, I lay down the principle that egoism is of the essence of the noble soul, I mean the immovable belief that to a being such as 'we are' other beings are by nature subject,

and are bound to sacrifice themselves. (*Beyond Good and Evil*, § 265.)

Belgium ought to have felt honoured by the opportunity of effacing herself at the command of the 'noble' German egoism; but, alas! her pitiful 'slave morality' prompted her to die rather than renounce her rights and obligations at the nod of the 'blond beast, lustfully roving in search of booty and victory'. In another place Nietzsche provides us with a still more striking image for the German spirit of domination. If Belgium had only kept the following pretty little fable before her eyes, she might have been more amenable to reason:

That the lambs should bear a grudge against the great birds of prey, is in no way surprising; but that is no reason why we should blame the great birds of prey for picking up the little lambs. And if the lambs say among themselves, 'These birds of prey are evil; and whoso is as unlike as possible to a bird of prey, and as like as possible to its opposite, a lamb, shall we not call him good?' one can have no objection to the setting up of such an ideal, except that the birds of prey are likely to regard it rather mockingly, and say 'We bear no grudge against these good lambs; on the contrary, we love them—for nothing is more to our taste than a tender lamb'. To demand of strength that it should *not* manifest itself as strength, that it should *not* be a will for overcoming, for overthrowing, for mastery, a thirst for enemies and struggles and triumphs, is as absurd as to demand of weakness that it should manifest itself as strength. (*Genealogy of Morals*, i. 13.)

If Nietzsche were now alive, would he, I wonder, have sufficient detachment of spirit to realize that recent events have falsified his last illustration, and shown that there is nothing absurd in the idea of weakness manifesting itself as strength? What else has Belgium done? Her weakness has been transmuted into strength by the

power of a heroic spirit and an intense indignation. By any standard not purely material and mechanical, it is Belgium, not Germany, that is to-day the 'noble', the 'aristocrat', the 'creator of values'.

As for general exhortations to war and denunciations of the spirit of pity, of humanity, of gentleness, of justice, it is difficult to select from their abundance. Here is a prophecy the fulfilment of which Germany is obediently endeavouring to bring about, though we trust she may be ultimately baffled :

We owe it to Napoleon . . . that several warlike centuries, unexampled in history, are now likely to follow one another, in short, that we have entered upon *the classical age of war*, of scientific and yet popular war on the grandest scale . . . to which all coming millenniums will look back with envy and reverence, as to an ideal realized. (*The Joyful Wisdom*, § 362.)

The same ideas inspire the following passage, which contains the most famous, and, indeed, the finest, of all Nietzsche's maxims :

I rejoice in all signs that a more manly, more warlike age is beginning, which will, before all things, bring bravery once more into repute ! For it must prepare the way for a still loftier age, and store up the forces necessary to it—that age which shall carry heroism into the domain of knowledge, and *wage wars* on behalf of ideas and their consequences . . . Believe me ! the secret of extracting the greatest profit and enjoyment from existence is this : *live dangerously* ! Build your cities on Vesuvius ! Launch your ships on uncharted seas ! Live at war with your equals and with yourselves ! Be robbers and conquerors, ye enlightened ones, so long as ye cannot be rulers and possessors. (*The Joyful Wisdom*, § 283.)

Apart from its context, the exhortation to 'live dangerously' sounds generous and noble. It is indeed the

finer sort of men who love 'the bright face of danger', and choose for themselves the tasks, duties and adventures from which those of softer fibre shrink. Life is full of opportunities for this type of man to enjoy the exhilaration of peril, either in the service of others, or at all events under conditions which involve neither tyranny nor cruelty. But how the splendour of the saying fades when we find that it is not the danger of the lifeboat-man, the explorer, the mountaineer that Nietzsche has in mind, but the danger of the bully and the bravo! It is not by preserving others from danger, but by inflicting it on them (of course with injustice, rapine, and cruelty in its train) that the adept of this gospel is to 'extract the greatest profit and enjoyment from existence'.

The reader may possibly feel that such passages cannot have been intended to be read literally—that they must be taken as figurative utterances, having reference to some spiritual plane of existence on which robbery and conquest, rapine and cruelty, mean something very different from what they mean on the common earth. It is true that Nietzsche mixes up the literal and the figurative in the most reckless way. In many of his most characteristic outpourings he himself would probably have been at a loss to tell whether he meant what he said, or something quite different. It is unfortunate that, during his lifetime, criticism simply ignored his writings, and no attempt was made to cross-examine him, to pin him down to definite meanings, to confront him with the consequences of his doctrines, if read in their plain and obvious sense. He enjoyed the irresponsibility conferred by neglect; and this is precisely what renders his 'aphorisms' so dangerous. Literally interpreted, they would lead straight back to chaos; even his most ardent disciples must, at many points, read

him in a figurative sense ; but they are perfectly free to take his words literally whenever it suits them—as Germany is doing at the present moment.

Such an ambiguity encounters us in the following famous passage :

My brethren in war ! I love you from my heart's heart. . . . Therefore let me tell you the truth !

I know the hate and envy of your heart. Ye are not great enough not to know hate and envy, Then be great enough not to be ashamed of them.

Ye shall be of those whose eye is ever seeking an enemy—*your* enemy. And some of you know hatred at first sight.

Ye shall seek your enemy, ye shall wage your war, and wage it for your thoughts. And, if your thought be overthrown, your honesty shall none the less shout Victory !

Ye shall love peace as a means to new wars. And the short peace better than the long.

I do not counsel you to work, but to fight. I do not counsel you to peace, but to conquest. Let your work be a battle, your peace a victory.

Ye say, a good cause will hallow even war ? I say unto you ! it is the good war that halloweth every cause. (*Zarathustra* : 'Of War and Warriors'.)

One of these verses (the fourth) may at a pinch be read as referring to intellectual rather than physical conflicts. It must be in a war of ideas, not in a struggle for material advantage, that the vanquished is adjured to shout 'Victory !'—that is, to admit that truth has triumphed though he himself be overthrown.¹ But though this

¹ It may be said that this interpretation is inconsistent with Nietzsche's general attitude towards the concept 'truth'. But in what other sense are we to read the passage ? Thought can only be overthrown by more valid thought ; and is not validity the Nietzschean test of truth ?

verse is, strictly speaking, irreconcilable with the idea of strife in its literal, physical sense, the whole passage has always been, and cannot but be, interpreted as a eulogy of war precisely as it is waged by the Prussian General Staff.

The ambiguity, nay contradiction, in the terms of this passage is only an example of Nietzsche's intellectual unscrupulousness. He did not take the pains to think his thoughts out, to carry them forward to their consequences, to assure himself of their real meaning and implication. So long as they were sufficiently violent and inhuman, he flung them forth recklessly, with no care for the consequences. Why, indeed, should we look for any intellectual conscience in a man who held evil to be 'just as expedient, race-conserving, and indispensable' as good ?

Before concluding this section, let me cite one or two miscellaneous passages about which there is no ambiguity whatever. The page containing the following text must doubtless have been well thumbed by those apostles of culture in Belgium who carried *Zarathustra* in their knapsacks :

I warn you against pity : from it will one day arise a heavy cloud for men. Verily, I am weatherwise !

But take heed also to this saying : All great love is still above its pity : for it desires to create the object of its love.

'Myself I sacrifice to my love, and my neighbour as myself'—so runs the speech of all creators.

For all creators are hard.

(*Zarathustra*, 'Of the Pitiful'.)

Germany was seeking to create a new, a German, Belgium ; and 'all creators are hard'. Should she succeed, however, the enslaved Belgians need not fear inter-

ference with their cherished Catholicism ; for thus saith the Nietzschean evangel :

For the strong and independent, prepared and predestined to command, in whom the judgement and skill of a ruling race is incarnated, religion is one more means of overcoming resistance to the exercise of authority : it is a common bond between the rulers and the ruled, betraying and surrendering to the former the conscience of the latter, the secrets of their inmost heart, which would prompt them to renounce obedience. (*Beyond Good and Evil*, § 61.)

Here, again, is an aphorism which Germany has taken quite literally, and has resolutely put in practice :

We need a transvaluation of values, under the new pressure and impact of which conscience shall be steeled and the heart transmuted to bronze, so as to bear the weight of such a responsibility. (*Beyond Good and Evil*, § 203.)

Finally, that our suffragist friends may be in no doubt as to what awaits them, if the spirit of Nietzsche wins in this war, let me remind them of the following oft-quoted texts :

Man shall be trained for war, and woman for the solace of the warrior. Everything else is folly.

Thou goest to women ? Forget not thy whip.
(*Zarathustra* : ' Of Old and Young Womankind '.)

III

I submit that, when a body of doctrine is known to have countless adherents in the country of its origin, and when the political and military conduct of the country is found to be in every detail exactly consonant with that doctrine, we cannot possibly resist the

clusion that it is one of the factors which render such conduct possible. In this case, as I have already suggested, it is a symptom as well as a cause. Nietzsche certainly did not beget the German frame of mind. But what can be more evident than that he has fomented and stimulated it, providing it with a philosophic background, and bringing Prussian Junkerdom into line with a congenially swaggering theory of the universe? He has hitched Mark Brandenburg to the stars in their courses.

What then are we to say of this philosophy? Is it a sane, a wholesome, a tenable theory of life? Is it desirable that the world of the future should be shaped in accordance with its dictates?

Let us first note that it is, above everything, a temperament-philosophy, a transcript of character. Henrik Ibsen, in a well-known epigram, has said, 'To poetize (*dichten*) is to hold judgement-day upon oneself.' Nietzsche, on the other hand, might have said 'To philosophize is to effect one's own apotheosis.' He admits as much, in more than one passage, saying, for example, 'the greater part of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly influenced by his instincts'.

Now the determining factor in Nietzsche's mental habit is certainly to be found in his persistent ill health. From early manhood onward, he was a chronic sufferer, with only occasional intervals of tolerable bodily comfort. A doctor, seeking to prove that the root of his malady was neglected eye-strain, has drawn up, from his correspondence and other sources, an appalling catalogue of his illnesses. One of his most frequent afflictions was violent headache with vomiting, which used often to last for many days on end. Those of us who are at all subject to sick headache know that a few hours of it are sufficient

to bring us to the verge of suicide, and that two or three recurrences of it in a year are a serious trial to an otherwise healthy man. There were long periods in Nietzsche's life when his days of anguish seem to have outnumbered his days of comparative ease. It is to me incredible that these persistent headaches were not premonitions of his ultimate insanity.¹ His father died insane; and though an attempt is made to attribute his breakdown entirely to some accidental lesion, the coincidence is, to say the least of it, curious.¹ But, putting aside the question of mental disease, we are certainly entitled to say that a man who was such a martyr to physical disease in the region of the brain was unlikely to take a very normal and healthy view of life. His mental attitude could not but be in some measure warped.

And warped it was, in a curious but quite comprehensible way. Nietzsche, like Robert Louis Stevenson—an almost exact contemporary who probably never heard of him—was driven by reaction against his bodily frailties into an imaginary attitude of aggressive robustness, of overpowering health, of ostentatious virility. Both men were in reality very brave, very stoical; and as Nietzsche's maladies seem to have been more painful, more depressing, than Stevenson's, his is perhaps the greater merit. But in both men the effort to react against what Cassius calls 'accidental evils' led to a certain loss of equilibrium, an over-emphasis of fortitude. In Stevenson's case the lack of balance was very slight, and tended to disappear as time went on. It is only in

¹ In August 1887, two years before his final breakdown, Nietzsche himself said to his friend Deussen: 'I am now at about the age at which my father died, and I feel that I shall succumb to the same trouble (*Leiden*).'

his early years that we find him a little shrill in his praises of the world as a ' brave gymnasium ', full of matchless opportunities for ' sea-bathing, and horse-riding, and bracing manly virtue '. It was only to such innocent exaggerations that his wholesome and kindly spirit was at any time prone. But in Nietzsche's congenitally irritable, arrogant, atrabilious nature, the effort ' to keep a stiff upper lip ' led to far other and uglier excesses. The supersensitive, quivering little invalid, who could never even find a woman willing to marry him, constructed for himself an ideal entity, physically his opposite, spiritually his counterpart—the great ' blond beast ', the human bird of prey, the conqueror, the destroyer, the slave-driver, the despiser of ' herd morality '. And to the stridulous persistence with which he preached this ideal, there can be little doubt that his countrymen's stolid neglect of his writings contributed. They fell still-born from the press, until at last he had to break in upon his own scanty capital in order to pay for the printing of them. Tragic indeed is the tale of his struggle against chilling indifference—it might well have embittered an originally sweeter nature. The enthusiastic friendships of his youth cooled and flickered out. In the end Zarathustra had but one faithful disciple, though his last years of sanity were brightened by recognition from Taine in France and George Brandes in Denmark. There have been few unhappier men than this lonely, unappreciated, jaundiced genius, wandering from third-rate pension to pension, in search of a little sunshine and health. But his pride forbade him to give in and ' say Nay ' to life. He felt that an invalid had no right to be a pessimist.

Under the bludgeonings of chance,
His head was bloody, but unbowed.

He took revenge on the world as he knew it by constructing one in which all the impulses, baulked in his own nature, should have free and unbridled course. One cannot read him without feeling that he was not so unhappy after all, since, in penning his ruthless paragraphs, he enjoyed ecstasies of that wild-beast-like destructiveness which was an essential part of his ideal.

Docked of its wantonness and virulence of expression, his philosophy is at many points acceptable enough. The Will to Power does not perceptibly differ from the Will to Live, or, if it does, it differs for the worse, as being a less universal concept. No one doubts the relativity of ethical standards, or the need of a transvaluation of many of our values; though Nietzsche himself would surely have admitted fortitude to be a tolerably permanent virtue, while it is hard to imagine a transvaluation which should make temperance (for example) a vice. The Superman, reasonably interpreted, becomes an innocent eugenic ideal. What Nietzsche actually meant by him will for ever remain doubtful. Sometimes he writes of him as an individual—as though all the groaning and travail of creation had no end save the production of a single super-Napoleon. At other times (more sanely) he uses Superman as a collective term for a breed or caste, a highly-developed variety of the genus 'blond beast', which, as he shrewdly conjectures, will very much resemble what the common man of to-day would describe as a legion of devils. But in this diabolism there is a touch of grim humour, a half-confessed mischievousness, and desire to 'épater le bourgeois'. So far as his practical recipes for the production of the Superman go, they are little more than eugenic common-places.

The really noxious feature of Nietzsche's philosophy—

apart from its general inhumanity of temper—is the division of mankind into masters and slaves, and the assertion that this is a desirable arrangement, conducive to the perfecting of the race. There may be some historical truth (along with much exaggeration) in the assignment of certain moral concepts to ‘master morality’ and ‘slave morality’ respectively. Over this contribution to the ‘genealogy of morals’ it is needless to quarrel. But to make the enslavement of the mass of humanity the fundamental requisite for an ideal (and apparently rigid, static, undeveloping) social state, was to supply aristocratic, plutocratic, and especially military arrogance with a pseudo-philosophic catchword that lends itself to the most hideous abuse. Very naturally, it is this ‘stupendous addition to human knowledge’ (as an English disciple calls it) upon which all the little Nietzsches of his following, who cultivate his insolence without a trace of his talent, fasten with parrot-cries of delight. They may not be exactly Supermen, for the production of that glorious race is to be a matter of time; but they can here and now rank themselves on the side of the masters, and condemn the herd. It needs no profound acquaintance with the literature inspired by Nietzsche to realize that he has at least succeeded in begetting a flourishing brood of super-snobs. Nor is it doubtful that these energumens abound in the high places of Pan-Germanism, military, political, and journalistic. Does not Nietzsche speak in every line of the following effusion by Herr K. F. Wolff, in *Alldeutsche Blätter* for September last? ¹

There are two kinds of races, master races and inferior races. Political rights belong to the master race alone, and can only be won by war. This is a

¹ Quoted by Mr. C. R. L. Fletcher in *Oxford Pamphlets*.

scientific law, a law of biology. . . . It is *unjust* that a rapidly-increasing master race should be struggling for room behind its own frontier, while a declining, inferior race can stretch its limbs at ease on the other side of that frontier. The inferior race will not be educated in the schools of the master race, nor will any school be established for it, nor will its language be employed in public. Should it rebel, it is necessary to use the most violent means to crush such insurrection, and not to encumber the prisons afterward. Thus the conquerors can best work for the annihilation of the conquered, and break for ever with the prejudice which would claim for a beaten race any right to maintain its nationality or its native tongue.

Here, we see, an easy but very significant transition has been effected. Nietzsche knew nothing of any master nation existing in the world to-day. His doctrine was that within all nations there was (or ought to be) a master aristocracy, and a 'herd' living in more or less disguised slavery. But Herr Wolff gaily transfers the 'master' quality from individuals to a whole nation—the Germans—and the slave quality to a whole nation, manifestly the French, who have no right to 'stretch their limbs at ease on the other side of their frontier.' This is, of course, a misreading of Nietzsche, but it is a misreading to which he lends himself only too readily; and there is every reason to believe that it is a misreading very widely accepted in Germany.

That Nietzsche was a man of genius there is no doubt. He had flashes of amazing lucidity. He had a disintegrating intellect of such abnormal power that at last it disintegrated itself. To his mastery of language German testimony is unanimous, though an English reader is apt to find more than a touch of the falsetto in his constant underscorings and points of exclamation. But

one gift he never possessed—a gift most essential to the man who aspires to shape the spiritual life of the future—the gift of sanity. It is for specialists to determine at what stage of his career definite mental disease set in ; for us it is enough to note that at no time after 1870 can he be said to have possessed either a sound body or a sound mind. His attitude to life is thoroughly morbid, his reading of its laws essentially mad ; and his mad philosophy was at once an effect and a very potent cause of that German madness which is convulsing the world.

What a calamity that this national aberration should have found a man of sympathetically aberrant genius to interpret and intensify it ! In a very real sense, it is the philosophy of Nietzsche that we are fighting.

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THE WAR AND ITS ECONOMIC ASPECTS¹

FOR many years—from the time when I first went as a student to Germany—I have had a warm place in my heart for the German people. Like many other young Englishmen, it was in Germany I first caught the infection of the scientific spirit, the spirit that cares as much for widening the bounds of knowledge as for handing on knowledge already acquired; and what I saw of social intercourse in Göttingen and Dresden made me appreciate the *Gemüthlichkeit*, the cheerful simple kindness, which characterizes so large a part of the people. I have believed that our two nations possessed many traits in common, and had some common interests and duties; and I have done what I could to promote a good understanding between them. And when the University of Berlin, in conferring an honorary degree, took occasion to describe me as ‘a true friend of our nation’, the epithet was not, I think, altogether undeserved.

To me, then, this war is a special and personal grief. It means the end, for many years to come, probably for my lifetime, of the hopes I have cherished of amicable co-operation between the two countries; the cessation—though that, indeed, in comparison, is but a small matter—of friendly interchange of thought with men

¹ Lecture to the Workers’ Educational Association at the University of Birmingham, on the evening of November 18, 1914.

whose work for economic science and for social reform I have long admired.

And though I am convinced that the German Government and the German nation supporting it are profoundly in the wrong ; though I am sure that it made a fatally unwise decision in determining, at all risks, to back up—nay, to prompt—Austria ; though I feel that it has quite misunderstood both the purposes and the temper of England ; though I have not the slightest doubt that it is the bounden duty of every Englishman to do all that in him lies to bring about Germany's complete defeat ; I am not going now to deny to Germany the qualities which first called forth my respect, and I am not going, if I can help it, to pay any German the poor compliment of returning his ' hatred '. Hatred, indeed, blinds the eyes ; and England wants to be as clear-sighted as possible to bring this war to a speedy and successful conclusion.

Perhaps it was a foolish dream that two States situated as Britain and Germany, the one with a tradition already old of maritime supremacy, the other with all the strength and combined self-confidence and self-distrust of the parvenu, could remain in friendship. The comparison is not mine : it is Prince von Bülow's, the late Chancellor, who in his remarkable book is continually picturing Germany as the *novus homo*, the new arrival, forcing his way to the side of the old-established world-power. I have had friends in England who have urged upon me that, whatever might be the virtues of the body of the German people, the virus of Bismarckian statecraft was working in the small governing class which really determined the nation's policy. And in recent years there certainly have been some disquieting features in the mental attitude even of that Germany

I was myself in touch with, which have given me more than an occasional qualm. In academic circles the legitimate pride in German science seemed sometimes to have become almost an obsession, and to have the effect of shutting out of sight what was being done in other lands. It seemed to be hardly realized that what Germany had to teach the western world in the way of thoroughness and method had already been pretty well learnt, and that there were intellectual qualities of almost equal value, qualities of lucidity and discrimination and balance, which could perhaps be better learnt elsewhere—even in the despised France. There was a curious national self-satisfaction which failed to perceive that the great new ideas, the waves of intellectual inspiration within and without the realm of scholarship and research, which were affecting the minds of this generation all over the world, were now almost all of them coming from other directions than Germany. Again, it is enough to turn to France, and mention such names as Pasteur and Rodin and Loisy and Bergson. And with this narrowing of the horizon went what I could not help thinking was apparently an almost total inability to understand the point of view of other nations. I have been wont to tell my German friends, for instance, that so long as England contented itself with its tiny army, the one thing on which all political parties in this country agreed was the absolute necessity of a big navy, and that it was hopeless to expect ever to outbuild England in ships : that dependent as England was for the bulk of its food on sea-borne trade, it simply dare not allow itself to be caught up with. I have told them again, that while England would not join France in aggression, it would certainly not stand by and see France humiliated ; that for no

friendship of Germany would England abandon the *Entente*. It seemed impossible, however, to make my German friends realize that a nation which proposed to have both the strongest army and the strongest navy in the world was not going the best way to work to promote a peaceable temper either in itself or in others, and that, great as were the virtues of Germany, it was not obviously more lovable to the British public than its neighbour across the Rhine.

The word for it all, I am afraid I must say, is simply 'conceit'. But then I have reflected that there have been times when we ourselves were similarly difficult to get on with. I suppose nobody, at this time of day, would say that Palmerston was positively ingratiating in his dealings with other countries, and if we want to see how confined was the outlook of the middle-Victorian Englishman we have but to go back to Matthew Arnold's criticisms or Thackeray's unconscious exemplifications. And as I believed England had become a little more tolerant, a little less self-pleased, a little less heavy-handed than in Palmerston's time, so I hoped that the German phase of self-glorification and disregard for the feelings of others would also pass away, without a great cataclysm. I was mistaken; but I am not ashamed of having ascribed to Germany a reserve of statesmanship and cool sense which it is now apparent it did not possess.

It is with the economic aspects of the war that I purpose especially to deal. Their importance must not be exaggerated. If the naval forces of the enemy and of the Allies were equal, Germany would be in a far safer position than this country; for Germany has not sacrificed its agriculture to its manufactures to anything like the same extent as Great Britain, and it is

much more able to run the risk of a stoppage of foreign food supplies. The mere magnitude of our trade could not have saved us. Moreover, difficult as Germany's economic position is—as I shall shortly point out—it is not so difficult as to compel, by itself, a speedy termination of the war. The natural resources of the country are great, the credit of the Government is good, and for the first few months some important trades have been kept busy by the manufacture of war material. It is perhaps impossible to find out what the state of affairs actually is in Germany just now; but I should not be surprised to learn that life on the surface has hitherto gone on very much as in England; that such distress as there may have been, has been relieved; and that there is not, as yet, any widely diffused popular discontent. And of course it would be quite absurd for us in England to pretend that the outbreak of war did not at first give a violent shock to the fabric of industry on this side the Channel. Even if we wanted to conceal the fact, the German authorities get our English newspapers, and know perfectly well all about our local distress committees, and about short time in the cotton trade and all the other English trades that are under the weather.

And yet, though the economic factor is not the most vital one, it is one of essential importance, and one which, as the months go on, and as the German forces are steadily driven back, will make itself felt with an ever accumulating weight, and hasten the final submission. For if only Britain and the Allies can retain the mastery of the sea, between the economic difficulties of England and Germany there is a fundamental difference. England's difficulties were due in the main to the complicated mechanism of modern credit, international pay-

ments, and contracts for the future. Germany did not feel these particular difficulties to anything like the same extent; it is able to boast, for instance, that it did not need a *moratorium*. That, however, is simply because London had become the credit centre of the world and the pivot of the delicate apparatus of the foreign exchanges. But the temporary breakdown of the credit and market system was capable of being repaired, and has in large measure been repaired already, by co-operation between the Government, the banks, and the great organized interests which are involved, and by the assistance thus rendered possible to bill-brokers, to merchants with outstanding foreign accounts, and to dealers in futures. Meanwhile, the productive capacities, the mutual wants, on which British economic activity, at home and abroad, was really based have remained substantially as before. To begin with, quite two-thirds of the annual product of British industry is normally consumed at home. There remain the same needs to be supplied, and so long as our people can import their food and the necessary raw materials, there is no reason why most of this consumption should not be resumed now that the first alarm is over. Of our export trade, the cessation of business with Germany and Austria, even with Belgium and Turkey thrown in, withdrew only between an eighth and a ninth. But, on the other hand, the market in the United Kingdom and in the British Colonies which Germany was losing at the same time can evidently be supplied, to some extent at any rate, from British factories; not to mention Germany's other oversea markets in which, as we shall find good reason for believing, it must be increasingly difficult and soon impossible for her to dispose of her goods. Even making large allowances for American and Japanese

enterprise, there are certainly quite promising openings in these previous German markets for fresh British trade. Accordingly, when once credit and exchange difficulties have been got over, the prospect is that Britain will regain, and more than regain, all it has lost. For the time being we may be said, compared with last year, to have lost about a third of our foreign trade. It should be observed, indeed, that a distinct falling-off in our trade had already become visible as early as April, and there are indications that it would have declined considerably since, even had there been no war. Moreover, much of the loss of trade has been due to our own prohibitions of export, not to failure of demand in neutral markets. These considerations do not remove, they only mitigate our sense of the severity of the initial blow. But the process of recovery is already taking place. The total volume of our import and export trade, which was 37 per cent less in August than in July, was only 31 per cent less in September, and 21 per cent less in October; and this, allowing for the one day short of September, means a steady improvement of about 8 per cent on the July figures each month since August. The percentage of unemployed in trade unions making returns jumped up from the low figure 2·8 at the end of July to 7·1 at the end of August. Even this was a good deal lower than has frequently been seen in periods of really bad trade. But at the end of September it had fallen to 5·9, and at the end of October to 4·4, which is actually below the average of the last ten years. And now that the Lancashire cotton trade—always one of the least stable portions of our industrial system—has begun to revive, we may count upon a still more rapid recovery.

But compare this position with that of Germany.

There the obstacles to trade are not of the secondary order, resulting from the temporary interruption in the delicate balance of the market machinery ; they are of that absolutely primary character which is involved in the sheer physical impossibility of obtaining the imports and disposing of the exports to which its economic life has been adjusted.

Germany in the last half-century has been rapidly industrialized. Its industrial and commercial population, which in 1882 was only 45 per cent of the whole, was in 1895 50 per cent, and in 1907 56 per cent. There has been, as we all know, a most wonderful growth of manufactures, due partly to natural abilities, partly to the discovery of coal resources, which forty years ago were quite unknown. It is possible for a country, sufficiently vast in area and varied in resources, to expand its manufactures without ceasing to be self-contained : the United States would be a case in point, were it not for its cotton export. But in a country like Germany, its vast manufacturing expansion could not have taken place without the acquisition of a wide foreign market ; and as manufactures require raw materials, and as foreigners cannot buy unless they also sell, large exports have necessitated large imports. The exports of Germany have steadily been coming to consist more and more of manufactured goods, and its imports more and more of food-stuffs and raw materials. Germany, again, might conceivably have been so placed geographically as to have access by land to its chief markets. It has indeed access by land to a large part of the European continent : but that has only furnished a comparatively small part of the market she has obtained. As long ago as 1900, it was reckoned by a distinguished German economist that 70 per cent of German

foreign trade was overseas, and the proportion to-day is, even greater. Accordingly, so long as Germany is unable to command the seas, every single German cargo, inwards or outwards, is a fresh hostage to the fortune of war.

This is not the mere optimism of an English enemy : it is what the economists of Germany have long ago quite clearly recognized. The representatives of German high finance may talk as they please about the vast accumulation of wealth in Germany, and suggest that it can bear with ease even the enormous burdens of a war like this. But the economist knows that the only form of wealth on which a nation can rely in times like these are forms which can feed and clothe it, and that to distribute these means of life they must either be doled out by the State or earned by employment.

Fourteen years ago the leading economists of the German Empire combined to publish a series of lectures in support of the Navy Bill. They were issued, in a handsome but cheap form, under the significant title *Handels- und Machtpolitik*—‘the politics of trade and power’. The recurrent refrain in one after the other of these lectures was always this : that unless the sea could be kept open the wellbeing of the German nation was insecure. As one of them said—a leader in social reform and in international co-operation for industrial betterment, whom it is grief even to think of as an enemy—‘In one way or another, from 24 to 26 millions of Germans’, out of a population, at the time, of some 55, ‘are dependent for their livelihood and work upon unrestricted import and export by water. The freedom of the sea and vigorous competition in the world’s markets are therefore questions of life and death for the nation, and questions in which the working classes are most deeply concerned.’

Since this was written, Germany's position in this respect has become even worse. It is unnecessary to labour the point, for it has been put with the utmost emphasis recently by Prince von Bülow. In 1864, he reminds us, Bismarck, in reply to a supposed English threat of war, remarked to the English Ambassador: 'Well, what harm can you do us? At worst you can throw a few bombs.' Bismarck, says Bülow, 'was right at that time. We were then as good as unassailable by England, in spite of her mighty sea power.' 'To-day'—he goes on—'it is different. We are now vulnerable at sea. We have entrusted millions to the ocean.' If Germany had been deprived of them, he insists, it 'could not have returned to the comfortable existence of a purely inland state. We should have been placed in the position of being unable to employ and support a considerable number of our millions of inhabitants at home. The result would have been an economic crisis which might easily attain the proportions of a national catastrophe.'

According to these economists and to Bülow the one way to ward off this catastrophe was to build a gigantic navy. It is not worth while arguing that they were mistaken: it is too late, and, in any case, English opinion is too much suspected to carry any weight. The bare fact is sufficient that Germany has chosen to plunge into the conflict at such a time and in such a way that, in spite of its great navy, the dreaded catastrophe is now actually approaching.

A few figures may be useful by way of illustration. To begin with, quite 40 per cent of Germany's export trade and 44 per cent of her import trade has been with the countries with which she is now at war. To its allies and to neutrals it cannot convey merchandise in

its own ships (except perhaps in the Western Baltic), because all its ships that have not been captured are now confined to the ports. It can dispense with its own vessels and do its business by means of neutral shipping, or through neutral countries, only for a small and decreasing part of its trade ; and this for several reasons. In the first place, the neutral shipping available is very limited. The shipping of the neutral countries is only about one-fourth that of the world, and only a portion of this fourth can be spared for German cargoes. Next, a large part of what Germany might import is absolute or conditional contraband, and will be avoided by neutral ship-owners. Then again, the Allies have put an embargo on the export from their shores of certain indispensable materials for which they are the chief sources of supply, e. g. wool ; and England has prohibited the import of an important product, sugar, of which it was Germany's one considerable customer. Indirect trade, through neutral lands, between residents in the allied States and in enemy countries is being stopped by certificates of origin and declarations of destination. The neighbouring neutral countries, moreover, especially Denmark and the Scandinavian kingdoms, partly for their own sake, in order to ensure their own supplies of food, partly to avoid undesirable complications with the Allies, are now prohibiting the export of food-stuffs and of a long list of commodities capable of being used for war purposes. And finally, the proclamation of the North Sea as a military area, and still more, the fact that, owing to Germany's initiative in the laying of mines, it obviously is exceedingly dangerous to shipping, will send up freight and insurance rates on cargoes sent by the North Sea to prohibitive figures.

The advocates in Germany of a great policy of naval construction were wont to have the possibilities of 'blockade' very much on the brain; and a German friend of mine used to write in *Nauticus*, the year-book of the navy movement, long articles on historic blockades, such as that of the Southern States at the time of the Cotton Famine. To-day the German coast is not technically 'blockaded' at all; that will come at a later stage of the war, possibly. But the objects of a blockade are being secured, if less dramatically hardly less effectively.

As to food, as I have before said, owing to measures of agrarian protection, Germany is better off than we should be in a like case. The chief bread corn of the people is still rye, and practically the whole German supply is grown within the Empire. But white wheaten bread has, in recent years, been coming into more general use; and even the so-called 'black bread' has a good deal of wheat flour in it, so that wheat now constitutes about two-fifths of the nation's bread. Of this wheat, a good deal more than a third has lately been imported, mainly from Russia. It is hardly conceivable that this deficiency should be made up from other sources. And it is a commonplace in economics that when prices are determined by competition the effect upon price of a deficiency in supply is altogether out of proportion to the deficiency itself. It is a significant thing that weeks after the plan of fixing food prices by authority has been discontinued in England as unnecessary, the German Government has been compelled to have recourse to it; with this notable difference, that while neither corn nor bread was ever in the English list, it is the price of corn which now demands the German Government's most anxious attention. 'The situation', it is officially

explained, 'has been complicated by the stoppage of the usual imports of fodder barley from Russia. As a result, the more valuable German barley has risen to a high price, and rye, which is now cheaper than barley, has been used for fodder instead of being saved for bread.' When we reflect that of late years almost half the German supply of barley has come from Russia, we can well believe 'the situation is complicated'. It looks, indeed, like the beginning of the end, even though the end should be a good way off.

I shall assume, then, that the Allies are going to win, and that economic pressure will contribute more and more, as the war goes on, to that consummation. What is going to be the outcome? Much doubtless that we can as yet hardly foresee; but there are a few large results that are beginning to make themselves discernible.

One result will be the further consolidation of the Empire. It is an old jest, but one which contains a great truth, that we ought to erect a statue to Kruger as one of the Creators of the British Empire. Certainly the Kaiser in that sense will deserve a much finer one. The real danger to the imperial tie is not conscious alienation between the several sister nations, but an unconscious drifting apart, due to the strength of local interests and the weakness of the centripetal forces; not antipathy, but simply the want of mutual intercourse. A war in which the self-governing Dominions voluntarily take an active part reveals to themselves the strength of their sense of imperial solidarity; the very fighting side by side creates a mutual knowledge, mutual understanding and respect, a fund of common memories; and it is out of such a soil that the confederate organization, appropriate for so unique an Empire as ours, is most likely to spring. Just as the creation, in the

decade just past, of the beginnings of a new imperial constitution in the Imperial Conference and the Imperial Secretariate, would have been impossible but for the wave of sentiment which spread over the Dominions during the Boer War, so the still closer intercourse, not only between individual Britons, but also between the several British Governments engaged in a common and world-wide task, cannot but contribute towards the solution of the great British problem: the problem of allying self-governing nationalities in a permanent confederation for common purposes. As it is, the German attack is already converting the loose congeries of Dominions into, not indeed a *Zollverein*, or Customs Union, but a *Kriegverein*, or War Union—an organization for military and naval co-operation. The capture of the *Emden* by the *Sydney* is worth, not only for imperial sentiment, but also for imperial organization, far more than the *Emden* cost us in captured merchantmen.

This is one more illustration of the strength in human affairs both of circumstance and of the unconscious. My German friends, I have noticed, pay us what I have always thought the undeserved compliment of ascribing all our national success to conscious policy, pursued with consistency generation after generation. If only they could discover just what our policy has been and is, they could imitate it, they seem to think, and get the same results! It is in vain I have told them that I thought we commonly had no policy, but just muddled along somehow. That, of course, was a playful exaggeration; just as it is an exaggeration to say that the British Empire has grown simply because it has been attacked, and that it has been forced together only by outside pressure. But it contains quite as much of the

truth as the other view, which assigns everything to conscious policy—a truth which even the Germans will probably learn from this war. No one, for instance, could have expected that the grant of self-government to the Union of South Africa so soon after the Boer War, magnanimously wise as it was, would have borne imperial fruit so splendid and so speedy. The best missionary of the Empire in South Africa, the best reconciler of Boer and Briton, has been William II.

It would be absurd to compare the German colonial possessions, almost devoid of white settlers, and governed entirely from Berlin, with the constellation of self-governing States and mighty dependencies which constitute the British Empire. The German has never yet proved himself a good colonist in a new country, and that is one of not the least reasons why the German colonial territories are relatively so inconsiderable. The notion that Germany is over-full, and that the German people are suffocating for want of room for expansion, is one of those ideas which commend themselves to political theorists, and which have a certain currency when once set going, but have very little basis in fact. As a fact, not only is German emigration very small, about a tenth that of Great Britain, but in proportion to the total German population, it has been falling ever since 1891, and it is only one-sixth of what it was then. But if there is no reason to believe that colonies are craved for by would-be colonists, they have been made useful by Germany as centres for the distribution of German exports—the avowed object, for instance, of Kiaouchou—as well as for the purposes of coaling and wireless stations. The result of the war will be the loss of most of them, if not of all. The English Government will probably want to be as generous as possible when

the settlement comes ; but others will have a say in the matter besides the Government of Great Britain. Considering the circumstances under which it was acquired, not even Germany, I should imagine, can expect to get Kiaouchou back. And as for the rest, those too far off from any great British dominion to compel its attention, and really at the disposal of the English Government, may possibly be the subject of negotiation ; but German possessions which the Dominions have themselves conquered, and which are within their sphere of solicitude, will have to remain in the hands of their new masters. This will be a blow to Germany's pride and power which some of us might like to avoid ; but it will be inevitable.

Of more immediate interest to us in England is the dramatic transformation which the war is affecting in the economic policy of the Home Government. Under the pressure of necessity the Government, with the complete support of the nation, instantly abandoned the traditional policy of economic inaction. We now wake up every morning to find Government credit extended to some new department of commerce ; some branch of trade put under an embargo ; some enormous purchase of commodities undertaken, such as sugar ; some extensive new manufacture encouraged and financial assistance offered to investors, as for the production of dye-stuffs.

A transformation I have called it ; and yet, after all, it is only the sudden emergence in new fields of that fresh economic courage which has been so remarkably displayed in our recent social legislation. To those of us who are now middle-aged, nothing is more remarkable than the cheerful and unsentimental hopefulness which, in this present generation, has led the nation

confidently to tackle vast problems, calling for a huge and complicated administrative organization. With the general consent of all parties, the country has not only undertaken the insurance of the labouring classes against sickness, for which other countries provided precedents, and our own friendly societies most of the machinery; but it has embarked on the more novel, the practically quite unprecedented and far more socially important work of insurance against unemployment. The thought of it would have taken away the breath of our fathers, and yet it was all done in the most matter-of-course way. I do not think the significance of new departures like this has been sufficiently realized by the German observers who imagined the English were a decadent people.

Of the trade measures, breathing the same new spirit of economic courage, that have followed in rapid succession upon the outbreak of war, the most significant is the stepping of the Government into the arena of manufacture. As to the bill-broking machinery and the futures market, they have only to be put on their legs again and will march as before. But a country in which the Government accepts in principle the duty of 'guaranteeing' the 'permanent' production within the land of commodities previously imported from the enemy's country can never be as before.

There has been a great deal of talk about 'capturing German trade'. The Board of Trade has embarked on what is officially called 'a campaign'; it has compiled statistics of every imaginable article that Germany sells to the world, and that British manufacturers could conceivably supply; it holds 'Exchange Meetings' where would-be purchasers meet would-be producers. And this labour has not been thrown away; it has

helped to familiarize business men with the idea that 'there may be something in it'. Yet those—and there are some—who have felt a little uncomfortable about our setting out to deprive even Germans of their livelihood, may take this comfort. No number of statistical pamphlets and newspaper paragraphs would make the English business man take any practical steps to 'capture German trade' unless the matter were pressed upon him in some more evidently remunerative way. What is really happening is that buyers of German manufactures, both at home and abroad, are beginning to get to the end of their stocks, and are turning to English manufacturers for fresh supplies. In some cases manufacturers whose businesses are depressed in consequence of the war are finding it possible to give employment to their work-people by making some commodity, previously supplied from Germany, which they can turn out with their existing plant. If the revival of trade, during the war or after it, brings back their old customers, they can perhaps dispense with the new ones. But cases like these are not numerous, nor in themselves considerable. What every one knows who moves at all in the business world, is that any considerable invasion of the German markets means the installation of expensive plant; and manufacturers are not going to do that unless they have a reasonable prospect of working it long enough to get back what they have invested, with profit. The word which strikes the key-note of the present disposition of the business world is 'Continuity'. Very big capital expenditures, however desirable, will probably not be entered upon unless the Government follows the dye-stuff precedent and offers a financial guarantee, of debenture interest or the like. But many others of

smaller amount will probably be undertaken, if the war continues and if 'inquiries' from customers accumulate to a stimulating extent, without waiting for a formal guarantee; in the confidence, which I cannot doubt is a reasonable one, that when peace returns they will not be left in the lurch. Great stocks of German manufactures will, of course, have accumulated, by the time peace is made, and these will be thrown upon the market at almost any price. Somehow or other, and there are more ways than one, means will assuredly have to be found to prevent the sudden extinction of the newly created English business.

If I could hope that anything I could say would reach German ears, I should remark that the longer the war lasts the worse it will be for Germany, economically as well as politically. The longer it goes on, the more it will be straitened in its economic activity when peace returns. England has hitherto afforded Germany an elbow-room which has been highly convenient to it in the alternating expansion and contraction which form the cyclical movement of trade. This is very apparent to any one who looks into its industrial history and learns how it was it escaped so lightly from the great depression of 1901-2. That elbow-room is going to be restricted, and the more completely the longer it waits. It is not that the English people has been converted to a new economic creed; it is that the English people will come out of this war with a new attitude towards fellow Britishers and allies, and a new attitude towards enemies; and with new interests also to which its honour will be pledged.

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THE WORSHIP OF POWER IN MODERN GERMANY

I

DURING the great days of the French Revolution and the War of Liberation Germany produced two great thinkers. One was Kant : the other was Hegel. Kant was the philosopher of Duty, stern daughter of the voice of God—duty, supreme over all alleged ‘ interests ’, and dominant over all pretensions of power. He held before Europe the ideal of a permanent peace achieved by ‘ a federal league of nations, in which even the weakest member looks for protection to the united power ’. An austere sense of law, pervading and controlling at once individual life, the life of the State, and even the life of the European comity or commonwealth of States—this was the note of his teaching. Hegel, in reaction against what he regarded as the bare austerity of Kant, preached a different doctrine. Duty, he held, was the fulfilling of a station in the community. It was an empty concept apart from the State. Faithfully to discharge his function as a member of his State—this is the duty of man. Along this line Hegel—perhaps influenced by admiration for Prussia—advanced to a conception of the State as something of an absolute, something of an ultimate, to which the individual must be adjusted, and from his relation to which he draws his meaning and being. The State, he could write, is the Universal, which has become ‘ for

itself', consciously and explicitly, all that it is 'in itself', in its latent and potential nature. Thus self-conscious and self-moved, it is a real individual, which can exist by itself in the world as an ultimate. As for the citizen, the apparent individual—why, he is an atom, which, 'seeking to be a centre for itself, is brought by the State back into the life of the universal substance'. Absolute, ultimate, universal—the State becomes a sort of transcendental majesty, *cui nihil viget simile aut secundum*. It is significant that Hegel, in his philosophy of the State, devotes less than a page to international law: it is still more significant that he can say, 'the state of war shows the omnipotence of the State in its individuality; country and fatherland are then the power, which convicts of nullity the independence of individuals.' It is here—in this neglect of international law, and in this glorification of war—that one lays one's finger on a permanent and essential attribute of German political thought and practice. If Kant is the philosopher of one side of Prussia, if he expresses that deep sense of duty which made Frederic the Great the first servant of the State, Hegel is the philosopher of another side, and Hegel expresses that sense of the absolute finality of the State which made Frederic seize Silesia in spite of an international guarantee of the integrity of the Austrian dominions, and impelled him to carry Prussia further and further along the paths of militarism.

Since the days of Sadowa and Sedan Germany has produced two other thinkers, Nietzsche and Treitschke. Both were ultimately of Slavonic origin; both were professors, the one of philosophy, the other of history; both lived and thought and taught in the new Germany which sprang from the great wars of 1866 and 1870.

They caught the spirit, and they helped to make the spirit, of that new Germany whose note, it has been well said, is *subdual*. Power, more power, and always power—this was the gospel which they found, and preached. 'Political questions are questions of power' was Bismarck's principle. 'Two souls dwell in the German nation,' a Berlin professor wrote.

The German nation has been called the nation of poets and thinkers, and it may be proud of the name. To-day it may again be called the nation of masterful combatants, as which it originally appeared in history.

The spirit of mastery was abroad : it could be seen in State policy ; it could be seen in a vast economic expansion ; it could be seen in the grandiose massivity of those buildings, 'veritable mastodons of masonry', which modern Germany loves to erect. Of that spirit Nietzsche and Treitschke have, in very different ways, both been the prophets. The one was a bitter enemy of Christianity : the other was a stern Protestant. The one detested the 'bovine spirit of nationality' and denounced Prussian militarism : the other preached exclusive Germanism and the glory of the sword. But both alike made power their watchword ; both alike loved war, and striving for mastery, and subdual ; both hated England.

II

The name Nietzsche is said to be derived from a Slavonic word signifying 'humble'. Nietzsche, however, was inclined to claim a noble origin from the counts of Nietzki, and he certainly did not love humility. It is another paradox that the man who boasted himself 'the most essential opponent of Christianity' should

have been the son of a village pastor. He was born in 1834: he died in 1900. He served in the army for a few months in 1867, and during the campaign of 1870 he worked for a little time in the German Ambulance Corps. For ten years, from 1869 to 1879, he acted as professor of Classical Philology in the University of Bâle; for the next ten years he was a wandering invalid; for the last eleven years of his life he was insane.

The stuff on which his mind worked was partly Greek literature and art, and partly biology, of which he acquired in later years a somewhat superficial knowledge. From the one he drew an aesthetic interpretation of the world, as a thing non-moral but potentially beautiful; from the other he drew the vision of the new beauty which might enter the world through the evolution of the superman. It was, perhaps, from both, or rather his own interpretation of both, that he drew his primary premiss. Life, that premiss ran, is essentially 'amoral'. The world is simply an aesthetic phenomenon, neither good nor bad—that is to say, in effect, neither beautiful nor ugly. All things in the world—all intentions and actions of men—are amoral. 'There are no moral phenomena; there is merely a moral interpretation of phenomena.' Nothing is, but thinking makes it so; and all so-called moral values are the creations of human interpretation. To these creations we must address a simple question. Are these existing valuations of intentions and acts as moral or immoral, as beautiful or ugly, of any real value? Or must they be 'transvalued' to suit a new and higher standard?

To answer such a question we must first of all examine existing values critically. If we do so, we find that

they are not absolute but relative. They are relative to race, and differ from race to race : they are relative to time, and vary from time to time.

Good and evil which would be everlasting—it doth not exist. All is in flux. Everything good is the evil of yore which has been rendered serviceable.

The morality of to-day is thus a phase, and nothing more ; and it is a phase to be condemned. This is plain, if we examine first its content, and then its source. The content of its rules shows that they are intended to adapt the individual to the advantage of the community or herd. Truthfulness is praised because it lets the herd know what to expect ; lying is blamed because it leaves the herd in a state of uncomfortable mystification. But is the advantage of the herd, after all, an ultimate criterion ? Morality makes that assumption : is it entitled to its assumption ? All is not necessarily for the best, when

lofty independent spirituality, the will to stand alone, are felt to be dangers ; when everything that elevates the individual above the herd is called evil, and the tolerant, unassuming, self-adapting, self-equalizing disposition attains the moral distinction and honour.

Nor does the source of this morality entitle it to any more respect. The source is alleged to be conscience ; and this conscience professes to condemn actions on the assumption of the free will of their agents and on the ground of the wrong use of that will. The profession and assumptions are baseless. There is no freedom of the will. Heredity and environment are the sources of our acts : what we call free will is really the ' complex state of delight ' of a personality as it issues inevitably in action ; and the supposed free will of the moralist is

really 'the most egregious theological trick . . . for the purpose of making mankind responsible in a theological manner—that is to say, dependent upon theologians'. As we cannot speak of free will, so we cannot speak of conscience. Conscience is not the source of valuations. The herd creates values by an emotion, an emotion of the same aesthetic nature as that of the artist contemplating his work—an emotion of comfortable contentedness with all that is pleasing to its senses. But shall we be foolish enough to accept the aesthetic sense of the herd as the final determinant of our values ?

Thus the community or herd creates, on the impulse of a sensuous emotion of contentedness inspired by certain kind of acts and intentions, a herd-morality which assigns moral value to acts and intentions advantageous to the herd. Once created, this morality is imitated : the force of mimicry, so potent in nature, as Nietzsche learned from his biological studies, is equally potent in man. But it is no guarantee of the truth of this morality that it was created by a majority, or that it has lasted through the centuries. The herd is a herd of slaves, contented just to live. But there are masters as well as slaves ; and masters are determined not only to have life, but to have it abundantly. For in truth—so Nietzsche held—any real life is not the issue of a mere 'will to live', as Darwin taught ; nor does the world show any mere 'struggle for existence', in which those who are fittest just to exist survive the ordeal. Life is the issue of a 'will to power' ; and the world shows a struggle for power in which the greatest power wins not only survival but dominance.

Life is a state of opulence, luxuriance, and even absurd prodigality : where there is a struggle, it is a struggle for power. Life is essentially appropria-

tion, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of its own forms, incorporation, at the least and in its mildest form exploitation. The criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power.

That then is true which enables me to expand in the full opulence of power : that is good which contributes to the unfolding of my power in the full blossom of action. Power is of the few, ultimately perhaps of the one, the Caesar or Napoleon ; and since power is the standard, it is therefore the few whose truth is the *vraie vérité des choses*, and whose morality is the true morality. Herd-morality, slave-morality, is untrue and immoral—untrue, that is to say, and immoral, if one seeks to apply or enforce it among masters, but true enough and moral enough for the slave. Let the slave demand and cultivate truth and pity—for himself and for his like. Truth and pity are the conditions of living—of bare living : and since that is all the slave can expect, truth and pity are his *métier*. They are not the *métier* of the master. What he expects and demands is power ; and power can only be attained in war ; and in war all things are fair,¹ and pity is misplaced.

There were preachers of power before Nietzsche. In the *Gorgias* of Plato Callicles already expounds the doctrine of herd-morality and master-morality. Convention, says Callicles, is one thing : nature is another. Convention is made by the majority or herd, who are weaklings and slaves ; ‘and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to themselves and their own interests.’ But ‘nature herself intimates

¹ ‘It matters greatly to what end one lies, whether one preserves or destroys by means of falsehood.’

that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker ' ; and ' a man who had sufficient force would trample under foot all formulas and spells and charms ', rising in the strength of his power and asserting the just right of his might. Let him who would see sophistry of this sort blown to the winds turn to his Plato ; for Callicles is just Nietzsche, and Nietzsche is just Callicles. But he is a Callicles with some twenty-three added centuries of experience ; and it is worth while to see how, not in its essence but in its trappings and adornments, the doctrine has grown in all these years.

There are for Nietzsche, as for Callicles, two moralities, each for its appointed class—the slave-morality based on the calculus of general advantage or the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and the master-morality founded on the rock of power. Of the two the latter is ultimate and absolute ; the former has only relative truth. This herd-morality, this slave-morality, is the morality of democracy and of Socialism : it is also the morality of Christianity. Democracy, Socialism, Christianity, all stand for the advantage of the weak. They are all anarchical, for they all contravene the just hierarchy of nature, whereby the strong rules the weak ; and they all encourage a temper of unstable sentimentality at the expense of disciplined power. Especially does Nietzsche denounce Christianity. It defeats the operations of natural selection : ' Christian altruism is the mob egotism of the weak.' It is a religion of maudlin pity, which preserves the botched, the weak, the degenerate. It is the religion of the infirmary ; and yet again it is the religion of Anarchy, because its object is destruction and the pulling down of the mighty from their seats. Not the dogma but the morality of Christianity is the

object of Nietzsche's attack ; and it is not our Lord, but St. Paul, whom he regards as the founder of this morality. St. Paul was the standard-bearer in a revolt of the decadents. He began the work of destroying the fruits of 'the will to the future of mankind, the great Yea to all things, which was materialized in the *imperium Romanum*' ; and henceforth a legion of 'crafty, stealthy, invisible, anaemic vampires'—St. Augustine for instance—continued his work of destruction. 'St. Paul was a slave-mind . . . with a bad conscience and a thirst for power' (though Nietzsche, by the way, has already denied the existence of conscience and deified the thirst for power) ;

and Paul, this appalling impostor, pandered to the instincts of Chandala (or Slave) morality in those paltry people when he said : Not many mighty, not many noble are called, but God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise.

So through Paul came to pass the revolt of decadence, and the turning of the world into an infirmary peopled by anaemic ascetics, who 'succeeded in transforming Eros and Aphrodite—sublime powers, capable of idealization—into hellish genii and phantom goblins'.

Nietzsche seeks to destroy Christian destruction, and to return to a healthy paganism in which there shall be the drunk delight of battle with peers on ringing windy plains. Not peace, but a sword wielded by the will to power—that is the true way of the world.

Horribly clangs its silvery bow ; and although it comes like the night, war is nevertheless Apollo, the true divinity for consecrating and purifying states. . . . National consumption, as well as individual, admits of a brutal cure. . . . Let the little schoolgirls say : 'To be good is sweet and touching.' Ye say, a good cause will hallow even war ? I say unto you : a good war hallows every cause. War and courage have done greater

things than love of your neighbour.¹ . . . Against the deviation of the State-ideal into a money-ideal the only remedy is war, and once again war, in the emotions of which this at any rate becomes clear, that in love to fatherland and prince the State produces an ethical impulse indicative of a much higher destiny.

Passages such as these would seem to indicate an aggressive and militant nationalism. But Nietzsche is not consistent; and nationalism, as has already been said, is one of his many *bêtes noires*. His constructive ideal is not national, and the war he would preach is not an ordinary battle of the nations. What he seeks is the gradual evolution of the type of man upwards and onwards to the superman. What he desires is an evolution working not through the will to live, but through the will to power, and not blindly, but under the direction of man's progressive intelligence. He would have the strong and vigorous to sort themselves out by struggle, to train themselves for further struggle, and to produce children who should at once inherit², continue, and improve that training, in order that finally, through successive improvements of the stock, a super-species should arise. His ideal may be said to be a sort of combination of Comte and Galton, of Positivism and Eugenics. Like the Positivist, he would abandon theology, and seek a goal in manhood, here on earth; like the Eugenist, he would create the manhood by pure breeding.

Let your will say: the superman shall be the meaning of the earth. I conjure you, my brethren, remain true to the earth, and believe not those who speak to you of hopes beyond the earth. I love him who liveth

¹ This passage is inscribed on the title-page of Bernhardi's *Deutschland und der nächste Krieg*.

² Nietzsche seems to have believed in the inheritance of acquired characteristics.

in order to know, and seeketh to know in order that hereafter the superman may live. I love him who laboureth and investeth that he may build the house for the superman.

At first Nietzsche seems to have thought of the superman as a single individual: he repeatedly speaks of Napoleon. Gradually, however, superman passed into super-species. Of the evolution there were apparently to be three stages: first, an aristocracy to rule all Europe; next, a new European race of 'higher men'; and finally, the race of supermen. It is significant that Nietzsche dreams of a united Europe, or a United States of Europe. Nationalism, in his later years, he abandoned. 'Is there a single idea behind this bovine nationalism?' 'We are not nearly German enough to advocate nationalism and race-hatred.' He emphasizes the unity of European culture, and the coming unity of European economics; he looks to the day when men shall be called in honour Good Europeans, 'the heirs of Europe, the rich, overwealthy heirs, the heirs, only too deeply-pledged, of millennia of European thought.' Already, he feels, in the nineteenth century itself the profoundest spirits have been seeking to anticipate the good European of the future, and they have only fallen back into patriotism when their wings flagged from carrying them further. Of such stuff were Napoleon and Goethe, Beethoven and Heine—men who transcended nationality and transcended the State, 'that coldest of monsters and most frigid of liars', which pretends to be the People, and by the People is detested.

Meanwhile this generation must travail for the future.

Talk not of 'land of my fathers': our bark must steer for the land of our children. Oh my brothers, I consecrate and lead you to a new nobility; ye shall

be to me begetters and trainers and sowers of the future.

In this duty of preparation for the superman the old egoism seems forgotten, or at any rate transmuted into a grave and austere altruism. True, the superman who is to come is a lover of power and not of contentment, of war and not of peace ; true, they from whose loins he shall come must be of like substance. And yet the sacrifice remains. This generation shall not see the superman, but it must surrender itself to his production. That production thus becomes as it were a categorical imperative, and indeed a religion. The will to power abides ; but it is the will to power as it will be embodied in the future race, and not the will to power as it lives in the men of to-day. The men of to-day must possess their souls in rigorous patience, not expanding in opulence, but contracting themselves to a rigid austerity of self-discipline and training. Here Nietzsche turns to Eugenics, and preaches the need of legislation for the race rather than for the individual ; for the future rather than for the present. He turns too to education, not of the masses but of the few men picked for great and lasting work—the aristocracy of good Europeans, the higher men, who shall be bridges to the supermen—men self-disciplined, obedient, faithful ; men of a good courage and a burning hope. So shall heroism (*Heldentum*) come back into honour, and an age shall arise ‘ which will carry heroism into knowledge and wage war for the sake of ideas and their consequences ’—a phrase in which one seems to detect in advance the idea of the culture-war intended to disseminate higher culture among less cultured nations.

It would be difficult to prove that Nietzsche’s doctrine is consistent. His books are a chaos of separate aphor-

isms and aperçus ; and he can at once denounce the State and hold that in war it produces a great ethical impulse—at once laud the will to power, and extol a Spartan self-discipline. His dream of the United States of Europe, and of mankind perfected by Eugenics, may attract, and rightly attract, many noble souls. He did not pander to that exclusive and jealous nationalism which has consumed modern Germany—‘that national heart-itch and blood-poisoning’ which he detested. But as Luther once said, ‘the Word goes into the ordinary man excellent, and comes out of him fleshly.’ *Quicquid recipitur secundum modum recipientis recipitur*. Now Nietzsche, neglected in his lifetime, has been held in great honour since his death ; and tens of thousands of his books have been sold in Germany.¹ He has been ‘received’ ; and it is difficult to believe that he has not been received according to the temper of modern Germany. Anti-nationalist himself, he has nevertheless ministered, by his gospel of power, to the national instinct for subdual. The Germans have felt, no doubt vaguely and almost unconsciously, that they are the European aristocracy, destined to ‘carry heroism into knowledge and to wage war for the sake of ideas’. Their militarism has drawn new encouragement from a praise of struggle which has indeed nothing to do with the mere soldiers’ battle, but which easily slips into a fleshly interpretation. It is quite natural that Bernhardi should quote Nietzsche by name ; and indeed much of Bernhardi is simply Nietzsche transcribed. Take for instance these sayings : ‘Without war, inferior or demoralized races would only too easily swamp the healthy and vital ones, and a general decadence would

¹ The writer’s copy of *Also sprach Zarathustra*, dated 1906, bears the imprint, ‘58th to 61st Thousand’

be the result. War is one of the essential factors of morality.' So has Nietzsche ministered to that which he despised.

Finally, he has helped to swell the contempt and hatred of England which, if one may judge from much recent German literature, is almost a national passion. That 'nation of consummate cant', that 'fundamentally mediocre species', that 'herd of drunkards and rakes', in which slave-morality has reached its zenith, infallibly attracted on its thick head the lightnings of Nietzsche's indignation—as it also attracted on its cunning and diabolical policy the thunders of Treitschke.

III

Treitschke was already a professor of history in Berlin while Nietzsche was a professor of philology at Bâle. Unlike Nietzsche, who was unknown to his own generation, Treitschke had great and abounding vogue during the twenty-two years, from 1874 to 1896, in which he lectured at Berlin. The German professor has always been more closely in contact with affairs of State than the teachers of our English Universities, probably because German Universities are themselves more closely in contact with the State, and probably because learning carries more weight and exerts more influence in Germany than it does in England. German professors of law, like Savigny and Gierke, have left a deep mark on the history of German law, and German professors of history, like Dahlmann and Treitschke, have left a deep mark on the history of German politics. None of them has left a deeper mark than Treitschke. His lectures at Berlin were attended by soldiers and by administrators as well as by students; and the version of German history and the interpretation of political

theory which he taught are living and moulding forces to the present day.

In a country like Germany, with a new Empire not yet irrefragably grounded, and with lines of division still present to separate the Prussians of the north from the Bavarians and other Germans of the south, it is natural that the interpretation of past history should be influenced by, and should in turn be used to influence, the politics of the present. In what is called the Prussian School of History this blending of politics and history is most remarkable. Droysen writes a *History of Prussian Policy* to laud and magnify Prussia; Sybel writes the story of *The Foundation of the German Empire* to justify the ways of Bismarck; Treitschke, greatest of all, writes his *German History* to point the moral that Prussia is the chosen nation of Germany. Thus he has served, in the national politics of Germany, to aid the movement towards Prussianization. He would indeed have preferred to see the incorporation of all Germany in Prussia as a single unitary State in 1870, rather than witness, as he had to do, the institution of a federal Empire. But he consoled himself by thinking and teaching that the Empire was in reality only a greater Prussia, and that, federal as it might seem, it was essentially a unitary State under the King of Prussia in his capacity of Emperor; and he did what in him lay to make his teaching true.

It is in the external politics of Germany, and in her policy in Europe, that the most striking side of Treitschke's influence is to be seen. Here his *Politik* is the crucial book. The *Politik* consists of two volumes based on the notes of the lectures delivered by Treitschke at Berlin, from 1874 onwards, on the science of politics.

Its central tenet and cardinal principle may be summarized in four words: 'the State is Power'. And if we should attempt to descry in advance the bearing of these words, it may be seen in another pithy phrase: 'war is politics *par excellence*'. The cult of power and the praise of war are as much articles of faith with Treitschke as they are with Nietzsche; but the power is the power of Prussia, and the war is the war of Prussia. And then, despite some fundamental similarities, Treitschke had no love for Nietzsche. Nietzsche's 'good European' is a bad Prussian; his 'will to power' is an individual will, and the only power that Treitschke tolerates is the power of the collective national State.

Nationalism, which Nietzsche condemned, is the starting-point and goal of Treitschke. His fundamental postulate may be simply stated. The German nation is and must be supreme and only sovereign of its destinies, and must freely and for itself determine its place in the world. 'Agreed,' most of us will instantly answer. Perhaps we shall not agree so readily if we realize what 'sovereignty' and 'place in the world' really mean. Sovereignty, we shall find, means practical immunity from international obligation; place in the world, we shall find, means nothing fixed or determinate, but all that the sword can carve.

The State is power, says Treitschke, as Machiavelli had said before. It is power, because its highest duty is its self-preservation, and the primary means of its self-preservation is power. But even so, power after all is not an end, but only a means; and it will only be justified if the end is just. Now that end is the preservation of the State. Is the preservation of the State, then, an end so absolute as to justify absolute

power ? To Treitschke the question only admits of an affirmative answer. But why should the preservation of the State be an end so absolute as to justify absolute power ? Because, Treitschke answers, the State is the home and the organ of culture. Now this answer raises difficulties. In the first place, if the fundamental cause of the existence and preservation of the State is culture, then the essential attribute of the State is not power but culture : and the State should be defined not as power, but as the organ of culture, which only uses power as a means to culture, and so far as it is such a means. In the second place, this culture needs definition. Is it something exclusive, something *sui generis*, something absolutely peculiar to each particular State ? If that be assumed, some question may arise of the relative values of the different cultures of different States, and it may be asked whether each and every culture of each and every State is equally valuable and equally final. Or again, is culture something general, something common, something to which all States contribute and in which all States share ? If that be assumed, some question may arise of the need of common action to preserve such common culture, and it may be asked whether such common action, issuing, let us suppose, in a Concert of Europe and a public law of Europe, does not involve some limitation on the absolute and exclusive sovereignty and self-sufficiency of the State.

The assumption which Treitschke makes, and which the Germans generally seem to make, is that the 'culture' of which they love to speak is exclusive, *sui generis*, peculiar to their State. The real hypothesis of all their reasoning is an exclusive nationalism. We read of *Deutsche Treue*, *Deutsche Tapferkeit*, *Deutsche Kultur*, until we begin to realize that the German mind

lives in an exclusively German world of its own. The wind of the spirit, that blows freely through Europe, stops at the Rhine, and a new wind of the German spirit takes its place. East of the Rhine, everything must bear the German print; the vocabulary must be pure German and only German; the very commodities must be German and only German. Now this exclusive national culture of Germany is assumed to be a thing final and ultimate, of final and absolute value; and therefore the State which sustains it is equally final and equally ultimate.

The State is the highest thing in the external society of man; above it there is nothing at all in the history of the world.

This once assumed, its self-preservation, and to that end its power, become imperative.

To care for its power is the highest moral duty of the State. Of all political weaknesses that of feebleness is the most abominable and despicable: it is the sin against the Holy Spirit of politics.

This exclusive nationalism is perhaps not natural to the German; and that may explain why it is so truculently inculcated by Treitschke. In the face of 'particularism', into which the Southern German falls, in the face of cosmopolitanism, for which the assimilative German has a natural instinct, and which some of its greatest thinkers have preached, the Prussian cult (for it is fundamentally Prussian) naturally runs to the other extreme. If that extreme only affected the internal conditions of Germany, as it springs from the internal conditions of Germany, it would be a matter of less concern to the world at large. But it affects all Europe; for the conclusions to which it leads are conclusions that go to determine the policy of Germany

towards other States. And exclusive nationalism, expressing itself in the cult of power, issues in an attitude to the comity of Europe which constitutes a menace to international law and a constant threat of aggressive war.

In discussing international law, Treitschke first states, in order to dismiss, what he regards as two extreme and therefore untenable views. One is the Machiavellian view, which regards the State as mere physical power, able to do whatever it will. This he rejects, because the State is not mere power, but a power with a moral content, which cannot secure its moral ideals internally unless it binds itself by some law externally. The other is the 'Liberal' theory, which 'regards the State as a fine young fellow, who is to be washed and combed and sent to school, and to be thankful and just and God knows what besides'. This theory preaches an imaginary law, laid down *ex cathedra* by professors; but such a law has no sanction and therefore no value, and it would in the last resort demand a Roman pontiff with supreme authority as its executor—a demand which would banish freedom from our beautiful world.

There remains a third view, which Treitschke holds. This view postulates a positive international law, historically developed, which goes on the basis that one must not demand too much from human nature. The foundation of such a law is the principle of give and take, among great States of equal size, which have to live together. That principle demands a system of *great* States, because 'history shows the continuous growth of great States out of decadent small States'—a growth which ends in the great State of adequate size, which is at last ready for peace to protect its existence and its culture. It demands in the second place a system of *equal* States, because no one State should be able to permit itself

to do what it likes without danger to itself. Small States like Belgium and Holland, 'so long the home of international law, to its great loss', are prone to a sentimental view, because they fear aggression; and they demand in the name of humanity concessions at once contrary to the power of the State, unnatural, and unreasonable.

Few people realize to-day how ridiculous it is that Belgium should feel itself the home of international law. A State in an abnormal position must have an abnormal view of international law. Belgium is neutral; it is emasculated (*verstümmelt*); it cannot produce a healthy international law.

On the other hand, over-great States like England have a still worse influence. The overgrown sea-power of England destroys equilibrium at sea. England thus treads international law under her feet; she maltreats neutrals abominably; she insists on a law of war at sea far more inhuman than the law of war on land. Only by building a navy which will produce an equilibrium on the sea can any Power secure humanity and the observance of proper international law.

International law thus represents the rules that result from the equilibrium of great and equal States. But even so it is precarious: it is a law of imperfection. It cannot diminish the sovereignty of the State. 'The State is no violet that blushes unseen: its might must stand out proudly in the light.' When the Ego of its sovereignty is threatened vitally, all bonds are more honoured in the breach than the observance.

It is ridiculous to advise a State which is in competition with other States to start by taking the catechism into its hands.

Not the catechism but the necessity of self-preservation is the canon of its action; and from this canon two results may be deduced. In the

first place, international treaties are no absolute limit, but a voluntary self-limitation, of the State. It has freely restricted itself; it may as freely remove or repudiate the restriction, if there be any vital question of the preservation of itself, its power, and its culture. In the second place, every treaty or obligation of a State must be held to be limited by the proviso *rebus sic stantibus*. 'A State cannot bind its will for the future over against other States'. If historical development changes circumstances, treaties and obligations are *ipso facto* changed and, it may be, nullified. Whether there has been such change is a point which the State itself alone can judge. There is no judge set over the State, and any judgement on this grave issue must be and can only be its own.¹

The ultimate effect of this doctrine is to leave decision not to the scales of justice, but to the arbitrament of the sword. Let us take, for instance, an international guarantee of the neutrality of a State. We may read in Treitschke that 'if a State is not in a position [if, in

¹ How exclusive nationalism affects a writer's attitude to international law may be seen from Bernhardt:

Each nation evolves its own conception of right, each has its particular ideals and aims, which spring with a certain inevitableness from its character and historical life. Even if a comprehensive international code were drawn up, no self-respecting nation would sacrifice its own conception of right to it. By so doing it would renounce its highest ideals: it would allow its own sense of justice to be violated by an injustice.

Bernhardt's references to Belgium are as curious as those of Treitschke. He uses the proviso *rebus sic stantibus* to raise a doubt whether Belgium is neutral to-day:

When she was proclaimed neutral, no one contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory is not *ipso facto* a breach of neutrality.

He adds that 'the conception of permanent neutrality is contrary to the essential nature of the State, which can only attain its highest moral aims in competition with other States'.

other words, it has not a sword of sufficient power] to maintain its neutrality, it is empty words to talk of its neutrality'. To the sword therefore Treitschke turns. Since there is no supreme court of international law, he argues, since history is in a perpetual flux, and historical development makes things stand otherwise than they did, war is justified, and must be conceived as ordained of God.

In 1866 Treitschke thought and said that any dragoon who had struck a Croat down had done more for the cause of Germany than the subtlest head with the best pen. As time went on, this subtle head fell more and more under the glamour of the sword. The German professor lent his pen, as has happened more than once in Germany, to put an ideal interpretation on given facts which in themselves and without such interpretation were somewhat gross; and learning bowed the knee before the soldier as the saviour of culture. Two functions, says Treitschke, belong to the State—the administration of law, and the making of war. It is war that is politics *par excellence*, and war therefore is the great function of the State. It is the great healer; it cannot be thought or wished out of the world, because it is the only medicine for a sick nation. It heals the State by renewing the spirit of membership and of sacrifice. It makes men realize that they are members one of another, and all limbs of one body politic. 'Therein lies the majesty of war, that the petty individual altogether vanishes before the great thought of the State.' And thus 'it is political idealism that involves war'. Nor is war only the sovereign remedy of States; it is also the nurse of the finest virtue of the individual.

What a perversion of morality it were, if one struck heroism out of humanity. . . . But the living God

will see to it that war shall always recur as a terrible medicine for humanity.

This hymn to war carries us back to Nietzsche. But whereas Nietzsche looked to war as a way of evolving a European superman, Treitschke looks to war as the expression of an exclusively national super-nation ; and while Nietzsche loved neither nationalism nor militarism, Treitschke is the lover of both. The danger with which his doctrine menaces Europe is simple. An ardently national State, proud of an exclusive culture which it conceives as the highest thing in the world, is released by his teaching from any real obligations to the public law of the European comity of nations, and armed with the sword for the preservation of its own exclusive culture. The fate of Europe seems to depend on the interpretation which Germany will place on the word ' preservation '. It is difficult not to think that that interpretation has been growing wider and wider. The preservation of German culture has come to mean, as far as one can see, not merely the preservation of the German State but the retention within the Germanic fold of all emigrants, and even the ingathering into the German fold of all the separate elements of the German stock. The policy of retention appears in the efforts made to maintain German schools, German speech, German newspapers in countries, like Brazil, in which there is a large German colony ; the policy of ingathering appears in the Pan-German attitude to countries like Switzerland and Holland. Pan-Germanism is perhaps a matter of words rather than of actual policy. But even a sober judgment may well fear that this concept of the preservation of an exclusive German culture is a real and driving force—so real that it has become something of a religion. It is perhaps extravagant to feel that the Germans have

tended to a certain attitude of mind like that of early Mohammedanism, an attitude of mind based on the conviction that there is one culture, so precious that it may well be spread by the sword ; and yet one may read in the writings of German savants phrases which make one uneasy. One thinker, for instance, can argue that just as a small State cannot afford a *Dreadnought*, so it cannot build any whole and rounded body of culture. A small State, he feels, must be dependent on the great culture-State for the greater part of its spiritual life, and its incorporation in that greater State will only enrich and invigorate its real vitality.

After all, the conception of power, however defensive it may be in the honest opinion of its votaries, and however much it may be used as the servant of the preservation of the State, tends in the long run, and must tend in the long run, to twist round in their hands and to show its offensive edge. Power cannot be the servant of defence ; power in its nature becomes the master of offence. It is true that Germany has to keep watch and ward on the Rhine and the Vistula ; it is true that there are internal forces of cosmopolitanism and particularism against which she has to guard. It is perhaps also true that the means designed to this end are in danger of becoming themselves the end. German culture may seem a precious thing when it is conceived as standing on the defence against the ' Slav menace ' of the East. It does not seem so precious when it becomes a menace itself ; and that follows inevitably when it betakes itself to power as the means of its defence. Culture, after all, is a thing of the spirit ; by the spirit it grows, and by the spirit it is defended. German culture is not really defended against the Slav by the spirit of power which prohibits the use of the Polish language and expropriates

Polish landowners. Not only is it not defended; it is killed. The culture which allies itself to power ceases to be culture and becomes a mere power.

In the year 416 B.C., Thucydides records, a debate was held between the great State of the Athenians and the inhabitants of a small island called Melos, to whom the Athenians offered the alternative between the sword and submission. 'You know as well as we do,' say the Athenians, 'that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.' The Melians plead for consideration of what is fair and right. That, they urge, is a common good. 'Surely you are as much concerned in this as any, since your fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance, and an example to the world.' 'We feel no uneasiness about the end of our Empire,' answer the Athenians; 'that is a risk we are content to take.' And they reiterate their faith in the necessary law of human nature, by which men rule wherever they can. Thus did Athenian culture become Athenian power, and thus did Athens preach that might was right. Even so to-day does Bernhardt, faithful disciple of Treitschke in his attitude to the 'common good' of international law and to the rights of the strong nation armed, preach the equivalence of power and right. Where a growing nation seeks to conquer new territory, 'might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war', which, he adds with a modern refinement, gives 'a biologically just decision'. Marvellous too in his eyes, as in the eyes of the Athenians, is the doctrine 'that the weak nation is to have the same right to live as the powerful and vigorous nation'. Well did Mommsen say to these new Athenians, 'Have a care, gentlemen, lest in this

State, which has been at once a power in arms and in intelligence, the intelligence should vanish, and nothing but the pure military State should remain'.

It is as a great military Power that Germany now stands before the world. She has taken unto herself the ideals of power and might, of massivity and grandiosity. It is colossal ; it is not culture. What we may hope, and hope earnestly and in anguish, is that she will return to worship with her heart the culture to which she pays abundant service of the lips ; that she will enter again into the comity of European States, by sacrificing the false ideal of an exclusive culture guarded by the sword, which in its nature cannot guard it, to the true ideal of a common culture guarded by the Spirit, which alone can kill and make alive ; and that she will again be a king's daughter all glorious within, as she was in those days when, disunited and devoid of ' power ', she gave of her spirit to Europe great music, great poetry, and great philosophy. Thus may she shed that curious paganism, which sees in ' heroism ' the cardinal virtue, and finds heroism only in war ; thus may she return from Nietzsche's ' will to power ' to Luther's justification by faith—from Treitschke's praise of war to Kant's vision of permanent peace.

E. B.

OXFORD,

September 23, 1914.

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OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, AMEN CORNER, LONDON, E.C.

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1914

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SINCE 1867

BY

MURRAY BEAVEN

LECTURER IN MODERN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN

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OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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AUSTRIAN POLICY SINCE 1867

GERMAN *Weltpolitik* can point to one notable achievement. It has succeeded in creating a community of interest between nations so alien from one another in sentiment and traditions as Great Britain and Serbia, Russia and Belgium, France and Japan.

War, like adversity, makes strange bedfellows. It also makes strange antagonists. Among the many seeming anomalies disclosed by the present state of European politics none is more startling than the spectacle of Great Britain at war with Austria-Hungary, a Power with whom she has been united for centuries by close ties of friendship and sympathy. In all the great struggles of modern times, against Louis XIV, the French Revolution, and Napoleon, Great Britain and Austria have co-operated towards the attainment of a common goal, the liberation of Europe. British and Austrian soldiers have fought side by side upon a hundred battle-fields, in Spain, in France, in the Netherlands, in Germany, and upon the shores of the Mediterranean and the Adriatic. There have been occasions when the relations between the two Powers have been strained, as for example when England lent her countenance to Frederick the Great, or again when Napoleon dragged unwilling Austria in his wake on the disastrous march to Moscow in 1812. But these were merely incidents such as may be expected to interrupt the harmony of any long friendship, whether between nations or individuals. Never until August 12

of this year have Great Britain and Austria been at open war.

My object in these few pages is to show how it has come about that Great Britain and Austria are ranged upon opposite sides in the present world-struggle, and why it is that Austria, who has fought so obstinately and honourably in the past to preserve the balance of power among the nations, should now be content to play a part—even if a subordinate and singularly ineffective one—in the great plot to reduce the whole of Europe under German domination. Austria's attitude at this crisis is not the outcome of natural perversity. Her statesmen are not, like those of her ally, animated by sentiments of hatred for Great Britain and France and for the ideals for which those countries stand. Her action is dictated rather by the instinct of self-preservation—in other words, by imperative considerations of policy. It is Austria's misfortune that these considerations of policy should have entangled her in hostility to the Triple Entente, and that the instinct of self-preservation should have impelled her towards a war which can scarcely end otherwise than in her ruin.

Austria's foreign policy differs from that of her neighbours in one important particular. To most great Powers the possession of a foreign policy is something in the nature of a luxury. Mr. Churchill once told us that the German fleet is a luxury: yet what is Germany's fleet but the symbol of her foreign policy, or at least of a very significant aspect of it? Weak States, such as Holland or Norway or Switzerland, dare not aspire to a foreign policy; some strong Powers, such as Russia, the United States, and Japan, can not only afford one, they are in a position to impart to it almost any orientation they please. Great Britain and Austria-

Hungary stand in a different category. The considerations which must govern Great Britain's foreign policy are dictated to her by her geographical position as an island, which makes it a condition of her security that no great military and potentially great naval Power shall be allowed to establish a supremacy over the rest of Europe. Austria's foreign policy is likewise imposed upon her by conditions over which she has no control—not indeed, like our own, by geography, but by ethnography; that is to say, by the racial composition of what Mr. Lloyd-George has bluntly called her 'ramshackle empire'.

The expression may be discourteous, but it is not inaccurate. Austria-Hungary is made up of a hotch-potch of peoples, inspired for the most part by warring traditions and ideals. Some indication of the complexity of Austria's internal problem is furnished by the recent action of the Grand Duke Nicholas, who caused the proclamation which he issued to the inhabitants of the Monarchy upon the entry of the Russian armies into Galicia to be printed in *eleven* different languages. It is not my purpose to dwell upon the geographical distribution and national peculiarities of each of the races to whom the Russian commander addressed his manifesto. It is enough to say that they group themselves into four families, the Germanic (or Austrian), the Magyar (or Hungarian), the Latin, and the Slavonic. Of the Germans and Magyars I need not speak: they constitute the ruling caste in Austria and Hungary respectively. The Latin family embraces at once the Italians of Trieste and the Trentino—the 'Italia Irredenta' of southern dreams—and the Rouman population of the south-eastern district of Hungary, known as Transylvania. The Slavs subdivide into

several minor sections, of which the only one which directly concerns us is the so-called Southern-Slav group, composed of the Serbs and Croatsians, who occupy the whole south-western littoral of the Dual Monarchy from the frontiers of Italy to those of Serbia and Montenegro. It is the conflict of interests and of national aspirations between German and Magyar on the one side, and these Southern Slavs of Bosnia, Croatia, and Slavonia on the other, which has been made the immediate pretext of the present war.

This concentration of so many mutually antagonistic populations under a single sovereignty was held, until recently, to be for the advantage of all concerned. Austria-Hungary was regarded as an element of stability in the continental state-system, the removal of which must convert the whole of South-Eastern Europe into a 'battle-field for the kites and crows'. The famous saying, ascribed to Napoleon, 'If God did not exist it would be necessary to create Him', has been applied to the Empire of the Habsburgs, and represents what until but lately was the commonly accepted view amongst diplomatists. Such a view was justifiable in the days before the principle of Nationality had become a power in Europe: it is no longer tenable now that Germany and Italy have crystallized out of 'geographical expressions' into powerful States, and that a group of small but efficiently governed national kingdoms—Roumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro—has fashioned itself out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. 'On the day when Europe imagines that she has solved the Eastern Question', wrote a French historian some years ago, 'she will inevitably find herself confronted by the Question of Austria;' and for Europe to-day the question of Austria is the

question of the destiny of her Slavonic races. A series of international crises, in each of which Austria has figured as the disturbing factor, had justified M. Sorel's prophecy even before the Dual Monarchy, in an evil hour for itself, lit the torch of the present conflagration. Austria-Hungary to-day stands no longer for peace, but for a sword. She has become the firebrand among the nations, whose extinction must be the indispensable preliminary to the restoration of tranquillity in Europe.

The Question of Austria, in its present acute form, dates from the conclusion of the *Ausgleich*, or Compromise, between Austria and Hungary in 1867—a year which may be taken as the starting-point of modern Habsburg history. The underlying principle of the *Ausgleich*, understanding of which is essential to the comprehension of Austria's foreign policy, was that in each of the two sections into which the Monarchy was henceforth to be divided, both in the Austrian Empire and in the Hungarian Kingdom, German and Magyar must be supreme over Latin and Slav. The spirit which animated both parties to the agreement may be gauged from a remark said to have been made by Count Beust to his Magyar colleague, 'Take care of your barbarians: we will take care of ours'. Hungarian statesmen stood in no need of such advice. The Magyars, in spite of their numerical insignificance, have always conceived their historical 'mission' to be that of a ruling race; they make fit allies for the Prussians, like whom they are accustomed to boast of the superiority of their national 'culture' over that of the surrounding peoples. The Magyarization of the Slavs, Roumans, and Italians has at all times represented the goal of Hungarian statesmanship, and

since 1867 the process has been carried to unexampled lengths. Unhappily for Magyar chauvinists, 'culture' provides but an inadequate substitute for numbers, and the broad fact remains, as a nightmare to German and Magyar alike, that the Slavs constitute a large and ever-increasing majority of the total population of the Habsburg Monarchy.

An internal situation such as this was bound to react unfavourably upon foreign relations. A programme of maintaining the Slav races in subjection at home involved, as its necessary corollary, the pursuit of an anti-Slav policy abroad. Other events contributed to the transition. Expelled from Italy by the loss of Lombardy and Venetia, and excluded from the new Germany which was born at Sadowa and Sedan, Austria found herself released from two embarrassing entanglements and thrown back upon a single line of expansion leading towards the Balkan Peninsula. Whether a policy of expansion was in the true interests of a State already composed of so many heterogeneous elements is open to question; but when the opportunity for putting it into execution arose out of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8 it was eagerly seized. Austria emerged from the Congress of Berlin armed with a mandate to occupy and administer, but not to annex, the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus an additional million and a half of potentially disaffected Slavs were included among the subject races of the Monarchy.

Events have shown that the occupation of Bosnia was a fatal half-measure destined to compromise, perhaps irretrievably, the future of the Habsburg state. That Austria efficiently carried out the task entrusted to her is not now disputed. The disturbed

provinces were effectively 'pacified', western civilization was substituted for oriental anarchy, and the condition of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the date of their definite annexation in 1908 is a standing contradiction of Mr. Gladstone's Midlothian statement, 'There is not a spot upon the map of Europe where you can lay your finger and say, There Austria did good'. But, unfortunately for Austria, her victory for progress in Bosnia was won at the expense of the principle of nationality, and the Serb population of the occupied provinces, in spite of the undeniable material benefits conferred upon them by the change of government, have never become reconciled to Habsburg rule. Moreover, the vice of Austria's action in Bosnia lay deeper still. By the occupation of Turkish territory she assumed the rôle of a Balkan Power, and thereby brought herself into inevitable collision with Russia and with the immense moral forces of the Slav Revival which has resulted from the establishment of independent Slavonic kingdoms to the south of the Danube. Austria was consequently driven by the fear of Russia into the policy of the Triple Alliance, that is to say, into union with the two Powers who had so recently despoiled her—Germany and Italy. Germany and Austria guaranteed each other against the danger of attack from Russia, whilst the former Power also secured herself against the contingency of having to face France in a 'war of revenge' undertaken for the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine. Austria-Hungary could congratulate herself upon having provided for the moment against the 'Slav Peril'; but, on the other hand, the Triple Alliance was the first step along a path which was to lead directly to the subordination of Habsburg to Hohenzollern interests,

and indirectly to the unenviable situation in which the Dual Monarchy finds itself to-day.

[The reply to the Triple Alliance was the Dual Alliance between France and Russia, which, however, was not officially acknowledged until 1896. Both alliances at the outset represented purely defensive combinations; and for twenty years the peace of Europe rested upon a stable basis, for the excellent reason that there was no Power which had anything to gain by imperilling it. We have to remember that the German Empire of the early 'eighties was not the blundering and blustering bully it has since become: the chief anxiety of Bismarck was to retain and, as far as possible, to assimilate what had been gained during the war epoch which had closed in 1871. The days of William II and *Weltpolitik* were not yet. Russia, too, was a factor making for European peace. The Tsar's Government had been disillusioned by the recent trend of events in the Balkans, where its vast expenditure of blood and treasure had brought but little return. The young Balkan States were not slow to prove that they possessed aspirations of their own and that they were not minded to act as Russia's cats'-paws. Infant Bulgaria, in particular, 'astonished the world by her ingratitude': within five years of her creation she had broken away altogether from Russian tutelage. Roumania, too, irritated by the poor reward which she had received from Russia in return for the valuable aid she had rendered at Plevna, attached herself to the Triple Alliance—a policy which she continued to pursue until the morrow of the Balkan Wars in 1913. Thus for a quarter of a century after the Treaty of Berlin the political constellations in the Balkans were adverse to Russia and auspicious for the furtherance of Austrian interests.]

In what did these interests consist? In the first place, it was absolutely vital to the integrity of the Monarchy that no strong and self-sufficing Slavonic State should be allowed to grow to maturity upon its southern frontier and to act as a magnet to the millions of discontented Slavs within its borders. Slav aspirations must not only be suppressed at home; they must be prevented from assuming alarming proportions anywhere within dangerous proximity of the Habsburg boundaries. In other words, the Balkan Peninsula, or at any rate that section of it to the west of a line drawn from Belgrade to Salonica, must constitute an Austrian, not a Russian, sphere of influence. Such a policy must obviously be directed in the first instance against Serbia, whose frontiers marched with those of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and who had acted as Russia's advance-guard in the war of 1877-8. Hence the immediate objective of Austrian statesmen was to maintain Serbia in a position of weakness, and at all costs to prevent the little inland state from uniting with the sister Serb principality of Montenegro and thereby obtaining access to the sea. If Serbia were once to succeed in 'opening a window upon the Adriatic', her economic dependence upon Austria would vanish, and her political emancipation from Habsburg pressure must speedily follow. It was partly with this object in view that Austria had obtained permission from the Powers at Berlin to occupy the region known as the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, and thus, as a glance at the map will show, to drive a wedge between Montenegro and Serbia.

But there was also another reason why Austria was determined that Serbia should never obtain access to the sea. We have to remember that the Dual Monarchy

has insensibly allowed its rôle in the Triple Alliance to degenerate into that of a mere understudy of Germany—a 'brilliant second upon the duelling-ground', as Kaiser Wilhelm once described his ally in a testimonial which was read with undisguised mortification in Vienna. An integral factor in the German project of 'world dominion', which has been evolved at Berlin since the accession of Wilhelm II, is the 'peaceful penetration' of the Ottoman Empire and the extension of German influence through the Balkan Peninsula into Asia Minor and thence by the Bagdad Railway to the Indian Ocean. Austria's part in this grandiose scheme of creating 'a Germanic wedge reaching from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf' is to act as Germany's pioneer in the Balkans and to bear the standard of German 'culture' to the Aegean at Salonica. Now it is obvious that a unified Serb State stretching from Belgrade to the Adriatic must interpose an impassable barrier in the way of Austria's southward advance to the Aegean. Again, Serbia's expansion to the sea, whether by union with Montenegro or by the absorption of Albania, must introduce a new and dubious factor into the complicated problem of the Adriatic, and possibly result in the intrusion of Russian influence into waters which the statesmen of the Triple Alliance regard as an exclusively Austro-Italian preserve. It has always been an axiom with Habsburg diplomats that in any disposition of the spoils of the Turkish Empire the Albanian coastline must fall into no other hands but their own. Hence has arisen at the same time a community and a conflict of interest between Austria and her Italian ally. Italy, like Austria, is resolved that Albania shall not be allowed to become a centre of Slav influence in the Adriatic ;

but she is no less determined that when the time shall come for its allocation to one or other of the European Powers, that Power shall be none other than herself.

Austria's policy in the Balkans is that of the 'offensive-defensive': it is the evil heritage of the *Ausgleich*, which has placed the Dual Monarchy in the position of having to choose between an advance and a retreat which must jeopardize her ascendancy over her Slavonic subjects. Before 1908 it cannot be said that her policy was actually aggressive. Her interest was rather to preserve the *status quo* in the Balkans and to convert it to her own advantage by a policy of 'peaceful penetration'. Such a policy could only prosper so long as the Eastern Question was allowed to slumber: that is to say, so long as Russia abstained from pressing for a solution of those problems which had been shelved at the Congress of Berlin. Fortunately for Austria her rival displayed no anxiety to reopen the Eastern Question. Russia desired to have her hands free in Europe in order to prosecute schemes of aggrandizement in Asia, and thus until the close of the nineteenth century fortune continued to smile upon Habsburg projects. Roumania was openly sympathetic; Bulgaria, at least not hostile; whilst even Serbia, under the degraded rule of King Milan, seemed to acquiesce for a time in the Austrian policy of strangulation. The eclipse of Russian influence in the Balkans at this period is exemplified by the Tsar's famous toast to 'Montenegro, Russia's only sincere and faithful friend'. Austria's high-water mark was reached in 1903, when Russia, upon the eve of the outbreak of war with Japan, acquiesced in the famous Müritzsteg Agreement. The essence of the 'Müritzsteg Programme' was that Russia and Austria should supervise the execution of a joint scheme of reforms in the disturbed

province of Macedonia—in other words, that they should exercise a *condominium* in Turkey-in-Europe. Thus the influence of the Dual Monarchy was extended into a region whither it had never hitherto penetrated, and the dream of an ‘advance to Salonica’ had been brought appreciably nearer to fulfilment.

Five years later, in 1908, an Austrian statesman committed the egregious blunder of reopening the Eastern Question, and from that time onwards Habsburg influence in the Peninsula has waned. How Austria came to take a step so undoubtedly contrary to her interests requires explanation. In 1903 the throne of Serbia passed to the dynasty of the Karageorgevitches, and the Government of Belgrade, alienated by the economic hostility of Austria, which had culminated in 1905–6 in the ‘Pig War’, reverted to a Russophil policy. Meanwhile the political situation had altered, to the disadvantage of Germany and Austria, not only in the Balkans but in Europe at large. Russia emerged from the Japanese War weakened, it is true, in a military sense, but disgusted with Asiatic adventures and full of resentment against Germany, whom she suspected, not without reason, of having inveigled her into the Manchurian entanglement in order to ensure that her hands should be tied when the favourable moment should arrive for the crushing of France—necessarily the first item upon Germany’s programme of World-Dominion. The Tsar’s Government, accordingly, drew closer to Great Britain, with whom France was already united in the Entente Cordiale. In 1907 an Anglo-Russian Agreement was negotiated, and thus the Triple Entente came into being.

This modification of the European situation coincided with a change of personnel at Vienna. Two tragic

figures now invite our attention, those of Count Aehrenthal and the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Both men have since died in the prime of life, and it is therefore impossible to speak with full knowledge of the ideals which inspired two of the most interesting personalities of recent history. Aehrenthal, who became Foreign Minister in 1906, is the less sympathetic figure of the two ; he seems to have aspired to be the Bismarck of the Dual Monarchy, and it is possible that his projects extended even further and that he may have dreamed of transferring the centre of gravity of the Triple Alliance from Berlin to Vienna and Budapest. Austria, he held, should conduct a foreign policy worthy of her position as a Great Power : the Dual Monarchy should demonstrate to Europe that ' the old horse had life in him yet '. The immediate objective of Aehrenthal's ' forward policy ', in the prosecution of which he could count upon the support of his ally, was to be revenged upon Russia for having emancipated herself from German influences and thrown in her lot with the Triple Entente. Where diplomacy had failed, recourse must be had to threats, and Russia must receive a check in the Balkans as an earnest of the consequences to be apprehended from the pursuit of an anti-German policy in Europe.

It is permissible to believe that Francis Ferdinand cherished other and more exalted ambitions. There is strong ground for thinking that the late heir-apparent had pondered, during long years of apprenticeship and self-effacement, over the problems which must some day confront him as Francis Joseph's successor, and that he had formed the opinion that a policy of maintaining the Slavs in perpetual subjection furnished but a slender guarantee for the future of an empire in which the Slav element was numerically preponderant. Francis

Ferdinand was accounted a 'dark horse' whilst he lived, and it may be that projects have been attributed to him which he never in fact entertained. However that may be, he was universally credited with the design of abolishing 'Dualism', and substituting what is known as 'Trialism' as the basis of the Habsburg state. The essence of this scheme lay in the consolidation of all the Serbo-Croatian provinces under Habsburg government into a single Southern-Slavonic kingdom strong enough to take its place by the side of Austria and Hungary in a composite monarchy, the framework of which would henceforth be triple, not dual. Southern Slav was to be admitted to equality with German and Magyar, and the policy of the *Ausgleich* reversed. Moreover, this national Slavonic kingdom might further serve as the nucleus of a still larger organism in which even those fragments of the Serb people at present independent might some day consent to be incorporated. The entire Serbo-Croatian race would thus attain to unity, but under the sceptre of the Habsburgs, not of the Karageorgevitches.

Up to a certain point the designs of Archduke and Foreign Minister ran parallel. Each involved the pursuit of a 'forward policy' in the Balkans and the resumption of Austria's 'march to Salonica'. Aehrenthal's first step towards the coveted goal was to take advantage of the Young Turk Revolution of July, 1908, to reopen the whole Eastern Question by decreeing the definitive annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Dual Monarchy. The immorality of Aehrenthal's action lay not in the annexation itself—Bosnia and Herzegovina had been Austrian territory in all but name for a generation, and there was no more ground for imagining that Austria would ever withdraw from them than for sup-

posing that Great Britain will ever voluntarily evacuate Egypt—but in the diplomatic chicanery by which it was accompanied. Austria cynically tore up the Treaty of Berlin and the more recent Mürzsteg Agreement, Russia was shamelessly tricked, and the indignation of Great Britain and France was excited by the treatment meted out to Turkey. In Serbia and Montenegro Aehrenthal's *coup* evoked a passionate outburst of resentment. So long as Bosnia-Herzegovina had remained even in name an integral part of the Turkish Empire the Serbs of the kingdom and the Principality had never renounced hope of some day effecting a union with their kinsfolk in the occupied provinces. Those hopes were now dashed to the ground. Serbia clamoured for war, Russia lodged an indignant protest, and the ferment in Belgrade and St. Petersburg spread to the Slavs of the Monarchy and awakened an echo even in distant Prague. For some weeks it seemed as if the great duel between Teuton and Slav was about to be decided by force of arms. But at the critical moment, in March, 1909, when war between Russia and Austria appeared to be a question of hours, Germany made her dramatic intervention at St. Petersburg, and the Tsar's Government, realizing that Russia had not yet sufficiently recovered from her Asiatic disasters to risk a rupture with her powerful neighbour, yielded to the threat of immediate hostilities. The Serb States, deserted by their protector, had no choice but to acquiesce in the apparent extinction of their hopes; and thus the crisis was for the moment averted.

It was merely a postponement. In reopening the Eastern Question Aehrenthal had raised a spectre which Austrian diplomacy has since proved unable to lay. It was not to be expected that the Tsar would forget the

humiliation which he had suffered at the hands of Austria's 'ally in shining armour'; and from 1909 onwards Russia has been consciously preparing for the struggle which was plainly inevitable. For two years, however, the Balkan cauldron merely simmered, whilst Great Britain and Germany strove for the diplomatic mastery at Constantinople. Germany won the day, and the foreign policy of the Young Turks henceforward became more Germanophil even than that of Abdul Hamid himself. Meanwhile Italy was the next great Power to take advantage of the internal convulsions of the Turkish Empire. Profiting by the preoccupation of her German ally in the Morocco Question, she determined to press her own claims upon the Mediterranean seaboard of Africa; and in the autumn of 1911 she declared war upon Turkey and invaded Tripoli. We have the sanction of no less an authority than General Bernhardt for the statement that Italy's action in Tripoli was the outcome of 'an undisguised arrangement with Great Britain and France, in direct opposition to the interests of the Triple Alliance'. Germany was placed in a position of extreme difficulty between her obligations to her Italian 'ally' and to her Turkish friend; whilst at the same time the Turco-Italian conflict served to bring into prominence the acute rivalry which has always existed between Austrian and Italian interests in the Adriatic. The operations of the Italian fleet off the coasts of Albania brought the two allies, as Bernhardt confesses, 'to the brink of war'. Thus the first-fruits of Aehrenthal's annexation of Bosnia had been the estrangement of Italy, the resentment of Russia, and, most ominous of all, the consolidation of Slav sentiment throughout Eastern Europe.

The Turco-Italian War is one of the least interesting

in history ; but it must rank amongst the most momentous in its consequences, for it sounded the knell of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. The Tripolitan campaign had exposed the military impotence of Turkey and excited the cupidity of her Balkan neighbours at the same time that their indignation was kindled by the atrocities which disgraced the Young Turkish régime in Macedonia. During the winter of 1911-12 the Balkan League came into being, and the Slav States of the Peninsula agreed to sink their mutual jealousies and to make common cause against a common foe. Roumania alone preferred to stand outside the combination and to adhere, as in the past, to the Germanic interest. We know now that the idea of a Balkan League did not emanate, as was supposed at the time, from Russia, much less, as an imaginative American writer asserts, from the Powers of the Triple Alliance. The League was indigenous in its origin ; the initiative towards its formation was taken by the Balkan States themselves, in particular by Greece, and the credit for having contributed to bring the negotiations to a successful issue must be ascribed in large measure to an English journalist. At the same time the establishment of the League constituted a diplomatic triumph for Russia. To Austria, on the other hand, it was a stunning blow. Austria's attitude towards the Balkan kingdoms, as towards her own subject peoples, has always been dictated by the principle *divide et impera*—‘create dissensions, if you wish to rule’. Ever since 1867 Habsburg statesmen have lived in fear of the formation even of a single strong Slavonic state, let alone of a combination of such states, upon the frontiers of Hungary and Bosnia. The danger which Austria dreaded had at last become real. To such a pass had Aehrenthal's ‘forward policy’

brought the empire whose destinies had been entrusted to him.

But whilst the League was still in embryo Aehrenthal himself disappeared from the scene. He retired from office early in 1912, and his premature death followed shortly afterwards. If Aehrenthal may be regarded as the evil genius of Austria, his successor, Count Berchtold, has contrived to bring the Dual Monarchy apparently to the verge of ruin. It is true that the problem which confronted the new Foreign Minister was one of extreme difficulty—nay more, that it was one which probably did not admit of solution in a sense favourable to Habsburg interests. A brief campaign at the end of 1912 laid Turkey prostrate at the feet of the Allies, and Austria saw her interests threatened in almost every quarter of the Peninsula. It was not enough that Serbs and Montenegrins should have joined hands in the Sanjak, which had so long sundered them; worse than this, whilst the Montenegrins laid siege to Scutari, the metropolis of northern Albania, the Serbs penetrated further to the south and west and fought their way to the Adriatic at Durazzo. Austria's path to the Aegean was effectively closed, and Salonica itself, the goal of Habsburg ambitions in the Balkans, fell into the hands of the Greeks. To complete the discomfiture of Pan-German intriguers the Ottoman Empire, which had shown itself the willing tool of Hohenzollern and Habsburg, appeared to be fatally crippled, whilst the Dual Monarchy was faced by the peril of an aggrandized Serbia who might be suspected of the design to conduct a subversive nationalist propaganda amongst the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The battle which Austrian statesmen had been waging for a generation was plainly lost; but it might

still be possible to save something from the *débâcle* and to obviate the most fatal effects of the catastrophe. The most immediately pressing need was that the Balkan League should be dissolved, and the newly-found unity of the Slav States shattered. Certain sacrifices, it is true, were inevitable; the Allies could not be altogether deprived of the fruits of victory. Austria had already withdrawn her troops from the Sanjak in 1909—a concession which her statesmen have never ceased to account unto themselves for righteousness: she now consented that the coveted province should be partitioned between Serbs and Montenegrins, and thus renounced, to all appearances, her programme of advance to the Aegean. But on the question of Scutari and Durazzo, Austria stood firm. Albania could not be allowed to become a Serbian, in other words a Russian, sphere of influence; if Serbia desired access to the sea she must find it through the Montenegrin port of Antivari. Since Albania could not be restored to Turkey, Albania must be constituted an independent State. The cry of ‘Albania for the Albanians’ was in reality the trump card in the diplomatic game. In proposing this solution, Austria would be able to count upon the diplomatic support of Italy, who was as much interested as herself in preventing the Adriatic seaboard from falling into the hands of a third party; whilst by insisting on the expulsion of the Serbians, Count Berchtold might even achieve the feat of ‘killing two birds with a single stone’. Serbia, if forbidden to expand into Albania, would inevitably demand compensation in another quarter, and that other quarter could only be Macedonia, the lion’s share of which her Bulgarian ally had already earmarked for herself. In other words, an opportunity

would be provided of driving a wedge between Serbia and Bulgaria, and perhaps of bringing about a total disruption of the League. It was even possible that Serbia and Bulgaria might actually go to war, and that the latter Power would pick Austria's chestnuts out of the fire for her by disposing of the Serbian bogey for good and all.

The scheme was Machiavellian, and it came within measurable distance of success. The Serbs were duly ejected from Durazzo, and the 'Powers', after much wrangling, recognized Albania as an independent State. The question of Scutari, however, brought Europe to the verge of war. King Nicholas pleaded hard for permission to keep his 'ewe lamb'; but Austria was adamant, Russia gave counsels of moderation, and ultimately the Montenegrins were induced to evacuate their conquest. Moreover, Count Berchtold succeeded in hitting the more distant mark at which he was aiming. Serbia demanded from her ally a larger share of Macedonia than had been assigned to her before the war; but Bulgaria, doubtless stiffened by Austrian backing, refused to abate one jot of her pretensions, and a rift was thus opened between Serbia and Greece on the one side and Bulgaria on the other. The Balkan League had crumbled to pieces.

Austrian diplomacy appeared to have scored an easy triumph, but as a matter of fact Count Berchtold had committed two mistakes. It was a cardinal error to stake the foreign policy of the Monarchy upon a very problematical victory for Bulgaria in the event of the quarrel between the Allies developing into an armed conflict. The Austrian Foreign Office seems to have been singularly ill-served during recent years by the General Staff: Austrian estimates of the value

of the armies of foreign Powers—and, indeed, of their own—have invariably been falsified by the event. Up to the last moment in 1912 Austrian military experts had clung to the delusion that the Turks would dispose of the armies of the Balkan League, and there can be no doubt that in 1913 Berchtold looked to Bulgaria, 'the Prussia of the Balkans', to make short work of the Serbs and Greeks. A scarcely less costly blunder was the alienation of Roumania. That little Latin State had proved herself in the past a valuable ally to the Dual Monarchy. She had abstained from throwing in her lot with the League in the days of its prosperity, and she now demanded from Bulgaria a slight rectification of frontier by way of 'compensation' for her neighbour's aggrandizement in Macedonia. It was natural that she should look to Austria to uphold her interests; but Count Berchtold displayed marked reluctance to put pressure upon a Government on whom he was relying to fight Austria's battle against the Serb peril, and thus Roumania's claims were only partially satisfied. Roumania bided her time, but she did not forget the slight.

Count Berchtold had alienated Roumania in order to conciliate Bulgaria. The extent of his miscalculations was soon apparent. Bulgaria, determined to prove herself 'the Prussia of the Balkans' in more senses than one, attacked her allies without any declaration of war. Roumania—undoubtedly with the connivance of Russia, who was not unwilling to see Bulgaria chastised for having allowed herself to be used as Austria's cat's-paw—threw her sword into the scale on the side of Serbia and Greece. A month's campaign (July, 1913) sufficed to bring the Allies within striking distance of Sofia, whilst the Turks took advantage of their late

adversary's embarrassment to recover Adrianople and part of Thrace. Count Berchtold realized, too late, that he had 'put his money on the wrong horse'. Roumania, not Bulgaria, was left the arbiter of the situation, and the Treaty of Bucharest embodied a settlement which coincided with the views of Roumanian diplomatists. Macedonia was partitioned in accordance with the aspirations of Serbs and Greeks, and a balance of power was established between the kingdoms of the Peninsula, amongst whom, however, Roumania was left with the determining voice. Serbia, so far from being crushed as Berchtold had anticipated, had emerged yet stronger and more self-confident from her second ordeal.

The situation created by the Treaty of Bucharest was one in which it was impossible for Austria to acquiesce indefinitely. Count Berchtold has since admitted to Sir Maurice de Bunsen that he regarded the settlement of 1913 as 'of a highly artificial character', and that 'he had never had much belief in its permanence'. The original Balkan League had vanished, but a new and more threatening confederacy had taken its place. The alliance of Roumania, Serbia, and Greece was distinctly more alarming to Austrian statesmen than the earlier combination of the latter two Powers with Bulgaria. Serbian and Bulgarian aspirations had clashed in Macedonia; whereas Serbia and Roumania possessed a genuine community of interest in their mutual concern for the future of the Serbs and Roumans still 'groaning beneath the Habsburg yoke'. It could hardly be doubted that this alliance, originally called into being to withstand Bulgaria's pretensions to the hegemony of the Balkans, must sooner or later come to be directed immediately against

the Dual Monarchy. Moreover, sundry developments in the spring of the present year tended to confirm Habsburg statesmen in the conviction which had long been growing, that Aehrenthal's precipitancy in reopening the Eastern Question had forged a knot which it was beyond the skill of mere diplomacy to untie. The visit of Nicholas II to Constanza showed that Russia was alive to the significance of the League, and that Roumania, so long regarded as an Austrian satellite, was steadily gravitating towards the Russian orbit. Again, Prince William's brief and burlesque career as the ruler of independent Albania had lasted long enough to emphasize the conflict between Austrian and Italian interests in the Adriatic. A prolongation of the experiment could scarcely fail to drive Italy into the hostile camp, especially since she, no less than Serbia and the sister Latin kingdom of Roumania, was vitally interested in the solution of the 'Austrian Question'. Most ominous of all, the growing ferment amongst the Slavs of the Monarchy, the inevitable and foreseen result of Serbia's aggrandizement, was already awakening an echo among the Roumans of Transylvania.

The 'Question of Austria', in a word, was growing ripe for solution. It was not to the interest of German and Magyar to delay the issue. Every year might be expected to see the Balkan League grow stronger, Russia more prepared, and the hostility of Italy more undisguised. Every day must bring the aged Francis Joseph closer to the tomb, and the crazy structure of which his personality constituted the chief cement, nearer to its inevitable collapse. War at no distant date was certain: it was well that it should come whilst Francis Joseph was still alive, whilst Italy and

Roumania might be regarded as possible neutrals, and before Serbia had recovered from two exhausting campaigns. And if Austria stood to gain by an immediate decision, still more was it to the interest of her ally to precipitate the crisis. If Germany must face the world in arms—an event which twenty years of a ‘ Mailed Fist ’ policy had rendered inevitable—it was clearly desirable to force matters to an issue before one partner to the Triplice had perished of internal combustion and the other had gone over to the enemy. What observers of Near Eastern politics had foreseen ever since the Eastern Question was reopened has come to pass. The emergence of the ‘ Austrian Question ’ and the danger of the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy have impelled the German military caste to a premature avowal of its plans. The Kaiser’s hand has been forced whilst the trump card of naval supremacy is still in his opponent’s possession. Germany, in a word, has chosen the ‘ Day ’, but the day which she has chosen is not the day which she would have chosen to choose.

Nothing save a pretext was wanting to plunge the world into war. At the psychological moment a *casus belli* was forthcoming in the assassination of Francis Ferdinand and his wife in the Bosnian capital on June 28—a crime which the Austro-Hungarian Government immediately attributed to Serbian conspirators. Who planned the murder of the Archduke we do not know, probably we shall never know ; but we do know the value of the evidence which the statesmen of the Dual Monarchy did not scorn to bring forward upon the last occasion when the exigencies of their foreign policy rendered it desirable to frame an indictment against the Serbian people.¹ Speculation as to the responsibility for

¹ A detailed account of the Agram and Friedjung Trials of 1908–9

the deed is profitless : if we apply the motto *cui bono* ? we are forced to the conclusion that the most conflicting interests stood to profit by Francis Ferdinand's 'removal'. If the success of the Archduke's Trialist schemes would have imperilled the fulfilment of Serbian national aspirations, it is no less true that it would have sounded the death-knell of German and Magyar ascendancy within the Habsburg Monarchy. In any case it will perhaps be wise not to invest the murder of Francis Ferdinand with undue historical significance. Evidence is gradually accumulating to show that minute preparations for an immediate war were already in progress upon the side of Germany and Austria some days before the crime at Sarajevo.

There is a tendency in this country to distinguish between Germany and Austria, and to cast upon the former Power the sole responsibility for the present conflict. But it is not easy to see how Germany's ally can be exonerated. The terms of the Austrian note of July 23, a document surely unique amongst ultimatums, leave no room for doubt that Austria desired war with Serbia, and if war with Serbia, war with Russia ; for it is impossible to believe that Count Berchtold allowed himself to be deluded into imagining that Russia would sit still under another such humiliation as she had suffered in 1909. Nor can Austria's apologists plead that her statesmen exerted themselves in the smallest degree to avert the threatening conflagration. Austria's

may be found in *The Southern-Slav Question*, by Scotus Viator (R. W. Seton-Watson). The Friedjung Trial, the interest of which eclipses that of the Dreyfus Case, established the fact that the allegations upon which the projected Austrian declaration of war against Serbia in 1909 was to have been based were founded upon documents fabricated in the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade.

twelfth-hour repentance, to which the British Ambassador refers in his message of September 1 to Sir Edward Grey, is rendered suspect by the fact that the concessions which, according to Sir M. de Bunsen, 'might have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history', were withheld until *after Germany had already dispatched her ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris*—in other words, until a pacific solution of the crisis had been rendered impossible. All the evidence goes to show that this is Austria's, no less than Germany's war.

Nevertheless it is possible to discriminate between the allies. Germany is animated by offensive, Austria-Hungary primarily by defensive ambitions. Government and people of the Dual Monarchy are alike convinced that they have no alternative save to subdue Serbia or sooner or later to submit to mutilation at her hands. Bernhardt's rallying-cry, *Weltmacht oder Niedergang*—'World-Dominion or Downfall'—is singularly appropriate to the position in which Germany and Austria stand to-day. Germany draws the sword inspired by a hope; Austria, haunted by a fear. Germany deems that the hour has struck to translate her vision of *Weltmacht* into substance; Austria trembles lest the war which she has provoked with the object of averting, may merely accelerate her inevitable *Niedergang*.

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OXFORD PAMPHLETS

1914

THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE

versus

THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

BY

JAMES M. BECK

FORMER ASSISTANT ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Price Threepence net

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

HUMPHREY MILFORD

LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW

NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY

OXFORD: HORACE HART
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

INTRODUCTION

MR. JAMES M. BECK, a distinguished American lawyer, was lately invited by the *New York Times* to review the British and German White Books. Many such reviews have been written here and in the United States. But Mr. Beck conceived the happy idea of treating these official documents precisely as they would be treated in a court of law. It was a natural course to put a review of such a kind, based upon the lawyer's canons of evidence, in the form of a legal judgment. Mr. Beck handles his intricate subject so lightly and so clearly that even those who are well acquainted with his subject-matter may find it profitable to study his presentment of the two conflicting cases, and the grounds of his final decision. I am indebted to the publishers of the *New York Times* and to Mr. Beck for their courtesy in permitting republication.

H. W. C. D.



The Case of
THE DOUBLE ALLIANCE
VS.
THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

Argued by JAMES M. BECK, *Former Assistant Attorney-General of the United States.*

LET us suppose that in this year of dis-Grace, Nineteen Hundred and Fourteen, there had existed, as let us pray will one day exist, a Supreme Court of Civilization, before which the sovereign nations could litigate their differences without resort to the iniquitous and less effective appeal to the arbitrament of arms.

Let us further suppose that each of the contending nations had a sufficient leaven of Christianity to have its grievances adjudged not by the ethics of the cannon or the rifle, but by the eternal criterion of justice.

What would be the judgment of that august tribunal?

Any discussion of the ethical merits of this great controversy must start with the assumption that there is such a thing as international morality.

This fundamental axiom, upon which the entire basis of civilization necessarily rests, is challenged by a small class of intellectual perverts.

Some of these hold that moral considerations must be subordinated either to military necessity or so-called manifest destiny. This is the Bernhardi doctrine.

Others teach that war is a beneficent fatality and that all nations engaged in it are therefore equally justified. On this theory, all of the now contending nations are but victims of an irresistible current of events, and the highest duty of the State is to prepare itself for the systematic extermination, when necessary, of its neighbors.

Notwithstanding the clever platitudes under which both these doctrines are veiled, all morally sane minds are agreed that this war is a great crime against civilization, and the only open question is, which of the two contending groups of powers is morally responsible for that crime ?

Was Austria justified in declaring war against Servia ?

Was Germany justified in declaring war against Russia and France ?

Was England justified in declaring war against Germany ?

As the last of these questions is the most easily disposed of, it may be considered first.

England's Justification.

England's justification rests upon the solemn treaty of 1839, whereby Prussia, France, England, Austria, and Russia ' became the guarantors ' of the ' perpetual neutrality ' of Belgium, as reaffirmed by Count Bismarck, then Chancellor of the German Empire, on July 22, 1870, and as even more recently reaffirmed in the striking fact disclosed in the Belgian ' Grey Book '.

In the Spring of 1913, a debate was in progress in the Budget Committee of the Reichstag with reference to the Military Budget. In the course of the debate the Germany Secretary of State said :

‘The neutrality of Belgium is determined by international conventions, *and Germany is resolved to respect these conventions.*’

To confirm this solemn assurance, the Minister of War added in the same debate :

‘Belgium does not play any part in the justification of the German scheme of military reorganization. The scheme is justified by the position of matters in the East. *Germany will not lose sight of the fact that Belgian neutrality is guaranteed by international treaties.*’

A year later, on July 31, 1914, Herr von Below, the German Minister at Brussels, assured the Belgian Department of State that he knew of a declaration which the German Chancellor had made in 1911, to the effect ‘that Germany had no intention of violating our neutrality’, and ‘that he was certain that the sentiments to which expression was given at that time *had not changed*’. (See Belgian ‘Gray Book’, Nos. 11 and 12.)

It seems unnecessary to discuss the wanton disregard of these solemn obligations and protestations, when the present Chancellor of the German Empire, in his speech to the Reichstag and to the world on August 4, 1914, frankly admitted that the action of the German military machine in invading Belgium was a wrong. He said :

‘We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. *Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law.* It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as her opponent respects it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for invasion. France could wait, but we could not wait. A French movement upon our flank upon the lower Rhine might

have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. *The wrong—I speak openly—that we are committing* we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only have one thought—how he is to hack his way through.'

This defense is not even a plea of confession and avoidance. It is a plea of 'Guilty' at the bar of the world. It has one merit, that it does not add to the crime the aggravation of hypocrisy. It virtually rests the case of Germany upon the gospel of Treitschke and Bernhardi, that each nation is justified in exerting its physical power to the utmost in defense of its selfish interests. There is no novelty in this gospel. Its only surprising feature is its revival in the twentieth century. It was taught far more effectively by Machiavelli in his treatise, 'The Prince', wherein he glorified the policy of Cesare Borgia in trampling the weaker States of Italy under foot by ruthless terrorism, unbridled ferocity, and the basest deception. Indeed, the wanton destruction of Belgium is simply Borgiaism amplified ten thousandfold by the mechanical resources of modern war.

Unless our boasted civilization is the thinnest veneering of barbarism; unless the law of the world is in fact only the ethics of the rifle and the conscience of the cannon; unless mankind after uncounted centuries has made no real advance in political morality beyond that of the cave dweller, then this answer of Germany cannot satisfy the 'decent respect to the opinions of mankind'. Germany's contention that a treaty of peace is 'a scrap of paper', to be disregarded at will when required by the selfish interests of one contracting party, is the negation of all that civilization stands for.

Belgium has been crucified in the face of the world. Its innocence of any offense, until it was attacked, is too clear for argument. Its voluntary immolation to preserve its solemn guarantee of neutrality will 'plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against the deep damnation of its taking off'. On that issue the Supreme Court could have no ground for doubt or hesitation. Its judgment would be speedy and inexorable.

A War of Diplomats.

The remaining two issues, above referred to, are not so simple. Primarily and perhaps exclusively, the ethical question turns upon the issues raised by the communications which passed between the various Chancellories of Europe in the last week of July, for it is the amazing feature of this greatest of all wars that it was precipitated by diplomats and, assuming that all the diplomats sincerely desired a peaceful solution of the questions raised by the Austrian ultimatum (which is by no means clear), it was the result of ineffective diplomacy and clumsy diplomacy at that.

I quite appreciate the distinction between the immediate causes of a war and the anterior and more fundamental causes; nevertheless, with the world in a state of Summer peace on July 23, 1914, an issue, gravely affecting the integrity of nations and the balance of power in Europe, is suddenly precipitated by the Austrian ultimatum, and thereafter and for the space of about a week a series of diplomatic communications passed between the Chancellories of Europe, designed on their face to prevent a war and yet so ineffective that the war is precipitated and the fearful Rubicon crossed before the world knew, except imperfectly, the nature of the differences between the Governments involved.

The ethical aspects of this great conflict must largely depend upon the record that has been made up by the official communications, which can, therefore, be treated as documentary *evidence* in a litigated case.

A substantial part of that record is already before the court of public opinion in the British and German 'White Papers' and the Russian 'Orange Paper', and the purpose of this article is to discuss what judgment an impartial and dispassionate court would render upon the issues thus raised and the evidence thus submitted.

The Suppression by Germany and Austria of Vitally Important Documents.

Primarily such a court would be deeply impressed not only by what the record as thus made up discloses, *but also by the significant omissions of documents known to be in existence.*

The official defense of England and Russia does not apparently show any failure on the part of either to submit all of the documents in their possession, but *the German 'White Paper' on its face discloses the suppression of documents of vital importance, while Austria has as yet failed to submit any of the documentary evidence in its possession.*

We know from the German 'White Paper'—even if we did not conclude as a matter of irresistible inference—that many important communications passed in this crisis between Germany and Austria, and it is probable that some communications must also have passed between those two countries and Italy. Italy, despite its embarrassing position, owes to the world the duty of a full disclosure. What such disclosure would probably show is indicated by her deliberate conclusion

that her allies had commenced an *aggressive* war, which released her from any obligation under the Triple Alliance.

The fact that communications passed between Berlin and Vienna, the text of which has never been disclosed, is not a matter of conjecture. Germany admits and asserts as part of her defense that she faithfully exercised her mediatory influence with Austria, but not only is such mediatory influence not disclosed by any practical results of such mediation, but the text of these vital communications is still kept in the secret archives of Berlin and Vienna.

Thus in the official apology for Germany it is stated that, in spite of the refusal of Austria to accept the proposition of Sir Edward Grey to treat the Servian reply 'as a basis for further conversations',

'we [Germany] continued our mediatory efforts to the *utmost* and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy.'¹

This would be more convincing if the German Foreign Office in giving other diplomatic documents had only added the *text* of the advice which it thus gave Vienna.

The same significant omission will be found when the same official defense states that on July 29 the German Government advised Austria 'to begin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof'. But here again the *text* is not found among the documents which the German Foreign Office has given to the world. The communications, which passed between that office and its Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, are given *in extenso*, but among the twenty-seven communications appended to the German official defense it is most

¹ German 'White Paper'.

significant that not a single communication is given of the many which passed from Berlin to Vienna and only one that passed from Vienna to Berlin. This cannot be an accident. Germany has seen fit to throw the veil of secrecy over the text of its communications to Vienna, although professing to give the purport of a few of them.

Until Germany is willing to put the most important documents in its possession in evidence, it must not be surprised that the world, remembering Bismarck's garbling of the Ems dispatch, which precipitated the Franco-Prussian war, will be incredulous as to the sincerity of Germany's mediatory efforts.

Austria's Case against Serbia.

To discuss the justice of Austria's grievances against Serbia would take us outside the documentary record and into the realm of disputed facts and would expand this discussion far beyond reasonable length.

Let us therefore suppose *arguendo* that our imaginary court would commence its consideration with the assumption that Austria had a just grievance against Serbia, and that the murder of the Archduke on June 29, 1914, while in fact committed by Austrian citizens of Servian sympathies on Austrian soil, had its inspiration and encouragement in the political activities either of the Servian Government or of political organizations of that country.

The question for decision would then be not whether Austria had a just grievance against Serbia, but whether having regard to the obligations which Austria, as well as every other country, owes to civilization, she proceeded in the right manner to redress her grievance.

The Secrecy of the Plan of the Double Alliance.

On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Crown Prince was murdered at Serajevo. For nearly a month there was no action by Austria, and no public statement whatever of its intentions. The world profoundly sympathized with Austria in its new trouble, and especially with its aged monarch, who like King Lear was 'as full of grief as years and wretched in both'.

The Servian Government had formally disclaimed any complicity with the assassination, and had pledged itself to punish any Servian citizen implicated therein.

From time to time, from June 28 to July 23, there came semi-inspired intimations from Vienna that that country intended to act with great self-restraint and in the most pacific manner. Never was it even hinted that Germany and Austria were about to apply in a time of profound peace a match to the powder-magazine of Europe.

This is strikingly shown by the first letter in the English 'White Paper' from Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, dated July 20, 1914. It is one of the most significant documents in the entire correspondence. At the time this letter was written it is altogether probable that Austria's arrogant and most unreasonable ultimatum had already been framed and approved in Vienna, and possibly in Berlin, and yet Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister of a great and friendly country, had so little knowledge of Austria's policy that he

'asked the German Ambassador to-day (July 20) if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia.' The German Ambassador replied 'that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step'.

Sir Edward Grey adds that he told the German Ambassador that he had learned that Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister,

‘in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up’.

The German Minister then replied that it would be desirable ‘if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia’, so that the first suggestion of Russia playing the part of the peacemaker came from the German Ambassador in London. Sir Edward Grey then adds that he told the German Ambassador that he

‘assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial’,

and the German Ambassador assented to this assumption.¹

Either the German Ambassador was then deceiving Sir Edward Grey, on the theory that the true function of an Ambassador is ‘to lie for his country’, or the thunderbolt was being launched with such secrecy that even the German Ambassador in England did not know what was then in progress.

The British Ambassador at Vienna reports to Sir Edward Grey :

‘The delivery at Belgrade on the 23d July of the note to Servia was preceded by a period of *absolute silence* at the Ballplatz.’

He proceeds to say that with the exception of the German Ambassador at Vienna—note the significance of the exception—not a single member of the Diplo-

¹ English ‘White Paper’, No. 1.

matic Corps knew anything of the Austrian ultimatum and that the French Ambassador when he visited the Austrian Foreign Office on July 23 was not only kept in ignorance that the ultimatum had actually been issued, but was given the impression that its tone was moderate. Even the Italian Ambassador was not taken into Count Berchtold's confidence.¹

Did Germany Know Of or Inspire the Ultimatum ?

The interesting and important question here suggests itself whether Germany had knowledge of and approved in advance the Austrian ultimatum. If it did, it was guilty of duplicity, for the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg gave to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs an express assurance that

*'the German Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was handed in and has not exercised any influence on its contents. It is a mistake to attribute to Germany a threatening attitude'.*²

This statement is inherently improbable. Austria was the weaker of the two Allies and it was Germany's sabre that it was rattling in the face of Europe. Obviously Austria could not have proceeded to extreme measures, which it was recognized from the first would antagonize Russia, unless she had the support of Germany, and there is a probability, amounting to a moral certainty, that she would not have committed herself and Germany to the possibility of a European war without first consulting Germany.

¹ Dispatch from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, dated September 1, 1914.

² Russian 'Orange Paper', No. 18.

Moreover, we have the testimony of Sir M. de Bunsen, the English Ambassador in Vienna, who advised Sir Edward Grey that he had 'private information that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was dispatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor', and that the German Ambassador himself 'indorses every line of it'.¹ As he does not disclose the source of his 'private information', this testimony would not by itself be convincing, but when we examine Germany's official defense in the German 'White Paper', we find that the German Foreign Office admits that it was consulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum and not only approved of Austria's course but literally gave her a *carte blanche* to proceed.

This point seems so important in determining the sincerity of Germany's attitude and pacific protestations that we quote *in extenso*. After referring to the previous friction between Austria and Serbia, the German 'White Paper' says :

'In view of these circumstances Austria had to admit that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the Monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the border without taking action. *The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of this view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter. We were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in Serbia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would receive our approval. We were fully aware in this connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Serbia would bring Russia*

¹ English 'White Paper', No. 95.

into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with our duties as an ally.'

Sir M. de Bunsen's credible testimony is further confirmed by the fact that the British Ambassador at Berlin in his letter of July 22, to Sir Edward Grey, states that *on the preceding night* (July 21) he had met the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and an allusion was made to a possible action by Austria.

'His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that the question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries.'

He adds that while he had regarded it as inadvisable that his country should approach Austria-Hungary in the matter, he had

'on several occasions in conversation with the Servian Minister emphasized the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing'.¹

Here we have the first statement of Germany's position in the matter, a position which subsequent events showed to be entirely untenable, but to which Germany tenaciously adhered to the very end, and which did much to precipitate the war. Forgetful of the solidarity of European civilization, and the fact that by policy and diplomatic intercourse continuing through many centuries a United European State exists, even though its organization be as yet inchoate, he took the ground that Austria should be permitted to proceed to aggressive measures against Servia without interference from any other Power, even though, as was

¹ English 'White Paper', No. 2.

inevitable, the humiliation of Serbia would destroy the status of the Balkan States and even threaten the European balance of power.

No space need be taken in convincing any reasonable man that this Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable in its demands. It would be difficult to find in history a more offensive document, and its iniquity was enhanced by the short shriving time which it gave either Serbia or Europe. Serbia had forty-eight hours to answer whether it would compromise its sovereignty, and virtually admit its complicity in a crime which it had steadily disavowed. As the full text of the ultimatum first reached the Foreign Chancelleries nearly twenty-four hours after its service upon Serbia, the other European nations had barely a day to consider what could be done to preserve the peace of Europe before that peace was fatally compromised.¹

Further confirmation that the German Foreign Office did have advance knowledge of at least the substance of the ultimatum is shown by the fact that on the day the ultimatum was issued the Chancellor of the German Empire instructed the German Ambassadors in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg to advise the English, French, and Russian Governments that

‘the acts as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government cannot but be looked upon as justified’.²

How could Germany thus indorse the ‘demands’ if it did not know the substance of the ultimatum?

The hour when these instructions were sent is not given,

¹ English ‘White Paper’, No. 5; Russian ‘Orange Paper’, No. 3.

² German ‘White Paper’, Annex 1 B.

so that it does not follow that these significant instructions were necessarily prior to the service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 P.M. Nevertheless, as the ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of Europe until the following day, as the diplomatic correspondence clearly shows, it seems improbable that the German Foreign Office would have issued this very carefully prepared and formal warning to the other powers on July the 23rd unless it had not only knowledge of Austria's intention to serve the ultimatum but also at least of the substance thereof.

While it may be that Germany, while indorsing in blank the policy of Austria, purposely refrained from examining the text of the communication, so that it could thereafter claim that it was not responsible for Austria's action—a policy which would not lessen the discreditable character of the whole business—yet the more reasonable assumption is that the simultaneous issuance of Austria's ultimatum at Belgrade and Germany's warning to the Powers were the result of a concerted action and had a common purpose. No court or jury, reasoning along the ordinary inferences of human life, would question this conclusion for a moment.

The communication from the German Foreign Office last referred to anticipates that Serbia 'will refuse to comply with these demands'—why, if they were justified?—and Germany suggests to France, England, and Russia that if, as a result of such non-compliance, Austria has 'recourse to military measures', that 'the choice of means must be left to it'.

The German Ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed

'to lay particular stress on the view that the above question is one the settlement of which devolves

solely upon Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and one which the Powers should earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned',

and he added that Germany strongly desired

'that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another Power, on account of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences impossible to measure'.

This is one of the most significant documents in the whole correspondence. If Germany were as ignorant as her Ambassador at London affected to be of the Austrian policy and ultimatum, and if Germany was not then instigating and supporting Austria in its perilous course, why should the German Chancellor have served this threatening notice upon England, France, and Russia, that Austria must be left free to make war upon Serbia, and that any attempt to intervene in behalf of the weaker nation would 'bring consequences impossible to measure'? ¹

A few days later the Imperial Chancellor sent to the Confederated Governments of Germany a *confidential communication* in which he recognized the possibility that Russia might feel it a duty 'to take the part of Serbia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary'. y
again, if Austria's case was so clearly justified? The Imperial Chancellor added that

'if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Serbia in this conflict, she certainly has a right to do it',

but added that if Russia did this it would in effect challenge the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that Russia would therefore alone—

¹ German 'White Paper', Annex I B.

‘ bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the Austro-Servian question, *which all the rest of the great European Powers wish to localize* ’.

In this significant confidential communication the German Chancellor declares the strong interest which Germany had in the punishment of Servia by Austria. He says ‘ *our closest interests therefore summon us to the side of Austria-Hungary* ’, and he adds that

‘ if, contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, owing to the intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an ally, we should have to support the neighbouring monarchy with the entire might of the German Empire ’.¹

The Efforts to Maintain Peace.

In reaching its conclusion our imaginary court would pay little attention to mere professions of a desire for peace. A nation, like an individual, can covertly stab the peace of another while saying, ‘ Art thou in health, my brother ? ’ and even the peace of civilization can be betrayed by a Judas kiss. Professions of peace belong to the cant of diplomacy and have always characterized the most bellicose of nations.

No war in modern times has been begun without the aggressor pretending that his nation wished nothing but peace, and invoking Divine aid for its murderous policy. To paraphrase the words of Lady Teazle on a noted occasion when Joseph Surface talked much of ‘ honor ’, it might be as well in such instances to leave the name of God out of the question.

Let us, then, analyze the record as already made up ; and for the sake of clearness the events which preceded the war will be considered chronologically.

¹ German ‘ White Paper ’, Annex 2.

Immediately upon the receipt of the ultimatum in St. Petersburg on July 24, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a formal communication to Austria-Hungary, suggested that the abrupt time limit 'leaves to the Powers a delay entirely insufficient to undertake any useful steps whatever for the straightening out of the complications that have arisen', and added :

'To prevent the incalculable consequences, equally disastrous for all the Powers, which can follow the method of action of the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems indispensable to us that above all the delay given to Servia to reply should be extended.'

Sazonof further suggested that time should be given for the Powers to examine the results of the inquiry that the Austro-Hungarian Government had made in the matter of the Serajevo assassination, and stated that if the Powers were convinced

'of the well-groundedness of certain of the Austrian demands they would find themselves in a position to send to the Servian Government consequential advice'.

He justly observes that

'a refusal to extend the terms of the ultimatum . . . would be in contradiction with the very bases of international relations'.¹

Could any court question the justice of this contention? The peace of the world was at stake. Time only was asked to see what could be done to preserve that peace and satisfy Austria's grievances to the uttermost farthing.

Concurrently with Sazonoff's plea for a little time to preserve the peace of the world Sir Edward Grey had

¹ Russian 'Orange-Paper', No. 4.

seen the German Ambassador on July 24, and had suggested to him that the only method of preventing the catastrophe was

‘ that the four Powers, Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves (England) should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg ’.¹

Germany had only to intimate to Austria that ‘ a decent respect to the opinions of mankind ’, as well as common courtesy to great and friendly nations, required that sufficient time be given not only to Servia, but to the other nations, to concert for the common good, especially as the period was one of Summer dullness and many of the leading rulers and statesmen were absent from their respective capitals.

Under these circumstances was it not natural that Russia should announce on July 24

‘ that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia would not leave Russia indifferent ’,

and on the same day the Russian Chargé d’Affaires at Vienna suggested to the Austrian Foreign Office

‘ that the Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms ’.

To which the only reply of the Austrian Foreign Minister was that their representative in Servia

‘ was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted in their integrity by 4 P.M. to-morrow ’.²

Austria’s only concession then or subsequently to the cause of peace was the assurance that Austria would not *after its conquest* of Servia demand any territory.

¹ English ‘ White Paper ’, No. 11.

² English ‘ White Paper ’, No. 7.

The action of Germany on this day, July 24, is most significant. Its Ambassador in England communicated a note to Sir Edward Grey, in which it justified Austro-Hungarian grievances and ultimatum by saying that

‘under these circumstances the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate’.

The note added :

‘The Imperial Government [Germany] want to emphasize their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the great Powers ought seriously to endeavor to reserve it to those two immediately concerned.’¹

On July 25, probably to the great surprise of both Germany and Austria, which had definitely calculated upon Serbia’s non-compliance with the ultimatum, the latter country, under the conciliatory advice of Russia, made a reply in which, at the sacrifice of its self-respect as a sovereign State, it substantially accepted all but one of the demands of Austria, and as to that it did not, in terms, refuse it, but expressed its willingness to refer it either to arbitration or to a conference of the Powers.²

No court would question for a moment the conclusion that the reply was a substantial acquiescence in the extreme Austrian demands, nor indeed did either Germany or Austria seriously contend that it was not. They contented themselves with impeaching the sincerity of the assurances, calling the concessions ‘shams’, and of this it is enough to say that if Germany and Austria had accepted Serbia’s reply as sufficient, and

¹ English ‘White Paper’, No. 9.

² English ‘White Paper’, No. 39.

Servia had subsequently failed to fulfill its promises thus made in the utmost good faith, there would have been little sympathy for Servia, and no general war. Indeed, both Russia and England pledged their influence to compel Servia, if necessary, to meet fully any reasonable demand of Austria. The outstanding question, which Servia agreed to arbitrate or leave to the Powers, was the participation of Austrian officials in the Servian courts. This did not present a difficult problem. Austria's professed desire for an impartial investigation could have been easily attained by having the neutral Powers appoint a commission of jurists to make such investigation.

On July 24 Sir Edward Grey also had asked the German Ambassador to use his good influences at Vienna to secure an extension of time. To this most reasonable request the answer and action of the German Government was disingenuous in the extreme. They agreed to 'pass on' the suggestion, but the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that as the Austrian Prime Minister was away from Vienna there would be delay and difficulty in getting the time limit extended, and

'he admitted quite freely that the Austro-Hungarian Government *wished to give the Servians a lesson and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that the Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands*'.

He added that Germany did not want a general war and 'he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity'.¹

If Germany made any communication to Austria in the interests of peace the text has yet to be disclosed to the world. A word from Berlin to Vienna

¹ English 'White Paper', Nos. 11 and 18.

would have given the additional time which, with sincerely pacific intentions, might have resulted in the preservation of peace. Germany, so far as the record discloses, never spoke that word.

Contrast this attitude with that of Russia, whose Foreign Minister on the morning of July 25 offered

‘to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy’.¹

On July 25 Sir Edward Grey proposed that the four Powers (including Germany) should unite

‘in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier and to give time for the four Powers, acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg, to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate’.²

To this reasonable request the Imperial German Chancellor replied :

‘First and last, we take the ground that this question must be localized *by the abstention of all the Powers from intervention in it,*’

but added that Germany would, if an Austro-Russian dispute arose,

‘co-operate with the other great Powers in mediation between Russia and Austria.’³

This distinction is very hard to grasp. It attempts to measure the difference between tweedledum and tweedledee. Russia’s difference with Austria was over the attempt of the latter to crush Serbia. Germany would not interfere in the latter, but would mediate

¹ English ‘White Paper’, No. 17.

² English ‘White Paper’, Nos. 24 and 25.

³ German ‘White Paper’, Annex 13.

between Russia and Austria. For all practical purposes the two things were indistinguishable.

How she 'co-operated' we shall presently see.

All that Germany *did* on July 25, so far as the record discloses, was to 'pass on' England's and Russia's requests for more time, but subsequent events indicate that it was 'passed on' without any indorsement, for is it credible that Austria would have ignored its ally's request for more time if it had ever been made?

The Austrian Foreign Minister, having launched the ultimatum, absented himself from the capital, but the Russian Minister at Vienna succeeded in submitting this most reasonable request verbally to the Acting Foreign Minister, who simply said that he would submit it to Count Berchtold, *but that he could predict with assurance a categorical refusal*. Later on that day (July 25) Russia was definitely advised that no time extension would be granted.¹

Was ever the peace of the world shattered upon so slight a pretext? A little time, a few days, even a few hours, might have sufficed to preserve the world from present horrors, but no time could be granted. **A colossal snap judgment was to be taken by these diplomatic pettifoggers.** It would be difficult to find in recorded history a greater discourtesy to a friendly Power, for Austria was not at war with Russia.

Defeated in their effort to get an extension of time, England, France, and Russia made further attempts to preserve peace by temporarily arresting military proceedings until efforts toward conciliation could be made. Sir Edward Grey proposed to Germany, France, Russia, and Italy that they should unite in asking Austria and Servia not to cross the frontier 'until we

¹ Russian 'Orange Paper', Nos. 11 and 12.

had had time to try and arrange matters between them', but the German Ambassador read Sir Edward Grey a telegram that he had received from the German Foreign Office that 'once she [Austria] had launched that note [the ultimatum] Austria could not draw back'.¹

As we have seen, Germany never, so far as the record discloses, sought in any way to influence Austria to make this or any concession. Its attitude was shown by the declaration of its Ambassador at Paris to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which, while disclaiming that Germany had countenanced the Austrian ultimatum, yet added that Germany approved its point of view,

'and that certainly the arrow, once sent, Germany could not allow herself to be guided except by her duty to her ally.'

This seemed to be the fatal fallacy of Germany, that her duties to civilization were so slight that she should support her ally, Austria, whether the latter was right or wrong. Such was her policy, and she carried it out with fatal consistency. To support her ally in actual war may be defensible, but to support her in times of peace in an iniquitous demand and a policy of gross discourtesy offends every sense of international morality.

On the following day Russia proposed to Austria that they should enter into an exchange of private views, with the object of an alteration in common of some clauses of the Austrian note of July 23. *To this Austria never even replied.* The Russian Minister communicated this suggestion to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs and expressed the hope that he would

¹ English 'White Paper', No. 25.

‘ find it possible to advise Vienna to meet our proposal ’, but this did not accord with German policy, for on that day the German Ambassador in Paris called upon the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in reply to a similar suggestion that Germany should suggest to Vienna to meet Serbia in the same conciliatory spirit which Serbia had shown, the Ambassador answered that that ‘ was not possible in view of the resolution taken not to interfere in the Austro-Servian conflict ’.

On the same day England asked France, Italy, and Germany to meet in London for an immediate conference to preserve the peace of Europe, and to this fruitful suggestion, which might have saved the peace of Europe, the German Chancellor replied with the pitiful quibble that ‘ it is impossible to bring our ally before a European court in its difference with Serbia ’, although it affected to accept ‘ in principle ’, the policy of mediation.

Germany’s acceptance ‘ in principle ’ of a policy which she in practice thwarted suggests the law-abiding tendencies of that Maine statesman who was ‘ for the Maine prohibition liquor law, but against its enforcement ’.¹

Germany’s refusal to have Serbia’s case submitted to the Powers even for their consideration is the more striking when it is recalled that the German Ambassador at London quoted to Sir Edward Grey the German Secretary of State as saying

‘ that there were some things in the Austrian note that Serbia could hardly be expected to accept ’,

thus recognizing that Austria’s ultimatum was, at least in part, unjust. Sir Edward Grey then called the

¹ English ‘ White Paper ’, No. 46.

German Ambassador's attention to the fact that if Austria refused the conciliatory reply of Serbia and marched into that country

'it meant that she was determined to crush Serbia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved'.

He added that the Servian reply

'should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause',

and asked that the German Government should urge this at Vienna, but the German Secretary of State on July 27 replied that such a conference 'was not practicable', and that it 'would practically amount to a court of arbitration', and could not, in his opinion, be called together 'except at the request of Austria and Russia'.¹

That this was a mere evasion is perfectly plain. Germany already knew that Austria would not ask for such a conference, for Austria had already refused Russia's request for an extension of time and had actually commenced its military operations. Germany's attitude is best indicated by the letter of the Russian Minister in Germany to the Russian Foreign Office in which he states that on July 27 he called at the German Foreign Office and asked it

'to urge upon Vienna in a more pressing fashion to take up this line of conciliation. Jagow replied that he could not advise Austria to yield'.²

Why not? Russia had advised Serbia to yield and Serbia had conceded nearly every claim. Why could not the German Foreign Office advise Vienna to meet

¹ English 'White Paper', Nos. 43 and 46.

² Russian 'Orange Paper', No. 38.

conciliation by conciliation, if its desire for peace were sincere ?

Before this interview took place, the French Ambassador had called at the German Foreign Office on a similar errand and urged the English suggestion that action should at once be taken by England, Germany, Russia and France at St. Petersburg and Vienna, to the effect that Austria and Servia

‘ should abstain from any act which might aggravate the situation at the present hour ’.

By this was meant that there should be, pending further parleys, no invasion of Servia by Austria and none of Austria by Russia. *To this the German Foreign Minister opposed a categorical refusal.*

On the same day the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had ‘ a long and earnest conversation ’ with the Austrian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He expressed the earnest hope that

‘ something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been aggressors ’.

The Russian Ambassador then said that his country would do all it could to keep the Servians quiet,

‘ and even to fall back before an Austrian advance in order to gain time.’

He urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to continue discussions with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,

‘ who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent power.’

The only reply to this reasonable suggestion was that it would be submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.¹

On the same day the German Ambassador at Paris called upon the French Foreign Office and strongly insisted on the '*exclusion of all possibility of mediation or of conference*', and yet contemporaneously the Imperial German Chancellor was advising London that he had

'started the efforts towards mediation in Vienna, immediately in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey, and had further communicated to the Austrian Foreign Minister the wish of the Russian Foreign Minister for a direct talk in Vienna'.

What hypocrisy! In the formal German defense, the official apologist for that country, after stating his conviction

'that an act of mediation could not take into consideration the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an Austro-Hungarian affair',

claimed that Germany had transmitted Sir Edward Grey's further suggestion to Vienna, in which Austria-Hungary was urged

'either to agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient or to look upon it as a basis for further conversations';

but the Austro-Hungarian Government—playing the rôle of the wicked partner of the combination—'in full appreciation of our mediatory activity' (so says the German 'White Paper' with sardonic humor), replied to this proposition that, coming, as it did, after the opening of hostilities, '*it was too late*'.

¹ English 'White Paper', No. 56.

Does any reasonable man question for a moment that, if Germany had done something more than merely 'transmit' these wise and pacific suggestions, Austria would have complied with the suggestions of its powerful ally or that Austria would have suspended its military operations if Germany had given any intimation of such a wish? On the following day, July 28, the door was further closed on any possibility of compromise when the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs

'said, quietly, but firmly, *that no discussion could be accepted on the basis of the Servian note*; that war would be declared today, and that the well-known pacific character of the Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that the war was both just and inevitable; that this was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned'.

To this arrogant and unreasonable contention that Europe must accept the guarantee of the Austrian Foreign Minister as to the righteousness of Austria's quarrel, the British Ambassador suggested 'the larger aspect of the question', namely, the peace of Europe, and to this 'larger aspect', which should have given any reasonable official some ground for pause, the Austrian Foreign Minister replied that he

'had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandizement, and which could no longer be postponed'.¹

The private conversations between Russia and Austria having thus failed, Russia returned to the proposition of a European conference to preserve its peace. Its Ambassador in Vienna on July 28 had a conference with

¹ English 'White Paper', No. 62.

Berchtold and pointed to the dangers to the peace of Europe and the desirability of good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia.

To this Count Berchtold replied that he understood perfectly well the seriousness of the situation and the advantages of a frank explanation with the Cabinet at St. Petersburg.

‘ He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, which had only reluctantly decided upon the energetic measures which it had taken against Servia, *could now neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.*’¹

On the same day, July 28, the German Imperial Chancellor sent for the English Ambassador and excused his failure to accept the proposal of conference of the neutral Powers, on the ground that he did not think it would be effective,

‘ because such a conference would in his opinion, have the appearance of an “Areopagus” consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers.’

After engaging in this pitiful and insincere quibble, and when reminded of Servia’s conciliatory reply, amounting to a virtual surrender,

‘ his Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss the Servian note, but that Austria’s standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern, *with which Russia had nothing to do.*’²

¹ Russian ‘ Orange Paper ’, No. 45.

² English ‘ White Paper ’, No. 71.

The Mobilization of the Nations.

At this point the rulers of the countries intervened in the dispute. The Kaiser, having returned from Norway, telegraphed the Czar, under date of July 28, that he was 'exerting all my influence to endeavor to make Austria-Hungary come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia'.

and invoked the Czar's aid.¹

If the Kaiser were sincere, and he may have been, *his attitude was not that of his Foreign Office*. Upon the face of the record we have only his own assurance that he was doing everything to preserve peace, but the steps that he took or the communications he made to influence Austria *are not found in the formal defense which the German Government has given to the world*. The Kaiser can only convince the world of his innocence of the crime of his Potsdam camarilla by giving the world *the text* of any advice he gave the Austrian officials. He has produced his telegrams to the Czar. *Where are those he presumably sent to Francis Joseph or Count Berchtold? Where are the instructions he gave his Ambassadors or Foreign Minister?*

It is significant that on the same day Sazonof telegraphed to Count Benckendorff:

'My conversations with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is rather favorable to the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria.'

and he adds, and history will vindicate him in the conclusion, that

'the Berlin Cabinet, which might have been able to arrest the whole development of this crisis, seems to exercise no action on its ally'.²

¹ German 'White Paper', Annex 20.

² Russian 'Orange Paper', No. 43.

On July 29, Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that he had that night seen the German Chancellor, who had 'just returned from Potsdam', where he had presumably seen the Kaiser. The German Chancellor then showed clearly how the wind was blowing, in making the suggestion to Sir Edward Goschen that if England would remain neutral, Germany would agree to guarantee that she would not take any French territory. When asked about the French colonies, no assurance was given.¹

Later in the day the German Chancellor again saw the English Ambassador, and expressed regret

'that events had marched too rapidly, and that it was therefore too late to act upon your [Sir Edward Grey's] suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion'.²

On the same day the Ambassador for Germany at St. Petersburg called upon Sazonof and expressed himself in favor of further explanations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, to which Sazonof assented.³ On the same day Sir Edward Grey asked the German Government

'to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be applied'.

To which the German Foreign Office replied that it could not act for fear that if they made to their ally any suggestion that looked like pressure, it might *'cause them [Austria] to precipitate matters and present a fait accompli'*.⁴

¹ English 'White Paper', No. 85.

² English 'White Paper', No. 75.

³ Russian 'Orange Paper', No. 49.

⁴ See letter of Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, July 29—English 'White Paper', No. 70.

This was the last and worst of the quibbles put forth to gain time while Austria was making progress toward Belgrade. It assumes that Austria might not only fail to respect the wish in a matter of common concern of its more powerful ally, but that it might act in disregard of Germany's wish. This strains human credulity to the breaking point. Did the German Secretary of State keep a straight face when he uttered this sardonic pleasantry? It may be the duty of a diplomat to lie on occasion, but is it ever necessary to utter such a stupid falsehood? The German Secretary of State sardonically added in the same conversation that he was not sure that the effort for peace had not hastened the declaration of war, as though the declaration of war against Servia had not been planned and expected from the first.

As a final effort to meet quibbles, the British Ambassador at Berlin then suggested that after Austria had satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favorable for four disinterested Powers to discuss the situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications.

To this proposal the German Secretary of State seemingly acquiesced, but, as usual, *nothing whatever was done*.¹ It is true that on July 29 Sir Edward Grey was assured by the German Ambassador that the German Foreign Office was

‘endeavoring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia’,

but again the communications which the German Foreign Office sent to Vienna on this point *have never yet been disclosed to the world*.²

¹ English ‘White Paper’, No. 76.

² English ‘White Paper’, No. 84.

In this same conference Sir Edward Grey

'urged that the *German Government should suggest any method* by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation *by any method that Germany could suggest* if mine were not acceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible, if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace'.¹

The difficulty was, however, that Germany never 'pressed the button', although obviously it would have been easy for her to do so, as the stronger and more influential member of the Double Alliance.

On the same day the Austrian Government left a memorandum with Sir Edward Grey to the effect that Count Mensdorff said that the war with Servia must proceed.

On the night of July 29 the British Ambassador at Berlin was informed that the German Foreign Office '*had not had time to send an answer yet*' to the proposal that Germany suggest the form of mediation, but that the question had been referred to the Austro-Hungarian Government with a request as to 'what would satisfy them'.²

On the following day the German Ambassador informed Sir Edward Grey that the German Government would endeavor to influence Austria after taking Belgrade, and Servian territory in the region of the frontier, to promise not to advance further, while the Powers

¹ English 'White Paper', No. 84.

² English 'White Paper', No. 107.

endeavored to arrange that Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria, but if Germany ever exercised any such pressure upon Vienna, *no evidence of it has ever been given to the world*. Certainly, it was not very effective, and for the reasons mentioned it is impossible to conclude that the advice of Germany, if in good faith, would not have been followed by its weaker ally.

From all that appears in the record, Austria made no reply to this most conciliatory suggestion of England but, in the meantime, the irrepressible Kaiser made the crisis more acute by cabling to the Czar that the mobilization of Russia to meet the mobilization of Austria was affecting his position as mediator, to which the Czar made a conciliatory reply, stating that Russia's mobilization was only for a defense against Austria.

What more could Russia do? If Austria continued to mobilize, why not Russia?

On this day, July 30, the German Ambassador had two interviews at St. Petersburg with Sazonof, and it was then that Sazonof drew up the following formula as a basis for peace :

‘ If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Serbia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which violate principle of sovereignty of Serbia, *Russia engages to stop all military preparations.*’¹

At this stage King George telegraphed Prince Henry of Prussia that

‘ the English Government was doing its utmost, suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations, if Austria will consent to be

¹ Russian ‘ Orange Paper ’, No. 60.

satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile suspending their war preparation¹.

The King adds a hope that the Kaiser

‘ will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe ’.¹

This last proposition, however, was never accepted or declined, for the impetuous Kaiser gave his twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia to demobilize, and this was an arrogant demand which no self-respecting Power, much less so great a one as Russia, could possibly accept.

While this demand was in progress Sir Edward Grey was making his last attempt to preserve peace by asking Germany to sound Vienna, as he would sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would

‘ undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided they did not embarrass Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory ’.

Sir Edward Grey went so far as to tell the German Ambassador that if this was not satisfactory, and if Germany would make any reasonable proposals to preserve peace and Russia and France rejected it, that

‘ his Majesty’s Government would have nothing to do with the consequences ’,

which obviously meant either neutrality or actual intervention in behalf of Germany and Austria.

¹ Second German ‘ White Paper ’.

On the same day the British Ambassador at Berlin besought the German Foreign Office to

‘ put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in the general interest to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis ’.

And Sir Edward Goschen reports that the German Foreign Minister replied that last night he had

‘ begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take the wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter ’.

Again the text of the letter in which Germany ‘ begged ’ Austria to be conciliatory is not found in the record.

The excuse of Germany that the mobilization of Russia compelled it to mobilize does not justify the war. Mobilization does not necessarily mean aggression, but simply preparation. If Russia had the right to mobilize because Austria mobilized, Germany equally had the right to mobilize when Russia mobilized, but it does not follow that either of the three nations could justify a war to compel the other parties to demobilize. Mobilization is only a preparation against eventualities. It is the right of a sovereign State and by no code of ethics a *casus belli*. The demand of Germany that Russia could not arm to defend itself, when Austria was preparing for a possible attack on Russia, has few, if any, parallels in history for bullying effrontery. It treated Russia as an inferior, almost a vassal, State.

This impetuous step of Germany, to compel its great neighbor to desist from military preparations to defend itself, came most inopportunately, for on August 1 the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador *for the first time* declared

to the Russian Government its willingness to discuss the terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and it was then suggested that the form of the ultimatum and the questions arising thereon should be discussed in London. (Dispatch from British Ambassador at Vienna to Sir Edward Grey, dated Sept. 1, 1914.) Sir Edward Grey at once advised the English Ambassador in Berlin of the fact, and urged that it was still possible to maintain peace

‘ if only a little respite in time can be gained before any great power begins war ’,

but the Kaiser, having issued the arrogant ultimatum to Russia to demobilize in twelve hours, had gone too far for retreat, and spurred on by the arrogant Potsdam military party he ‘ let loose the dogs of war ’.

The Judgment.

These are the facts as shown by the record, and upon them, in my judgment, an impartial court would not hesitate to pass the following judgment :

1—*That Germany and Austria in a time of profound peace secretly concerted together to impose their will upon Europe and upon Servia in a matter affecting the balance of power in Europe. Whether in so doing they intended to precipitate a European war to determine the mastery of Europe is not satisfactorily established, although their whole course of conduct suggests this as a possibility. They made war almost inevitable by (a) issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and disproportionate to any grievance that Austria had and (b) in giving to Servia and Europe insufficient time to consider the rights and obligations of all interested nations.*

2—*That Germany had at all times the power to compel Austria to preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course,*

but at no time effectively exerted that influence. On the contrary, she certainly abetted, and possibly instigated, Austria in its unreasonable course.

3—*That England, France, Italy, and Russia at all times sincerely worked for peace, and for this purpose not only overlooked the original misconduct of Austria but made every reasonable concession in the hope of preserving peace.*

4—*That Austria, having mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably justified in mobilizing its forces. Such act of mobilization was the right of any sovereign State, and as long as the Russian armies did not cross the border or take any aggressive action no other nation had any just right to complain, each having the same right to make similar preparations.*

5—*That Germany, in abruptly declaring war against Russia for failure to demobilize when the other Powers had offered to make any reasonable concession and peace parleys were still in progress, precipitated the war.*

In Conclusion.

The writer of this article has reached these conclusions with reluctance, as he has a feeling of deep affection for the German people and equal admiration for their ideals and matchless progress. Even more he admires the magnificent courage with which the German nation, beset on every hand by powerful antagonists, is now defending its prestige as a nation. The whole-hearted devotion of this great nation to its flag is worthy of the best traditions of the Teutonic race. Nevertheless, this cannot alter the ethical truth, which stands apart from any considerations of nationality ; nor can it affect the conclusion that the German nation has been plunged

into this abyss by its scheming statesmen and its self-centred and highly-neurotic Kaiser, who in the twentieth century sincerely believes that he is the proxy of Almighty God on earth, and therefore infallible.

In visiting its condemnation, the Supreme Court of Civilization should therefore distinguish between the military caste, headed by the Kaiser and the Crown Prince, which precipitated this great calamity, and the German people.

The very secrecy of the plot against the peace of the world and the failure to disclose to the German people the diplomatic communications hereinbefore quoted, strongly suggest that this detestable war is not merely a crime against civilization, *but also against the deceived and misled German people*. They have a vision and are essentially progressive and peace-loving in their national characteristics, while the ideals of their military caste are those of the dark ages.

One day the German people will know the full truth and then there will be a dreadful reckoning for those who have plunged a noble and peace-loving nation into this abyss of disaster.

‘The mills of God grind slowly,
But they grind exceeding small,
With patience He stands watching,
With exactness grinds He all.’

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NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY

OXFORD: HORACE HART
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

ENGLAND'S MISSION

THE subject of this paper is, What is England's mission? or, in other words, in what cause are we fighting in the present war? A second question, arising out of the first, is this, Is our cause good or bad in the usual sense of those words? It seems unnecessary to demonstrate the overwhelming practical importance of these questions. A very intelligent Nonconformist inquired of me, not many days ago, on what special grounds can we implore the blessing of God on our arms? On what ground should He be asked to favour us rather than our adversaries? Are we fighting for our hearths and homes, for our wives and children? So are they. Are we fighting for our national prosperity and independence? So are they. Are we fighting for the triumph of our national ideals? So are they. In these, and many other similar questions that might be asked, there is no difference between one side and the other; no reason why we are justified in asking for special favour for our own. Every one, whether English, French, or German, has his family, his friends, his country, and its national ideal, and all are, or ought to be, equally dear to every one. The question is natural, and in the highest degree reasonable: it is based on the eternal sense of justice; which is one of the highest privileges of humanity. It not only deserves an answer, but it is of great practical importance that one should be given; for men, and especially men of the best type, will not give their whole heart to a cause when they feel any scruple as to its justice.

Taking nations as a whole, there is one point on which they all differ, at least in some degree, and that is the national ideal ; and, for whatever other causes they may go to war, the fortunes of their respective ideals will at the same time be involved. From what beginnings, or by what stages, ideals develop, we need not stop to inquire. It is enough for us to recognize that all nations have an ideal, even if it be only destructive, and that in this respect small nations are of at least equal value as great. Indeed, all the great ideals which now govern civilization have been derived from petty States. The Jews gave us our beliefs on the relations between man and God ; to Athens and to Florence we owe our art ; to Athens also we owe the beginnings of our philosophy. Early Rome was the cradle of law. Since the birth of Islam the ideals which divided mankind have usually been religious. It is possible that even now we may not have seen the last of the great wars between the Cross and the Crescent. The wars between Catholic and Protestant have been less protracted, but hardly less bitter or less devastating. It will aid the reader to comprehend the tenor of what follows if we state that the conflict now in progress is, in our opinion, between religious and irreligious ideals. The dispute, of course, is not on the field of dogmatic beliefs but between the morality of the Gospel and the total rejection of morality by such writers as Machiavelli and Nietzsche.

The peculiar mission of each nation is the maintenance development, and propagation of its own ideals. Freedom is the condition under which the ideal can be realized ; and tyranny the condition under which it is held down and stifled by a competing ideal ; and if men value freedom more than even their own lives, it is because nothing else in this life is so dear to them as

the special task that has been set before them. What then is the special task which has been set before England? Englishmen have no need to be told. The answer will leap to every Englishman's lips. It is Freedom; the preservation of their own freedom, and the communication of the same inestimable blessing to others.

In some respects the mission of Rome was the same, but it fell far short of ours. Hers was the establishment of law, and the protection of the individual from outrage, and spoliation, by superior force. As Virgil says, 'To spare the humble, and abase the proud.' In the words of the town-clerk at Ephesus, 'The courts are open, and there are Proconsuls.' The success with which the Romans laboured for this end, and the gratitude which they thereby earned, are shown by the contented loyalty of the provincials at the time, and the enduring power and majesty of the name of the Eternal City. Rome, through law, secured the freedom of the individual, and their gratitude was her great reward. But, she was unable to rise to the conception of political freedom. The law and the political institutions throughout the Empire were Roman, and, in consequence, her rule from the beginning to the end was wholly sterile of new political ideas.

England has been selected for a more difficult, and much nobler, enterprise in the cause of civilization. Our lesson was learned in the revolt of our American colonies. They were animated with a love of freedom, which they inherited from their British forefathers, and they made us ashamed for our temporary departure from its principles. Judged by its results, their revolt may prove to be the greatest event in history; the

turning point from which the tide of evolution has set, for the whole world, as well as for ourselves, in the direction of freedom. But in America, too, the conflict of the same ideals is likely to be repeated: nearly half the population is German, and inherited ideals are not easily lost. We, at any rate, have never forgotten the lesson; never repeated the offence. To each of our colonies, the heirs of our common traditions and our common speech, we have given the priceless gift of perfect independence; not merely internal law and order, as the Romans did, but an unshackled control over their development in all its branches, political, social, religious, and commercial, in which it is possible that its interests may come into conflict with our own. The same measure of renunciation we have lately repeated in the cases of the Boer Republics, and of the Irish nation, under risks which may have appeared exceptionally great. Who among us now repents of our confidence, or will call it mistaken? With the inhabitants of India our relations have been the same. We have already given them a more than Roman peace, and they recognize with gratitude the sincerity of our desire—attested by often-repeated measures in that direction—to admit them, not only into partnership with ourselves, but to a complete and unreserved independence. The test of results has not proved discouraging to those who advocate the principle that love is a stronger bond of union than material force.

Freedom, however, is an ideal state, which we work for, and not a rule for the guidance of our conduct—it is a beacon, and not a compass. The compass, by which the English direct their course, is duty. Nelson's signal, 'England expects every man to do his duty',

appealed to the highest (I use the word deliberately) instincts of the English people. The epitaph dictated on his death-bed by Henry Lawrence, 'Here lies Henry Lawrence, who tried to do his duty. May the Lord have mercy on his soul', sums up the whole of the moral and religious genius of our race. Duty is to us what the glory is to others. When we ask for the meaning of the term, we find that it is obedience to a command for no other reason than that it proceeds from a recognized authority. This virtue is possessed by the Germans in the very highest degree, and it is, and has been since the beginning of their history, the chief secret of their success. German obedience, however, differs from English obedience in recognizing another seat of authority. The German obeys his superior officer, whose right to command is ultimately derived from the Emperor. This is a noble quality; but the command proceeds from without, and its operation is not in the direction of freedom. English obedience, on the contrary, is paid to the conscience, the internal ruler, which may be found in every man's breast. The man who obeys that voice is his own master, and enjoys the highest form of freedom. Wordsworth apostrophizes duty as 'Stern daughter of the voice of God', and that is the English view as to the source of those authoritative commands. No nation can dispense with the recognition of both forms of authority, the human as well as the divine; and we, perhaps, at any rate in civil life, have far too little of the former. With the general problem, however, we need not trouble ourselves. All that concerns us is, that the predominant source of authority is, in Germany, the Emperor; to the Englishman, his God. With no race has the voice of conscience been more respected than with the Romans, and none have left

more splendid examples of heroism. The German programme exactly reverses theirs ; it is : 'To spurn the humble, and exalt the proud'. Weakness to the German is a crime, and to oppress it a virtue. To the Roman conscience, the seat of authority was the Law.

All the chief moral impulses, or tendencies, may be classed under one or other of two great divisions as either egotistic or altruistic ; as, in plain English, tendencies towards self-assertion or towards self-effacement. Towards which of these does our national ideal lean ? Let our works answer for us. The task we have accepted at the command of our national conscience, and with a blind confidence in the issue, is to impart to others all the power which is derived from freedom, even including such knowledge as may be used against ourselves ; and all the while we forgo the profit in services and tribute, which, to all nations but our own, has appeared to be inherent in that kind of relation. And not only that ; for, while they were still in their nonage, we have taken on our shoulders the whole burden of defence and tutelage. Cries have been heard in our midst of 'Perish the colonies ! Perish India !' ; our material interests may have seemed to dictate assent, but we have always closed our ears to them, as false to duty. A distinguished Austrian statesman once assured our Government in India that in imparting higher knowledge to our subjects we were sealing our own doom ; and Germans certainly do not follow the precedent. The vernacular newspapers in India, at one time, teemed with gross and filthy libels against the Government and its officers. Did we put them down ? The task was easy, and we were loudly recommended, for our own safety, to do it ; but our national instincts again intervened, and it was to them, and not to force, th^{at}

we owed our safety. Was this timidity, or courage ? baseness, or magnanimity ? Selfish or unselfish ? Let us not boast. A nation has no more right to boast of its instincts than a man of his personal beauty. But when our motives are arraigned, we must defend them, not for our own sake, but in the defence of our cause. The magnanimous always incur this danger—that their motives may be misinterpreted ; and their magnanimity itself prevents them from taking any serious notice of the mistake. It is their nature to yield to others advantages which they might have retained for themselves. Such a habit is interpreted as mere cowardice by those who are not themselves magnanimous. Whenever we make a fresh concession to Indian public opinion, they are not ashamed of lowering us in the esteem of our subjects, and encouraging revolt, by proclaiming on the housetops that we never yield except to threats ; though the real and obvious reason is, that we should be unwise to yield to a demand before we are assured that it is both genuine and popular. Our guiding principles in these cases are in conformity with Christian teaching. The Christian too renounces his own advantage, is not easily provoked, and endures contempt and reproach without resentment. The comparison of a spider fattening on a fly, which is current among Germans, was no doubt suggested by utterances of the same class and the same origin. The fly, at any rate, has no reason to complain. She is ten times fatter now than she was when the depleting process began.

Many other illustrations of the same general tendency might be adduced, such as the emancipation of our slaves, our missions, religious or medical, and other countless philanthropic enterprises ; but we must not close the account without mention of one which is of

special significance. We were the first to reform our code of honour by the abolition of duelling. This was not prompted by want of manliness—our courage has been proved on hundreds of battlefields, but to our self-effacement in the presence of the law which brought us very close to the distinctively Christian virtue of humility, and exposed us to the same feelings of dislike and impatience which are inspired in self-assertive natures by the sight of that virtue. Self-effacement in mundane affairs becomes self-abasement in our relations with the Almighty.

We may now proceed to consider the German ideal or mission. And first we may rule out a subject which, judging from the space which the newspapers allot to it, must be of great interest to the public—that is, who is responsible for the war? who was the aggressor? We need not begin a general disquisition on the causes of war, but, confining ourselves to the present case, we may state our opinion that one nation is as responsible as the other, or rather, that neither is responsible. Responsibility is not incurred except when there is a free choice, and the act may be declined. When personal ambition is the cause, the aggressor is no doubt responsible, and is deserving of censure; but when it is a matter of life and death, there is no blame, for every living being, from the highest to the lowest, must fight for existence, and there can be no reasonable objection to his choosing his own time. In the present case, the recent victories of the Slavs threatened the Teutonic races with their own favourite movement of envelopment. They are no more to be blamed for struggling for escape than a wasp is, when one of its legs has been entangled in a spider's web. But, since we deny the right of Germany to secure herself at the

expense of France and Belgium, we too are involved, and our own existence is at stake. Such struggles are the certain and necessary result of the natural increase of population, for which no one is to be blamed. But they involve the dispossession of a neighbour, and the neighbour in this case is England.

The professed aim of Germany is universal empire, and Germans add that this is the ultimate end of all wars, attributing it to ourselves in our wars with Napoleon, and at other times. This is not quite true, for we have often given back conquests which we might have retained, and forgone them when they might have been made without much difficulty. We may, however, admit that the proposition is generally true. The really important question is this: what are the further results on account of which empire is desired? They may be either altruist or egotist, and we want to know, in each case, under which of these two categories it falls. Let us begin with our own aim in the Napoleonic wars. It was to secure freedom—not only for ourselves, but also for all other nations in Europe, including the Germans—to develop, each and all of them, its own type of civilization, on its own appropriate lines; this may fairly be described as, in the main, altruistic. The aim of Napoleon, on the contrary, was the diffusion of the typical principles of the French Revolution, and the destruction of all that were opposed to them, thereby creating a French empire, with himself at the head of it. This may fairly be called egotistic. Similarly, it is reported of Alexander that his professed aim was to make Greeks of the barbarians. The aim of the Germans is no doubt to make all men like themselves, and to extinguish all conflicting types of civilization. But the advance of civilization is dependent on

the interaction, friendly or hostile, between two or more types; if there were only one type, there would be no interaction and no advance; and this would certainly be the consequence of our defeat. Under the one-sided ideal of the Germans, the civilization of Europe would enter on a period of rapid decay. The lamp of freedom would have fallen from our hands, and we could only hope that it would be taken up in the New World.

There are two subjects which have a vital bearing on the direction in which the German ideal is likely to influence our beliefs and conduct. The superiority of Germany is generally acknowledged in the two departments of metaphysics and criticism. Kant, the imperishable glory of her philosophy, was a pure-bred Scotsman, and he inherited from his covenanting forefathers a fervent sense of religion. The German temper first manifested itself in his successors. Hegel still remained on good terms with Christianity, and professed a sympathy with her doctrines which, if not feigned, was at any rate strangely inconsistent with his own intellectual conclusions. Schopenhauer made no secret of his dislike and contempt. Others, in our own day, while following Hegel in professions of friendship, cut away all the doctrine which is inconsistent with a scientific pantheism—an operation which can only be compared to the excision of their friend's heart. At the present day, much the most popular of all is Nietzsche, whose rabid animosity against Christian ethics is his sole recommendation as a philosopher. In criticism, the tendency of the German mind has always been, in the main, destructive. Not long ago they attempted to dismember Homer, but after a long campaign, in which they exhibited great skill, learning,

and audacity, they have been forced to abandon that field. Next, with Strauss of Tübingen and his school, they turned the arms of their criticism against the Bible. There again the frontal attack has, in the main, failed, and the theologians, with professions of friendliness, which in their case are, no doubt, sincere, are busy undermining all the distinctive doctrines of the Faith, leaving nothing behind but a rational Socinianism. The same irreligious feeling pervades all classes, and all literature. We are told that religion is no longer the dominant force in man's life, which is no doubt true of Germany. Apologies for religion are stigmatized as 'obscurantist'. We are blamed as unworthy of our position in India, because we have failed to transplant some new form of pantheism to England, in the same way, we may suppose, as mediæval travellers brought devil worship from the East to Aquitaine.

It is to be hoped that enough has been said to remove all scruples as to the justice of our cause, and to make it clear on what special grounds, not shared by our enemies, we are justified in imploring for our arms the favour of the Almighty. Our cause is freedom, the freedom of political institutions. Our adversaries profess that they seek freedom of thought; but if they do, it is for themselves only; our thought is not as their thought, and a man is not free when he works for the ideals of a master. Again, free thought cannot subsist without free institutions. Under a despotism it lives, if at all, on sufferance; its growth is restricted and unnatural, and it will not flourish for long. Again, having secured freedom for ourselves, we use it in the interests of others: we desire freedom not only on our own account, but for the whole of mankind, as far as our influence extends. Within the whole of the Empire

there is no single community which does not, so far as that lies in our power, enjoy a perfect independence, living under its own laws, following out its own ideals, and paying no taxes except what are spent on its own development. In carrying out this aim we have had to make considerable sacrifices, and have forgone advantages which others would have insisted on. Our rewards have been, first, a peaceful commerce, unfettered by any regulations, save such as may have been freely agreed on for the mutual and equal benefit of ourselves and our customers; and secondly, what we value above all other rewards, the affection and gratitude of our affiliated peoples. Our guiding principles have been respect for law and love of freedom, both for ourselves and for others also. This, certainly, is one good reason for imploring the divine favour against a nation who love neither freedom nor self-effacement, and who are certainly not meek. Add to this the direct evidence of the animosity against Christianity which is openly professed by their representative philosophers, and, what is still more significant, the destructive criticism of those who honestly believe themselves to be its friends.

Is it not possible to connect all the various points of dissimilarity between the two races by means of some deeper distinction, of which they are only (so to speak) the symptoms? I think it is, and that it is essential to a comprehension of our cause that the true nature of the opposition should be clearly understood. Paradoxical though the statement may at first appear, the fundamental distinction between our aims and those of Germany is that between the love of humanity and the love of country. Both of these are highly deserving of respect, for both involve the sacrifice of

merely personal and selfish interests to those of an ideal, but one is much more completely unselfish than the other ; for, in one case, the sacrifice is on behalf of an ideal of which we are ourselves a part, and by whose maintenance we personally benefit, whereas in the other it is made on behalf of the whole of humanity, and must necessarily include innumerable interests which are, or seem to be, in direct opposition to our own. Now, of these two ideals, it is certainly the more comprehensive that is favoured by Christianity. That commands us to love all men, without distinction, as the sons of one Father. The love of the whole of humanity, without distinction of race or nation, is therefore a part of our religion and indissolubly connected with our worship ; it not only can but must be admitted into our petitions, as an integral part of our religious duties.

Patriotism, or the willing sacrifice of the individual to his country, was the highest virtue of antiquity. Among the nations of those times foreigners were of no more value than cattle, and in some cases of even less. To the Greek and Roman they were barbarians. It was only after a long struggle that they were admitted at Rome to equal fellowship at board and bed. The Jew would not eat with the Gentile, and the Hindu, at the present day, puts the descendants of aborigines below the lowest of the castes of his own race, makes intermarriage with them a capital offence to both the parties, and regards their touch as a greater pollution than that of any animal. Moreover, by their inhuman regulations, they have reduced them to a state which almost justifies the loathing. This, though it usually falls short of full achievement, is the ultimate result of a policy of selfish conquest ; the reduction of the

conquered to the condition of hewers of wood and drawers of water, or worse. Moreover, in our own days the danger is peculiarly horrible. There are many kinds of work (and the number increases with evolution) which are so repellent, and even degrading, that no free man will willingly undertake them. The conquerors will require slaves, and will take them from the conquered people. Patriotism is the dominant ethical principle of the Germans, and it will no doubt mould their conduct, should they ever become possessed of the empire which is the object of their desires. Dangers of this kind have been put an end to by the doctrine of universal brotherhood in all lands where the Christian faith is both professed and acted on.

The people of Russia, though in an earlier stage of political development, are animated by the same spirit as ourselves. In no other part of the world has their religion so strong an influence in the lives of the masses, and in their fiction—a certain reflection of their spirit—a profound sympathy with the trials and hopes of the poor and the humble and the afflicted, joined with an indifference, if not hostility, to the ambitions of the rich, display, as no other literature ever did, the *anima naturaliter Christiana*.

Some have been surprised that no mention of so great a virtue as patriotism is to be found from one end to the other of the New Testament. The reason is now clear. That was a rule of conduct which it was the mission of Christianity to supersede, and there was no need to enjoin it. But to supersede is not to cancel. The Mosaic ritual itself was not abrogated, but was retained as a servant to faith. In the same way, patriotism was retained, more glorious as a servant to humanity than when it held the first place itself.

Its use was to assist the altruist State in putting forth the utmost possible amount of energy. A State that loved others only would not be nearly so strong as one that loved itself also, as a minister to the welfare of others. The altruistic principle when it stands alone, without the necessary prop of patriotism, soon decays, and becomes too weak to withstand the meaner impulses of sloth and luxury, with all their attendant evils. And here we may remark on the fallacy that is involved in condemning all small States to extinction. The value of a State is proportionate, not to the number of its inhabitants, but to the greatness of its achievements.

It has been our singular good fortune that both these principles have received adequate recognition in our Parliament. The Whigs have represented universalism ; the Tories patriotism. It is a general rule that the first is appropriate to dealings with people within our Empire ; the second, for peoples with whom we are at war. So long as the Boers held out, our proper guide was patriotism ; as soon as they laid down their arms, universalism. The justice of our cause, though it ought to be our only guide while we are still at peace, loses all relevance directly war is declared. During the course of a war, either to question that, or to forget our patriotism, is treason, and deserves to be punished as that.

Before leaving the subject let us apply these considerations to our own case. Let it not be supposed that in extolling our mission I extol ourselves. It is one thing to have a mission and another to fulfil it, and the neglect of its duty is the delinquency which brings down on a nation the scourge of God. On this charge it would be difficult to clear us. Let us consider

what a German might have seen if he had turned his eyes on England early this year. In what words would he have been likely to describe what met his eyes? A Government defied in one of the three kingdoms; an apathetic people who rejected the advice and traduced the motives of the veteran leader of their armies, when he made an appeal to their manhood; who relied on their navy, and complained when called on to pay for more ships; unable or unwilling to defend themselves, each man with his own right hand. Our Legislature would have shown him an habitual preference, on both sides alike, of petty party aims over large national interests, which turned the august Mother of Parliaments into a by-word among the nations; and all the time his ears would have been dinned with vociferous professions of sanctity which accorded ill with the meanness and luxury of our lives. All this he would have seen, or thought he saw. It is true that the view was one-sided, and he might have seen more had he wished to; but it was not all illusion. The basis of concrete fact was wide and solid, and it provoked war and seemed to justify it. It is well we should not forget this ourselves; for those tendencies actually held the lead amongst us at the time; even now they are far from being extinct, and, unless we are watchful, they may easily recapture us. If, exchanging parts, we had observed Germany at the same period, we should have found a great nation straining every nerve and sinew on the prosecution of a single aim; without doubt or dissension among themselves, sacrificing all that opposed that aim, and training, like a good athlete, for its realization. Whatever we may think of the aim, and, so far as it was self-preservation, we must approve, there was nothing in the spectacle itself to inspire contempt

Even an enemy must admire. And when a German compared what he saw in us with what he felt to be true of himself, what must his conclusions have been? Shall we boast of this? Ought we not rather to repent?

The sum of the matter is this. By their strenuous and sustained self-devotion, the Germans have thrown lustre on a bad cause. We are the heirs of the noblest cause of all times, that of Freedom, and, by our apathy, and indolence, and selfish luxury, we have come near to betraying it. Many of us have never fallen, many others, but not all, have repented. Let our repentance be heartfelt and general. Let us burn the new gods we have worshipped, and hate what we have lately desired, lest at a not distant future a worse thing overtake us.

And let us fight for victory, but not for peace with a probable relapse into the sloth and self-indulgence from which we have just been awakened. The soldier of freedom can never expect a lasting peace, but will always be prepared for fresh trials, and heavier sacrifices. We must recognize that even now nothing short of our utmost effort will avail to preserve our threatened freedom.

And let us not rely overmuch on the empire of the sea, lest that prove to be a snare instead of a bulwark. Think of what might have been our lot if the day had been decided against us at Trafalgar. Let no one expect or even wish to be exempt from his full share of risk and hardship. Should there be any such among us, I would say to him; 'Our sailors and soldiers are doing all they can, almost beyond the limit of human endurance; but if, trusting in your ships and the valour of your brothers, you are so mean as to prefer football to fighting,

and neglect to prepare yourselves for war, you may soon become the slave you deserve to be.'

NOTE.—I append a short extract from a recent number of *The Times* :

'We have received the following from the Contessa Evelyn Martinengo Cesaresco :

I translate from the *Secolo* of to-day, October 19, the following conversation between the correspondent of that newspaper and one of the King's Indian soldiers now in France.

The correspondent was curious to know what was the spirit of the Indian troops. "Are you glad," he asked, "to have come here to fight for a country which is not yours—France—at the bidding of another country—England—which dominates you?"

The Indian looked at him with eyes full of wonder and indignation, and replied : "India is not oppressed by any one ; she is a part, and not a small part, of a great Empire. Therefore the Indians are not slaves of this Empire, but subjects as are the English, the Scottish, and the Irish. The English Empire is menaced by a nation called Germany, and to defend itself it has appealed to all its subjects. If the Empire were menaced in India, the English soldiers would have gone there, but as it is menaced in Europe, we have come here." He added in accents of profound pride, "We are English!"

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THE LEADING IDEAS
OF BRITISH POLICY

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GERARD COLLIER

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OXFORD: HORACE HART
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

THE LEADING IDEAS OF BRITISH POLICY

It is necessary for any one who would understand the leading ideas of British policy to run over in his mind the long roll of our mighty dead—from Alfred the Great downwards. Only then will he understand how deep-rooted and persistent is the imperial instinct of the English nation. It is older than the English Parliament, and about as old as the English language or any other of the oldest things that are essentially English. It is exemplified in our earliest annals by the Northumbrian and Mercian forerunners of Alfred, and by his descendants from Edward the Elder to Edgar the Peaceful. It was gratified by the wars and conquests of our foreign rulers from William the Conqueror to Richard Cœur de Lion. In Edward III we see the most conspicuous of these early imperialists. Edward III, besides continuing an old and a mistaken policy of continental aggrandizement, turned his thoughts to sea-power. He claimed, and for a time he secured, the ‘dominion of the narrow seas’, which since his time has been regarded as vital to the prosperity and safety of these islands; though more than a century elapsed from his death before England was sufficiently united and self-confident to follow out his naval policy with resolution and success. It was under the Tudors that she begun consistently to behave as though ‘her future lay upon the water’.

Throughout the last four hundred years, which is the

Modern Age, the position of England has been mysterious and complicated, and as England has become Britain this is true also of Britain and the British Empire—there is no doubt that this mystery is the secret of our strength, but, as the probing of a mystery only leads to the discovery of deeper truths, we do not hesitate to attempt the task.

With the break-up of mediaeval Christendom, England, like some other European countries, became intensely national in feeling, in ambitions, in religion. At the same time, and indeed as a part of the same process, the English imagination turned to the New World, which provided a boundless field for the enrichment and expansion of national life and for the propagation of national ideals. An empire of the New World was now the dream of Englishmen. Let us consider first what this dream of empire meant ; secondly, how Englishmen prepared themselves to win it ; thirdly, how, in the race for empire, England was favoured above other nations.

(1) The empire of the New World was, to begin with, a religious ideal ; the quest for it was a crusade. The English supposed themselves to be the chosen people, enjoying a monopoly of divine truth. A strange belief, it may seem, for rough sea-faring folk such as were the Elizabethan pioneers of the imperial idea. But we have the very perfect example of John Davis (who discovered Davis' Straits, and died in 1605) in those days, and of Captain Cook in a much later age, to show how religion may be and has been the mainspring of the conduct of great sailors, even though their religion goes along with characteristics that may seem irreconcilable with a religious faith. But it was not only the seaman who believed himself one of a chosen people. That conviction was shared by the merchant who went long

voyages for gain, and by the capitalist who financed the merchant.

The mediaeval Church had set her face against the belief that the pursuit of wealth was a lawful occupation. Her theologians held that money-getting was a proof of avarice, and that avarice was a sin. The papal court at Rome, the higher clergy elsewhere, might be ostentatious and luxurious. But still the Church set her face against the ideal of developing Nature's resources for the use of men. The Puritan with all his faults was the reverse of this: he practised a rigid simplicity in his private life, but devoted his energies to business which meant the piling up of wealth and the development of the world; he thus went far towards the solution of the economic problem—a moderate and stationary standard of expenditure for those who have the immediate control of wealth combined with a real increase of the total which all must share. Indeed it seemed that traditional religion stood with a drawn sword guarding the entrance to an Eden in which was to be found not only scientific truth but also the material bounty of God. England believed that it was her function to lead the way in forcing an entrance for mankind into this paradise.

Like the Protestants of England, the orthodox Spaniards had a dream and a vision of the same kind. The Spanish Empire was based upon religious ideals. But the English ideals though crude were less crude than those of Spain. We understood, what the Spaniard did not, that the gold of the waving corn is more precious than yellow metal, and that the spirit works in its own way demanding an atmosphere of freedom.

(2) Before the South African War we were apt to pride ourselves on muddling through. That pride received a fall, and now most Britons are congratulating

themselves that at the beginning of last August we had an Expeditionary Force which could be mobilized in a few hours, and a fleet ready for action. The successful conduct of the government of an empire demands the same high qualities as any other work of note ; and we have not in fact been such muddlers as other peoples, and we ourselves, sometimes imagine. We have often seemed to be in a state of intellectual muddlement because we were trying to take all the facts into consideration, and were thinking over the permanent principles of our policy. In this sense, but in this sense only, we have always been a muddled people whenever we were engaged in empire-building.

When a man takes a few selected facts of any situation into account and rules out all the others, if those selected facts happen to dominate he will be easily and quickly successful, but otherwise he will be lost ; likewise the actions of a nation which has set its heart on achieving a certain object for a few years will be easy to follow and to appreciate, while the actions of those trained through hundreds of years will be unselfconscious and perhaps mysterious ; but if the training has been good they will be very effective.

Under Elizabeth we set ourselves with a tremendous energy to lay the foundations of the empire of the New World ; we laid them deep and systematically ; Elizabeth encouraged our sea rovers as far as she dared, she also encouraged the men of the Low Countries as her auxiliaries in the war against Spain. Burleigh, quite systematically, built up industries from the point of view of sea-power ; the fisheries were to be encouraged as a school for seamen ; we were to make our own powder and our own cannon, we were to have a plentiful supply of naval stores—and as a result, in 1588, our fleet was

more numerous than the Spanish Armada, our ships could sail faster and nearer the wind, and our guns shot more quickly and harder. But more important than this our religion was a religion of freedom and order, for although the main strength of English religion was moving towards Puritanism and the Puritans were not tolerant, still there was a strong religious element which though traditional was not Roman, an element which made possible the existence of such a family as the Ferrers, and such an establishment as the religious community of Little Gidding, and which represented gentleness and charity; moreover, Puritanism itself did achieve toleration with the appearance of the Society of Friends. There was therefore a spirit in England which offered a welcome to religious refugees of the reforming societies throughout Europe, and, besides that, the non-religious people in England, led by the Queen, were zealously anxious for religious peace as long as it could be reconciled with some measure of order.

Thus both the religious and non-religious elements of England combined to draw over to us the pick of the middle and industrial classes of Europe, and this most important result may be regarded as part of the fixed and conscious policy of the nation.

(3) Our advantages over other nations have on the whole been sufficiently described in Seeley's *Expansion of England*; it is only necessary here to emphasize the great importance of the fact that we were an insular nation, and so able to keep ourselves comparatively free from the entanglements of continental policy. This, as Seeley has pointed out, enabled us to concentrate our energies much more completely than the Spaniards or the Dutch or the French could do, on the acquisition of the empire of the New World; but furthermore, this

concentration on the New World and aloofness from the Old World affected the spirit of our nation and the quality of the work we did. In the Modern Age we have never wished or attempted to conquer Europe, we have not wished to be supreme on the Continent, we have taken part in continental strife only to the extent that ourselves and our supremacy in the New World was at stake.

Oliver Cromwell might have been beguiled into taking up the sword of Gustavus Adolphus and leading the Protestant armies of Europe, rightly or wrongly he resisted the temptation, and instead we fell to quarrelling with the Dutch—our religious allies—over the prize of maritime supremacy ; on the surface this looks like the policy of the backslider, but it is possible that fundamentally we were never more true to our mission. So, as a matter of fact, we addressed ourselves to a possible problem instead of an impossible one. It was necessary that the world should be opened up to the vital civilization of Europe, means of communication had to be established over all the seas radiating out from and returning to Europe ; the streams of commerce with their collecting and distributing centres had to be organized, and derelict continents peopled with emigrants from the progressive nations—the primal command must be obeyed, ‘ Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth ’, and the human family thus extended must be kept in touch the one part with the other, or brought into touch where it had been for ages separated, so that in material, intellectual, and spiritual things there should be interchange and co-operation.

As the leading nations had not learnt to co-operate in equality and peace, it seemed necessary that the work should proceed under the supremacy of one, and it was

this supremacy which we determined to win. The impossible problem which we avoided was the attainment of supremacy of one nation over all the others in Europe : this object did not correspond with the accomplishment of any useful piece of work, neither does it so correspond now. Europe never has been under the dominion of one nation for a thousand years ; it last happened in the days of Charlemagne—what we call the Dark Ages. (It is, however, true that the acknowledged supremacy of one nation over all the world to-day should make possible the abolition of armaments, and no doubt if we are so foolish as not to arrive at that result some better way, we shall deserve the supremacy of one.) So the real gist of our advantage was that the continental nations were wasting much of their strength in useless and demoralizing rivalry, while we were bending our main energies to a great and really necessary piece of work.

The secret of our success and our glory was that we were doing real work towards shaping the material earth itself and the organization of man upon it, so that this planet might become a perfected whole, achieving its mission ; in fact, we stood for work rather than life, for the future rather than the present, for achievement rather than enjoyment.

Our constitutional and social history during the period brings out this ideal ; we organized ourselves for an object, not for the sake of the organization, nor, indeed, for the sake of the people.

The Tudor form of government being a popular and enlightened despotism, would seem to have been the best for the purpose of attaining the sovereignty of the New World, and no doubt it fulfilled admirably its function of organizing the beginnings of the enterprise ; but success

was eventually achieved with a form of organization more subtle, much more mysterious, and better adapted for attaining quick but lasting results over an area co-extensive with the globe. The English Parliament has been called the mother of parliaments, and so she is. In the later Middle Ages we established a most advanced system of constitutional government which, from the practical point of view, broke down in the fifteenth century to recover itself in the seventeenth, but the success of this constitutional government during the eighteenth century was of a peculiar kind. Our government during the eighteenth century was in truth an aristocracy, if by that is understood the rule of the best, and if by best we mean the most efficient in view of the national policy. From the point of view of a formal constitution, it became, as the years went by, more and more anomalous and more corrupt. The actual government was in the hands of the House of Commons, the members of which were theoretically elected by the constituencies, that is to say, the shires and towns of the country, but as a matter of fact, they were mainly appointed by the House of Lords, whose members were the great landowners, the leaders of the landed aristocracy. The essence of the situation was a world to be conquered (the New World, not the Old World), and all the strong men in England, whether their traditions were religious or commercial or military, inspired or inflamed to effect the conquest. Although the direct political power was in the hands of the landed aristocracy, no caste feeling was allowed seriously to hamper the national ideal, for after the attainment of the religious toleration of all Protestants in 1689 there was no serious cleavage in the solid phalanx of our military, commercial, and Puritan efficiency. Indeed, as the

foreigner observed, we were a nation of shopkeepers, that is to say, the commercial element in the phalanx was becoming predominant. Families soon forget their origin ; no doubt there were many families in the eighteenth century who assumed a blue-blooded purity of caste, but, as Lecky has pointed out, they often enough owed the establishment of their prosperity to a merchant or a banker.

Thus the British system in the eighteenth century worked, partly indeed, on account of long and great traditions and a certain national genius for government—the cause or effect of those traditions, but more especially because the adventurous element was given a new world to explore, the military element a new world to conquer, the commercial and industrial element an unlimited market, and the religious element visions of the Kingdom of Heaven, and the whole nation a new world to construct ; the system did not work on its own merits as a system.

The best simple illustration of what we have been saying is the important and well-known share that the Scots have taken in the development and administration of the British Empire ; they have entered into it so wholeheartedly and identified themselves with it so thoroughly because it has given unlimited scope to their magnificent national vitality ; as to the Highlanders, it is a household word how the elder Pitt recognized their genius for warfare—fighting they must have and fighting they were given. What our Indian administration owes to Scotland is equally well known, her part in Indian evangelization is perhaps less familiar, though not less glorious. Canada and Australasia give their testimony to the enterprise of the Scots in all departments of life, and the scope that was offered to them.

Another illustration of how much the system depended on its object is given by the immediate collapse which occurred as soon as the object was attained ; but we shall have to return to this later.

We have seen how England provided scope for the enterprise of her sons, and, as always is the case when there is something real to be done, there existed in Britain to a very considerable extent the Napoleonic ideal of the career open to talent ; but what about the unenterprising, the people who would have preferred to go on living in the old way, or indeed the inefficient—that is to say, inefficient from the point of view of the national ideal ? There were mainly two classes to be considered, the peasantry on the land and the craftsmen in the towns ; if the bulk of the land had continued to be held by an irremovable peasantry, wishing to continue a more or less immemorial system of subsistence-farming, and impervious to the idea of the sovereignty of the New World, the realization of that idea would have been hampered at every step ; the solution of the problem was a simple one—to get practically all the land into the possession of large proprietors who were imbued with the ideal of expansion, and for them to form an alliance with some of the more progressive of the peasantry as tenant farmers, then with inexorable power the landlords and farmers could and did dictate a progressive policy for the land. Thus the land, its occupiers and cultivators, was made into an organism highly sensitive to the national ideal. This process was not indeed complete until the early years of the nineteenth century, but had then been going on for a hundred years and more.

The development in commerce and industry was similar ; the mediæval system by which industry was

monopolized by highly organized guilds, who were mainly occupied in each town in supplying the needs of that town, and who held control of entry into the craft could, and probably would, have hampered economic progress even more effectively than a persistent body of peasant proprietors. Commerce indeed was naturally controlled by the wealthy few, who no doubt were convinced that it was their duty to devote the resources at their disposal to the development of the world, and, as we have noticed, the opposition of the Church had for long been removed; but commerce is based on industry, for it consists in the exchange of the products of industry. There were two ways in which industry could be brought under the control of those in touch with the national ideal: (1) as soon as the artificer produces for a distant market he is in the hands of the merchants who conduct the exchange, this brings industry immediately and directly under the control of commerce; (2) the so-called capitalist system by which the instruments of production—that is to say the tools, machines, material, and organization necessary for the conduct of industry—come into the possession of a few rich men, be they merchants or be they captains of industry.

By these methods, happening of themselves or consciously pursued, industry and the industrial population also became part of that organism or body, of which the directing head consisted of those inspired by the national ideal. In no other country of the world at that time was the system of national organization at all comparable in sensitiveness, in no other country could the resources of the nation be applied so quickly and so completely to the attainment of an object.

It is of course notorious that there was a dark side to this economic policy—indeed by the time that the

national ideal was achieved that dark side was seen to be intensely black and lowering. Britain was ceasing to be only these small islands, and was becoming the British Empire; this involved economic revolution, and we have noticed how the sensitiveness and adaptability were attained which rendered this revolution possible; this sensitiveness was sufficient to make the revolution possible, but it was not nearly sufficient to remove all friction. The weak, the ignorant, and the backward always suffer when there is an economic upheaval, unless the process is conducted with transcendent skill and elaborate method; no such skill or method was at our disposal, but we established a vast system of public and private charity to save the myriads who fell out of the ranks from actual starvation and despair.

Here, at the risk of complexity, it is necessary to review the period of preparation (roughly speaking, from the accession of Elizabeth to the fall of Charles I); in the sixteenth century there was very generally over Europe an economic upheaval, consequent on the break-up of the Middle Ages and the discovery of the New World; to meet the stress there was very generally a poor-law system established. In England, as in other countries, the Government exerted itself to stem the economic tide, to maintain a vigorous and contented peasantry on the soil, and to save the corporate life and traditions of the craftsmen from the economic flood. Thus far indeed the national policy of work rather than life, the idea of hammering the world into shape at all costs, including the sacrifice of one's own comfort if need be, and one's own health, had perhaps been envisaged but had not been embarked upon. But with the fall of Charles I this conservative and domestic policy collapsed, the

power was speedily concentrated in the hands of the efficient of all classes, and the homes of the weak were sacrificed on the altar of the magnificent ideal of the strong.

Thus when we emerged in 1815 completely victorious and completely successful (except for the loss of the United States), having achieved the empire of the New World, we had incurred a debt, in the intense misery and degradation of our people, which was not experienced by our defeated rivals.

After 1815 the policy to be pursued was obviously to strengthen the Empire and to look after our people, and this in the main has been our accepted policy ; but, as we have already suggested, with the attainment of the traditional objective a certain amount of disintegration set in.

We had finished the task which we had set ourselves, we had won the empire of the New World. What next ? asked our strong men. The answer was—Cosmopolitanism ; the Old World also must be brought into the scheme. We were a nation of shopkeepers, we had beaten Napoleon with our industry and our credit ; our commercial and industrial classes now set to work to extort political supremacy at home from the landowners, and to work out cosmopolitanism in the commercial sphere. There was first a Glasgow School and then a Manchester School, shipping and cotton, Adam Smith and Richard Cobden. The intellectual system produced is generally known as Free Trade. We had won the New World on the principle of exclusion, no other nation was allowed to take part except in subordination to us. Adam Smith taught that the wealth of the nations was the wealth of a nation, that the good of one was the good of all, that natural liberty involved a universal freedom for manufacture and for trade ; the whole system was

shot through and through with idealism, with the knowledge that the economic well-being of man is part of the natural order of the will of God. As the Puritans had overthrown the restraints of the mediaeval Church, so the free-trader was to overcome the restraints of a self-centred nationalism. Spiritually and intellectually, as well as economically, the shopkeeper was the strongest man in Britain, and the shopkeeper's philosophy conquered.

There were two grave defects in the system ; for one of them the shopkeeper was directly responsible, for the other he was not. In the first place the system contained a hideous logical error, which can be stated shortly as follows : the free-traders accepted self-interest as the motive in a system whose main doctrine was equality of opportunity, when of course these two principles are incompatible, the wolf and the lamb ; self-interest as generally understood must destroy equality of opportunity. As a matter of fact, this defect has vitiated our economic system through and through ; in the United States its ravages have been even more fatal. Secondly, the system was one-sided ; besides commerce and industry, it was necessary that cosmopolitanism should take religion and nationality into account. To this, however, the shopkeeper might fairly retort that it was not his business, he had done his part ; let the Church take religion and the landowners nationality.

Upon the whole, it is true that the Church and the landowners have been very dilatory in doing their share of the work, and even negatively their criticism of the shopkeeper was for long ineffective ; as a result of the French Revolution they both had become reactionary and obscurantist, and having lost faith in the things of

the mind they allowed the shopkeeper to establish a monopoly in truth.

However, working along their own lines, they have done something, and let us begin with the Church. The Oxford Movement re-emphasized for us the catholic idea, and their work has now attained remarkable success; not only among Anglicans but in the other communities—especially the Presbyterians and not excluding the Quakers—the question now is not only what of the individual and his salvation, but what of the Church, and what is the Church. The catholic ideal is a relationship in which every man and every community is free and good and capable of realizing its mission—in fact, an existence open to all in the power and in the presence of God. This ideal in the sphere of organized religion is the counterpart of free trade in the subordinate sphere of economics. Unfortunately, the Oxford Movement was not altogether fortunate in making its object clear; to the Evangelical it seemed to mean sovereignty of the Bishop of Rome over all that Britons held most dear; to the ordinary man it meant processions, vestments, lights, and incense; however, that period is passing, and we can feel growing up around us an evangelical catholicism.

As to the landowner: he was beaten by the shopkeeper in 1832, for the Reform Act amounted to the enfranchisement of the middle classes; he was beaten again in 1849, for the success of Cobden and Bright and their Anti-Corn Law agitation meant the dominance of free-trade economics over the mind and the policy of the nation. Beaten from his position, and unwilling and incapable to meet his opponent in the intellectual field, the landowner, under the leadership of Disraeli, fell back on the traditional imperialism of Elizabeth, which had

been supposed to be superseded since 1815. But in advocating 'forms of permanence and power' Disraeli was only emphasizing the need in the political sphere for some scheme of relationships without which the individual man is unable to operate.

The teaching of Disraeli was followed up by that of Joseph Chamberlain, the gist of whose policy it was, that the British Empire would be hampered in its development, if not actually strangled, unless it were provided with an organization, that is to say, a scheme of relationships appropriate to its life. No doubt his early experience of the government of a great and growing city opened his mind to the human need for forms of permanence and power.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, beside the ordinary man there existed two fairly well defined schools of thought; there was the Little Englander, who believed in the general principles of the Empire but had no confidence in the actual organization which had been built up—he considered the more abstract thought of his ancestors to be admirable, but the work of their hands deplorable. On the other hand, there was the Imperialist (whom the Little Englander called Jingo), who did not interest himself much in general ideas, but knew that his ancestors had won the empire of the New World, and intended that he should keep it; moreover, he believed that the British had a special genius for the task denied to other races. The South African War changed all that; the Little Englander could not get over the impressive evidence which was provided that the Dominions themselves believed passionately in the Empire. The Imperialists were disillusioned to see that it taxed the resources of the whole Empire to overcome the resistance of a few thousand brave and obstinate farmers of a race similar indeed to our own.

Thus we all now really believe in the Empire, the work of the souls, the brains, and the hands of our ancestors, and we none of us really believe in exclusiveness ; a liberal imperialism has emerged which enabled us to make the magnificent experiment of granting self-government to South Africa.

Traditional British policy is the making of the world, at whatever present sacrifice, into a more and more perfect home for the united human family, and the British Empire is the preliminary sketch for the future federation of the world. It may be objected that both these things are as true or more true of the United States, but this only strengthens the argument, for they came from us.

We have elaborated very carefully (but, as was shown above, very imperfectly) the economic scheme appropriate for a united world, we have experimented in the political scheme and done something in religion ; but in all three of these departments, though we have experimented much, we have thought little. Except for Socialism, there has been little original and vital political thinking in Britain since Adam Smith and Burke, and an utter dearth since Cobden ; we have, with the one exception, simply been stretching old ideas to meet new demands, or indeed, sometimes simply for something to do. We have allowed practice to outrun theory, which is obscurantism and the negation of even the possibility of progress—our feet are taking us whither our minds know not.

To us has been entrusted leadership in politics and economics, and recently our failure has been great (though our achievement has still been great) ; if we had provided the world with a true politic adequate to the

conditions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it is inconceivable that the Germans, who are an educated people, with their minds open to ideas, could have fallen so far as they have done under the sway of a system of thought untenable in logic, hideous in sentiment, and glaringly incompatible with the religion that we all profess.

The reason for our intellectual failure has lain in just that analysing method which, when restricted to its proper place, is so often an essential of success; analysis no doubt should generally come first, but synthesis must always follow it. We have analysed life into religion, politics, and economics, and have somehow persuaded ourselves that to bring them together is to sin against the light. The Socialists alone have attempted a synthesis, and with all their defects they are not barren of thought.

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SERBIA AND THE SERBS ¹

UNTIL the outbreak of the war Serbia was perhaps to most Englishmen little more than a name, and not a very acceptable name, for it was the worst pages of her history which chiefly clung to people's memory. It is not surprising, therefore, that, when Europe was suddenly threatened with a great conflagration of which Serbia was supposed to be the cause, Englishmen were inclined to visit upon her their horror and indignation. Gradually, as proofs accumulated that, whatever the demerits of Serbia, she had been used on this occasion merely as a stalking-horse for vast ambitions bent on war, a reaction set in and grew with every fresh report of her splendid gallantry in the field. It is proposed in these pages to tell as briefly as possible the story of Serbia and of the part her people have played throughout the course of events that have been leading up for many years past to the present catastrophe—a part that has been neither unimportant nor discreditable.

Serbia is one of the small States which grew up during the nineteenth century, in that part of South-eastern Europe commonly known as the Balkan Peninsula, out of the gradual disintegration of the Turkish Empire. Many hundred years ago, before the Turkish invasion of Europe, the Serbs, who are of Slavonic origin, formed for a time quite a powerful kingdom which attained its

¹ The term 'Serbs' is applied generally to the Slav population belonging to that family of the Slavonic race, whilst the term 'Serbians' is reserved specifically for those who inhabit the kingdom of Serbia.

zenith under their national hero, Stephen Dushan, towards the middle of the fourteenth century. But on June 15, 1389, the Sultan Amurath I overthrew, on the plain of Kossovo, a great Christian host consisting of Albanians and Hungarians as well as Serbs, and though the Sultan himself was slain by a Serb prisoner, Dushan's kingdom passed under the Turkish yoke. But the ecclesiastical self-government which the Turkish conquerors left, partly from a shrewd instinct of political expediency and partly from contempt, to the Christian races they subdued, helped the Serbs to maintain a sort of national existence even under Turkish misrule. They preserved their churches, their language, and their traditions. It was not, however, till nearly the close of the eighteenth century that they ventured to dream of reconquering their freedom, and—strange as it may seem to-day—it was under Austrian colours that bands of Serb volunteers first went forth to fight against Turkey. At last, in 1804, the Serbians rose in open revolt against Turkish oppression under a popular leader called Karageorge, or the Black George, whose descendant is to-day King Peter I of Serbia. Thus, they may claim to have been the real pioneers of Balkan independence. The struggle was a long and fierce one, and it was only in 1817 and after many terrible vicissitudes that Turkey agreed to recognize a certain measure of Serbian self-government, whilst still retaining garrisons in the fortress of the Serbian capital, Belgrade, and other strong places. By the Treaty of Adrianople, after the Russo-Turkish war of 1827–9, which had completed the liberation of Greece, a few more districts were added to the self-governing Serbian province; and in 1867, after a succession of further risings, the Turks finally withdrew all their garrisons. Though still recognizing the nominal suze-

rainty of the Sultan, Serbia became henceforth a practically independent State.

By this time also, Serbia had begun to cultivate very close relations with the kindred people of Montenegro, a little mountain principality overlooking the Adriatic, which had practically never been subdued by the Turks, and was only separated from Serbian territory by a narrow strip of Turkish territory known as the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar. In spite of occasional jealousies between the two reigning families and a somewhat prolonged period of coolness when Serbia appeared to be falling under Austrian influence, the two States have acted together in almost every important crisis in South-eastern Europe. The total population of Montenegro to-day is only half a million, but her people are hardy mountaineers and splendid fighters, and have always enjoyed the special protection and goodwill of Russia. Prince Nicholas, who assumed the title of king in 1910 on the fiftieth anniversary of his accession to the throne, is one of the popular heroes of the Slav world, and, whilst two of his daughters have become Russian Grand Duchesses, another is married to the present King of Italy. The more aggressive the ambitions of the Germanic Powers have grown in South-eastern Europe, the more closely have Serbia and Montenegro drawn together in defence of their common interests.

But to go back to Serbia. Though a practically independent State since 1867, it was, and still is, a State which comprises but a very small portion of the territories inhabited by Serbs, Serbo-Croats, and other closely-related races, a large part of which were incorporated in the Austrian dominions as the tide of Turkish conquest in Eastern Europe retreated. Moreover, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and what was then called Old Serbia

to the south of self-governing Serbia, remained in 1867 and for many years after under Turkish rule, as also did the Bulgarian Slavs, who were only just beginning to make a name for themselves. But the practical independence to which the Serbians had attained made their State the rallying-point for the growing aspirations of those still outside the pale of freedom. So small a State obviously had to cast about for more powerful friends ; and, not unnaturally, it turned chiefly towards Russia, the one great Slav Power in Europe. When, in 1875, the populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina in their turn rose against Turkey, it was Serbia who, with Montenegro, first gave them material aid, and, in the summer of 1876, boldly went to war with Turkey on their behalf. Defeated by superior numbers, the Serbians were compelled after a gallant resistance to make peace, as Russia professed to be still confident that the Concert of Europe would succeed in imposing far-reaching reforms upon the Turkish Government. But under Lord Beaconsfield's administration, British distrust of Russia was largely responsible for the failure of the Conference which met at Constantinople in the following winter ; and the Russian armies took the field in the spring of 1877. Great Britain, dreading to see Constantinople in the hands of the Russians, saved Turkey from the worst consequences of military defeat. The Treaty of San Stefano, which the victorious Russians had imposed upon Turkey at the gates of Constantinople, was subjected to complete revision by the Congress of Berlin, and though Serbia had once more joined in the fray, the final settlement afforded her, beyond the recognition of her complete independence, very slender territorial compensation for the heavy sacrifices she had made in the common cause. Indeed, both at San Stefano and at Berlin, Russia

showed much more anxiety to promote the interests of the new Bulgarian Principality she had created than those of her sorely-stricken Serbian ally.

The bitter disappointment experienced by the Serbians created a great revulsion of feeling, and, at the instigation of Prince (afterwards King) Milan, Serbia turned away from Russia to Austria. For the next twenty years that prince was destined to play a most mischievous part in Serbian history. From the very beginning Serbia has been too often singularly unfortunate in her rulers. Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria owe more than their people are often willing to admit, to their alien princes and to the powerful dynastic influences which those princes have enlisted at critical moments in favour of their adopted countries. Serbia chose her rulers amongst her own people, and few of them have proved worthy of their trust. The great patriot Karageorge had no sooner achieved the first emancipation of his country from Turkish rule than he was assassinated in 1817, and a member of the rival Obrenovitch family rose to power in his stead. Henceforth the domestic history of Serbia was constantly bound up with the deadly feuds of the Karageorgevitches and the Obrenovitches and of the political factions which supported them. Prince Milan's immediate predecessor had been assassinated in Belgrade in 1868. Milan himself was the worst of all despots—a weak despot—whilst Serbia was nominally endowed with domestic institutions of the most advanced type, for which her people were still quite unfitted. Austria-Hungary found in him an all-too-willing tool, and throughout the greater part of his reign the Dual Monarchy was able to treat Serbia as a sort of Austro-Hungarian satrapy. It was at the instigation of Austria-

Hungary that in 1884 the Serbian armies fell upon Bulgaria in the rear at the very moment when Eastern Rumelia, as Southern Bulgaria was then called, having driven out her Turkish governor and proclaimed her union with Northern Bulgaria, was threatened with invasion by Turkey. Milan, who had exchanged the title of Prince for that of King in 1882, led his forces into Bulgaria, and it was largely through his incompetency and cowardice that they were hopelessly beaten after a three days' battle at Slivnitsa by the Bulgarians, who had the advantage of gallant and successful leadership in Prince Alexander of Battenberg. Milan's sordid quarrels with his eccentric consort, Queen Nathalie, and his repeated attempts to ride roughshod over the Constitution, did not end even with his abdication in 1889 any more than his intrigues with Vienna. Until his death in 1891 his nefarious influence persisted, sometimes behind the scenes, sometimes before the footlights, throughout the reign of his son, King Alexander, whose marriage with Madame Draga added another scandalous page to the history of his country.

The revolting brutality with which King Alexander and his consort were murdered by a band of mutinous officers in 1903 sent a thrill of horror throughout Europe, from which the Serbian name has not yet recovered. That crime put an end to the Obrenovitch dynasty. King Peter I, who was then placed on the throne, belonged to the rival Karageorgevitch family. The regicides, whom King Peter hesitated for a long time to remove from his entourage, have been suspected in some quarters of having acted in the interests, if not with the connivance, of Russia; but Austria showed herself, at first at least, equally indifferent to the crime

they had perpetrated, and it was not until two and a half years later that the relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia suffered, for quite other reasons, a marked change for the worse.

Even in Austrian history there are few more discreditable pages than the treatment of Serbia by her powerful neighbour during the quarter of a century which followed the Congress of Berlin. The Austrian hold upon Serbia during that period was twofold. There was first of all the personal subserviency of King Milan, whose extravagant vices made him to a great extent dependent upon Austrian subsidies; and there was the economic dependence of Serbia upon the markets of Austria-Hungary for the greater part of her import and export trade, for which there was scarcely any outlet in other directions. In 1905, Serbia attempted to find some relief by concluding a customs treaty with the neighbouring Principality of Bulgaria. Vienna replied by a merciless tariff war against Serbia, opprobriously termed by the Austrians the 'Pig War', because swine form a very important item of the Serbian export trade. This fresh turn of the economic thumbscrew, however, roused in Serbia a spirit of fierce revolt against Austro-Hungarian ascendancy, and, for the first time, she applied herself with great courage and resourcefulness to develop new channels of economic communication with the outer world. Politically, she drew once more nearer to Russia, and when, in 1908, Austria found, in the revolution at Constantinople, a long-sought-for pretext for definitely annexing the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which she had occupied after the Congress of Berlin and administered ever since, Serbia as well as Montenegro appealed to Russia for help. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not only held by

Serbians and Montenegrins alike to seal irrevocably the fate of their Slav kinsmen in those provinces, but the Serbians saw in it a direct menace to their independence, especially as, in collusion with Vienna, Bulgaria had seized the same opportunity to repudiate the last shadowy rights of sovereignty which the Sultan had until then retained over the Bulgarian Principality as well as over Bosnia and Herzegovina. None of the Great Powers was disposed to resist by force of arms the action either of Austria-Hungary or of Bulgaria, though in both cases the absence of any previous consultation constituted a flagrant breach of the international law of Europe. Russia, nevertheless, with the diplomatic support of Great Britain and of France, strongly pressed for some compensation for Serbia and Montenegro, and, though she was not then in a position to go to war, she did not altogether abandon her clients' claims until she found herself confronted with a scarcely veiled ultimatum, not from Austria-Hungary, but from Germany, who had gone out of her way to convert the support she was bound to give to her Austrian ally into a direct humiliation inflicted upon Russia. It was on that occasion that the German Emperor made his flaming speech about Germany's 'shining armour' which was never forgotten or forgiven in Petrograd.

This crisis marked a turning point in Serbia's fortunes. At Vienna and at Pesth there had been incessant talk about chastising Serbia. But for the pacific influence of the old Emperor, Francis Joseph, war would certainly have been declared against Serbia, and, in order to justify it, the Austrian Foreign Office had already prepared an anti-Serbian 'case' very similar to that which was produced a few weeks ago from Vienna. I shall refer to it again later. The military party had

discovered that the strategic roads down to Salonika and the Aegean Sea, the goal of Austro-Hungarian ambitions, lay through Serbian territory, and Serbia must, therefore, be got out of the way. At the same time Germany, who seemed to have lost her trump card at Constantinople with the dethronement of the 'Red Sultan', Abdul Hamid, was regaining her hold over the Young Turks. Under her sinister influence, the liberal professions of the first days of the Turkish revolution were repudiated, and Turkish oppression settled down more heavily than ever upon the Christian populations of Macedonia, whether Serbs or Bulgars or Greeks. Bitter as had been the rivalry between the small States of the Balkan Peninsula, they were compelled now, by a sense of common danger, to draw closer together. They formed themselves into a Balkan League for common defence, Serbia and Montenegro perhaps chiefly as a safeguard against Austria-Hungary, Greece and Bulgaria rather with an eye to Turkey. The welter in Macedonia grew worse and worse, and Turkey having been to some extent weakened by her war in Tripoli with Italy, though hostilities had never extended to the Turkish territories in Europe or in Asia, the Balkan States declared war in September 1912. Within a few weeks the Sultan's armies were defeated in all parts of European Turkey, and Constantinople itself was in danger. This result was a tremendous blow to both Austria-Hungary and Germany—and especially mortifying to the latter, as it was German officers who had reorganized and equipped the Turkish army. Thanks mainly to the unselfish efforts of this country, the war had, however, been localized; and lest worse things should befall her Turkish friends, Germany was as anxious as England to bring hostilities

to a close. At the Peace Conference held in London, the German Ambassador worked heartily with Sir Edward Grey to bring about a settlement, but for very different reasons. The Germanic Powers calculated that, once peace was signed with Turkey, the Balkan League would destroy itself. And the League very nearly did this. The old jealousies between the Balkan States broke out afresh, especially between Serbia and Greece on the one hand, and Bulgaria on the other, in regard to the division of Macedonia. None displayed much moderation, but it was the inordinate ambition of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria which precipitated the final rupture. Serbia was ready to refer the question at issue to the arbitration of the Tsar; but, secretly prompted from Vienna and from Berlin, and relying upon the splendid achievements of his army against the Turks, King Ferdinand rejected the Russian offer and rushed into war against his recent allies. Again the hopes of Austria-Hungary and of Germany were frustrated. The Balkan League, it is true, was shattered for the time being, but it was Bulgaria who was beaten, and Serbia, the client of Russia, who, with Greece, emerged triumphant from this second ordeal. Rumania, too, though not a party to the first Balkan war and suspected until then of strong leanings towards the Germanic Powers, had on this occasion entirely thrown off their influence and brought decisive military pressure to bear upon Bulgaria.

The attitude of Austria-Hungary towards Serbia grew more and more menacing. Not only had Serbia proved herself a fighting Power of no mean value; not only had she, under the Treaty of Bucharest which closed the second Balkan War, nearly doubled her territory and added more than 50 per cent. to her

population, which now numbers about four and a half millions,—but her prestige amongst the Slav populations of the Hapsburg dominions had risen exceedingly. By sheer misgovernment Vienna and Pesth had driven the two chief Slav races in the southern provinces of the Monarchy, the Croats and the Serbs, to draw closer together, in spite of the denominational and other differences which tended to keep them apart—the Croats, numbering over three millions, being mostly Roman Catholics, whilst the Serbs, numbering nearly two millions, belong to the Orthodox Eastern Church. Croats and Serbs were equally exposed to official persecution, they were equally robbed of their liberties, they were thrown into the same prisons. They joined hands in a common spirit of revolt, and in common they put their faith in their Serbian kinsmen. To such an appeal the population of the Serbian kingdom could not but respond, and the Serbian authorities themselves, even if they had wished to, could not have stemmed a movement which was directed more or less openly to the emancipation of all the Southern Slav provinces of the Monarchy from the Austro-Hungarian yoke. The attitude of Serbia towards the southern Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy resembled more and more that of the little kingdom of Piedmont, fifty years ago, towards the other Italian States struggling for unity and freedom. The Russian Minister in Belgrade, of a very active and rather unscrupulous type not uncommon amongst Russian diplomatists, made no secret of his sympathies with this movement, which at Vienna and even more at Pesth began to be regarded as a serious danger to the Monarchy. Germany was only indirectly affected, but the ascendancy of Austria-Hungary in the Balkan Peninsula was essential to

Germany's own ascendancy in Constantinople, upon which depended the success of her far-reaching schemes of expansion in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. Behind Serbia loomed, or was supposed to loom, the spectre of Russian Pan-Slavism; and in Berlin, as well as in the Austrian and Hungarian capitals, the 'Russian peril' began to bulk large in Ministerial speeches as well as in inspired utterances of the press. Before the Balkan wars, moreover, the German Emperor had come to regard the Turkish army as a sure addition to his own armed millions in the event of a great European war. He could no longer do so with the same confidence after the Turkish defeats, and it was partly to redress the balance that a huge new Army Bill was introduced last year in Berlin. That, however, was not said in public, and during the parliamentary debates it was on French armaments and still more on the necessity of preparing for a great struggle against Russian Pan-Slavism that stress was chiefly laid by the German Chancellor and other official speakers. Austrian and Hungarian statesmen had Russia equally in their minds, but their talk was mainly of Serbia and of the chastisement which she was wantonly seeking at the hands of her mighty but long-suffering neighbour.

Such was the position when, on June 28 last, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Hapsburg throne, and his consort were murdered in the streets of Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia. There are many mysterious features about that tragedy. His death certainly did not serve any Southern Slav interests, for, however great and dangerous his ambitions, he is known to have been quite out of sympathy with the short-sighted policy of repression which had hitherto found favour in Vienna and in Pesth, where, for various

reasons, he had many enemies in extremely influential quarters. The absence of all the most elementary precautions for his safety during the visit to Serajevo, though according to the Austrians themselves the whole of Bosnia was honeycombed with sedition, is an awkward fact which has not hitherto been explained. And there are others. The actual murderers, however, were unquestionably Serbs, though Austro-Hungarian subjects; and neither public nor official opinion in the Dual Monarchy required any further proof that the crime was what they wanted it to be, namely, part of a vast conspiracy hatched in Serbia with the connivance of Serbian officials, if not of the Serbian Government, against the safety of the Dual Monarchy. The cry for the chastisement of Serbia was now fierce and universal, and the sovereign's reluctance to embark in his old age upon fresh warlike adventures was at last overborne by the duty which it was urged he owed to the memory of his murdered nephew. Nevertheless, the Austro-Hungarian Government kept its own counsel to the last. The only person to whom was confided the secret of the impending stroke was the German Ambassador, Baron von Tschirschky, who enjoyed in an exceptional degree the confidence of William II. The German Foreign Office, as it has since admitted, had given Austria a free hand, and neither asked for nor wanted details. On July 23 the Austro-Hungarian Government flung an ultimatum at Serbia demanding, in effect, such a surrender of her independence as no sovereign State, however puny, could ever be expected to agree to, and demanded it within forty-eight hours. Mr. Lloyd George has described in burning and yet absolutely accurate terms this episode, without a parallel in modern history:

What were the Austrian demands? She sympathized with her fellow countrymen in Bosnia. That was one of her crimes. She must do so no more. Her newspapers were saying nasty things about Austria. They must do so no longer. That is the Austrian spirit. You had it in Zabern. How dare you criticize a Customs official, and if you laugh it is a capital offence. The colonel threatened to shoot them if they repeated it. Serbian newspapers must not criticize Austria. I wonder what would have happened had we taken up the same line about German newspapers. Serbia said: 'Very well, we will give orders to the newspapers that they must not criticize Austria in future, neither Austria, nor Hungary, nor anything that is theirs.' Who can doubt the valour of Serbia when she undertook to tackle her newspaper editors? She promised not to sympathize with Bosnia, promised to write no critical articles about Austria. She would have no public meetings at which anything unkind was said about Austria. That was not enough. She must dismiss from her Army officers whom Austria should subsequently name. But those officers had just emerged from a war where they were adding lustre to the Serbian arms—gallant, brave, efficient. I wonder whether it was their guilt or their efficiency that prompted Austria's action. Serbia was to undertake in advance to dismiss them from the Army: the names to be sent on subsequently. Can you name a country in the world that would have stood that?

And what was the case on which Austria based her demands? It consisted solely of a series of charges supported by no evidence whatsoever, beyond statements ascribed to witnesses in the course of a secret inquiry conducted by the Austrian authorities themselves. And by whom had this case been drawn up? By the same Count von Forgach, notorious for his hatred of the Slavs, who had been Minister in Belgrade five years previously, at the time when another anti-

Serbian case that had been drawn up also to justify Austrian aggression, was proved before a reluctant Austrian tribunal to have consisted largely of forgeries, some of which were actually traced to the Austrian Legation over which Count von Forgach presided.

How, on the other hand, did Serbia face these outrageous demands ? Here again let me quote Mr. Lloyd George :

It was a difficult situation for a small country. Here was a demand made upon her by a great military Power who could put five or six men in the field for every one she could : and that Power supported by the greatest military Power in the world. How did Serbia behave ? It is not what happens to you in life that matters ; it is the way in which you face it. And Serbia faced the situation with dignity. She said to Austria : ' If any officers of mine have been guilty and are proved to be guilty I will dismiss them.' Austria said : ' That is not good enough for me.' It was not guilt she was after, but capacity.

Then came Russia's turn. Russia has a special regard for Serbia. She has a special interest in Serbia. Russians have shed their blood for Serbian independence many a time. Serbia is a member of her family, and she cannot see Serbia maltreated. Austria knew that. Germany knew that, and Germany turned round to Russia and said : ' I insist that you shall stand by with your arms folded whilst Austria is strangling your little brother to death.' What answer did the Russian Slav give ? He gave the only answer that becomes a man. He turned to Austria and said : ' You lay hands on that little fellow, and I will tear your ramshackle empire limb from limb.' And he is doing it.

As a matter of fact, when Austria saw that Russia was in earnest, she was for a moment disposed to relent, and conversations had been actually resumed between

Vienna and Petrograd, and not altogether without some prospect of success, when Germany interposed with her own ultimatum to Russia, followed within twelve hours with the declaration of war which started the great European conflagration. This is the story of the share that Serbia has had in the European crisis. We ourselves are not fighting for Serbia, nor should we ever have fought for Serbia, since we were never under any obligation to fight for interests so far removed from our own. But we have no reason to feel ashamed that we are now fighting on the same side with her against a common enemy. Her history may not, indeed, be unblotted, but the splendid pluck with which her sons have faced the Austrian Goliath and smitten him hip and thigh would have wiped out even worse blots, and the cause for which she is fighting is to-day the same cause for which we are all fighting—the cause of freedom.

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OXFORD PAMPHLETS
1914

GERMANY AND
'THE FEAR OF RUSSIA'

BY

SIR VALENTINE CHIROL

FOURTH IMPRESSION

Price Twopence net

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

HUMPHREY MILFORD

LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW

NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY

GERMANY AND THE 'FEAR OF RUSSIA'

OF all the arguments used to enlist the sympathies of the British public on the German side during the crisis which led up to the war, none made so wide an appeal to British sentiment as Germany's 'fear of Russia'. The average Englishman knows very little about Russia, and what he knows about her is often derived from violently though not unnaturally prejudiced witnesses—political refugees, Jews, Poles, Finns, and other victims of the repressive methods to which the Russian governing classes have clung, in many directions, tenaciously, in spite of the marked movement towards progress in other directions. Many Englishmen, therefore, see in Russia a remote but formidable and scarcely half-civilized Power, sprawling across two continents, imbued with an insatiable lust of conquest, herself ignorant of freedom and bent on confiscating the freedom of other peoples brought under her sway. This, of course, is a very distorted picture, but it fitted in admirably with Germany's purpose, which was to represent the coming war as a war for German 'culture' against Russian 'barbarism'. That it is nothing of the kind, many distinguished Russians, who cannot be suspected of subserviency to the Russian Government, have now undertaken to tell the British public. Amongst these are Professor Vinogradoff, whose admirable letter to *The*

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Times has been republished by the Clarendon Press ; Professor Struve, one of the founders of the Russian Constitutional Democratic party of the Duma, and M. Bourtseff, a leader of the advanced revolutionary party. They all speak on this aspect of the question with an authority to which I cannot pretend.

All that I desire to show is how incompatible is this theory of the German 'fear of Russia' with the relations of close intimacy and co-operation with Russia which Germany has always sought to cultivate, and has successfully cultivated until quite recently, with great advantage to her own immediate political purposes, but to the detriment of all the best interests of Russia.

The 'fear of Russia' is, it is true, not quite a new boggy in Germany. Even Bismarck used to trot out the danger of Pan-Slavism on sundry occasions when he wanted to make the German people's flesh creep, in order to procure acceptance of fresh military burdens. But he quickly put it away again as soon as it had fulfilled its purpose. Friendship with Russia was one of the cardinal principles of his foreign policy, and one thing he always relied upon to make Russia amenable to German influence was that she should never succeed in healing the Polish sore. In his own *Reflections and Reminiscences*, he boasts with the most extraordinary cynicism of the agreement which he made with Russia in 1863 for the repression of the Polish insurrection. There was a powerful party in Russia to which the Tsar Alexander II himself at first inclined which favoured large concessions to Poland. Bismarck threw the whole weight of Prussian influence into the scale of the reactionary party at St. Petersburg ; and the result was, as he himself describes it, 'a victory

in the Russian Cabinet of Prussian over Polish policy. . . . An agreement between Russia and the German foe of Pan-Slavism [i.e. Prussia] for joint action, military and political, against the Polish "fraternization" movement was a decisive blow to the views of the philo-Polish party at the Russian Court.' What Bismarck also defeated at the same stroke was the possibility of a triple *entente* between Russia, France, and England, even in those far-off days. For the two Western Powers were then working together to win Russia over to the liberal policy towards Poland, which Bismarck succeeded in checkmating. In regard to Poland, the Emperor William II, except for a couple of years under the more liberal Chancellorship of Bismarck's immediate successor, Count von Caprivi, has adhered steadily to the Bismarckian tradition. Germany, down to the present day, has oppressed her own Poles not less ruthlessly than Russia, but a great deal more scientifically.

In just the same spirit, Bismarck always sided with the party of German ascendancy in Vienna against the Austrian Slavs; and he used openly to resent any concessions made to them, until the Austro-German alliance was signed and sealed in 1879. Then he felt he could henceforth rely upon the still more anti-Slav tendencies of the Hungarian Government to counteract, as far as foreign policy was concerned, the tenderness which the Emperor Francis Joseph was inclined to display towards his Slav subjects in the Austrian part of his dominions. Here again, the Kaiser has walked in Bismarck's footsteps.

Nevertheless, when the Kaiser came to the throne and dropped the old pilot overboard, the relations between Germany and Russia entered upon a new phase.

Bismarck preferred, on principle, the friendship of Russia to that of Austria; for he believed that there could be no more solid basis for political co-operation between great European Powers than common principles of internal government. At bottom, he remained a Prussian *junker* all his life long, and absolutism was and still is the ideal of all Prussian *junkers*. Thus, when the Tsar Nicholas I died in 1855, during the Crimean war, the Berlin *Kreuz-Zeitung*, then and still their chief organ, appeared in the deepest mourning with a leading article headed, 'Our Emperor is dead.' There was, of course, no German Emperor in those days; and, though there was an Austrian Emperor at Vienna, it was towards the Russian autocrat that the Prussian *junkers* turned in worship, just as every Mohammedan turns in prayer towards the Prophet's shrine at Mecca. After the Franco-German war, when Bismarck concentrated all his energies on the preservation of the great German Empire he had created, the combination which above all commended itself to him was the 'Three Emperors' Alliance', i.e. an alliance between Germany, Austria, and Russia, based upon common dynastic interests and, to a great extent, common principles of domestic government. It was only when Russian policy with regard to Turkey and her subject races began to alarm Austria-Hungary that, compelled to make his choice between Russia and Austria, Bismarck chose rather reluctantly the latter. He did not himself care twopence about the fate of the Christian races in the Balkans, which, as he once said, were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. But Russia could not remain indifferent to them. The whole nation regarded the emancipation of the Balkan peoples from the Turkish yoke as the historic mission of Russia. It was the Russo-Turkish war of

1827-9 which consummated the independence of Greece. The Crimean war was, for the Russian people, a war waged primarily for the overthrow of Turkish misrule. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8 resulted in the liberation of a large part of what is now the kingdom of Bulgaria. Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, had quite different views about the Balkans. The Austrians had played a great part in driving back the tide of Turkish conquest in Eastern Europe, but they had retained for themselves large territories inhabited by Slav races, Serbs, Croats, and others ; in the same way, after the last Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8, they had occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, also largely peopled by Slavs. Their ultimate object was to get down to Salonica and the Aegean Sea, and they did not want to see Turkey dismembered merely to make room for independent Balkan States, least of all for Balkan States under Russian protection. When Bismarck saw the growing friction between Russian policy and Austro-Hungarian policy in the Balkans, he could not run the risk of falling between two stools. He therefore concluded an alliance with Austria-Hungary, partly because she was far more likely than Russia to be content with the position of a subordinate ally. At the same time, to borrow one of his favourite expressions, he was not going to 'cut the wire to St. Petersburg' altogether; and, a few years later, when the wire was becoming rather shaky, he did not shrink from the famous Reinsurance Compact with Russia which, concluded behind Austria's back, fell only very little short of a treacherous bargain that Germany would put her own interpretation, when the time came, upon her treaty obligations towards Austria in the event of an Austro-Russian conflict.

That was the position when William II dismissed

Bismarck. Now Bismarck's chief object was to safeguard the position of undisputed pre-eminence which the German Empire had acquired on the European continent, and to prevent, at all costs, any hostile combination of Powers which might imperil his life's work. This did not satisfy the young Emperor. He wanted Germany not merely to remain the most powerful State in Europe but to become a world Empire. The Near East, Constantinople, Asia Minor, and Syria—first attracted his attention, and, as he could not very well conquer the Sultan's dominions, he set to work to capture the Sultan himself. All the other Powers were constantly warning the Sultan to introduce reforms and to set his house in order. The Kaiser said to him in effect : ' Deal with your house as you think fit, and I will protect you against these busybodies, if you will make it worth my while. All I want is railway concessions, commercial concessions, banking concessions, privileges for my German colonists in Syria and elsewhere, and the employment of German officers to reorganize and equip your army with German war materials.' To seal this bargain, he was quite willing to go to Constantinople and pay his court to the ' Red Sultan ', Abdul Hamid, when the rest of the civilized world was boycotting him on account of the Armenian massacres. Austria-Hungary followed the lead of Germany, though not without occasional hesitation ; for she knew that it was only with the help of Germany that she could achieve her own ambitions in the Balkan Peninsula.

But to Russia, German ascendancy at Constantinople could not fail to be most unpalatable ; and, as one of the first acts of the Kaiser after he had dismissed Bismarck was to drop his Reinsurance Compact with Russia, the German wire to Petrograd, if not actually

cut, was again very much weakened, and a tariff war between Russia and Germany tended further to make bad blood between the two countries. The Kaiser was by no means ready at that time to break with Russia, and the policy of adventure which Russia was then entering upon in the Far East proved a godsend to Germany. The construction of the Siberian railway, linking up the Tsar's dominions in Europe with his possessions on the remote Pacific, was opening up to Russian statesmen the possibility of finding in the Far East that access to the warmer waters of the world from which they were practically cut off in Europe. The victories of Japan over China in 1894-5 introduced, however, a new and very disturbing factor into their calculations. The Emperor William was quick to seize his opportunity. If he did not, as the Japanese firmly believe, actually instigate Russia to prevent Japan from reaping the fruits of her Manchurian campaign against China, he was prompt to lend her his heartiest co-operation ; even at the cost of sowing in Japan a harvest of bitter resentment which has even now come to maturity in the investment of Kiaochao by the Japanese forces, Germany helped Russia and her (on this occasion) somewhat unwilling ally France to eject the Japanese from the territories ceded to them by China. She of course very soon required payment, and Russia was not overwell pleased when, two years later, the Mailed Fist descended upon Kiaochao. On the other hand, she was able to rely on the Kaiser's eager acquiescence when, shortly afterwards, she herself took possession of Port Arthur. One good turn deserves another, and so, in the international expedition for the relief of the Legations in Peking, during the Boxer movement in 1900, the Tsar allowed himself to be jockeyed by the Kaiser

into proposing that all the foreign forces in Northern China should be placed under a German Generalissimo, Field Marshal von Waldersee, who returned the compliment by giving the Russians a free hand in Manchuria. Germany, again, had no sooner signed an agreement with this country during the Boxer movement for the preservation of the integrity and independence of the Chinese Empire than, at the first hint from St. Petersburg, she hastened to repudiate all idea of its having any application to the Manchurian provinces of China, over which Russia was establishing a scarcely veiled protectorate. Directly and indirectly, German influence henceforth steadily elbowed Russia into a conflict with Japan which, it was hoped in Berlin, would not only divert all Russia's energies from Europe, but also lead to the ultimate conflict between Russia and Great Britain which was then still the certain hope of German statesmen.

Here, however, as in many other cases, the Emperor William overreached himself. From the days of the Holy Alliance onwards, the Russian and German sovereigns have been in the habit of entertaining much closer personal relations than usually exist between the rulers of two independent States. Apart, for instance, from the ordinary diplomatic representation, a special military plenipotentiary, accredited to the person of the sovereign, served as the medium for direct and extremely confidential communications, sometimes quite unknown to the Embassies. Moreover, in Russia, a large section of the Court and of the higher official world consists of Russians of German origin, many of them from the Baltic provinces, whose sympathies have not unnaturally been largely German. Even amongst pure Russians, the reactionary party

has always had much more in common with Imperial Germany than with the liberal Powers of Western Europe. All these forces were in turn mobilized by the Kaiser to urge Russia on to action in the Far East, and to encourage the belief that Japan either would shrink at the last from a conflict with the mighty Russian Empire, or would be easily crushed if she ventured upon the attempt. These forces carried the day, and brought on the Russo-Japanese war, but the result was not what the Kaiser had expected. Thanks very largely to the cordial understanding which had been restored between England and France, both Powers were able to stand out of the conflict, though France was the ally of Russia and Great Britain was the ally of Japan. The war was localized in the Far East, and Russia was defeated.

It was true that, as one result of the Japanese war, Russia's military forces were seriously crippled for years and her position, even in Europe, considerably weakened; but the bitter lesson which she learnt from her defeat was not at all that upon which the Kaiser had reckoned. In the first place, the Tsar Nicholas realized that the advice he had received from London before the war had been far sounder and inspired by far more genuine friendship than the advice he had received from Berlin; for the British Government had consistently warned him that Japan would certainly fight if pressed too hard, and that, if she fought, she might prove to be a very formidable foe. Then, again, the revolutionary movement in Russia, which had derived much of its strength from popular resentment at the Manchurian fiasco, had not ended in the complete triumph of reaction which the Kaiser and the pro-German party in Russia had expected. On the

contrary, the constitutional reforms, the establishment of the Duma, the attempts to infuse a more liberal spirit into the bureaucracy, created new currents of thought throughout Russia, which were much more in sympathy with Western Europe than with Germany. Not only the most progressive parties in Russia, but even the moderate conservative parties welcomed from the first the possibility of a better understanding between Great Britain and Russia, not merely on international grounds, but because they were convinced that friendly relations between the two countries were bound to exert a favourable influence on the Russian internal situation. The reactionary parties, on the other hand, were those that persisted in the old distrust of England, and clung desperately to the time-honoured connexion with Germany.

Thus, for the first time, the Russian Government was induced to approach the question of a political understanding with Great Britain in an entirely new spirit. This country had often before, especially under Liberal administrations, made overtures to Russia for a settlement of existing differences in Asia ; but until the Japanese war induced a more chastened spirit in St. Petersburg, such overtures never met with any genuine response. French influence, too, was now exerted in St. Petersburg for the removal of any further chances of conflict between her Russian ally and her British friend. In 1907, an Anglo-Russian agreement was signed for the settlement of the three principal questions concerning Central Asia, which had repeatedly threatened to embroil the two countries, and it not only removed the chief dangers of collision between them, but paved the way for more intimate relations than had existed for nearly a hundred years. To

Germany, the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 brought even more bitter disillusionment than had the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, because it was still more unexpected. The Kaiser felt that, just as he has already lost one of his trump cards in the removal of the old colonial jealousies between France and England, he was again losing another in the removal of the old Asiatic antagonism between Russia and Great Britain. So as, in 1905, Germany had made a desperate attempt to break up over Morocco the Anglo-French understanding before it had had time to consolidate, so, in 1908, a determined attempt was made to smash the Triple Entente between Great Britain, France, and Russia. The crisis arose with the formal incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Hapsburg dominions and the simultaneous proclamation of Bulgarian independence. I need not dwell here upon its vicissitudes. Austria-Hungary, who was primarily concerned, had practically carried her point by diplomatic pressure, but this did not satisfy the Kaiser. It was not enough that Russia, whose military organization had not yet recovered from the Japanese war, should be compelled to abandon the claims she had rather rashly advanced on behalf of her Slav clients. The Kaiser insisted upon her public humiliation, and a scarcely veiled ultimatum was delivered at St. Petersburg, which at that stage was quite needless except to advertise Germany's 'Shining Armour'.

The humiliation thus inflicted upon Russia was resented all the more keenly as it struck at the very point where the policy of the Russian Government most accurately reflected the sentiments of the whole nation. There is in Russia as in most other countries, and far more than in any democratic country, a chauvinist

party whose ambitions find little echo in the nation as a whole, and that party has always been very strongly represented amongst the official classes, and not least in the Russian Foreign Office. The policy of Asiatic adventure upon which the Russian Government had entered was the policy of that party. The Russian people have always remained more or less indifferent to Persian or Tibetan or Far Eastern questions. Its heart was never even really stirred by the war against Japan. On the other hand, Russian policy in the Balkans, whether or not it was always prompted by disinterested solicitude for the little Slav brothers, always struck a responsive chord throughout Russia; and the people perhaps even more than the Government fiercely resented the slap in the face which Russia had received as a great Slav Power.

As between the two Sovereigns, the wire from Berlin to St. Petersburg had been almost irreparably damaged by the Kaiser's Shining Armour; but when, in theory, the supreme authority is concentrated, as in Russia, in the hands of one man, he is rarely able to exercise real control over any department of the State. Hence in Russia the curious administrative anarchy which often seems to prevail under autocratic rule, even after the events of 1909. Thus it came about that although the Tsar had from the beginning been a whole-hearted supporter of the understanding with England, German influence continued to make itself felt in many powerful quarters, and even in the Russian Foreign Office. In foreign policy, it was chiefly in connexion with Persia that the voice of the German tempter still frequently obtained a hearing, and partly under pressure, Russian diplomacy, it must be admitted, often put a severe strain upon the spirit if not the letter of the Anglo-

Russian agreement of 1907. Still more visible was the hand of Germany in the swing of the Russian pendulum towards reactionary methods at home ; but the more bitter the disappointment of the progressive parties in Russia over the developments of internal policy, the more steadfastly they clung to the maintenance of friendly relations between the Russian and the British Governments as a certain safeguard for what remained of their liberties. Events, meanwhile, were shaping themselves in the Balkan Peninsula in such a way as to force the hands of even the worst reactionaries, who, whatever else they might be willing to do, could not repudiate altogether the traditions of Russian policy in regard to the Slavs outside the Empire.

The small States of South-eastern Europe had taken to heart the lesson of 1908-9. They felt that their interests and even their independence were exposed henceforth to even greater danger from the ambitions of the two Germanic Powers than from their old enemy Turkey. Each of them began to set his own house in order, and a genuine attempt was made to compose their past differences and jealousies in order to meet the common enemy. Long-drawn negotiations between them resulted in the formation of a Balkan League composed of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro. All had not, probably, quite the same objects in view. Bulgaria and perhaps Greece had an eye chiefly to Constantinople. For Serbia and Montenegro, it was the Austrian menace that loomed largest. All, however, claimed special, if sometimes rival, interests in Macedonia, and it was Turkish misrule in Macedonia which ultimately brought the Balkan League into the field. The action, perhaps the very existence, of the League took Austria and Germany by surprise. The result of

its action was a still more unpleasant surprise for them. A victorious Balkan League was likely to prove a very formidable obstacle to Austro-Hungarian expansion to the Aegean Sea ; and Germany's prestige at Constantinople was specially affected by the fact that it was she who had made herself largely responsible for the organization and even for the equipment of the defeated Turkish armies. Germany, therefore, was quite ready to co-operate as peacemaker with Great Britain. The British Government was chiefly concerned to put an end to the war lest it should spread beyond its local limits. The German Government reckoned that, once peace was signed with Turkey, the Balkan League would quarrel over the division of the spoils and fall a prey to internal dissensions. It proved an accurate calculation. Russia tried at the last moment to defeat it by offering to act as arbitrator between the Balkan States. Serbia, whose exorbitant demands had gone far to provoke the conflict, could not reject the Russian proposal, for she, more than any other Balkan State, was dependent, in the last resort, upon Russian protection. But at Sofia the influence of the Germanic Powers prevailed, and King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, whose ambitions were still more inordinate, would not hear of arbitration, and himself cut the Gordian knot by initiating hostilities against his Serbian neighbours. Once more, the result was not what Germany or Austria-Hungary had expected and hoped. For Rumania, who had hitherto been regarded as a satellite of the Germanic Powers, suddenly emancipated herself from their influence. Under the pressure of her armies, as well as of defeats inflicted upon the Bulgarian armies by both Serbia and Greece, Bulgaria was compelled to acknowledge herself beaten ; whilst with Greece, Serbia, whom Austria had flouted

in 1909, emerged triumphantly from this fratricidal struggle.

Both in Vienna and in Berlin, it was felt that a severe blow had been dealt to the position of the Germanic Powers in South-eastern Europe, and that the situation could only be retrieved by taking action which would inevitably involve the risk of bringing Russia into the field. It was then that, for the first time, German statesmen began to talk about the 'Russian peril', and the impending conflict between German 'culture' and Russian 'barbarism'. In Vienna, the talk was more about Serbian insolence, and the necessity of chastising it. The murder of the Austrian heir apparent and his consort at Serajevo on June 28 provided the long-sought-for opportunity. That abominable crime overbore the old Emperor Francis Joseph's reluctance to sanction any kind of warlike enterprise, whilst the German Emperor, who had been a close friend of the Archduke, unquestionably felt it deeply, and as a personal injury not less than as a political misfortune. The counter-blow was dealt swiftly and brutally. The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, charging her with a deliberate conspiracy against the safety and integrity of the Hapsburg dominions, as well as with the actual connivance of some of her officials in the crime, demanded an abject and quite unparalleled surrender of Serbia's independence. We know now that, though the German Foreign Office may have been content to give a free hand to Austria without asking or wishing to be made acquainted with the details of the Austrian demands, it was not so with the German Emperor. His ambassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirschky, whose influence was throughout exerted for war, enjoyed his special confidence; through the am-

bassador he knew exactly what the Austrian ultimatum was to be—an ultimatum carefully framed to secure not acceptance but rejection. Even so, under Russian advice, Serbia did accept it almost in its entirety; but even this sacrifice in the cause of European peace was of no avail. We know also, from the German official memorandum published after the outbreak of hostilities, that, though addressed to Serbia, the ultimatum was from the first directly aimed over her head at Russia. M. Sazonoff, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was quick to realize that this was the real object which the two Germanic Powers had in view, but the whole Russian nation was equally quick to realize it. Popular feeling ran as high over the Austrian menace to Serbia as it had done in former days, when the issue was the emancipation of the Balkan Slavs from the Turkish yoke, and M. Sazonoff undoubtedly spoke for the Russian people as well as for the Russian Government when he at once declared that Russia could not allow Serbia to be crushed, and that she would rather face all the risks of war. In Austria there was at first an inclination not to take this warning very seriously. It was lightheartedly assumed that Russia would, at the last moment, flinch as she had done in 1909 before the Kaiser's 'Shining Armour'; and when it became clear that this time she was in grim earnest, a belated attempt was made to resume conversations with St. Petersburg, which were, in fact, still proceeding when the Kaiser precipitated the catastrophe by his two-fold ultimatum, to Russia and to France. Then, indeed, was the German wire to Petrograd irrevocably cut, and all the warnings of Bismarck's statesmanship cast to the winds.

Even from so brief a review of Russo-German relations,

it will be seen how little the present war has to do with any inexorable antagonism between German 'culture' and Russian 'barbarism'. So long as Germany could successfully exploit for her own purposes all the worst elements in the governing classes of Russia and deflect Russian ambitions into channels which did not impede her own, German statesmen and the German press laid eloquent stress upon the old dynastic friendship and the community of conservative principles and of political interests between the two countries. But when the gradual movement towards progress in Russia itself began to undermine the buttresses of German influence, and when finally the exigencies of the Kaiser's World-Policy compelled him to make a frontal attack upon Russia's position as the great Slav Power of Europe, then German statesmen and their scribes in the German press suddenly discovered that it was no longer, as in the old days when Germany was helping to hypnotize Russia in the Far East, the Chinese and the Japanese that threatened the 'holiest possessions' of European civilization, but that terrible Slav barbarism of which Russia was the monstrous embodiment. Well, if Russian barbarism were all that Germans in their new-fangled 'fear of Russia' have depicted it to be, it might still stand comparison with the sort of German 'culture' which has staggered humanity since the outbreak of this war. But the so-called 'barbarism' which has suddenly provoked in Germany a righteous indignation too long dissembled to be very genuine, is largely the result of long-arrested development. It is too often forgotten that, whilst Western civilization was slowly but steadily emerging from the Dark Ages, the forbears of modern Russia provided for a couple of centuries the great breakwater against which the tide of Asiatic

invasion repeatedly spent itself. Only then was Russia free to begin to tread the path on which the rest of Europe had already been striding forward. If we still owe the Russians of those remote days a debt of gratitude, it looks as if, before this war is over, Western Europe may have contracted a further debt towards their descendants of the present day for bearing a very large share in the preservation of Europe's liberties against the modern Huns.

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A NOVEL

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THE WAR THROUGH DANISH EYES

SINCE the outbreak of the great European War, we have now and then seen English newspapers express the opinion that the Danish public in general does not manifest its sympathy with the British cause so clearly and openly as—in their opinion—it ought to do; sometimes we even find tokens of suspicion whether Danish sympathies do not tend to the other side, and whether German claims and German intrigue have always on the part of Denmark been met with so decided a refusal as they ought to be, according to the duty imposed by the professed strict and impartial neutrality of the Danish State.

In seeking to give an opinion on this subject, I must begin by pointing out the extreme difficulty of arriving at an absolutely impartial and general judgement about a matter which is complicated by several different and mutually incompatible facts and circumstances. In the first place, however, it is absolutely necessary to direct the reader's attention to the immense danger and difficulties arising from the mere fact of our frontiers being immediately adjacent to Germany, and especially to Prussia.

It must be very difficult for an Englishman to form a clear conception of that peculiar feeling of latent but imminent peril impressed upon Danes by the consciousness of always having the German military power

immediately outside their doors—this army of millions so admirably equipped and prepared for instant action, at any time able to invade our country within a few hours; besides this, the German fleet, enormous in comparison with ours, manœuvring near our coasts, and ever and anon trespassing on our waters in a way that would never be tolerated by Germany, if any foreign Power dared to try similar proceedings near her coasts; and added to this the dire experience of the absolutely unscrupulous use made of these forces, as soon as their masters gain the conviction that ‘we must have’ some provinces belonging to a neighbouring country, which sentence of Count Bismarck, pronounced with reference to the Danish duchies, was the sole and real cause of the attack on Denmark in 1864. These facts cause a feeling of despondency and helplessness which makes many Danes regard our existence as depending to a great extent upon the doubtful goodwill of Germany, and makes them above all fear any utterance or act that might in any way be disagreeable to the mighty neighbour.

Add to this a sincere admiration of everything really great in Germany—German ability, energy, and enterprise, German art and science, German progress and development during the last forty or fifty years—and the circumstance that many Danes, settled in Germany, are strongly influenced by the milieu in which they are living, often *completely imbued with the German point of view*, and constantly striving to impress this upon their correspondents at home—and it will be intelligible that a number of Danes are to be found arguing as follows :

Notwithstanding our sincere wish to remain on equally friendly terms with all our neighbours, and notwithstanding the extreme importance of our con-

nexions and trade with other States—especially with England—there is no country whose friendship is so indispensable, and whose ill-will is so detrimental, to Denmark as Germany. Germany has contributed more than any other nation to all our development ; as for trade, much of what we export goes to Germany, and by far the greatest part of our imports is brought in from her ; as for our culture, German art and science have given us many impulses, while on the other hand Danish artists, authors, and poets have found more appreciation in Germany than anywhere else. As for political relations, our very independence is at the mercy of Germany ; we have learnt in 1864 that even the guarantee of all the Great Powers could not maintain our integrity against the will of Germany ; therefore, in view of her tremendous development and our fatal decline since that time, nothing remains for us but to put all our hope and confidence in the justice and magnanimity of that great nation. Whatever may be our sympathy or antipathy, we have no choice ; the question of self-preservation dictates our line of conduct as an inevitable necessity. We must do our utmost to satisfy the claims, and avoid everything that might tend to awake the suspicion and discontent, of our powerful southern neighbour.

It is very difficult to ascertain how many there are who really accept these arguments ; there are others who denounce them as below the standard of an independent nation's self-respect ; and in spite of all the reasons which give weight to them, there are many—in my opinion by far the greater part of the Danish nation—who argue in quite a different way. I shall now try to give a summary of their views, and to make clear the foundation on which they rest.

If we desire to judge clearly, without risk of deceiving ourselves as to our real interests and situation, it is absolutely necessary to take our departure from a historical point of view. Looking at the main outlines, it

appears obvious that this war presents itself to the mind as the direct consequence of the wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870—the logical continuation (perhaps conclusion) of that era of blood and iron begun on January 16, 1864, by the Austro-Prussian ultimatum to Denmark, and continued unrelentingly to the present day. In this ultimatum the two German Powers demanded from Denmark the cancelling within two days of the new constitution of November 15, 1863, a demand which—parliament having been adjourned—could only be fulfilled by violating the constitution. There is a striking resemblance between some points of this ultimatum and of that delivered by Austria to Serbia on July 23, 1914. The striking feature in both of these pieces of diplomacy is the putting forth of claims that are absolutely irreconcilable with the constitution and other laws of the nation concerned, and the absolute refusal of sufficient time for having the said laws altered in the legal way.

When Denmark took up the war in 1864, many persons expressed the opinion that the inevitable bloodshed was ‘but for a scrap of paper’, and when afterwards the Danish Government with more tenacity than prudence stuck to the conviction of rescue through the intervention of England and France, this too was ‘but for a scrap of paper’, viz. the Treaty of London of May 8, 1852; by which the integrity of the Danish Monarchy was fixed and guaranteed by the five Great Powers besides Sweden-Norway. But in 1864—contrary to the case of Belgium in 1914—England and France did not acknowledge any separate duty to back their guarantee by military force when it was infringed by two of the other guarantors with the silent consent of the third. Denmark, left alone and disappointed, was mutilated

and Prussia acquired the excellent harbours at Kiel and Sønderborg, which in her hand have been first-rate means for creating that mighty navy which, according to Kaiser Wilhelm's hopes, is to dispute with Britannia the ruling of the waves.

From this it will be understood that it caused no surprise whatever in Denmark, when Germany, in spite of solemn obligations, invaded the neutral States of Luxembourg and Belgium ; we recognized exactly the same line of conduct which was carried on against us with so much success, and is legalized to the mind of every true German by the sentence of Count Bismarck, that 'war cancels all treaties'. Therefore we feel convinced that the same line of action will be continued just as long as the triumphal career of Prussia continues, and it is this conviction that deprives some Danes of the hope that real independence can possibly be preserved by any small neighbour of Prussia.

It may be noted here, that neither have the German cruelties on record from Belgium caused any surprise to those who have studied the details of Prussian behaviour in Denmark during the war of 1864. It must be admitted that—upon the whole—she did not often afford cause of complaint ; but it must also be borne in mind that circumstances were of a quite different nature from what they are during the present war. In the first place, the superiority of the armies invading our country was so enormous that there was not for a single moment a real danger of any decisive defeat ; in the second place, they did not meet with the least resistance on the part of the peaceful inhabitants, who on the contrary received and treated them in a way which soldiers rarely experience in an enemy's country. Nevertheless, the Prussian army did commit several deeds incompatible

with civilized warfare, and only attributable to wanton cruelty and delight in devastation. It may suffice to mention two instances.

In besieging the position at Dybbøl, which was strengthened by some entrenchments, the Prussians, in spite of their superiority both in number and armament, met with a lengthy and obstinate resistance. About a mile and a half behind the position, beyond the sound of Als and on the low coast of this island, the small town of Sønderborg is situated. It did not take any part in the defence, but had some value as shelter for part of the troops. One day Prussian shells suddenly began to rain down over the town with great violence, continuing with some pauses till the whole town was in ruins, and this was done without the least notice being given to the unhappy inhabitants, of whom a number were wounded and killed, although this cruelty could not give the assailants any advantage whatever. In another instance Prussian troops burnt down the village of Assendrup because they had been taken by surprise there, although the attack was executed by a small body of the *Danish regular army*, without the villagers having any knowledge of it or taking any part whatever in the fighting.

When an army, which even under such circumstances cannot withhold from cruelties, is exasperated by meeting unforeseen resistance, by seeing unexpected dangers accumulate, and by feeling the peril of a definite total defeat gradually increasing for itself and its country, it may well be capable of still worse deeds, such as those lately committed by the German army in Belgium.

Now the war of 1864 is not the only one which has been fought between Denmark and Germany or some part of it. During the thousand years and more of Denmark's

existence as a single and independent realm, a multiplicity of connexions may be traced between the two nations, numerous wars have been fought, and between them long periods of peace and friendly terms have existed ; but the presence of this powerful neighbour has always continued to be an imminent danger to the small country, sometimes bringing it near the verge of annihilation, yet never succeeding in totally subjugating it. However, perilous as the enmity of Germany has been, we are taught by our history that its friendship in times of peace has been still more pernicious. Its culture, its arts, its industry have penetrated Denmark by a thousand channels, not only serving to stimulate and fertilize, but also to dislodge, scatter, and destroy native industries, while numerous adventurers, spreading over the country, have to a certain extent expelled the natives from the best posts and the most lucrative business, and by introducing their own fashions and language have largely contributed to the degeneration of our original national culture and even to the deterioration of our very language.

This peaceful invasion has often created political as well as cultural dangers, affording to the native country of the immigrants many excellent pretexts for meddling with our home affairs. It is a matter of course that in proportion as Denmark has been weak and Germany powerful, the greater has been the danger caused by this interference, and it is highly aggravated by the peculiar way in which Germans look upon themselves in relation to other nations. A keen sense of patriotism and a marked pride in the greatness of his nation are innate in every good German, but by a systematic training in the schools and throughout life these laudable sentiments are overdeveloped to such a degree, that they

are converted into a disregard for all other nations, combined with a most repulsive and exaggerated overrating of themselves. To many Germans their own nation is the only one really at the top of modern culture and civilization ; nay, it is God's own select people to whose grandeur all other inferior nations ought to contribute. All the Slavs are regarded as semi-barbarous people lying far behind, while the nations of Latin stock are considered as degenerate remnants of a culture from past times ; and as for the non-German nations of Gothic origin like the Netherlands and Danes, they are looked upon as misled children of the original German race that ought to be led back to true Teutonism.

These opinions are especially professed and propagated by a number of organizations, counting among their members many distinguished persons in official and university circles, some of whom act as editors of periodicals with numerous readers. Among these, two may be mentioned : ¹

1. 'The German Association for North Slesvig' ('Der Deutsche Vercin für das Nördliche Schleswig'), with the organ *Northern Borderland* (*Nordmark*), has been formed with the aim of rooting out completely the Danish mother-tongue among the inhabitants of Slesvig, and it pursues its aim unrelaxingly and unrelentingly with all possible means at its disposal.

2. 'The Pan-German Language and Literature Association' ('Der Alldutsche Sprach- und Schriftverein'), with the organ *Heimdall*, does not at all limit its operations to cultural objects, as the name would indicate, but aims directly at the enlargement of German territory, a fact clearly expressed by the following motto, which, written in runes, forms part of the heading of the above-named *Heimdall* : 'From

¹ From Dr. Gudmund Schütte : *Pan-Germanism and Denmark*.

the Skaw to the Adriatic! From Boulogne to Narva!
From Besançon to the Black Sea!

Although not possessed of any official character, these leagues exert a marked influence on the authorities, often pushing them on to acts of rudeness against the Danish population of Slesvig, and sometimes to interference with the home affairs of the independent Danish State. With Argus eyes they are constantly watching every manifestation of Danish life inside as well as outside the frontier; by numerous misunderstandings and misinterpretations they find acts of hostility against Germany in the most innocent proceedings of natural self-defence, and by their denunciations they are constantly working to create, and often succeeding in creating, suspicion and ill-will against Denmark throughout Germany.

These leagues, however, principally concentrate their hatred against a number of Danish associations united under the name of the 'Co-operative South-Jutlandish Associations' ('Samvirkende Sønderjydske Foreninger'). These associations are formed with the object of supporting Danish subjects of Germany in the preservation of their hereditary mother-tongue. It has been officially and clearly proved that they are not chargeable with any act of hostility against Germany, or any illegal proceedings whatever, their activity (besides the issue of printed information) consisting in keeping up a continuation-school for young people from Slesvig who desire to obtain some education beyond that afforded by the Prussian primary schools, and further to give financial support to these young people during their sojourn at this or other schools in Denmark. It may be noted that Germany—even officially—employs exactly the same procedure to assist Germans in foreign

countries (including Denmark) in the preservation of their language, without meeting with any obstacle whatever ; but the thing that is meritorious if Germans do it is a great crime in Pan-German eyes if done by Danes. In fact, the Pan-Germans have succeeded in instigating their authorities to call upon the Danish Government to take action against the ' Co-operative South-Jutlandish Associations ', asking it to issue a series of prohibitions, viz. to forbid officials to be members of them or to speak at their meetings, to expel South-Jutlanders taking part in the meetings, &c., although none of these claims could be complied with without infringement of the Danish laws.

The ' Co-operative South-Jutlandish Associations ' publish a monthly review called *The South-Jutlander* (*Sønderjyden*), bearing as mottoes this declaration of the first Danish members of the German Diet, Krüger and Ahlmann : ' We are Danes, we will remain Danes, we will be treated as Danes according to International Law,' and this quotation from § 5 of the Treaty of Prague, 1866 : ' The inhabitants of the northern districts of Slesvig shall be reunited to Denmark, if by a free vote they express their wish accordingly.' This last motto was the subject of an attack from the Pan-Germans through the German minister and the Danish Government, but as the latter had no means of compelling the associations to cancel their motto, these replied that the first condition would be the cancelling from the above-named *Heimdall* of the motto : ' From the Skaw to the Adriatic', &c. ; after this nothing more was heard about the matter.

Other examples might be quoted, but these will suffice to explain the uneasiness and apprehension felt by many Danes and the question which is often asked

with deep anxiety : ' If the present state of Europe subjects us to such interference on the part of Germany, how much worse will it be, when once victorious she has dictated terms of peace to all other Powers, and stands as the supreme and uncontrolled Great Power above all others, exercising her iron hegemony over all the world ? May it not be feared, that even if she leaves us the name of independence, it will scarcely be more than a mere title without any real value ? '

Now, if we wish to ascertain what conditions of moral and cultural life such dependence upon Germany offers to foreign nations, we need but cast a glimpse at the German yoke laid upon the Danes in South-Jutland (Slesvig). It has been frequently proved, and occasionally avowed by the German authorities themselves, that there does not exist throughout all the German Dominions a single people more cultivated, more quiet, and more obedient to the laws than these very Danes. But are they treated accordingly ? Have their characteristics been respected as was promised by the King of Prussia in a proclamation of 1864 ?

In the law-courts the Danish language was abolished a few years after the conquest, and all the business is conducted in German, a language not understood by the population. In the churches, German was introduced and its use gradually extended whenever a few immigrated Germans, or persons dependent on the authorities, could be induced to give the impulse by petitioning for it. These proceedings were carried on even in congregations where the overwhelming majority of the members were Danish, incapable of understanding a German sermon, to such an extent that earnest people were seized with a keen apprehension of the population being alienated from the Church and even

from the Christian Faith. But the authorities were deaf to all complaints; their true reason was once given by a clergyman in an elevated position, who made the following reply: 'Certainly, it is a pity; but even if the present generation goes to ruin, what matters, if following generations are lifted up into the higher sphere of true Teutonism?' To be Germanized was so great a benefit in his eyes, that it could not be paid for too dearly. In many districts the only means by which Christian Danes could procure intelligible religious instruction was the forming of independent congregations and the building of new churches, but these proceedings were met by the authorities with all sorts of chicanery: every pretext was made use of to prevent the population from utilizing their own churches; the first was closed by the police, and legal proceedings had to be carried on for three years, before it could be opened; afterwards the use of church bells was forbidden, the validity of ministerial acts was denied, &c., &c.

What, however, violates and hurts the population most, is that the German language has been gradually introduced in the schools, in such a way that now—since 1888—[even in purely Danish districts] there are only a couple of hours' weekly instruction in religion in the Danish mother-tongue;¹ it is made impossible to establish Danish schools and even to keep Danish teachers in the homes; in this manner the Government does all that it can to root out the language of the population. What a goal to set before itself for a people that claims to be a Christian people and a people of culture!²

Add to this that the use of the Danish language in public meetings is prohibited in all districts where both

¹ By Governmental circular of November 29, 1883.

² From J. Andersen: *South Jutland under Prussian Rule*.

languages are spoken, and that this harsh measure will be extended in 1928 even to all purely Danish districts.¹

The way in which Germanization is carried on in the schools will be made obvious by the simple fact that Danish children are severely punished whenever they are heard making use of their own language in the playgrounds or on the premises of the schools.

It would require volumes to describe in detail all the forms in which the persecution of everything Danish is carried on, including the repression of Danish journalism, Danish literature, Danish and even Norwegian songs, or to enumerate instances of the expulsion of Danish (and Norwegian) 'speakers, artists and scientific men, nay even of Danish peasant labourers necessary for agricultural purposes—and all this in most cases without the slightest cause or even pretext. A single example of very recent date may be sufficient to illustrate these features of Prussian rule. A young Danish peasant was about to marry a young girl in South-Jutland, and the couple were to take possession of the small property belonging to the parents of the bride. But on the very wedding-day German officials stepped forth before the wedding ceremony took place, and presented an order for the bridegroom to leave the country immediately. And this was done in these very days when thousands of young Danes from Slesvig are faithfully fulfilling their imposed duty, fighting and bleeding—many of them giving their lives—for the sake of their subduers.

What above all things contributes to give to these German methods of ruling an aspect of menace to all those peoples, who either now or in the future are

¹ According to the Association Law (*Vereinsgesetz*) of April 19, 1908, § 12.

endangered by the possibility of German supremacy, is the fact of their being carried out with the very best conscience—not at all from malevolence or cruelty, but in the firm conviction that it all tends to the real and true benefit of the population concerned, Germanization being the best of all good things. If the people in question does not understand this, then it must be compelled to do so ; and assuredly the time will come when these benefits will be recognized with thankfulness. This point of view leaves but little hope of any reform of methods.

It can only be guessed at, which nations are threatened with being blessed with these benefits, but a hint as to which they are according to German assumptions may be derived from the above-quoted motto of *Heimdall*. Other hints may be found in some maps of Europe after the war, which are widely circulated throughout Germany, and sometimes exhibited in the windows of Danish booksellers. I have here copies of two of them. The first bears the title : ‘ Map of Europe as our enemies would like to make it,’ and ‘ as the German Michel *is going to make it.*’ On the one side Germany is divided between its present enemies, only leaving in the centre a little country smaller than Switzerland, while at the same time the Danish islands are assigned to England, Holland to Belgium, Northern Italy to France, and most of Austria-Hungary besides the greater part of the Balkan peninsula to Serbia. On the other side Germany is represented as comprising Belgium, nearly all France and a large part of Poland and Russia, while nearly all the visible rest of Russia and the bulk of the Balkan peninsula is attributed to Austria-Hungary, *Great Britain being marked as a German, and Ireland as an Austrian colony.* It is possible that this map scarcely deserves

to be taken in good earnest ; nevertheless, it aims at stimulating, to the utmost point German patriotism and presumption, and by its accusation of Germany's enemies excites against them the hatred of millions of Germans who accept its exaggerations with credulity.

The other map is a little less exaggerated, leaving on the German side a kingdom of Poland as a member of the German federation, making Scotland and Ireland independent, and generously leaving Cornwall (!) as a sort of independent England, while the rest of Old England is marked as a ' German Protectorate ' (*Deutsches Schutzgebiet*).

If we consider such German aspirations, bearing in mind the peculiar appreciation of foreign nations characteristic to Germans, we must feel convinced that if Germany comes forth victorious from the terrible contest, there will be no real and true independence for any of her small neighbours in future, whatever may be the formal state of independence left to them. The fact is that to Germany (as to Austria) there are two degrees of independence : one fit for themselves, another for their small neighbours ; the latter consisting in these being allowed to govern themselves, but only according to the will of the big neighbour, who reserves to himself the right of meddling with all their affairs, from the greatest vital questions to the pettiest details.

If, on the contrary, Germany is defeated, we cannot forget that her enemies have drawn their sword not only for their own sake, but quite as much for the independence of the small States and for the validity of those solemn treaties that are to be reduced by Germany to mere ' scraps of paper ', while on the contrary she herself has opened the war under the classical maxim : ' *Vae victis* '. In the history of past times, moreover, we do

not find any cause whatever for suspicion against England, France, or Russia as harbouring the least inclination towards violating our integrity or our independence. On the contrary, we often find English voices of some consequence expressing deep regret for England having suffered the mutilation of Denmark in 1864 ; and as for France, she does remember that it was on her initiative that § 5, with its promise of some relief, was put into the Treaty of Prague.

Upon the whole, we must rest every hope in the victory of the three Entente Powers, and in our inmost hearts consider them as fighting in reality for our sake quite as much as for their own.

Every intelligent reader who has studied the points of view above developed, and has examined the recorded facts with impartiality, will certainly admit that the situation of the Danish people is a most difficult one, and will understand that the greater part of the people found its own thoughts expressed by the following proclamation, issued by the King and posted up at all street corners and on all hoardings on the first of August.

‘ In the serious circumstances created for our native country by the portentous occurrences of these last days, we feel impelled to make the following announcement to our people :

‘ Never was the sense of responsibility more necessary both for individuals and for the nation as a whole.

‘ Our country stands in friendly relations with all nations. We feel fully assured that the strict and impartial neutrality which has always been maintained as the foreign policy of our country, and which will now be followed unswervingly, will be respected by all.

‘ As this is the view common to the Government and to all responsible and prudent men, we rely upon the

dignity and tranquillity, so indispensable for creating confidence in the attitude of our country, not being broken by any untimely utterance of feeling, inconsiderate demonstration, or similar action. Every one now has his responsibility and his duty. We feel convinced that the seriousness of this hour will set its stamp upon the actions of all Danish men and women.

‘God save our country.’

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TO BELGIUM.

BY

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WHAT EUROPE OWES TO BELGIUM¹

JUST over a hundred years ago, at the end of 1813, the allied armies of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain were closing in upon France to dethrone Napoleon. One of the successes which were gained by the Prussians on the road to France was the expulsion from Belgium of the French, who had held the country since 1795. For eighteen years Belgium had been treated as an integral part of France ; in fact it had been organized as nine French departments. A minor problem which had to be settled after Napoleon's deposition was the future ownership of this country ; the Congress of Vienna handed it over to the kingdom of the Netherlands. No one imagined at the time that the Belgian people might object to this arrangement. Indeed, it was supposed that they would welcome union with the Dutch. For the State so formed would certainly be powerful enough for self-defence—whereas Belgium had been singularly defenceless in the past—and further, it was certain to become exceedingly prosperous, because it would control the lower part of the Rhine and the Meuse valleys, and would naturally be the main outlet for the foreign trade of Western Germany. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the Great Powers paid much attention to Belgian susceptibilities. What they desired, in their own interest, not in that of the Belgians or the Dutch, was to create a kingdom which would serve as

¹ A lecture delivered at Birmingham to the Workers' Educational Association on November 25, 1914.

a buffer between France and Germany, and which would be strong enough to keep Antwerp and Amsterdam from falling into the hands of a first-class State, such as France or Prussia. And in justice to the Great Powers it must be said that no one of them got any direct advantage from the union of the Dutch and the Belgians. Austria, who ranked as the second of the Great Powers—though she would not have admitted that she was only the second—gave up a good deal by assenting to the union. Legally she had the best claim to Belgium, which had belonged to her, under the name of the Austrian Netherlands, for eighty-two years before the French conquest. Austria had acquired her right, by the consent of the Great Powers, at the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.

But though the treatment of Belgium in 1815 was not conspicuously selfish—the interests of Belgium were only subordinated to the general interests of Europe—the Great Powers showed a blindness to the lessons of past history which is certainly surprising.

They might be excused for supposing that the Belgians did not greatly desire independence. It is true the Belgians had disliked the rule of the Jacobins and of Napoleon; they had fought against Napoleon at Waterloo. Before that they had rebelled against Austrian rule, and had proclaimed themselves a republic (1789). But in each case they had risen simply to defend the ancient laws and privileges of their provinces and cities; and past experience seemed to show that they had no objection to a foreign ruler who allowed them to manage their local affairs in their own way. Before they came under Austria they had been ruled by the Spanish Hapsburgs for two hundred years; and before that by a French dynasty, the Dukes of Burgundy. In the remote past the provinces of Belgium had been little feudal princi-

palities; Ghent and Mons and Louvain, Liège and Namur, had been the capital cities of counts and dukes who were practically independent. But there had never been a Belgian national State. The very name of Belgium was an invention of the antiquarians: in the time of Julius Caesar the Celtic tribes of the Netherlands were federated under the name of Belgæ. But the Belgium of modern history contains two distinct races; and though the Walloons in the southern provinces were and are Celts, the Flemings in the north are undeniably Teutons in physique, in language, and in manners.

All these facts seemed so many reasons to justify the action of the Congress of Vienna. But, on the other hand, it should have been clear that the Dutch were the last nationality with whom the Belgians would consent to amalgamate. In the sixteenth century, for just twelve years (1567-79), the two peoples had united to throw off what seemed to them the intolerable yoke of Spain. But, after twelve years of the alliance, the Belgians had decided that, great as were the wrongs which they had suffered from Spain, it was better to be ruled by Spain than to run the risk of being ruled by the Dutch. They found the Dutch too imperious; they felt that, to maintain the alliance, it would be necessary to give way to the Dutch on every point of difference. And the points of difference were serious. The Dutch were Protestants, while the larger half of Belgium has always been devoted to the old faith. The Dutch were democratic and radical in politics, while the Belgians were strongly conservative and inclined to aristocratic government. The Dutch were a commercial race, who made no secret of their jealousy for the prosperous Belgian trading towns. Finally, the

Dutch were a seafaring race, inclined to risk everything for the sake of colonies and a carrying trade; but the Belgians were a sedentary folk, given over to agriculture and industrialism, with no interest at all in sea-power.

Such had been the causes of difference in 1579; and substantially the same causes produced civil war in the kingdom of the United Netherlands only fifteen years after it had been created. The population of Holland was considerably smaller than that of Belgium; but the king was a Dutchman; the Dutch usually contrived to make a majority in the national parliament; and the ministers of the crown were chosen by the king from his own countrymen. Both the bad and the good measures of this Government were displeasing to the Belgians; they were indignant at its attempts to make Dutch the official language, and also at its adoption of a policy of complete religious tolerance. They found that the Dutch system of taxation was so contrived as to bear hardly on the Belgian provinces; and they grumbled because their clergy were compelled to go through a course of higher education.

Civil war broke out in 1830; the Belgians were badly beaten by the Dutch, but saved from subjugation through the interference of France and England. The Great Powers decided to set up an independent Belgian State (1831), and after eight years the Dutch consented to recognize this arrangement (Treaty of London, 1839). The Belgians were obliged to compensate the Dutch by ceding territory on the eastern frontier, which was and is inhabited by a Flemish population. That is how Maestricht comes to be a Dutch possession at the present day. But the Belgians may now console themselves by reflecting that the Dutch occupation of Maestricht has

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been a most useful check upon the German invaders of Belgium in the present war.

The Great Powers, then, in 1839, made amends to Belgium for the injury which had been inflicted in 1815. But, in doing so, they raised again a question which they had hoped to settle for good and all at Vienna. Obviously the new kingdom of the Belgians was not strong enough to defend Antwerp against France or against Prussia. If left to themselves, the Belgians would in common prudence accept the protection of one of these two Powers, probably of France ; and then would be revived the danger of a French naval base at Antwerp, which had driven England to war with France in 1793. So it was agreed to make Belgium a neutral State in perpetuity. This plan had already been adopted, in regard to Switzerland, at the Congress of Vienna. It conferred a great advantage on Belgium ; for it made any invasion of her territory a breach of international law. But it also restrained her freedom of action. She could not go to war except in self-defence ; nor might she make any treaty which was not obviously and entirely defensive. She could not even go to war to defend an ally ; and this, in effect, meant that she would never be able to make an alliance upon equal terms. All the Powers who signed the Treaty of London were equally bound to protect her ; but she could hardly make further provisions for her safety by private treaties. You will remember that the Germans, quite recently, have gone so far as to argue that, if Belgium has at any time in the past made arrangements with France or with England for her own defence, those arrangements amount to a breach of neutrality. The argument is not one which international lawyers would accept ; but, as a matter of fact, it is very hard to

frame a treaty, or even an agreement of a less formal kind, between two nations in such a way that it cannot possibly be construed as offensive in its purpose.

Here, then, we come to the legal obligations by which Europe is bound to Belgium. The Great Powers, for their own security, insisted upon partially disarming Belgium. By way of compensation they promised to defend the independence of Belgium. They are bound to fulfil this obligation, and not only as a matter of their national honour—though it will be a bad day for Europe when nations cease to think that they are bound in honour to fulfil their pledges, or to think that their honour is worth no considerable sacrifices. They are bound by their plain interests. For if they betray such pledges, how can they hope to make firm friends in the future? If they desert the small States who trust in them, how can they expect loyal dealings from allies who are not afraid of them?

German writers and statesmen sometimes make light of international law, as though it consisted entirely of rules which had been made by weak States, such as Belgium and Switzerland, to tie the hands of their more powerful neighbours. One may freely admit that many text-books of international law have been written by lawyers who belong to the smaller nationalities; and it is true that some of these books lay down doctrines which have no claim to be regarded as law, though the weaker States hope that they may be so regarded. But there is a great deal of international law which is formally recognized as binding by all the civilized States of the world. For example, there are general rules relating to the rights and duties of neutral States in war-time. These are embodied in the Hague Convention of 1907, which was ratified by all the Powers.

Then there are the more special rights and obligations of particular Powers one to another, which are defined in the treaties concluded at various times between them—as, for instance, the treaties which France and Germany concluded with Great Britain in 1870, treaties by which these two States promised to respect the neutrality of Belgium. It is the general belief, not simply of theorists and philanthropists, but of the practical statesmen of the world, that if such conventions and treaties may be repudiated with impunity by any Power which, after signing them, finds them inconvenient, if diplomacy may decline to recognize any Right but that of the strong to take what they covet, then the inevitable result will be a frightful anarchy, a ceaseless warfare of all States against all. The race of armaments will become increasingly acute, the best energies of every nation will be perforce devoted to no other tasks but that of self-defence, and the end of this insane rivalry will be either the bankruptcy of all the rivals, or a world-wide despotism of one.

These are the issues at stake in the present war. The central fact of the situation is that, in attacking Belgium, the Germans have proclaimed their contempt for international law and for the ideals which have given birth to that law. The Germans have indeed attempted to prove that Belgium forfeited her rights of neutrality before they attacked her; but these attempts have been singularly unsuccessful, for the simple reason that they had no foundation in fact. Only four days before attacking Belgium they assured the Belgian Government that they intended to respect Belgian neutrality; and a few days after German troops had entered Belgium the German Chancellor told the Reichstag that the German Government had committed

a breach of international law, because 'necessity knows no law'. Unquestionably he was more prudent than those of his countrymen who deny that any nation is bound by its plighted word; but if promises can be repudiated at any moment on the unproved plea of necessity, international law is reduced to a sham. Englishmen felt, and felt rightly, when they heard of the German invasion of Belgium, that the German Empire is the deadliest peril which has menaced Europe since the downfall of Napoleon Bonaparte. Unless we defended Belgium, all European treaties might as well be torn up. We have a longer political experience than the German Empire; we know that neither we nor any other nation can exist without firm alliances and honourable understandings. And we have gone to war mainly for the purpose of convincing Germany that treaties and guarantees are something more than 'scraps of paper'.

What we have done for Belgium is no more than we should be bound, in honour and in interest, to do for any Power to which we had given such guarantees of whole-hearted and individual support. And one must confess with very genuine shame that our support has been far from adequate to the danger in which Belgium was involved. We have made great efforts, and we have every cause to be proud of the gallantry with which our soldiers are fighting on the flank of the Belgian army at the present moment. Our soldiers have done more than any foreign nation ever expected of them—more than we had any right to expect, however much we hoped of them. But, for all that, the Belgian army is to-day all but driven out of Belgium; some of the most renowned of Belgian cities are in ruins; at least half the Belgian people are either starving or dependent

upon foreign charity in foreign lands. We hope and believe that this calamitous state of things will soon be bettered. But we know only too well that we can never restore to the Belgians the best of their lost possessions—her fallen soldiers, and, still more pitiful, the martyrs of Termonde, of Dinant, of Louvain.

I hope we are not proud of the way in which we Allies have repaid our debt to Belgium. Do we realize, even now, what a debt we owe to her? When the war-cloud first appeared on the horizon, in 1913, the Belgians made a sacrifice to the idea of national independence which we have never made. Their Parliament decreed the principle of universal military service and provided the ways and means for doubling the Belgian Army. They are the most pacific, the most industrial of the Continental nations; but they were prepared to put for the future one-half of their able-bodied men into the field for national defence. The war broke upon them before the new regulations had produced anything like their full effect. But it is the simple truth that the resistance of the Belgians at Liège and before Brussels saved the situation for the Allies. The Germans entered Belgium on August 4. They had expected to march straight through Belgium to the French frontier. In fact they were prevented from reaching the frontier until the 23rd. No one knows the exact state of the French defences on that day; but we know this much, that on the left of the Allied armies, at the point where the Germans made their great effort to reach Paris by outflanking the Allies, the French Commander-in-Chief had staked everything on the power of the British troops to delay the German advance. As we know, Sir John French and his troops did what was expected, at the cost of incredible efforts and in spite of losses which

would have demoralized most armies. But if the Germans had reached Mons three days earlier, they would have found no British forces drawn across their road. Our troops reached Mons at the earliest date which had ever been expected ; but they only got into position on August 22, barely twenty-four hours before the Germans were upon them. But for the delay caused by the Belgian resistance, which was so fierce and so unexpected that it upset all the calculations of the enemy, it is hard to see how the Germans could have been kept out of Paris. The fall of Paris would not have ended the war ; but it would have prolonged the war—such is the expert opinion—perhaps by as much as two years. What two additional years of warfare on the present scale would have cost the Allies in human lives, one hardly dares to conjecture. But in money alone two years of war could not cost this country less than £700,000,000. Money is not the first or even the second consideration in a war like this. Yet, after all, money represents wealth, the material basis of civilization. Lacking wealth, we must forgo many of the goods of life which are absolutely essential to civilization, not to speak of comfort. Let us only try to imagine how we should be obliged to economize—as individuals and as a nation—to pay off £700,000,000. It would mean pinching and scraping, for at least a generation, on such items as our charities, our poor-relief, our hospitals, the education of our children. When we emerge from the present war we are likely to be pinched in any case. I hope we shall never forget how much worse the position might have been, if General Leman had not played the part of a hero at Liège, or if King Albert had consented to make his peace with the Germans while he was still at Brussels.

But, after all, the Belgians have not been fighting for our material advantage or their own. If they have allowed their own women and children to go hungry and ragged, they have not done so simply and solely that English women and children might still be well fed and warmly clothed. It is not for the safety of England or of France that thousands of the Belgian people have allowed themselves to be driven into exile. Belgium has made her unparalleled sacrifices for the sake of an ideal. While we are fighting to assert the rule of law, the Belgians are fighting for their rights as a nationality. Under German rule they would have been much better secured against aggression than they ever will be as an independent State; and it is highly probable that they would have been materially more prosperous. Antwerp might have become the maritime capital of the German Empire; at all events Belgian trade would have been protected and fostered by German armaments and German diplomacy. Belgium would probably have kept her own King and her own Parliament; she might have been admitted into the Empire on the same favourable terms as Saxony, or even as Bavaria. And the Belgian nation almost to a man have refused to consider these alluring prospects, as not worthy to be weighed for a moment against national honour and national freedom. The greatest debt which Europe owes to the Belgians is this: that, in an age which appeared to be wholly materialistic, in an age which has talked as though the highest end and object of government was to effect a right distribution of wealth, and as though a man's duty to his class or his party came before his duty to his nation, they have been ready to sacrifice all that they possess, and life itself, for the sake of their national freedom. A nation

of artisans and manufacturers, of merchants and of shopkeepers, of farmers and peasant proprietors, they have dared to assert the value of the ideal, and to fight for their ideal in the teeth of overwhelming odds. Whether they succeed or fail—and they will not fail until France and England and Russia are beaten and broken—they have at least given Europe a lesson and an example which Europe can never forget.

To think of Belgium as a national State had not occurred to many Englishmen before the present war. We knew that the old racial differences of Fleming and Walloon survived ; and that these two races, approximately equal in numbers, were acutely divided on political and on religious questions. We knew also that conflicts between Labour and Capital had been particularly virulent in Belgium up to the close of the nineteenth century ; and that Belgian socialists were at all events theoretically cosmopolitan in their outlook. We remembered the Belgian War of Independence in 1830-3 ; but we had the impression that the Fleming, and the Walloon, had been drawn together by no stronger ties than those of a common resentment against Dutch misrule. Some of us admired the great Belgian writers, Maeterlinck and Verhaeren ; a few of us were aware of the existence of a Belgian school of sculptors. Hardly any one realized that these writers and artists represented a national sentiment of considerable strength. We are wiser now. We have realized that a coherent nation may be formed out of different races ; that national patriotism may grow up in the midst of political and social controversies ; and that, even in the modern world, the men of the counting-house and of the factory may find the ultimate rule of their lives in the dreams of the study or the studio.

After all, though the Belgian nationality is a plant of recent growth, it is deeply rooted in the soil of Belgium. The Belgians are to-day the same people that they have been for centuries ; they have only changed since 1839 to this extent, that they have become more fully conscious of their individuality as a people, prouder of the great traditions by which they are united, more alive to the advantages of every kind which result from the union and the independence of the Belgian provinces. But the essential characteristics and aptitudes of the Belgians, the qualities which entitle them to an honourable place in the commonwealth of nations—these can be detected even in the remote past when the name of Belgium was unknown, even as a geographical expression, and when the soil of Belgium was divided between half a dozen feudal principalities. Then, as now, the Belgian, whether he was by race a Walloon or a Fleming, was, remarkable, first for his untiring, almost heroic industry, secondly for a fervid idealism which coloured his religion and his art and often found expression in the conduct of his life. By virtue of these qualities the Belgian people have made, in the course of the past fifteen hundred years, a very substantial contribution both to the economic development of Europe and to its higher civilization. The mediaeval history of Belgium brings home to us the antiquity and the far-reaching extent of the debt which Europe owes the Belgian nation of to-day. I should like to give some illustrations, not because the Belgians of to-day have any need to rely upon the merits of their ancestors for our respect, but because it is a pure pleasure to dwell on such a record of past services.

Do we realize, in the first place, how completely the marvellous edifice of European wealth and civilization

is founded upon the labours and the economies of the forgotten pioneers and squatters who, from prehistoric times down to the very end of the Middle Ages, were slowly manufacturing habitable and cultivable land out of tangled forests, out of muddy swamps, out of desert moors and wastes? Every square yard of soil which we employ to-day in Europe owes some of its value to these early agriculturists. And there is no country in Europe where this work was carried on with more zeal or under more difficult conditions than in the Belgian Netherlands. In the fourth century after Christ the northern part of this country, the plains of Flanders and of North Brabant, was composed of heaths and marshes and sand-dunes. By the fifteenth century this wilderness had become a land of populous cities, surrounded by a dense agricultural population. How it had been reclaimed you may see from the case of the Yser river basin, which the Belgian army is defending. The rich meadows, which the Belgians have flooded by cutting the sea-dykes, were reclaimed from the sea in the fourteenth century. The Yser dykes were almost the last of the great artificial works by which Flanders became prosperous. It is no wonder that Flemish peasants were in demand all over Europe when there was land to be reclaimed. Three districts in Germany—Schleswig-Holstein, the Alt-Mark of Brandenburg, and Silesia—are partly indebted to the Flemings for their present prosperity. But it is needless to insist that, irrespective of such migrations—and at one time they were very considerable—the agricultural development of Flanders inevitably benefited all the numerous states with which her population traded from the earliest days of Flemish history.

To-day, however, all European countries are or aspire

to be industrial communities ; and they are impelled towards industrialism by the fact that their territories are too small for their population, if that population remains rooted to the soil and persists in an agricultural mode of life. Industrialism, like most great inventions of the past, seems to us now a very obvious way of maintaining a dense population. But the plan of producing wholly for the market, of sinking large stocks of capital in manufacturing enterprise, of searching out foreign markets and of clearing the road for foreign trade by means of commercial treaties—this was not rapidly or easily discovered. It was found out simultaneously by two European peoples, by the Italians and by the Flemings. But the Flemings made their first experiments in capitalistic industry under circumstances which were relatively unfavourable ; and these experiments were the more valuable to Europe because they were admired and copied by those Northern nations—the English, the French, and the Germans—with whom lay the future of European industry. The Flemings discovered that their soil was particularly suited to sheep-breeding. They turned to the textile industries as a means of utilizing the fleeces of their sheep. Then they found that their cloth was in request all over Europe ; and their weavers migrated from the open country into towns, to devote themselves entirely to cloth-making. Lastly, there grew up an aristocracy of merchants who became organizers of the industry, who imported wool from abroad to supplement the home-supply, who bought the finished cloth for export, who arranged for its transport, and who travelled far and wide in search of customers. Such was the trade which gave to the Flemish cities—particularly to Ghent and Ypres and Bruges—their marvellous pros-

perity in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. These cities were an unforgettable object-lesson to the statesmen of other nations.

But it was not their wealth alone which made the Flemish cities admirable. In the golden age of their development they were more than municipalities; they were states in miniature. Ghent and Bruges and Ypres ruled over considerable territories outside their walls. United they were strong enough to dictate terms to their lord, the Count of Flanders; and on one memorable field, at Courtrai in 1302, they gave a sound beating to the army of their overlord the King of France. How they were able to do it has been much discussed. Some say that they proved the superiority of the foot-soldier to the cavalryman; others that they owed the victory to the ditches which crossed the battle-field and made it impossible for the French knights to charge. The French themselves had no explanation to give; they could not understand it. One prefers to think that the Flemish burghers won because they had in them the temper which Oliver Cromwell declared—and he was no mean judge of such matters—to be the making of an efficient soldier. ‘I had rather have a plain russet-coated man that knows what he fights for, and loves what he knows, than that which you call a gentleman and is nothing else.’ The Flemings knew what they fought for; the independence of their native province, and still more the right to govern their native cities as they pleased, without the interference of either Count or King. Courtrai was won by an army of artisans and small employers; they fought to destroy the power of the narrow oligarchic coterie which had usurped the government of the towns; and they fought the King of France because he was on the side of their oppressors

The object, in fact, was to set up industrial democracies. It was only achieved in part and for a short time ; the Flemings were hard hit by the French at Cassel in 1328, and at Roosebecque in 1382. The second of these battles was the death-blow to Flemish liberties ; Flanders became the property of a French prince, and the nucleus of that powerful Burgundian State which, under the autocratic rule of Charles the Rash (1465-77), formed a menace to both France and Germany.

The catastrophe of 1382 destroyed Flemish independence for the next three centuries and a half. It did not destroy material prosperity, or prevent Flanders and the other Flemish province of North Brabant, which shared the same servitude, from remaining glorious as homes of art and culture. It definitely linked the fortunes of the Flemings to those of their Walloon neighbours in Hainault, in Namur, and in the Ardennes ; and to that extent the Burgundian supremacy prepared the way for the founders of the Belgian nation. But for the time being it destroyed something more valuable than it created. It destroyed the democratic ideals of the Flemish cities.

We must not exaggerate the results which this democratic movement had achieved. It was proving a failure some time before the French conquest ; for its leaders had attempted the impossible, and they were not consistently faithful to their own ideals. After the battle of Courtrai the craft-gilds of the cities got political power into their own hands ; they ousted the capitalist from the town-councils and the magistracies. But the craft-gilds did not really desire liberty and equal opportunities for all. Under their rule the weaving cities relentlessly stamped out the weaving trade in every village within reach. The members of the craft-

gilds, who were mostly employers on a small scale, made it illegal for those whom they employed to organize. And they discovered very soon that the rich merchants, although robbed of political power, were still masters of the economic situation. It was only through the merchants that the craftsman could obtain his raw materials or dispose of his finished product. Democracy had failed to produce the material advantages which were expected from it ; and it fell out of favour when the first flush of enthusiasm for the new political creed had passed away. Democracy was indeed impracticable in a society of which the structure was essentially capitalist and aristocratic. Ghent and Bruges were no more fitted to be democracies than was the Republic of Venice, which rose to greatness and decayed contemporaneously with them. None the less is honour due to the Flemish burghers for a bold political experiment, which was all the more honourable to them because it anticipated by some centuries the natural course of social evolution. At all events they share with the Swiss cantons the credit for reviving the idea of political freedom when it was in danger of dying altogether. From the battles of Courtrai and Morgarten we may date the birth of the Third Estate as a factor in European politics.

This democratic movement of the fourteenth century illustrates one side, the political side, of Flemish idealism. It was a movement which was coloured and indeed disfigured by an intensely localized patriotism, which understood by freedom little more than the assertion of municipal independence, which made the citizen of Bruges or Ghent even more anxious to humble other Flemish cities than to reform his own. This local patriotism it was which made the Belgian Netherlands so defenceless against French and Austrian and Spanish

despotism. But such as it was, it gave some dignity and meaning to Belgian history in the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries. The Flemish provinces were always prepared to take up arms in defence of local liberties. And we have seen of late the proof that, when the provinces were united under a government of their own choosing, this local patriotism was rapidly transmuted into a nobler sentiment of nationalism.

But there are other aspects of Flemish idealism which are better known, and to which Europe is more profoundly indebted. It is almost a commonplace with German writers on political science that the small states of the modern world are unlikely to do much for artistic or intellectual progress. It is a strange view to be held by the countrymen of Schiller and of Goethe. It is contradicted more emphatically by the history of Belgium than by that of Weimar. Weimar was for a single generation the focus of a great literary movement. The Flemings and the Walloons have been not once but several times conspicuous as the pioneers of religious revivals and of new artistic forms.

No doubt there was much spiritual indolence among the patriciates of the Flemish cities, these 'rich men, furnished with ability, living peaceably in their habitations', who were the patrons of Rubens and of Teniers, who lavished their money upon sumptuous mansions, on costly furniture and tapestries, who often spent more on their town-halls than their churches. But there was another temperament, the very antithesis of this complacent satisfaction in the best of all possible worlds, which meets us at every stage of Flemish history; a mystical temperament, which rebelled against the commonplace and the worship of material splendour, which found satisfaction in painful enterprises, in seclusion

and self-mortification, or in visions of the good and the beautiful. The Flemings and the Walloons were intimately associated with every religious revival of the Middle Ages ; and nowhere did the urban classes give a more consistent or generous support to the founders of new religious houses. The *béguinage* for male or female recluses was a distinctive feature of the smallest Flemish towns ; these communities were founded by burghers for men and women of their own class. If any one is inclined to make light of such communities, and of the religion which they fostered, he should read the *Imitatio Christi* attributed to Thomas à Kempis. It was produced in a Dutch community, but it expresses faithfully the best religious thought of the Belgian Netherlands. Besides the recluses, we must remember the popular preachers, and the crusaders, of whom both the Flemish and the Walloon provinces were prolific. A Walloon, Godfrey of Bouillon, was the first Latin king of Jerusalem. One count of Flanders (Baldwin IX) became the first ruler of the Latin Empire of Constantinople ; another, Thierry of Alsace, made four several expeditions to the Holy Land. In the crusading movement, from its commencement almost to its close, the Flemings and the Walloons played a part which was out of all proportion to their numbers or their political importance.

For the fifteenth century, the age of the Renaissance, we have another sort of witnesses to attest the vitality of Flemish faith. The early Flemish school of painting, which reached the height of perfection in the works of the Van Eycks and of Hans Memling, is remarkable not only for rich colouring and the minute representation of detail, but still more for its profoundly religious spirit. These painters, we feel, delight in the forms and colours of the world around them ; but they are chiefly preoccu-

pied with the problem how to make of the seen world a symbol which shall foreshadow and suggest the unseen. In Flanders and Brabant, as in Italy, the native schools of art and of religious thought were blighted during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries first by Spanish and afterwards by Austrian rule. Louvain and Antwerp became the head-quarters of an official Catholic propaganda which had its virtues, no doubt, but was Spanish, or Austrian or Italian, never Flemish in its character. Flemish art became denationalized in the same manner; a Rubens or a Vandyck worked for patrons of many nationalities and developed a cosmopolitan manner which, though certainly magnificent, had little or no relation to the Flemish mind. But, since 1870, in the national kingdom of Belgium, there has been a genuine revival of Flemish mysticism both in art and literature. In the writings of Maeterlinck, in the symbolic sculptors of the young Belgian school, we see the spirit of the *béguinage* and the spirit of Van Eyck, adapted indeed to modern forms of thought and expression, but substantially unchanged. Local traditions and racial characteristics have a truly astonishing power of persistence; and it would be a grave error to suppose that the modern Belgians are connected with their ancestors of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries solely in the imagination of the poet or the antiquarian. The traditions, in particular, of the glorious past of the Netherlands have entered into the very life-blood of the Belgians. The Greeks and the Italians have shown us in the past how such traditions may lift up the hearts of a whole people, and nerve them for incredible renunciations. The Belgians are teaching us the same lesson by their example at the present day.

Europe owes it to Belgium, and owes it to herself, that such traditions, and the nation whom they have inspired, should not be allowed to become a memory of the past. The Belgians deserved well of Europe in the Middle Ages ; but the Belgians of to-day have deserved still better. They have added another chapter to the long history of the brave deeds of small nations ; such deeds are the greatest heritage that any men can leave to the future. It is more than two thousand years ago since three hundred Spartans faced and fought the innumerable armies of the Persians, and died to a man, that they might gain time for their countrymen behind them to prepare defences ; more than two thousand years since the whole people of the Athenians took ship and sailed from Athens, saying that the barbarian might take away their homes, but should not take away their freedom. Those actions are as fresh in the minds of men as if they had happened yesterday. The Spartans in the pass of Thermopylae, the Athenians in their ships at Salamis, have been for seventy generations the symbols of heroic patriotism. But I think that future generations, without forgetting the Spartans or the Athenians, will quote the Belgians as a proof that the old standards of heroism and of patriotism have not altogether been forgotten in the modern world. We, who have seen this war, when we hear the name of patriot in the future, shall always think of the little war-worn Belgian army on the Yser ; a ragged army, pinched with cold and drenched with rain, short of guns, short of ammunition, short of food ; an army which has been pushed back by the brute weight of men and metal, till it stands on the very frontier of Belgium and has been obliged to let in the sea over the last few miles of Belgian territory that it controls ; but an army

which is still unconquered and, as we firmly hope, unconquerable. Is there in the world at this moment another industrial democracy which would be able to endure this ordeal? We may think so, but we must hope with all our hearts that the belief will never be put to the hard test of facts. So far we have owed much, too much to Belgium. I doubt we shall never pay that debt in full; it is unpayable. And so it is with mingled shame and sympathy that we wish God-speed to King Albert and his brave Belgians on the Yser.

I

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1914

THE BATTLES OF THE
MARNE AND AISNE

BY

H. W. C. DAVIS

WITH A MAP

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HUMPHREY MILFORD
LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW
NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY

MAP

Between pages 30 and 31

INTRODUCTION

THE documents which are printed in this pamphlet describe the operations of the British Expeditionary Force in France from August 28 to September 28. Nos. I and II are the official dispatches of Field-Marshal Sir John French. Appendices A and B are also official. They were written by an officer attached to the General Head-quarters' Staff and were published by the Press Bureau; they relate to operations on the Aisne from the 10th to the 17th of September inclusive. They are interim reports, often studiously vague as to details; but they give an admirable picture of the terrain and of the general features of the British operations. The second of them contains some remarkable extracts (p. 52) from the letter of a German soldier describing the operations of the German Xth Army Corps from the 5th to the 9th of September inclusive.

From August 27 to September 3 inclusive the British Force continued to take part in the general retrograde movement which had been ordered by General Joffre. But the pressure of the enemy on the British rear was less dangerous than it had been on the retreat from Mons to La Cateau. Sir John French makes it clear that, when once General Joffre had ascertained the scale and object of the German flanking movement, from which the British troops had suffered so severely, the left of the Allies' line was promptly extended and

consolidated. Two French armies, the 7th and the 6th, were brought up to the neighbourhood of Amiens and of Roye, where they covered the British left. On the 28th the British Force had reached the line of the Oise and covered the line La Fère-Chauny-Noyon. The Germans were advancing upon the centre of this position, by way of Ham, in great strength. The pressure was relieved by a counter-attack of the 5th French Army, which held the line, to the right of the British Force, from La Fère to Guise ; and under cover of this operation Sir John French retired on the 29th, towards the river Aisne, between Compiègne and Soissons. It is clear that the 7th and 6th French Armies on his left were also retiring fast ; for at this point he thought it wise to abandon the line of communications through Amiens to Havre, and to remove his sea-base to the mouth of the Loire.

But the retirement was now deliberate and confident ; as the retreating line of the Allies was lengthened, more and more French troops were thrust into the gaps and weak points. Both the British and the French fought rear-guard actions with success ; the British First Cavalry Brigade distinguished themselves particularly by a desperate counter-attack in the forest of Compiègne ; but no attempt was made to follow up such advantages. On September 3 the British forces were south of the Marne, where they stretched like the string of a bow across the loop which the river makes between Lagny on the west and La Ferté on the east. On September 5, by the desire of General Joffre, they were still further to the south, behind the line of the Grand

Morin, a tributary of the Marne. The Germans were already crossing the Marne in strength ; but from September 3 it had become evident that they were moving south-east on Montmirail. This operation left their right flank exposed to attack from the left wing of the Allies ; and accordingly General Joffre delivered his counter-stroke on the 7th of September.

Sir John French describes only the operations of the British Force and of the two French armies which covered its flanks—the Sixth Army on his left, and the Fifth on his right. These three armies were drawn up on the 6th of September along an arc of a circle, extending from Betz to Meaux, and thence behind the Grand Morin River to Esternay. Their attack was mainly directed against the 1st German Army, which now extended from the Ourcq to various points south of the Grand Morin, though the 2nd German Army, further to the east, also came into action against the right of the 5th French Army. The object of the Allies was to isolate the 1st German Army and thrust it northwards. The 6th French Army moved eastward against the line of the Ourcq ; the British troops and the 5th French Army moved north in the direction of the Marne. They found the enemy aware of their intention and already on the retreat ; from the 7th of September to the 10th inclusive the three allied armies were in hot pursuit, and continually engaged with the German rear-guards, whose positions originally extended from the east of the Ourcq to various points south-west of Montmirail. These engagements took place in a region which is intersected by the Marne and its tributaries, by the southern

tributaries of the Aisne, and by a number of canals. The general plan of the German rear-guards was to hold the fords and bridges of these waterways.

Our Force now contained three Army Corps and was therefore stronger than it had been at Mons. It crossed the Grand Morin, apparently without serious difficulty, on the 7th of September; on the 8th it forced the passage of the Petit Morin after severe fighting; on the 9th it carried the Marne between La Ferté and the confluence of the Ourcq; on the 10th it was pursuing the enemy up the east bank of the Ourcq in the direction of Soissons. Further to the east the 5th French Army was advancing northwards in the same manner. On the 11th the British Force was south and south-east of Soissons facing the Aisne. At this point the German 1st and 2nd Armies ceased their retreat; the 1st Army was in position between Missy and Villers, to the north of the Aisne; the 2nd Army was north of Reims.

The battle of the Aisne is clearly described by Sir John French. It opened on the 13th of September with British attacks upon three points of the Aisne between Soissons and Villers. The 3rd Army Corps (under Lieut.-General Pulteney) was on the extreme left; it attacked the line of the river at Soissons and also at Venizel, which is about four miles east of Soissons; the 2nd Corps attacked opposite Missy, to the east of Venizel; the 1st Corps advanced on a line reaching from Chavonne on the west to Bourg on the east. All the three Corps had established a footing on the north bank of the Aisne by nightfall. They had also begun to force their way up the high ground on which the

Germans were entrenched. The Germans therefore withdrew to the high ridge two miles north of the river and parallel with it, along which runs the road called Chemin des Dames (through Courtecon and north of Ostel).

The British forces spent the 14th of September in bridging the Aisne and strengthening the positions already gained. On the 15th the 1st Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, advanced from the right of the British position, covering the line from Moulins on the east to Ostel on the west. Their object was to outflank the enemy and drive him north-west; and by the end of the day Sir Douglas Haig had so far succeeded that his right flank touched the Chemin des Dames at a point near Courtecon. But the enemy had now brought up their heavy guns from the siege of Maubeuge; and, for the following days of the battle, Sir Douglas Haig could only hold the position which he had won. Sir John French received information that the enemy was making a stand in force along the whole line of high ground from the north of Compiègne to the north of Reims. He also learned from General Joffre that the decisive attack was to be delivered by French armies on the left of the Allied position. Accordingly, from the 16th to the 28th, the British forces made no attempt to carry out extensive attacking movements. They entrenched themselves, and were for the most part engaged in repelling attacks of extraordinary violence, which reached their culmination on the 26th, 27th, and 28th.

The advance to the Aisne and the battle of the Aisne have not the dramatic interest which attaches to the

retreat from Mons ; in September the British forces were acting in close co-operation with French armies, and were no longer threatened by overwhelming odds. But the second "eyewitness" report which we print below (Appendix B) shows, even better than the dispatches of the Commander-in-Chief, how desperate was the fighting on the Aisne. The advance of Sir Douglas Haig to the Chemin des Dames, and his obstinate defence of the valuable strategic points which he thereby secured, must rank among the most splendid feats of gallantry and endurance which have been witnessed in the western theatre of the war.

THE MARNE AND THE AISNE

I

17th September, 1914.

MY LORD,

In continuation of my despatch of September 7th, I have the honour to report the further progress of the operations of the Forces under my command from August 28th.

RETREAT TO THE LINE COMPIÈGNE-SOISSONS

On that evening the retirement of the Force was followed closely by two of the enemy's cavalry columns, moving south-east from St. Quentin.

The retreat in this part of the field was being covered by the Third and Fifth Cavalry Brigades. South of the Somme General Gough, with the Third Cavalry Brigade, threw back the Uhlans of the Guard with considerable loss.

General Chetwode, with the Fifth Cavalry Brigade, encountered the eastern column near Cérizy, moving south. The Brigade attacked and routed the column, the leading German regiment suffering very severe casualties and being almost broken up.

The 7th French Army Corps was now in course of being railed up from the south to the east of Amiens. On the 29th it nearly completed its detrainment, and the French 6th Army got into position on my left, its right resting on Roye.

The 5th French Army was behind the line of the Oise between La Fère and Guise.

The pursuit of the enemy was very vigorous ; some five or six German corps were on the Somme, facing the 5th Army on the Oise. At least two corps were advancing towards my front, and were crossing the Somme east and west of Ham. Three or four more German corps were opposing the 6th French Army on my left.

This was the situation at 1 o'clock on the 29th, when I received a visit from General Joffre at my headquarters.

I strongly represented my position to the French Commander-in-Chief, who was most kind, cordial, and sympathetic, as he has always been. He told me that he had directed the 5th French Army on the Oise to move forward and attack the Germans on the Somme, with a view to checking pursuit. He also told me of the formation of the 6th French Army on my left flank, composed of the 7th Army Corps, four Reserve Divisions, and Sordêt's Corps of Cavalry.

I finally arranged with General Joffre to effect a further short retirement towards the line Compiègne-Soissons, promising him, however, to do my utmost to keep always within a day's march of him.

In pursuance of this arrangement the British Forces retired to a position a few miles north of the line Compiègne-Soissons on the 29th.

The right flank of the German Army was now reaching a point which appeared seriously to endanger my line of communications with Havre.

I had already evacuated Amiens, into which place a German reserve division was reported to have moved.

Orders were given to change the base to St. Nazaire, and establish an advance base at Le Mans. This operation was well carried out by the Inspector-General of Communications.

In spite of a severe defeat inflicted upon the Guard Xth and Guard Reserve Corps of the German Army by the 1st and 3rd French Corps on the right of the 5th Army, it was not part of General Joffre's plan to pursue this advantage ; and a general retirement on to the line of the Marne was ordered, to which the French Forces in the more eastern theatre were directed to conform.

A new Army (the 9th) had been formed from three corps in the south by General Joffre, and moved into the space between the right of the 5th and left of the 4th Armies.

Whilst closely adhering to his strategic conception to draw the enemy on at all points until a favourable situation was created from which to assume the offensive, General Joffre found it necessary to modify from day to day the methods by which he sought to attain this object, owing to the development of the enemy's plans and changes in the general situation.

In conformity with the movements of the French Forces, my retirement continued practically from day to day. Although we were not severely pressed by the enemy, rearguard actions took place continually.

RETREAT FROM THE AISNE TO THE MARNE

On the 1st September, when retiring from the thickly wooded country to the south of Compiègne, the First Cavalry Brigade was overtaken by some German cavalry. They momentarily lost a Horse Artillery battery, and several officers and men were killed and wounded. With the help, however, of some detachments from the 3rd Corps operating on their left, they not only recovered their own guns but succeeded in capturing twelve of the enemy's.

Similarly, to the eastward, the 1st Corps, retiring south, also got into some very difficult forest country, and a somewhat severe rearguard action ensued at Villers-Cotterets, in which the Fourth Guards Brigade suffered considerably.

On September 3rd the British Forces were in position south of the Marne between Lagny and Signy-Signets. Up to this time I had been requested by General Joffre to defend the passages of the river as long as possible, and to blow up the bridges in my front. After I had made the necessary dispositions, and the destruction of the bridges had been effected, I was asked by the French Commander-in-Chief to continue my retirement to a point some 12 miles in rear of the position I then occupied, with a view to taking up a second position behind the Seine. This retirement was duly carried out. In the meantime the enemy had thrown bridges and crossed the Marne in considerable force, and

was threatening the Allies all along the line of the British Forces and the 5th and 9th French Armies. Consequently several small outpost actions took place.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE COUNTER-ADVANCE

On Saturday, September 5th, I met the French Commander-in-Chief at his request, and he informed me of his intention to take the offensive forthwith, as he considered conditions were very favourable to success.

General Joffre announced to me his intention of wheeling up the left flank of the 6th Army, pivoting on the Marne and directing it to move on the Ourcq ; cross and attack the flank of the 1st German Army, which was then moving in a south-easterly direction east of that river.

He requested me to effect a change of front to my right—my left resting on the Marne and my right on the 5th Army—to fill the gap between that army and the 6th. I was then to advance against the enemy in my front and join in the general offensive movement.

These combined movements practically commenced on Sunday, September 6th, at sunrise ; and on that day it may be said that a great battle opened on a front extending from Ermenonville, which was just in front of the left flank of the 6th French Army, through Lizy on the Marne, Mauperthuis, which was about the British centre, Courtecon, which was the left of the 5th French

Army, to Esternay and Charleville, the left of the 9th Army under General Foch, and so along the front of the 9th, 4th, and 3rd French Armies to a point north of the fortress of Verdun.

This battle, in so far as the 6th French Army, the British Army, the 5th French Army and the 9th French Army were concerned, may be said to have concluded on the evening of September 10th, by which time the Germans had been driven back to the line Soissons-Reims, with a loss of thousands of prisoners, many guns, and enormous masses of transport.

THE GERMAN RIGHT WING SWERVES SOUTH-EAST

About the 3rd September the enemy appears to have changed his plans and to have determined to stop his advance South direct upon Paris ; for on the 4th September air reconnaissances showed that his main columns were moving in a south-easterly direction generally east of a line drawn through Nanteuil and Lizy on the Ourcq.

On the 5th September several of these columns were observed to have crossed the Marne ; whilst German troops, which were observed moving south-east up the left bank of the Ourcq on the 4th, were now reported to be halted and facing that river. Heads of the enemy's columns were seen crossing at Changis, La Ferté, Nogent, Château Thierry and Mezy.

Considerable German columns of all arms were seen to be converging on Montmirail, whilst before

sunset large bivouacs of the enemy were located in the neighbourhood of Coulommiers, south of Rebais, La Ferté-Gaucher and Lagny.

COUNTER-ADVANCE OF THE ALLIED LEFT

I should conceive it to have been about noon on the 6th September, after the British Forces had changed their front to the right and occupied the line Jouy-Le Chatel-Faremoutiers-Villeneuve Le Comte, and the advance of the 6th French Army north of the Marne towards the Ourcq became apparent, that the enemy realised the powerful threat that was being made against the flank of his columns moving south-east, and began the great retreat which opened the battle above referred to.

On the evening of the 6th September, therefore, the fronts and positions of the opposing armies were roughly as follows :

ALLIES.

6th French Army.—Right on the Marne at Meaux, left towards Betz.

British Forces.—On the line Dagny-Coulommiers-Maison.

5th French Army.—At Courtaçon, right on Esternay.

Conneau's Cavalry Corps.—Between the right of the British and the left of the French 5th Army.

GERMANS.

4th Reserve and 2nd Corps.—East of the Ourcq and facing that river.

9th Cavalry Division.—West of Crecy.

2nd Cavalry Division.—North of Coulommiers.

4th Corps.—Rebais.

3rd and 7th Corps.—South-west of Montmirail.

All these troops constituted the 1st German Army, which was directed against the French 6th Army on the Ourcq, and the British Forces, and the left of the 5th French Army south of the Marne.

The 2nd German Army (IX., X., X.R. and Guard) was moving against the centre and right of the 5th French Army and the 9th French Army.

STAGES OF THE ADVANCE, SEPT. 7-9

On the 7th September both the 5th and 6th French Armies were heavily engaged on our flank. The 2nd and 4th Reserve German Corps on the Ourcq vigorously opposed the advance of the French towards that river, but did not prevent the 6th Army from gaining some headway, the Germans themselves suffering serious losses. The French 5th Army threw the enemy back to the line of the Petit Morin river after inflicting severe losses upon them, especially about Montceaux, which was carried at the point of the bayonet.

The enemy retreated before our advance, covered by his 2nd and 9th and Guard Cavalry Divisions, which suffered severely.

Our Cavalry acted with great vigour, especially General De Lisle's Brigade with the 9th Lancers and 18th Hussars.

On the 8th September the enemy continued his

retreat northward, and our Army was successfully engaged during the day with strong rearguards of all arms on the Petit Morin River, thereby materially assisting the progress of the French Armies on our right and left, against whom the enemy was making his greatest efforts. On both sides the enemy was thrown back with very heavy loss. The First Army Corps encountered stubborn resistance at La Trétoire (north of Rebais). The enemy occupied a strong position with infantry and guns on the northern bank of the Petit Morin River ; they were dislodged with considerable loss. Several machine guns and many prisoners were captured, and upwards of two hundred German dead were left on the ground.

The forcing of the Petit Morin at this point was much assisted by the Cavalry and the 1st Division, which crossed higher up the stream.

Later in the day a counter-attack by the enemy was well repulsed by the First Army Corps, a great many prisoners and some guns again falling into our hands.

On this day (8th September) the Second Army Corps encountered considerable opposition, but drove back the enemy at all points with great loss, making considerable captures.

The Third Army Corps also drove back considerable bodies of the enemy's infantry and made some captures.

On the 9th September the First and Second Army Corps forced the passage of the Marne and advanced some miles to the north of it. The Third Corps

encountered considerable opposition, as the bridge at La Ferté was destroyed and the enemy held the town on the opposite bank in some strength, and thence persistently obstructed the construction of a bridge ; so the passage was not effected until after nightfall.

During the day's pursuit the enemy suffered heavy loss in killed and wounded, some hundreds of prisoners fell into our hands, and a battery of eight machine guns was captured by the 2nd Division.

On this day the 6th French Army was heavily engaged west of the River Ourcq. The enemy had largely increased his force opposing them ; and very heavy fighting ensued, in which the French were successful throughout.

The left of the 5th French Army reached the neighbourhood of Château Thierry after the most severe fighting, having driven the enemy completely north of the river with great loss.

THE BRITISH ON THE OURCQ, SEPT. 10

The fighting of this Army in the neighbourhood of Montmirail was very severe.

The advance was resumed at daybreak on the 10th up to the line of the Ourcq, opposed by strong rearguards of all arms. The 1st and 2nd Corps, assisted by the Cavalry Division on the right, the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades on the left, drove the enemy northwards. Thirteen guns, seven machine guns, about 2,000 prisoners, and quantities of transport fell into our hands. The enemy left many dead

on the field. On this day the French 5th and 6th Armies had little opposition.

As the 1st and 2nd German Armies were now in full retreat, this evening marks the end of the battle which practically commenced on the morning of the 6th instant ; and it is at this point in the operations that I am concluding the present despatch.

Although I deeply regret to have had to report heavy losses in killed and wounded throughout these operations, I do not think they have been excessive in view of the magnitude of the great fight, the outlines of which I have only been able very briefly to describe, and the demoralisation and loss in killed and wounded which are known to have been caused to the enemy by the vigour and severity of the pursuit.

In concluding this despatch I must call your Lordship's special attention to the fact that from Sunday, August 23rd, up to the present date (September 17th), from Mons back almost to the Seine, and from the Seine to the Aisne, the Army under my command has been ceaselessly engaged without one single day's halt or rest of any kind.

Since the date to which in this despatch I have limited my report of the operations, a great battle on the Aisne has been proceeding. A full report of this battle will be made in an early further despatch.

It will, however, be of interest to say here that, in spite of a very determined resistance on the part of the enemy, who is holding in strength and great

tenacity a position peculiarly favourable to defence, the battle which commenced on the evening of the 12th instant has, so far, forced the enemy back from his first position, secured the passage of the river, and inflicted great loss upon him, including the capture of over 2,000 prisoners and several guns.

I have the honour to be,
Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,
(Signed) J. D. P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief,
The British Forces in the Field.

II

8th October, 1914.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to report the operations in which the British Forces in France have been engaged since the evening of the 10th September.

FROM THE OURCQ TO THE AISNE

1. In the early morning of the 11th the further pursuit of the enemy was commenced; and the three Corps crossed the Ourcq practically unopposed, the Cavalry reaching the line of the Aisne River; the 3rd and 5th Brigades south of Soissons, the 1st, 2nd and 4th on the high ground at Couvrelles and Cerseuil.

On the afternoon of the 12th from the opposition encountered by the 6th French Army to the west of

Soissons, by the 3rd Corps south-east of that place, by the 2nd Corps south of Missy and Vailly, and certain indications all along the line, I formed the opinion that the enemy had, for the moment at any rate, arrested his retreat and was preparing to dispute the passage of the Aisne with some vigour.

South of Soissons the Germans were holding Mont de Paris against the attack of the right of the French 6th Army when the 3rd Corps reached the neighbourhood of Buzancy, south-east of that place. With the assistance of the Artillery of the 3rd Corps the French drove them back across the river at Soissons, where they destroyed the bridges.

The heavy artillery fire which was visible for several miles in a westerly direction in the valley of the Aisne showed that the 6th French Army was meeting with strong opposition all along the line.

On this day the Cavalry under General Allenby reached the neighbourhood of Braine and did good work in clearing the town and the high ground beyond it of strong hostile detachments. The Queen's Bays are particularly mentioned by the General as having assisted greatly in the success of this operation. They were well supported by the 3rd Division, which on this night bivouacked at Brenelle, south of the river.

The 5th Division approached Missy, but were unable to make headway.

The 1st Army Corps reached the neighbourhood of Vauxcéré without much opposition.

In this manner the Battle of the Aisne commenced.

THE BATTLE-GROUND OF THE AISNE

2. The Aisne Valley runs generally East and West, and consists of a flat-bottomed depression of width varying from half a mile to two miles, down which the river follows a winding course to the West at some points near the southern slopes of the valley and at others near the northern. The high ground both on the north and south of the river is approximately 400 feet above the bottom of the valley and is very similar in character, as are both slopes of the valley itself, which are broken into numerous rounded spurs and re-entrants. The most prominent of the former are the Chivre spur on the right bank and Sermoise spur on the left. Near the latter place the general plateau on the south is divided by a subsidiary valley of much the same character, down which the small River Vesle flows to the main stream near Sermoise. The slopes of the plateau overlooking the Aisne on the north and south are of varying steepness, and are covered with numerous patches of wood, which also stretch upwards and backwards over the edge on to the top of the high ground. There are several villages and small towns dotted about in the valley itself and along its sides, the chief of which is the town of Soissons.

The Aisne is a sluggish stream of some 170 feet in breadth, but, being 15 feet deep in the centre, it is unfordable. Between Soissons on the west and Villers on the east (the part of the river attacked and secured by the British Forces) there are eleven

road bridges across it. On the north bank a narrow-gauge railway runs from Soissons to Vailly, where it crosses the river and continues eastward along the south bank. From Soissons to Sermoise a double line of railway runs along the south bank, turning at the latter place up the Vesle Valley towards Bazoches.

The position held by the enemy is a very strong one, either for a delaying action or for a defensive battle. One of its chief military characteristics is that from the high ground on neither side can the top of the plateau on the other side be seen except for small stretches. This is chiefly due to the woods on the edges of the slopes. Another important point is that all the bridges are under either direct or high-angle artillery fire.

The tract of country above described, which lies north of the Aisne, is well adapted to concealment, and was so skilfully turned to account by the enemy as to render it impossible to judge the real nature of his opposition to our passage of the river, or to accurately gauge his strength; but I have every reason to conclude that strong rearguards of at least three army corps were holding the passages on the early morning of the 13th.

PASSAGE OF THE AISNE, SEPT. 13

3. On that morning I ordered the British Forces to advance and make good the Aisne.

The 1st Corps and the Cavalry advanced on the river. The 1st Division was directed on Chanouille

via the canal bridge at Bourg, and the 2nd Division on Courtecon and Presles via Pont-Arcy and on the canal to the north of Braye via Chavonne. On the right the Cavalry and 1st Division met with slight opposition, and found a passage by means of the canal which crosses the river by an aqueduct. The Division was therefore able to press on, supported by the Cavalry Division on its outer flank, driving back the enemy in front of it.

On the left the leading troops of the 2nd Division reached the river by 9 o'clock. The 5th Infantry Brigade were only enabled to cross, in single file and under considerable shell fire, by means of the broken girder of the bridge which was not entirely submerged in the river. The construction of a pontoon bridge was at once undertaken, and was completed by 5 o'clock in the afternoon.

On the extreme left the 4th Guards Brigade met with severe opposition at Chavonne, and it was only late in the afternoon that it was able to establish a foothold on the northern bank of the river by ferrying one battalion across in boats.

By nightfall the 1st Division occupied the area Moulins Paissy-Geny, with posts in the village of Vendresse.

The 2nd Division bivouacked as a whole on the southern bank of the river, leaving only the 5th Brigade on the north bank to establish a bridge head.

The Second Corps found all the bridges in front of them destroyed, except that of Condé, which was in possession of the enemy, and remained so until the end of the battle.

In the approach to Missy, where the 5th Division eventually crossed, there is some open ground which was swept by heavy fire from the opposite bank. The 13th Brigade was, therefore, unable to advance ; but the 14th, which was directed to the east of Venizel at a less exposed point, was rafted across, and by night established itself with its left at St. Margu rite. They were followed by the 15th Brigade; and later on both the 14th and 15th supported the 4th Division on their left in repelling a heavy counter-attack on the Third Corps.

On the morning of the 13th the Third Corps found the enemy had established himself in strength on the Vregny Plateau. The road bridge at Venizel was repaired during the morning, and a reconnaissance was made with a view to throwing a pontoon bridge at Soissons.

The 12th Infantry Brigade crossed at Venizel, and was assembled at Bucy Le Long by 1 p.m., but the bridge was so far damaged that artillery could only be man-handled across it. Meanwhile the construction of a bridge was commenced close to the road bridge at Venizel.

At 2 p.m. the 12th Infantry Brigade attacked in the direction of Chivres and Vregny with the object of securing the high ground east of Chivres, as a necessary preliminary to a further advance northwards. This attack made good progress, but at 5.30 p.m. the enemy's artillery and machine-gun fire from the direction of Vregny became so severe that no further advance could be made. The positions reached were held till dark.

The pontoon bridge at Venizel was completed at 5.30 p.m., when the 10th Infantry Brigade crossed the river and moved to Bucy Le Long.

The 19th Infantry Brigade moved to Billy-sur-Aisne, and before dark all the artillery of the Division had crossed the river, with the exception of the Heavy Battery and one Brigade of Field Artillery.

During the night the positions gained by the 12th Infantry Brigade to the east of the stream running through Chivres were handed over to the 5th Division.

The section of the Bridging Train allotted to the Third Corps began to arrive in the neighbourhood of Soissons late in the afternoon, when an attempt to throw a heavy pontoon bridge at Soissons had to be abandoned, owing to the fire of the enemy's heavy howitzers.

In the evening the enemy retired at all points and entrenched himself on the high ground about two miles north of the river along which runs the Chemin-des-Dames. Detachments of Infantry, however, strongly entrenched in commanding points down slopes of the various spurs, were left in front of all three corps with powerful artillery in support of them.

During the night of the 13th and on the 14th and following days the Field Companies were incessantly at work night and day. Eight pontoon bridges and one foot bridge were thrown across the river under generally very heavy artillery fire, which was incessantly kept up on to most of the crossings after

completion. Three of the road bridges, i.e. Venizel, Missy and Vailly, and the railway bridge east of Vailly were temporarily repaired so as to take foot traffic, and the Villers Bridge made fit to carry weights up to six tons.

Preparations were also made for the repair of the Missy, Vailly and Bourg Bridges so as to take mechanical transport.

The weather was very wet and added to the difficulties by cutting up the already indifferent approaches, entailing a large amount of work to repair and improve.

The operations of the Field Companies during this most trying time are worthy of the best traditions of the Royal Engineers.

THE ADVANCE OF THE FIRST CORPS

(SIR DOUGLAS HAIG)

4. On the evening of the 14th it was still impossible to decide whether the enemy was only making a temporary halt, covered by rearguards, or whether he intended to stand and defend the position.

With a view to clearing up the situation, I ordered a general advance.

The action of the First Corps on this day under the direction and command of Sir Douglas Haig was of so skilful, bold and decisive a character that he gained positions which alone have enabled me to maintain my position for more than three weeks

of very severe fighting on the north bank of the river.

The Corps was directed to cross the line Moulins-Moussy by 7 a.m.

On the right the General Officer Commanding the 1st Division directed the 2nd Infantry Brigade (which was in billets and bivouacked about Moulins) and the 25th Artillery Brigade (less one battery), under General Bulfin, to move forward before day-break, in order to protect the advance of the Division sent up the valley to Vendresse. An officers' patrol sent out by this Brigade reported a considerable force of the enemy near the factory north of Troyon, and the Brigadier accordingly directed two regiments (the King's Royal Rifles and the Royal Sussex Regiment) to move at 3 a.m. The Northamptonshire Regiment was ordered to move at 4 a.m. to occupy the spur east of Troyon. The remaining regiment of the Brigade (the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment) moved at 5.30 a.m. to the village of Vendresse. The factory was found to be held in considerable strength by the enemy, and the Brigadier ordered the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment to support the King's Royal Rifles and the Sussex Regiment. Even with this support the force was unable to make headway, and on the arrival of the 1st Brigade the Coldstream Guards were moved up to support the right of the leading Brigade (the 2nd), while the remainder of the 1st Brigade supported its left.

About noon the situation was, roughly, that the whole of these two brigades were extended along

a line running east and west, north of the line Troyon and south of the Chemin-des-Dames. A party of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment had seized and were holding the factory. The enemy held a line of entrenchments north and east of the factory in considerable strength, and every effort to advance against this line was driven back by heavy shell and machine-gun fire. The morning was wet and a heavy mist hung over the hills, so that the 25th Artillery Brigade and the Divisional Artillery were unable to render effective support to the advanced troops until about 9 o'clock.

By 10 o'clock the 3rd Infantry Brigade had reached a point one mile south of Vendresse, and from there it was ordered to continue the line of the 1st Brigade and to connect with and help the right of the 2nd Division. A strong hostile column was found to be advancing, and by a vigorous counter-stroke with two of his battalions the Brigadier checked the advance of this column and relieved the pressure on the 2nd Division. From this period until late in the afternoon the fighting consisted of a series of attacks and counter-attacks. The counter-strokes by the enemy were delivered at first with great vigour, but later on they decreased in strength, and all were driven off with heavy loss.

On the left the 6th Infantry Brigade had been ordered to cross the river and to pass through the line held during the preceding night by the 5th Infantry Brigade and occupy the Courtecon Ridge, whilst a detached force, consisting of the 4th Guards

Brigade and the 36th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery, under Brigadier-General Perceval, were ordered to proceed to a point east of the village of Ostel.

The 6th Infantry Brigade crossed the river at Pont-Arcy, moved up the valley towards Braye, and at 9 a.m. had reached the line Tilleul-La Buvelle. On this line they came under heavy artillery and rifle fire, and were unable to advance until supported by the 34th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery, and the 44th Howitzer Brigade and the Heavy Artillery.

The 4th Guards Brigade crossed the river at 10 a.m. and met with very heavy opposition. It had to pass through dense woods; field artillery support was difficult to obtain; but one section of a field battery pushed up to and within the firing line. At 1 p.m. the left of the Brigade was south of the Ostel Ridge.

At this period of the action the enemy obtained a footing between the First and Second Corps, and threatened to cut the communications of the latter.


Sir Douglas Haig was very hardly pressed and had no reserve in hand. I placed the Cavalry Division at his disposal, part of which he skilfully used to prolong and secure the left flank of the Guards Brigade. Some heavy fighting ensued, which resulted in the enemy being driven back with heavy loss.

About 4 o'clock the weakening of the counter-attacks by the enemy and other indications tended to show that his resistance was decreasing, and a general advance was ordered by the Army Corps

MAPS







Commander. Although meeting with considerable opposition and coming under very heavy artillery and rifle fire, the position of the corps at the end of the day's operations extended from the Chemin-des-Dames on the right, through Chivy, to Le Cour de Soupir, with the 1st Cavalry Brigade extending to the Chavonne-Soissons road.

On the right the corps was in close touch with the French Moroccan troops of the 18th Corps, which were entrenched in échelon to its right rear. During the night they entrenched this position.

Throughout the Battle of the Aisne this advanced and commanding position was maintained, and I cannot speak too highly of the valuable services rendered by Sir Douglas Haig and the Army Corps under his command. Day after day and night after night the enemy's infantry has been hurled against him in violent counter-attack which has never on any one occasion succeeded, whilst the trenches all over his position have been under continuous heavy artillery fire.

The operations of the First Corps on this day resulted in the capture of several hundred prisoners, some field pieces, and machine guns.

The casualties were very severe, one brigade alone losing three of its four Colonels.

The 3rd Division commenced a further advance and had nearly reached the plateau of Aizy when they were driven back by a powerful counter-attack supported by heavy artillery. The division, however, fell back in the best order, and finally entrenched

itself about a mile north of Vailly Bridge, effectively covering the passage.

The 4th and 5th Divisions were unable to do more than maintain their ground.

THE GERMAN HEAVY GUNS, SEPT. 15

5. On the morning of the 15th, after close examination of the position, it became clear to me that the enemy was making a determined stand ; and this view was confirmed by reports which reached me from the French Armies fighting on my right and left, which clearly showed that a strongly entrenched line of defence was being taken up from the north of Compiègne, eastward and south-eastward, along the whole valley of the Aisne up to and beyond Reims.

A few days previously the Fortress of Maubeuge fell, and a considerable quantity of siege artillery was brought down from that place to strengthen the enemy's position in front of us.

During the 15th shells fell in our position which have been judged by experts to be thrown by eight-inch siege guns with a range of 10,000 yards. Throughout the whole course of the battle our troops have suffered very heavily from this fire, although its effect latterly was largely mitigated by more efficient and thorough entrenching, the necessity for which I impressed strongly upon Army Corps Commanders. In order to assist them in this work all villages within the area of our occupation were searched for heavy entrenching tools, a large number of which were collected.

In view of the peculiar formation of the ground on the north side of the river between Missy and Soissons, and its extraordinary adaptability to a force on the defensive, the 5th Division found it impossible to maintain its position on the southern edge of the Chivres Plateau, as the enemy in possession of the village of Vregny to the west was able to bring a flank fire to bear upon it. The Division had, therefore, to retire to a line the left of which was at the village of Marguérite, and thence ran by the north edge of Missy back to the river to the east of that place.

With great skill and tenacity Sir Charles Fergusson maintained this position throughout the whole battle, although his trenches were necessarily on lower ground than that occupied by the enemy on the southern edge of the plateau, which was only 400 yards away.

General Hamilton with the 3rd Division vigorously attacked to the north, and regained all the ground he had lost on the 15th, which throughout the battle has formed a most powerful and effective bridge head.

ATTACKS AND COUNTER-ATTACKS

SEPT. 16-24

6. On the 16th the 6th Division came up into line.

It had been my intention to direct the First Corps to attack and seize the enemy's position on the Chemin-des-Dames, supporting it with this new reinforcement. I hoped from the position thus gained to bring effective fire to bear across the front

of the 3rd Division which, by securing the advance of the latter, would also take the pressure off the 5th Division and the Third Corps.

But any further advance of the First Corps would have dangerously exposed my right flank. And, further, I learned from the French Commander-in-Chief that he was strongly reinforcing the 6th French Army on my left, with the intention of bringing up the Allied left to attack the enemy's flank and thus compel his retirement. I therefore sent the 6th Division to join the Third Corps with orders to keep it on the south side of the river, as it might be available in general reserve.

On the 17th, 18th and 19th the whole of our line was heavily bombarded, and the First Corps was constantly and heavily engaged. On the afternoon of the 17th the right flank of the 1st Division was seriously threatened. A counter-attack was made by the Northamptonshire Regiment in combination with the Queen's, and one battalion of the Divisional Reserve was moved up in support. The Northamptonshire Regiment, under cover of mist, crept up to within a hundred yards of the enemy's trenches and charged with the bayonet, driving them out of the trenches and up the hill. A very strong force of hostile infantry was then disclosed on the crest line. This new line was enfiladed by part of the Queen's and the King's Royal Rifles, which wheeled to their left on the extreme right of our infantry line, and were supported by a squadron of cavalry on their outer flank. The enemy's attack was ultimately driven back with heavy loss.

On the 18th, during the night, the Gloucestershire Regiment advanced from their position near Chivy, filled in the enemy's trenches and captured two maxim guns.

On the extreme right the Queen's were heavily attacked, but the enemy was repulsed with great loss. About midnight the attack was renewed on the First Division, supported by artillery fire, but was again repulsed.

Shortly after midnight an attack was made on the left of the 2nd Division with considerable force, which was also thrown back.

At about 1 p.m. on the 19th the 2nd Division drove back a heavy infantry attack strongly supported by artillery fire. At dusk the attack was renewed and again repulsed.

On the 18th I discussed with the General Officer Commanding the Second Army Corps and his Divisional Commanders the possibility of driving the enemy out of Condé, which lay between his two Divisions, and seizing the bridge which has remained throughout in his possession.

As, however, I found that the bridge was closely commanded from all points on the south side and that satisfactory arrangements were made to prevent any issue from it by the enemy by day or night, I decided that it was not necessary to incur the losses which an attack would entail, as, in view of the position of the Second and Third Corps, the enemy could make no use of Condé, and would be automatically forced out of it by any advance which might become possible for us.

7. On this day information reached me from General Joffre that he had found it necessary to make a new plan, and to attack and envelop the German right flank.

It was now evident to me that the battle in which we had been engaged since the 12th instant must last some days longer until the effect of this new flank movement could be felt and a way opened to drive the enemy from his positions.

It thus became essential to establish some system of regular relief in the trenches, and I have used the infantry of the 6th Division for this purpose with good results. The relieved brigades were brought back alternately south of the river, and, with the artillery of the 6th Division, formed a general reserve on which I could rely in case of necessity.

The Cavalry has rendered most efficient and ready help in the trenches, and have done all they possibly could to lighten the arduous and trying task which has of necessity fallen to the lot of the Infantry.

On the evening of the 19th and throughout the 20th the enemy again commenced to show considerable activity. On the former night a severe counter-attack on the 3rd Division was repulsed with considerable loss, and from early on Sunday morning various hostile attempts were made on the trenches of the 1st Division. During the day the enemy suffered another severe repulse in front of the 2nd Division, losing heavily in the attempt. In the course of the afternoon the enemy made desperate attempts against the trenches all along the front of the First Corps, but with similar results.

After dark the enemy again attacked the 2nd Division, only to be again driven back.

Our losses on these two days were considerable, but the number, as obtained, of the enemy's killed and wounded vastly exceeded them.

As the troops of the First Army Corps were much exhausted by this continual fighting, I reinforced Sir Douglas Haig with a brigade from the reserve, and called upon the 1st Cavalry Division to assist them.

On the night of the 21st another violent counter-attack was repulsed by the 3rd Division, the enemy losing heavily.

On the 23rd the four six-inch howitzer batteries, which I had asked to be sent from home, arrived. Two batteries were handed over to the Second Corps and two to the First Corps. They were brought into action on the 24th with very good results.

Our experiences in this campaign seem to point to the employment of more heavy guns of a larger calibre in great battles which last for several days, during which time powerful entrenching work on both sides can be carried out.

These batteries were used with considerable effect on the 24th and the following days.

CLIMAX OF GERMAN COUNTER-ATTACKS

SEPT. 26-28

8. On the 23rd the action of General de Castelnau's Army on the Allied left developed considerably, and apparently withdrew considerable forces of the enemy away from the centre and east. I am not

aware whether it was due to this cause or not, but until the 26th it appeared as though the enemy's opposition in our front was weakening. On that day, however, a very marked renewal of activity commenced. A constant and vigorous artillery bombardment was maintained all day, and the Germans in front of the 1st Division were observed to be "sapping" up to our lines and trying to establish new trenches. Renewed counter-attacks were delivered and beaten off during the course of the day, and in the afternoon a well-timed attack by the 1st Division stopped the enemy's entrenching work.

During the night of 27th-28th the enemy again made the most determined attempts to capture the trenches of the 1st Division, but without the slightest success.

Similar attacks were reported during these three days all along the line of the Allied front, and it is certain that the enemy then made one last great effort to establish ascendancy. He was, however, unsuccessful everywhere, and is reported to have suffered heavy losses. The same futile attempts were made all along our front up to the evening of the 28th, when they died away, and have not since been renewed.

On former occasions I have brought to your Lordship's notice the valuable services performed during this campaign by the Royal Artillery.

Throughout the Battle of the Aisne they have displayed the same skill, endurance and tenacity, and I deeply appreciate the work they have done.

Sir David Henderson and the Royal Flying Corps under his command have again proved their incalculable value. Great strides have been made in the development of the use of aircraft in the tactical sphere by establishing effective communication between aircraft and units in action.

It is difficult to describe adequately and accurately the great strain to which officers and men were subjected almost every hour of the day and night throughout this battle.

I have described above the severe character of the artillery fire which was directed from morning till night, not only upon the trenches, but over the whole surface of the ground occupied by our Forces. It was not until a few days before the position was evacuated that the heavy guns were removed and the fire slackened. Attack and counter-attack occurred at all hours of the night and day throughout the whole position, demanding extreme vigilance, and permitting only a minimum of rest.

The fact that between the 12th September to the date of this despatch the total numbers of killed, wounded and missing reached the figures amounting to 561 officers, 12,980 men, proves the severity of the struggle.

The tax on the endurance of the troops was further increased by the heavy rain and cold which prevailed for some ten or twelve days of this trying time.

The Battle of the Aisne has once more demonstrated the splendid spirit, gallantry and devotion which animates the officers and men of His Majesty's Forces.

OFFICERS MENTIONED

With reference to the last paragraph of my despatch of September 7th, I append the names of officers, non-commissioned officers and men brought forward for special mention by Army Corps commanders and heads of departments for services rendered from the commencement of the campaign up to the present date.

I entirely agree with these recommendations, and beg to submit them for your Lordship's consideration.

I further wish to bring forward the names of the following officers who have rendered valuable service :—General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig (commanding First and Second Corps respectively) I have already mentioned in the present and former despatches for particularly marked and distinguished service in critical situations.

Since the commencement of the campaign they have carried out all my orders and instructions with the utmost ability.

Lieutenant-General W. P. Pulteney took over the command of the Third Corps just before the commencement of the Battle of the Marne. Throughout the subsequent operations he showed himself to be a most capable commander in the field and has rendered very valuable services.

Major-General E. H. H. Allenby and Major-General H. de la P. Gough have proved themselves to

be Cavalry leaders of a high order, and I am deeply indebted to them. The undoubted moral superiority which our Cavalry has obtained over that of the enemy has been due to the skill with which they have turned to the best account the qualities inherent in the splendid troops they command.

In my despatch of 7th September I mentioned the name of Brigadier-General Sir David Henderson and his valuable work in command of the Royal Flying Corps ; and I have once more to express my deep appreciation of the help he has since rendered me.

Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray has continued to render me invaluable help as Chief of the Staff ; and in his arduous and responsible duties he has been ably assisted by Major-General Henry Wilson, Sub-Chief.

Lieutenant-General Sir Nevil Macready and Lieutenant-General Sir William Robertson have continued to perform excellent service as Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General respectively.

The Director of Army Signals, Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Fowler, has materially assisted the operations by the skill and energy which he has displayed in the working of the important department over which he presides.

My Military Secretary, Brigadier-General the Hon. W. Lambton, has performed his arduous and difficult duties with much zeal and great efficiency.

I am anxious also to bring to your Lordship's notice the following names of officers of my Personal Staff, who throughout these arduous operations have

shown untiring zeal and energy in the performance of their duties :—

Aides-de-Camp.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stanley Barry.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Brooke.

Major Fitzgerald Watt.

Extra Aide-de-Camp.

Captain the Hon. F. E. Guest.

Private Secretary.

Lieutenant-Colonel Brindsley Fitzgerald.

Major His Royal Highness Prince Arthur of Connaught, K.G., joined my Staff as Aide-de-Camp on the 14th September.

His Royal Highness's intimate knowledge of languages enabled me to employ him with great advantage on confidential missions of some importance, and his services have proved of considerable value.

I cannot close this despatch without informing your Lordship of the valuable services rendered by the Chief of the French Military Mission at my Headquarters, Colonel Victor Huguet, of the French Artillery. He has displayed tact and judgment of a high order in many difficult situations, and has rendered conspicuous service to the Allied cause.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

(Signed) J. D. P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief,
The British Army in the Field.

APPENDIX A

ACCOUNT BY AN OFFICER ATTACHED TO SIR JOHN FRENCH'S STAFF OF THE BRITISH OPERATIONS OF THE 10TH TO THE 13TH OF SEPTEMBER INCLUSIVE

Since Thursday, September 10, the Army has made steady progress in its endeavour to drive back the enemy in co-operation with the French. The country across which it has had to force its way, and will have to continue to do so, is undulating and covered with patches of thick wood. Within the area which faced the British before the advance commenced, right up to Laon, the chief feature of tactical importance is the fact that there are six rivers running right across the direction of advance, at all of which it was possible that the Germans might make a resistance.

These are, in order from the south, the Marne, the Ourcq, the Vesle, the Aisne, the Ailette, and the Oise. The enemy held the line of the Marne, which was crossed by our forces on September 9 as a purely rearguard operation; our passage of the Ourcq, which here runs almost due east and west, was not contested; the Vesle was only lightly held; while the resistance along the Aisne, both against French and British, has been and still is of a determined character.

The course of the operations during 11th, 12th, and 13th has been as follows: On Friday, the 11th, but little opposition was met with by us along any part of our front, and the direction of advance was, for the purpose of co-operating with our Allies, turned slightly to the north-east. The day was spent in pushing forward and in gathering in various

hostile detachments, and by nightfall our forces had reached a line to the north of the Ourcq extending from Oulchy-le-Château to Long Pont. On this day there was also a general advance on the part of the French along their whole line, which ended in substantial success, in one portion of the field, Duke Albrecht of Würtemberg's Fourth Army being driven back across the Saulx, and elsewhere the whole of the corps artillery of a German corps being captured. Several German colours also were taken.

It was only on this day that the full extent of the victory gained by the Allies on the 8th was appreciated by them, and the moral effect of this success has been enormous. An order dated the 6th or 7th September, by the Commander of the German VIIth Corps, was picked up, in which it was stated that the great object of the war was about to be attained, since the French were going to accept battle, and that upon the result of this battle would depend the issue of the war and the honour of the German armies.

It seems probable that the Germans not only expected to find that the British Army was beyond the power of assuming the offensive for some time, but counted on the French having been driven back on to the line of the Seine; and that, though surprised to find the latter moving forward against them after they had crossed the Marne, they were in no wise deterred from making a great effort.

On Saturday, the 12th, the enemy were found to be occupying a very formidable position opposite to us on the north of the Aisne. At Soissons they held both sides of the river and an entrenched line on the hills to the north. Of eight road bridges and two railway bridges crossing the Aisne within our section of front, seven of the former and both of the latter had been demolished. Working from west to east our Third Army Corps gained some high ground south of the Aisne overlooking the Aisne valley east

of Soissons. Here a long-range artillery duel between our guns and those of the French on our left and the enemy's artillery on the hills continued during the greater part of the day, and did not cease until nearly midnight. The enemy had a very large number of heavy howitzers in well-concealed positions. The movement of this army corps was effected in co-operation with that of the French 6th Army on our left, which gained the southern half of the town during the night. The Second Army Corps did not cross the Aisne.

The First Army Corps got over the River Vesle to the south of the Aisne after the crossing had been secured by the First Cavalry Division. It then reached a line south of the Aisne practically without fighting. At Braine the First Cavalry Division met with considerable opposition from infantry and machine guns holding the town and guarding the bridge. With the aid of some of our infantry it gained possession of the town about midday, driving the enemy to the north. Some hundred prisoners were captured round Braine, where the Germans had thrown a large amount of field-gun ammunition into the river, where it was visible under 2 ft. of water. On the right the French reached the line of the river Vesle.

On this day began the action along the Aisne which is not yet finished, and which may be merely of a rear-guard nature on a large scale, or may be the commencement of a battle of a more serious nature. It rained heavily on Saturday afternoon and all through the night, which severely handicapped the transport.

On Sunday, the 13th, an extremely strong resistance was encountered along the whole of our front, which was some 15 miles in length. The action still consisted for the most part of long-range gun fire, that of the Germans being to a great extent from their heavy howitzers, which were firing from cleverly concealed positions. Some of the actual

crossings of the Aisne were guarded by strong detachments of infantry with machine guns. By nightfall portions of all three corps were across the river, the cavalry returning to the south side. By this night or early next morning three pontoon bridges had been built, and our troops also managed to get across the river by means of a bridge carrying the canal over the river, which had not been destroyed. On our left the French pressed on, but were prevented by artillery fire from building a pontoon bridge at Soissons. A large number of infantry, however, crossed in single file on the top of one girder of the railway bridge which was left standing.

During the last three or four days many isolated parties of Germans have been discovered hiding in the numerous woods a long way behind our line. As a rule they seem glad to surrender, and the condition of some of them may be gathered from the following incident. An officer, who was proceeding along the road in charge of a number of led horses, received information that there were some of the enemy in the neighbourhood. Upon seeing them he gave the order to charge, whereupon three German officers and 106 men surrendered.

APPENDIX B

General Headquarters,
18th September, 1914.

At the date of the last narrative—on the 14th September—the Germans were making a determined resistance along the River Aisne. The opposition, which it was at first thought might possibly be of a rearguard nature not entailing material delay to our progress, has developed, and has proved to be more serious than was anticipated. The action now being fought by the Germans along their line

may, it is true, have been undertaken in order to gain time for some strategic operation or move, and may not be their main stand.

But if this be so, the fighting is naturally on a scale which, as to extent of ground covered and duration of resistance, makes it indistinguishable in its progress from what is known as a "pitched battle," though the enemy certainly showed signs of considerable disorganization during the earlier days of their retirement. Whether it was originally intended by them to defend the position they took up as strenuously as they have done, or whether the delay gained for them during the 12th and 13th by their artillery has enabled them to develop their resistance and to reinforce their line to an extent not originally contemplated, cannot yet be said.

So far as we are concerned the action still being contested is the battle of the Aisne, for we are fighting just across that river along the whole of our front. To the east and west the struggle is not confined to the valley of that river, though it will probably bear its name. The progress of our operations and of those French Armies nearest to us for the 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th will now be described.

On Monday, the 14th, those of our troops which had on the previous day crossed the Aisne after driving in the German rearguard on that evening found portions of the enemy's forces in prepared defensive positions on the plateau on the right bank, and could do little more than secure a footing north of the river. This, however, they maintained in spite of two counter-attacks, delivered at dusk and at 10 p.m., in which the fighting was severe.

During the 14th strong reinforcements of our troops were passed to the north bank, the troops crossing by ferry, by pontoon bridges, and by the remains of the permanent bridges. Close co-operation with the French forces was

maintained, and the general progress made was good. Although the opposition was vigorous and the state of the roads after the heavy rain made movements slow, one division alone failed to secure the ground it expected to. The 1st Army Corps, after repulsing repeated attacks, captured 600 prisoners and 12 guns ; the cavalry also took a number of prisoners. Many of the Germans taken belong to Reserve and Landwehr formations, which fact appears to indicate that the enemy is compelled to draw on the older classes of soldiers to fill the gaps in his ranks.

There was heavy rain throughout the night of the 14th-15th, and during the 15th September the situation of the British forces underwent no essential change, but it became more and more evident that the defensive preparations made by the enemy were more extensive than was at first apparent. In order to counterbalance these, measures were taken by us to economize troops and to secure protection from the hostile artillery fire, which was very fierce, and our men continued to improve their own entrenchments.

The Germans bombarded our lines nearly all day, using heavy guns, brought no doubt from before Maubeuge, as well as those with the corps. All their counter-attacks, however, failed, although in some places they were repeated six times ; one made on the 4th Guards Brigade was repulsed with heavy slaughter. An attempt to advance slightly made by part of our line was unsuccessful as regards gain in ground, but led to withdrawal of part of the enemy's infantry and artillery. Further counter-attacks made during the night were beaten off. Rain came on towards evening and continued intermittently until 9 a.m. on the 16th. Besides adding to the discomfort of the soldiers holding open trenches in the firing line, the wet weather to some extent hampered the motor transport service, which was also hindered by the broken bridges.

On Wednesday, the 16th, there was little change in the situation opposite the British. The efforts made by the enemy were less active than on the previous day, though their bombardment continued throughout the morning and evening. Our artillery fire drove the defenders off one of the salients of their position, but they returned in the evening. Forty prisoners were taken by the 3rd Division.

On Thursday, the 17th, the situation still remained unchanged in its essentials. The German heavy artillery fire was more active than on the previous day. The only infantry attacks made by the enemy were on the extreme right of our position and, as had happened before, were repulsed with heavy loss, chiefly on this occasion by our field artillery.

In order to convey some idea of the nature of the fighting it may be said that along the greater part of our front the Germans have been driven back from the forward slopes on the north of the river. Their infantry are holding strong lines of trenches amongst and along the edges of the numerous woods which crown these slopes. These trenches are elaborately constructed and cleverly concealed. In many places there are wire entanglements and lengths of rabbit fencing both in the woods and in the open, carefully alined so that they can be swept by rifle fire and machine guns, which are invisible from our side of the valley. The ground in front of the infantry trenches is also as a rule under cross fire from field artillery placed on neighbouring features and under high-angle fire from pieces placed well back behind woods on top of the plateau.

A feature of this action, as of the previous fights, is the use made by the enemy of their numerous heavy howitzers, with which they are able to direct a long-range fire all over the valley and right across it. Upon these they evidently place great reliance. Where our men are holding the

forward edges of the high ground on the north side they are now strongly entrenched. They are well fed, and in spite of the wet weather of the past week are cheerful and confident. The bombardment by both sides has been very heavy, and on Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday was practically continuous.

Nevertheless, in spite of the general din caused by the reports of the immense number of heavy guns in action along our front on Wednesday, the arrival of a French force acting against the German right flank was at once announced on the east of our front some miles away by the continuous roar of their quick-firing artillery with which their attack was opened. So far as the British are concerned the greater part of this week has been passed in bombardment, in gaining ground by degrees, and in beating back severe counter-attacks with heavy slaughter. Our casualties have been severe, but it is probable that those of the enemy are heavier. The rain has caused a great drop in temperature and there is more than a distinct feeling of autumn in the air, especially in the early mornings.

On our right and left the French have been fighting fiercely and have also been gradually gaining ground. One village has already during this battle been captured and recaptured twice by each side, and at the time of writing remains in the hands of the Germans. The fighting has been at close quarters and of the most desperate nature, and the streets of the village are filled with the dead of both sides. As an example of the spirit which is inspiring our Allies the following translation of the *Ordre du Jour* published on September 9 after the battle of Montmirail by the Commander of the French 5th Army is given :

Soldiers !

Upon the memorable fields of Montmirail, of Vauchamps, or Champaubert, which a century ago witnessed the victories

of our ancestors over Blücher's Prussians, your vigorous offensive has triumphed over the resistance of the Germans. Held on his flanks, his centre broken, the enemy is now retreating towards East and North by forced marches. The most renowned army corps of Old Prussia, the contingents of Westphalia, of Hanover, or Brandenburg, have retired in haste before you.

This first success is no more than a prelude. The enemy is shaken, but not yet decisively beaten.

You have still to undergo severe hardships, to make long marches, to fight hard battles.

May the image of our country, soiled by barbarians, always remain before your eyes. Never was it more necessary to sacrifice all for her.

Saluting the heroes who have fallen in the fighting of the last few days, my thoughts turn towards you—the victors in the next battle.

Forward, soldiers, for France !

Montmirail, 9th September, 1914.
General Commanding the 5th Army,
FRANCHET D'ESPEREY.

The Germans are a formidable enemy. Well trained, long prepared, and brave, their soldiers are carrying on the contest with skill and valour. Nevertheless they are fighting to win anyhow, regardless of all the rules of fair play, and there is evidence that they do not hesitate at anything in order to gain victory. A large number of the tales of their misbehaviour are exaggerations, and some of the stringent precautions they have taken to guard themselves against the inhabitants of the areas traversed are possibly justifiable measures of war. But at the same time it has been definitely established that they have committed atrocities on many occasions and they have been guilty of brutal conduct.

So many letters and statements of our own wounded soldiers have been published in our newspapers that the

following epistle from a German soldier of the 74th Infantry Regiment (Xth Corps) to his wife may also be of interest :

My dear Wife,

I have just been living through days that defy imagination. I should never have thought that men could stand it. Not a second has passed but my life has been in danger, and yet not a hair of my head has been hurt. It was horrible, it was ghastly. But I have been saved for you and for our happiness and I take heart again, although I am still terribly unnerved. God grant that I may see you again soon and that this horror may soon be over. None of us can do any more, human strength is at an end.

I will try to tell you about it :

On the 5th September the enemy were reported to be taking up a position near St. Prix (N.E. of Paris). The Xth Corps, which had made an astonishingly rapid advance, of course attacked on the Sunday.

Steep slopes led up to heights which were held in considerable force. With our weak detachments of the 74th and 91st Regiments we reached the crest and came under a terrible artillery fire that mowed us down. However, we entered St. Prix. Hardly had we done so than we were met with shell fire and a violent fusillade from the enemy's infantry. Our Colonel was badly wounded—he is the third we have had. Fourteen men were killed round me. . . . We got away in a lull without being hit.

.

The 7th, 8th, and 9th of September we were constantly under shell and shrapnel fire and suffered terrible losses. I was in a house which was hit several times. The fear of a death of agony which is in every man's heart, and naturally so, is a terrible feeling.

How often I thought of you, my darling, and what I suffered in that terrifying battle which extended along a front of many miles near Montmirail, you cannot possibly imagine. Our heavy artillery was being used for the siege of Maubeuge ; we wanted it badly, as the enemy had theirs in force and kept up a furious bombardment. For four days I was under artillery fire. It is like Hell, but a thousand

times worse. On the night of the 9th the order was given to retreat, as it would have been madness to attempt to hold our position with our few men, and we should have risked a terrible defeat the next day. The First and Third Armies had not been able to attack with us, as we had advanced too rapidly.

Our *moral* was absolutely broken.

In spite of unheard-of sacrifices we had achieved nothing. I cannot understand how our Army, after fighting three great battles and being terribly weakened, was sent against a position which the enemy had prepared for three weeks ; but naturally I know nothing of the intentions of our Chiefs. . . . They say nothing has been lost. In a word, we retired towards Cormontreuil and Reims by forced marches by day and night. We hear that three armies are going to get into line, entrench, rest, and then start afresh our victorious march on Paris. It was not a defeat, but only a strategic retreat. I have confidence in our Chiefs that everything will be successful. Our first battalion, which has fought with unparalleled bravery, is reduced from 1,200 to 194 men. These numbers speak for themselves. . . .

Amongst minor happenings of interest is the following :

During a counter-attack by the German 53rd Regiment on portions of the Northampton and Queen's Regiments on Thursday, the 17th, a force of some 400 of the enemy were allowed to approach right up to the trench, occupied by a platoon of the former regiment, owing to the fact that they had held up their hands and made gestures that were interpreted as signs that they wished to surrender. When they were actually on the parapet of the trench held by the Northamptons they opened fire on our men at point-blank range.

Unluckily for the enemy, however, flanking them and only some 400 yards away there happened to be a machine-gun manned by a detachment of the "Queen's." This at once opened fire, cutting a lane through their mass, and they fell back to their own trench with great loss. Shortly

afterwards they were driven further back with additional loss by a battalion of the Guards which came up in support.

An incident which occurred some little time ago during our retirement is also worthy of record. On August 28, during the battle fought by the French along the Oise, between La Fère and Guise, one of the French Commanders desired to make an air reconnaissance. It was found, however, that no observers were available. Wishing to help our Allies as much as possible, the British officer attached to this particular French Army volunteered to go up with a pilot to observe. He had never been in an aeroplane, but he made the ascent and produced a valuable reconnaissance report. Incidentally he had a duel in the air at an altitude of 6,000ft. with the observer of a German Taube monoplane which approached. He fired several shots and drove off the hostile aeroplane. His action was much appreciated by the French.

In view of the many statements being made in the Press as to the use of Zeppelins against us, it is interesting to note that the Royal Flying Corps, who have been out on reconnaissances on every day since their arrival in France, have never seen a Zeppelin, though airships of a non-rigid type have been seen on two occasions. Near the Marne, late one evening, two such were observed over the German forces. Aeroplanes were dispatched against them, but in the darkness our pilots were uncertain of the airships' nationality and did not attack. It was afterwards made clear that they could not have been French. A week later, an officer reconnoitring to the flank saw an airship over the German forces and opposite the French. It had no distinguishing mark and was assumed to belong to the latter, though it is now known that it also must have been a German craft. The orders of the Royal Flying Corps are to attack Zeppelins

at once, and there is some disappointment at the absence of those targets.

The following special order has been issued to-day to the troops :—

SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY.

By Field-Marshal Sir John French, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.,
K.C.M.G., Commander-in-Chief, British Army in
the Field.

September 17, 914.

Once more I have to express my deep appreciation of the splendid behaviour of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the Army under my command throughout the great Battle of the Aisne, which has been in progress since the evening of the 12th inst. The Battle of the Marne, which lasted from the morning of the 6th to the evening of the 10th, had hardly ended in the precipitate flight of the enemy when we were brought face to face with a position of extraordinary strength, carefully entrenched and prepared for defence by an Army and a Staff which are thorough adepts in such work.

Throughout the 13th and 14th that position was most gallantly attacked by the British Forces, and the passage of the Aisne effected. This is the third day the troops have been gallantly holding the position they have gained against the most desperate counter-attacks and a hail of heavy artillery.

I am unable to find adequate words in which to express the admiration I feel for their magnificent conduct.

The French Armies on our right and left are making good progress, and I feel sure that we have only to hold on with tenacity to the ground we have won for a very short time

longer, when the Allies will be again in full pursuit of a beaten enemy.

The self-sacrificing devotion and splendid spirit of the British Army in France will carry all before it.

(Signed) J. D. P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal,
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INTRODUCTION

AT the beginning of October, when the battle of the Aisne had subsided into siege operations, the British troops were entrenched upon the line of the Aisne, between Soissons and Villers. On their left were French armies whose front extended in a curve from Soissons through Roye and Albert to a point some miles north of Arras. The German right extended equally far to the north, in a curve which passed west of Douai, Peronne, and Noyon. In the rear of the German right a strong German force was besieging Antwerp, and the situation of the defenders was becoming critical, since both in numbers and in weight of guns they were decidedly inferior to their assailants. It was only to be expected that, when Antwerp had fallen, the besieging army would be pushed forward on the German right to undertake an outflanking movement, and to cut off the Allies from the Channel ports.

Under these circumstances the British naval and military authorities resolved to throw whatever land-forces were available into the northern theatre of operations. The Admiralty dispatched to Antwerp two Naval Brigades and one Brigade of Marines, which arrived on the night of October 3-4 ; the War Office sent over the Fourth Corps, under Sir Henry Rawlinson, to keep open the line of

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retreat from Antwerp to the Yser ; and Sir John French obtained permission from General Joffre to transfer his three Army Corps to the extreme left of the Allied line.

The adventures of the Naval and Marine Brigades are described in the dispatch of Major-General Paris (Appendix). They were in Antwerp for less than a week ; a large number of their men crossed the Dutch frontier on the night of October 8-9, in the course of the retreat, and were interned by order of the Dutch Government. Sir John French is, however, of opinion that this force delayed the enemy for a considerable time ; and, if that opinion is correct, the mission of Major-General Paris was strategically justifiable. The fall of Antwerp occurred at a critical moment, when the three Army Corps which had been on the Aisne were in transit to their new base at St. Omer. It was essential that the advance of the German force from Antwerp should be delayed until the main body of the British Expeditionary Force was in position to receive them. But obviously much more was done to retard the German advance by the retreating Belgian army, by the French Territorials who were pushed forward for this purpose to Ypres and Poperinghe, and by the Fourth Army Corps operating near Antwerp and Ghent. To the gallantry of the Fourth Army Corps and its commander we may fairly give the chief credit for the fact that the German army of Antwerp, a week after the fall of the city, found itself at a standstill to the east of Ypres and Nieuport. The exhausted Belgian army

was relieved, on the line of the Yser, by French forces ; but further to the south, in the gap between the Yser and the Lys, the main burden of defence fell upon the British Fourth Corps, which was already decimated by heavy fighting. Through this gap the Germans hoped to advance upon Calais and Boulogne ; but for four days Sir Henry Rawlinson and the forces under his command succeeded in holding an improvised line of defence against greatly superior forces. The Fourth Corps was posted on the line Zonnebeke-Gheluvelt-Zandvoorde, and this line they successfully held. Sir Henry Rawlinson was instructed to advance, if possible, to Menin—a position six and a half miles from the centre of his front—in order to hold the passage of the Lys at that point. If he had succeeded in doing this, it would have been very difficult for the German troops advancing from Antwerp to co-operate with the right wing of the main German force, which had now been extended from Douai to Lille and Roubaix. But the requisite effort was found impossible. The Fourth Corps had been already taxed almost beyond the limits of human endurance, and it was only able to hold its ground on the line originally selected by Sir Henry Rawlinson.

The order to take Menin was issued on October 17. By this time the removal of the First, Second, and Third Army Corps from the Aisne was almost completed. They were removed by train from Soissons to St. Omer. The French left extended to the village of Annequin, midway between Béthune and La Bassée and south of the La Bassée Canal.

The Expeditionary Force was directed to move eastward from St. Omer. The French armies south of Annequin were to operate similarly eastward, keeping pace with the British troops on their left.

The work of detrainment was smoothly accomplished. The Second Army Corps, under Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, was the first to arrive and moved south-east from St. Omer, until it came (October 11) into touch with the French left. Smith-Dorrien was directed to advance south of the river Lys in the direction of La Bassée, where the troops of the extreme German right were entrenched. His corps was to pivot upon Givenchy, to the west of La Bassée, so as to envelop the German right from the north and east. But it was sharply checked at an early stage of the turning movement, and on the night of October 23 retired to the line Givenchy—Fauquissart ; here it remained, terribly exhausted by enormous losses. Its orders were, after October 20, to act on the defensive. Though reinforced on the 19th and the 20th by Indian troops, which did splendid service, it was always outnumbered.

The Third Army Corps, under General Pulteney, was instructed to act on the left of the Second Army Corps. It reached Hazebrouck from St. Omer on October 12 and it then proceeded to move in the direction of Armentières, following the line of the main road through Bailleul. On its right, acting as a link of connexion with the Second Corps, was the French Cavalry Corps of General Conneau. Although operating in enclosed and rain-sodden country, General Pulteney moved forward rapidly,

driving in the cavalry outposts of the enemy ; he carried the line of the river Lys, to the west of Armentières, on October 15. On the three following days he advanced to and beyond Armentières with his forces astride of the river. His orders were to proceed down the valley of the Lys ; but on October 18, finding that the German troops in front of him had been considerably reinforced, he came to a stand on a line which extended from Le Gheir and east of Armentières to a point due west of Lille. On this line General Pulteney held his own in spite of severe counter-attacks ; like Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, he had been ordered to stand on the defensive ; and his resources were strained to the utmost in the last eleven days of October. Sir John French considers that the work of this Corps, operating on an extended front which showed many weak points, was ' beyond all praise '.

Before October 19 the outflanking movements of the Third and Second Corps had been parried by the rapid lengthening of the German line. On that day it became apparent that these corps were themselves in danger of being outflanked by an advance of the enemy through Ypres, where the Fourth Corps was barely holding its own. It is clear that, though Sir John French divined the enemy's true intention, he was not fully informed as to the strength of the German forces which were being concentrated against Ypres. He instructed Sir Douglas Haig, the commander of the First Corps, which had just detrained at St. Omer, to advance to the north-east of Ypres and to operate on the left of the Fourth

8 THE BATTLE OF YPRES-ARMENTIÈRES

Corps ; the direction indicated was Thourout, and the ultimate object of the advance was the recapture of Bruges and Ghent. Sir Douglas Haig moved forward rapidly, and on October 21 was established north-east of Ypres. But he was immediately threatened with a flank attack from the north ; and he found that the remnants of the Fourth Corps were in no condition to support an advance. It was perhaps as well that he remained on the defensive ; for on October 29, 30, and 31 the British troops east of Ypres were exposed to attacks of unprecedented severity. On the last of these three days the attack was executed by no less than three German Army Corps, who had been ordered by the Emperor to break through at all costs.

The story of these days is briefly told in the dispatch. They were as critical as the worst days of the retreat from Mons. The main burden of the defence fell upon the reconstituted First Corps, with which the Fourth Corps was amalgamated, by order of Sir John French, on October 27. Both on the 30th and on the 31st the enemy gained initial successes which might have induced a less stout-hearted commander than Sir Douglas Haig to order a general retirement ; and, if the First Corps had given way, a general *débâcle* of the Expeditionary Force would almost certainly have followed. The crisis was surmounted on October 31, the decisive factor being the recapture of Gheluvelt by the First Division. It was a brilliant feat of arms, accomplished after the Division had once been forced to retire. The 2nd Worcestershire Regiment are men-

tioned by Sir John French for their share in this achievement.

The tenth section of the dispatch refers briefly to the operations of November 1—November 12, when a fresh series of assaults was delivered by the Germans against the First Corps on the British left. It is not clear why this period is so summarily dealt with ; and one is disappointed to find that the narrative breaks off before the battle of November 15, when the Prussian Guard made their advance. It will be noted that Sir John French considers the situation on November 15 to have been even more critical than that of October 31, when everything depended on the recapture of Gheluvelt.

Sir John French calls special attention to the unparalleled feat of the Cavalry Corps in holding a long line of trenches against two German Army Corps for forty-eight hours ; to the extraordinary powers of endurance shown by the Third Corps under General Pulteney in defending an extremely extended line ; and to the excellent work of the Indian Corps round Ypres and in the zone of the Second British Corps. It was in this battle that the Indian troops had the first opportunity of proving their efficiency ; and it will be noticed that they are highly commended by Sir John French.

Clearly the battle made exceptional demands on the endurance of the individual and on the resource of subordinate commanders. Sir John French has occasion to praise many officers and a number of regiments. But it will be long before we know the full details of the heroic achievements with which

the last fortnight of October, 1914, was crowded. We are left with the impression that the enemy possessed the advantage in mobility, in accurate information, in unity of control, and above all in numbers ; but that the marvellous discipline of the British infantry, the accuracy of the British artillery and rifle fire, and the doggedness of the British general officers, retrieved a situation which an umpire in manœuvres would have declared to be hopeless. Undoubtedly the Expeditionary Force owed much to the support of General Conneau's cavalry and of the 9th French Corps. How much, we shall perhaps learn in more detail at some later date.

H. W. C. D.

THE BATTLE OF YPRES-ARMENTIERES

War Office, November 29th, 1914.

THE following despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, British Forces in the Field :—

General Headquarters,
20th November, 1914.

MY LORD,—

1. I have the honour to submit a further despatch recounting the operations of the Field Force under my command throughout the battle of Ypres-Armentières.

REMOVAL FROM THE AISNE

Early in October a study of the general situation strongly impressed me with the necessity of bringing the greatest possible force to bear in support of the northern flank of the Allies, in order to effectively outflank the enemy and compel him to evacuate his positions.

At the same time the position on the Aisne, as described in the concluding paragraphs of my last despatch, appeared to me to warrant a withdrawal of the British Forces from the positions they then held.

The enemy had been weakened by continual

abortive and futile attacks, whilst the fortification of the position had been much improved.

I represented these views to General Joffre, who fully agreed.

Arrangements for withdrawal and relief having been made by the French General Staff, the operation commenced on the 3rd October; and the 2nd Cavalry Division, under General Gough, marched for Compiègne *en route* for the new theatre.

The Army Corps followed in succession at intervals of a few days, and the move was completed on the 19th October, when the First Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, completed its detrainment at St. Omer.

That this delicate operation was carried out so successfully is in great measure due to the excellent feeling which exists between the French and British Armies; and I am deeply indebted to the Commander-in-Chief and the French General Staff for their cordial and most effective co-operation.

NEW PLAN OF OPERATIONS

As General Foch was appointed by the Commander-in-Chief to supervise the operations of all the French troops north of Noyon, I visited his headquarters at Doullens on 8th October and arranged joint plans of operations as follows :—

The Second Corps to arrive on the line Aire-Bethune on the 11th October, to connect with the right of the French 10th Army and, pivoting on its left, to attack in flank the enemy who were opposing the 10th French Corps in front.

The Cavalry to move on the northern flank of the Second Corps and support its attack until the Third Corps, which was to detrain at St. Omer on the 12th, should come up. They were then to clear the front and act on the northern flank of the Third Corps in a similar manner, pending the arrival of the First Corps from the Aisne.

The 3rd Cavalry Division and 7th Division, under Sir Henry Rawlinson, which were then operating in support of the Belgian Army and assisting its withdrawal from Antwerp, to be ordered to co-operate as soon as circumstances would allow.

In the event of these movements so far overcoming the resistance of the enemy as to enable a forward movement to be made, all the Allied Forces to march in an easterly direction. The road running from Bethune to Lille was to be the dividing line between the British and French Forces, the right of the British Army being directed on Lille.

OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND ARMY CORPS, OCTOBER 11—OCTOBER 31

2. The great battle, which is mainly the subject of this despatch, may be said to have commenced on October 11th, on which date the 2nd Cavalry Division, under General Gough, first came into contact with the enemy's cavalry who were holding some woods to the north of the Bethune-Aire Canal. These were cleared of the enemy by our cavalry,

which then joined hands with the Divisional Cavalry of the 6th Division in the neighbourhood of Hazebrouck. On the same day the right of the 2nd Cavalry Division connected with the left of the Second Corps, which was moving in a north-easterly direction after crossing the above-mentioned canal.

By the 11th October Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien had reached the line of the canal between Aire and Bethune. I directed him to continue his march on the 12th, bringing up his left in the direction of Merville. Then he was to move East to the line Laventie-Lorgies, which would bring him on the immediate left of the French Army and threaten the German flank.

On the 12th this movement was commenced. The 5th Division connected up with the left of the French Army north of Annequin. They moved to the attack of the Germans who were engaged at this point with the French ; but the enemy once more extended his right in some strength to meet the threat against his flank. The 3rd Division, having crossed the canal, deployed on the left of the 5th ; and the whole Second Corps again advanced to the attack, but were unable to make much headway owing to the difficult character of the ground upon which they were operating, which was similar to that usually found in manufacturing districts and was covered with mining works, factories, buildings, etc. The ground throughout this country is remarkably flat, rendering effective artillery support very difficult.

Before nightfall, however, they had made some

advance and had successfully driven back hostile counter-attacks with great loss to the enemy and destruction of some of his machine guns.

On and after the 13th October the object of the General Officer Commanding the Second Corps was to wheel to his right, pivoting on Givenchy to get astride the La Bassée-Lille road in the neighbourhood of Fournes, so as to threaten the right flank and rear of the enemy's position on the high ground south of La Bassée.

This position of La Bassée has throughout the battle defied all attempts at capture, either by the French or the British.

On this day Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien could make but little progress. He particularly mentions the fine fighting of the Dorsets, whose Commanding Officer, Major Roper, was killed. They suffered no less than 400 casualties, 130 of them being killed, but maintained all day their hold on Pont Fixe. He also refers to the gallantry of the Artillery.

The fighting of the Second Corps continued throughout the 14th in the same direction. On this day the Army suffered a great loss, in that the Commander of the 3rd Division, General Hubert Hamilton, was killed.

On the 15th the 3rd Division fought splendidly, crossing the dykes, with which this country is intersected, with planks; and driving the enemy from one entrenched position to another in loop-holed villages, till at night they pushed the Germans off the Estaires-La Bassée road, and establishing themselves on the line Pont de Ham-Croix Barbée.

On the 16th the move was continued until the left flank of the Corps was in front of the village of Aubers, which was strongly held. This village was captured on the 17th by the 9th Infantry Brigade ; and at dark on the same day the Lincolns and Royal Fusiliers carried the village of Herlies at the point of the bayonet after a fine attack, the Brigade being handled with great dash by Brigadier-General Shaw.

At this time, to the best of our information, the Second Corps were believed to be opposed by the 2nd, 4th, 7th, and 9th German Cavalry Divisions, supported by several battalions of Jaegers and a part of the 14th German Corps.

On the 18th powerful counter-attacks were made by the enemy all along the front of the Second Corps, and were most gallantly repulsed ; but only slight progress could be made.

From the 19th to the 31st October the Second Corps carried on a most gallant fight in defence of their position against very superior numbers, the enemy having been reinforced during that time by at least one Division of the 7th Corps, a brigade of the 3rd Corps, and the whole of the 14th Corps, which had moved north from in front of the French 21st Corps.

On the 19th the Royal Irish Regiment, under Major Daniell, stormed and carried the village of Le Pilly, which they held and entrenched. On the 20th, however, they were cut off and surrounded, suffering heavy losses.

On the morning of the 22nd the enemy made

a very determined attack on the 5th Division, who were driven out of the village of Violaines, but they were sharply counter-attacked by the Worcesters and Manchesters, and prevented from coming on.

The left of the Second Corps being now somewhat exposed, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien withdrew the line during the night to a position he had previously prepared, running generally from the eastern side of Givenchy, east of Neuve Chapelle to Fauquissart.

On the 24th October the Lahore Division of the Indian Army Corps, under Major-General Watkis, having arrived, I sent them to the neighbourhood of Lacon to support the Second Corps.

Very early on this morning the enemy commenced a heavy attack, but, owing to the skilful manner in which the artillery was handled and the targets presented by the enemy's infantry as it approached, they were unable to come to close quarters. Towards the evening a heavy attack developed against the 7th Brigade, which was repulsed, with very heavy loss to the enemy, by the Wiltshires and the Royal West Kents. Later, a determined attack on the 18th Infantry Brigade drove the Gordon Highlanders out of their trenches, which were retaken by the Middlesex Regiment, gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel Hull.

The 8th Infantry Brigade (which had come into line on the left of the Second Corps) was also heavily attacked, but the enemy was driven off.

In both these cases the Germans lost very heavily, and left large numbers of dead and prisoners behind them.

The Second Corps was now becoming exhausted, owing to the constant reinforcements of the enemy, the length of line which it had to defend, and the enormous losses which it had suffered.

OPERATIONS OF THIRD ARMY CORPS, OCTOBER 13—OCTOBER 18

3. By the evening of the 11th October the Third Corps had practically completed its detrainment at St. Omer, and was moved east to Hazebrouck, where the Corps remained throughout the 12th.

On the morning of the 13th the advanced guard of the Corps, consisting of the 19th Infantry Brigade and a Brigade of Field Artillery, occupied the position of the line Strazeele Station-Caestre-St. Sylvestre.

On this day I directed General Pulteney to move towards the line Armentières-Wytschaete ; warning him, however, that should the Second Corps require his aid he must be prepared to move south-east to support it.

A French Cavalry Corps under General Conneau was operating between the Second and Third Corps.

The Fourth German Cavalry Corps, supported by some Jaeger Battalions, was known to be occupying the position in the neighbourhood of Meteren ; and they were believed to be further supported by the advanced guard of another German Army Corps.

In pursuance of his orders, General Pulteney proceeded to attack the enemy in his front.

The rain and fog which prevailed prevented full advantage being derived from our much superior

artillery. The country was very much enclosed and rendered difficult by heavy rain.

The enemy were, however, routed ; and the position taken at dark, several prisoners being captured.

During the night the Third Corps made good the attacked position and entrenched it.

As Bailleul was known to be occupied by the enemy, arrangements were made during the night to attack it ; but reconnaissances sent out on the morning of the 14th showed that they had withdrawn, and the town was taken by our troops at 10 a.m. on that day, many wounded Germans being found and taken in it.

The Corps then occupied the line St. Jans Cappel-Bailleul.

On the morning of the 15th the Third Corps were ordered to make good the line of the Lys from Armentières to Saily, which, in the face of considerable opposition and very foggy weather, they succeeded in doing, the 6th Division at Saily-Bac St. Maur and the 4th Division at Nieppe.

The enemy in its front having retired, the Third Corps on the night of the 17th occupied the line Bois Grenier-Le Gheir.

On the 18th the enemy were holding a line from Radinghem on the south, through Perenchies and Frelinghien on the north, whence the German troops which were opposing the Cavalry Corps occupied the east bank of the river as far as Wervick.

On this day I directed the Third Corps to move down the valley of the Lys and endeavour to assist the Cavalry Corps in making good its position on

the right bank. To do this it was necessary first to drive the enemy eastward towards Lille. A vigorous offensive in the direction of Lille was assumed, but the enemy was found to have been considerably reinforced, and but little progress was made.

The situation of the Third Corps on the night of the 18th was as follows :

The 6th Division was holding the line Radinghem-La Vallée-Emnetières-Capinghem-Premesques-Railway Line 300 yards east of Halte. The 4th Division were holding the line from L'Épinette to the river at a point 400 yards south of Frelinghein, and thence to a point half a mile south-east of Le Gheir. The Corps Reserve was at Armentières Station, with right and left flanks of Corps in close touch with French Cavalry and the Cavalry Corps.

Since the advance from Bailleul the enemy's forces in front of the Cavalry and Third Corps had been strongly reinforced, and on the night of the 17th they were opposed by three or four divisions of the enemy's cavalry, the 19th Saxon Corps, and at least one division of the 7th Corps. Reinforcements for the enemy were known to be coming up from the direction of Lille.

OPERATIONS OF CAVALRY CORPS, OCTOBER 11— OCTOBER 19

4. Following the movements completed on the 11th October, the 2nd Cavalry Division pushed the enemy back through Flêtre and Le Coq de Paille, and took Mont des Cats, just before dark, after stiff fighting.

On the 14th the 1st Cavalry Division joined up, and the whole Cavalry Corps under General Allenby, moving north, secured the high ground above Berthen, overcoming considerable opposition.

With a view to a further advance east, I ordered General Allenby, on the 15th, to reconnoitre the line of the River Lys, and endeavour to secure the passages on the opposite bank, pending the arrival of the Third and Fourth Corps.

During the 15th and 16th this reconnaissance was most skilfully and energetically carried out in the face of great opposition, especially along the lower line of the river.

These operations were continued throughout the 17th, 18th, and 19th; but, although valuable information was gained, and strong forces of the enemy held in check, the Cavalry Corps was unable to secure passages or to establish a permanent footing on the eastern bank of the river.

OPERATIONS OF FOURTH ARMY CORPS, OCTOBER 16—OCTOBER 20

5. At this point in the history of the operations under report it is necessary that I should return to the co-operation of the forces operating in the neighbourhood of Ghent and Antwerp under Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson, as the action of his force about this period exercised, in my opinion, a great influence on the course of the subsequent operations.

This force, consisting of the 3rd Cavalry Division,

under Major-General the Hon. Julian Byng, and the 7th Division, under Major-General Capper, was placed under my orders by telegraphic instructions from your Lordship.

On receipt of these instructions I directed Sir Henry Rawlinson to continue his operations in covering and protecting the withdrawal of the Belgian Army, and subsequently to form the left column in the eastward advance of the British Forces. These withdrawal operations were concluded about the 16th October, on which date the 7th Division was posted to the east of Ypres on a line extending from Zandvoorde through Gheluvelt to Zonnebeke. The 3rd Cavalry Division was on its left towards Langemarck and Poelcappelle.

In this position Sir Henry Rawlinson was supported by the 87th French Territorial Division in Ypres and Vlamertinghe, and by the 89th French Territorial Division at Poperinghe.

On the night of the 16th I informed Sir Henry Rawlinson of the operations which were in progress by the Cavalry Corps and the Third Corps, and ordered him to conform to those movements in an easterly direction, keeping an eye always to any threat which might be made against him from the north-east.

A very difficult task was allotted to Sir Henry Rawlinson and his command. Owing to the importance of keeping possession of all the ground towards the north which we already held, it was necessary for him to operate on a very wide front, and, until the arrival of the First Corps in the northern theatre

—which I expected about the 20th—I had no troops available with which to support or reinforce him,

Although on this extended front he had eventually to encounter very superior forces, his troops, both Cavalry and Infantry, fought with the utmost gallantry, and rendered very signal service,

On the 17th four French Cavalry Divisions deployed on the left of the 3rd Cavalry Division, and drove back advanced parties of the enemy beyond the Forêt d'Houthulst.

As described above, instructions for a vigorous attempt to establish the British Forces east of the Lys were given on the night of the 17th to the Second, Third, and Cavalry Corps.

FAILURE TO OCCUPY MENIN

I considered, however, that the possession of Menin constituted a very important point of passage, and would much facilitate the advance of the rest of the Army. So I directed the General Officer Commanding the Fourth Corps to advance the 7th Division upon Menin, and endeavour to seize that crossing on the morning of the 18th.

The left of the 7th Division was to be supported by the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, and further north by the French Cavalry in the neighbourhood of Roulers.

Sir Henry Rawlinson represented to me that large hostile forces were advancing upon him from the east and north-east, and that his left flank was severely threatened.

I was aware of the threats from that direction,

but hoped that at this particular time there was no greater force coming from the north-east than could be held off by the combined efforts of the French and British Cavalry, and the Territorial troops supporting them, until the passage at Menin could be seized and the First Corps brought up in support.

Sir Henry Rawlinson probably exercised a wise judgement in not committing his troops to this attack in their somewhat weakened condition ; but the result was that the enemy's continued possession of the passage at Menin certainly facilitated his rapid reinforcement of his troops and thus rendered any further advance impracticable.

On the morning of the 20th October the 7th Division and 3rd Cavalry Division had retired to their old position extending from Zandvoorde through Kruiseik and Gheluvelt to Zonnebeke.

THE SITUATION ON OCTOBER 19

6. On the 19th October the First Corps, coming from the Aisne, had completed its detrainment and was concentrated between St. Omer and Hazebrouck.

A question of vital importance now arose for decision.

I knew that the enemy were by this time in greatly superior strength on the Lys, and that the Second, Third, Cavalry and Fourth Corps were holding a much wider front than their numbers and strength warranted.

Taking these facts alone into consideration, it would have appeared wise to throw the First Corps in to strengthen the line ; but this would have left the country north and east of Ypres and the Ypres Canal open to a wide turning movement by the 3rd Reserve Corps and at least one Landwehr Division which I knew to be operating in that region. I was also aware that the enemy was bringing large reinforcements up from the east which could only be opposed for several days by two or three French Cavalry Divisions, some French Territorial troops, and the Belgian Army.

After the hard fighting it had undergone the Belgian Army was in no condition to withstand, unsupported, such an attack ; and unless some substantial resistance could be offered to this threatened turning movement, the Allied flank must be turned and the Channel Ports laid bare to the enemy.

FIRST ARMY CORPS ORDERED TO ADVANCE BEYOND YPRES, OCTOBER 19

I judged that a successful movement of this kind would be fraught with such disastrous consequences that the risk of operating on so extended a front must be undertaken ; and I directed Sir Douglas Haig to move with the First Corps to the north of Ypres.

From the best information at my disposal I judged at this time that the considerable reinforcements which the enemy had undoubtedly brought up during the 16th, 17th, and 18th had been directed

principally on the line of the Lys and against the Second Corps at La Bassée ; and that Sir Douglas Haig would probably not be opposed north of Ypres by much more than the 3rd Reserve Corps, which I knew to have suffered considerably in its previous operations, and perhaps one or two Landwehr Divisions.

At a personal interview with Sir Douglas Haig on the evening of the 19th October I communicated the above information to him, and instructed him to advance with the First Corps through Ypres to Thourout. The object he was to have in view was to be the capture of Bruges and subsequently, if possible, to drive the enemy towards Ghent. In case of an unforeseen situation arising, or the enemy proving to be stronger than anticipated, he was to decide, after passing Ypres, according to the situation, whether to attack the enemy lying to the north or the hostile forces advancing from the east : I had arranged for the French Cavalry to operate on the left of the First Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Division, under General Byng, on its right.

The Belgian Army were rendering what assistance they could by entrenching themselves on the Ypres Canal and the Yser River ; and the troops, although in the last stage of exhaustion, gallantly maintained their positions, buoyed up with the hope of substantial British and French support.

I fully realized the difficult task which lay before us, and the onerous rôle which the British Army was called upon to fulfil.

That success has been attained, and all the enemy's

desperate attempts to break through our line frustrated, is due entirely to the marvellous fighting power and the indomitable courage and tenacity of officers, non-commissioned officers and men.

No more arduous task has ever been assigned to British soldiers; and in all their splendid history there is no instance of their having answered so magnificently to the desperate calls which of necessity were made upon them.

Having given these orders to Sir Douglas Haig, I enjoined a defensive rôle upon the Second and Third and Cavalry Corps, in view of the superiority of force which had accumulated in their front. As regards the Fourth Corps, I directed Sir Henry Rawlinson to endeavour to conform generally to the movements of the First Corps.

ADVANCE OF FIRST CORPS, OCTOBER 20—

OCTOBER 21

On the 20th October they reached the line from Elverdinghe to the cross-roads one and a half miles north-west of Zonnebeke.

On the 21st the Corps was ordered to attack and take the line Poelcappelle-Passchendaele.

Sir Henry Rawlinson's Command was moving on the right of the First Corps, and French troops, consisting of Cavalry and Territorials, moved on their left under the orders of General Bidon.

The advance was somewhat delayed owing to the roads being blocked; but the attack progressed favourably in face of severe opposition, often necessitating the use of the bayonet.

Hearing of heavy attacks being made upon the 7th Division and the 2nd Cavalry Division on his right, Sir Douglas Haig ordered his reserve to be halted on the north-eastern outskirts of Ypres.

Although threatened by a hostile movement from the Forêt d'Houthulst, our advance was successful until about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, when the French Cavalry Corps received orders to retire west of the canal.

Owing to this and the demands made on him by the Fourth Corps, Sir Douglas Haig was unable to advance beyond the line Zonnebeke-St. Julien-Langemark-Bixschoote.

COUNCIL OF WAR, OCTOBER 21

As there was reported to be congestion with French troops at Ypres, I went there on the evening of the 21st and met Sir Douglas Haig and Sir Henry Rawlinson. With them I interviewed General De Mitry, Commanding the French Cavalry, and General Bidon, Commanding the French Territorial Divisions.

They promised me that the town would at once be cleared of the troops, and that the French Territorials would immediately move out and cover the left of the flank of the First Corps.

I discussed the situation with the General Officers Commanding the First and Fourth Army Corps, and told them that, in view of the unexpected reinforcements coming up of the enemy, it would probably be impossible to carry out the original rôle

assigned to them. But I informed them that I had that day interviewed the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre, who told me that he was bringing up the 9th French Army Corps to Ypres, that more French troops would follow later, and that he intended—in conjunction with the Belgian troops—to drive the Germans east. General Joffre said that he would be unable to commence this movement before the 24th; and I directed the General Officers Commanding the First and Fourth Corps to strengthen their positions as much as possible and be prepared to hold their ground for two or three days, until the French offensive movement on the north could develop.

WAITING FOR FRENCH REINFORCEMENTS,
OCTOBER 22—OCTOBER 23

It now became clear to me that the utmost we could do to ward off any attempts of the enemy to turn our flank to the north, or to break in from the eastward was to maintain our present very extended front, and to hold fast our positions until French reinforcements could arrive from the south.

During the 22nd the necessity of sending support to the Fourth Corps on his right somewhat hampered the General Officer Commanding the First Corps; but a series of attacks all along his front had been driven back during the day with heavy loss to the enemy. Late in the evening the enemy succeeded in penetrating a portion of the line held by the Cameron Highlanders north of Pilkem.

At 6 a.m. on the morning of the 23rd a counter attack to recover the lost trenches was made by the Queen's Regiment, the Northhamptons and the King's Royal Rifles, under Major-General Bulfin. The attack was very strongly opposed and the bayonet had to be used. After severe fighting during most of the day the attack was brilliantly successful, and over six hundred prisoners were taken.


On the same day an attack was made on the 3rd Infantry Brigade. The enemy advanced with great determination, but with little skill, and consequently the loss inflicted on him was exceedingly heavy; some fifteen hundred dead were seen in the neighbourhood of Langemarck. Correspondence found subsequently on a captured German officer stated that the effectives of this attacking corps were reduced to 25 per cent. in the course of the day's fighting.


ARRIVAL OF FRENCH 9TH ARMY CORPS


In the evening of this day a division of the French 9th Army Corps came up into line and took over the portion of the line held by the 2nd Division, which, on the 24th, took up the ground occupied by the 7th Division from Poelzelhoek to the Becelaere-Passehendaele road.

On the 24th and 25th October repeated attacks by the enemy were brilliantly repulsed.

On the night of the 24th-25th the 1st Division was relieved by French Territorial troops and concentrated about Zillebeke.







During the 25th the 2nd Division, with the 7th on its right and the French 9th Corps on its left, made good progress towards the north-east, capturing some guns and prisoners.

FOURTH ARMY CORPS MERGED IN THE FIRST CORPS, OCTOBER 27

On the 27th October I went to the headquarters of the First Corps at Hooze to personally investigate the condition of the 7th Division.

Owing to constant marching and fighting, ever since its hasty disembarkation in aid of the Antwerp Garrison, this division had suffered great losses, and were becoming very weak. I therefore decided temporarily to break up the Fourth Corps and place the 7th Division with the First Corps under the command of Sir Douglas Haig.

The 3rd Cavalry Division was similarly detailed for service with the First Corps.

I directed the Fourth Corps Commander to proceed, with his Staff, to England, to watch and supervise the mobilization of his 8th Division, which was then proceeding.

On receipt of orders, in accordance with the above arrangement, Sir Douglas Haig redistributed the line held by the First Corps as follows :

(a) 7th Division from the Chateau east of Zandvoorde to the Menin road.

(b) 1st Division from the Menin road to a point immediately west of Reytel village.

(c) 2nd Division to near Moorslede-Zonnebeke road.

THE CRISIS OF THE BATTLE FOR YPRES,
OCTOBER 29—OCTOBER 31

On the early morning of the 29th October a heavy attack developed against the centre of the line held by the First Corps, the principal point of attack being the cross roads one mile east of Gheluvelt. After severe fighting—nearly the whole of the Corps being employed in counter-attack—the enemy began to give way at about 2 p.m.; and by dark the Kruseik Hill had been recaptured and the 1st Brigade had re-established most of the line north of the Menin road.

Shortly after daylight on the 30th another attack began to develop in the direction of Zandvoorde, supported by heavy artillery fire. In face of this attack the 3rd Cavalry Division had to withdraw to the Klein Zillebeke ridge. This withdrawal involved the right of the 7th Division.

Sir Douglas Haig describes the position at this period as serious, the Germans being in possession of Zandvoorde Ridge.

Subsequent investigation showed that the enemy had been reinforced at this point by the whole German Active Fifteenth Corps.

The General Officer Commanding First Corps ordered the line Gheluvelt to the corner of the Canal to be held at all costs. When this line was taken up the 2nd Brigade was ordered to concentrate in rear of the 1st Division and the 4th Brigade line. One battalion was placed in reserve in the woods one mile south of Hooze.

Further precautions were taken at night to protect this flank, and the Ninth French Corps sent three battalions and one Cavalry Brigade to assist.

The First Corps' communications through Ypres were threatened by the advance of the Germans towards the Canal; so orders were issued for every effort to be made to secure the line then held and, when this had been thoroughly done, to resume the offensive.

An order taken from a prisoner who had been captured on this day purported to emanate from the German General Von Beimling, and said that the Fifteenth German Corps, together with the 2nd Bavarian and Thirteenth Corps, were entrusted with the task of breaking through the line to Ypres; and that the Emperor himself considered the success of this attack to be one of vital importance to the successful issue of the war.

Perhaps the most important and decisive attack (except that of the Prussian Guard on 15th November) made against the First Corps during the whole of its arduous experiences in the neighbourhood of Ypres took place on the 31st October.

GERMAN ATTACK OF OCTOBER 31

General Moussy, who commanded the detachment which had been sent by the French Ninth Corps on the previous day to assist Sir Douglas Haig on the right of the First Corps, moved to the attack early in the morning, but was brought to a complete standstill, and could make no further progress.

After several attacks and counter-attacks during the course of the morning along the Menin-Ypres-

road, south-east of Gheluvelt, an attack against that place developed in great force, and the line of the 1st Division was broken. On the south the 7th Division and General Bulfin's detachment were being heavily shelled. The retirement of the 1st Division exposed the left of the 7th Division, and owing to this the Royal Scots Fusiliers, who remained in their trenches, were cut off and surrounded. A strong infantry attack was developed against the right of the 7th Division at 1.30 p.m.

Shortly after this the Headquarters of the 1st and 2nd Divisions were shelled. The General Officer Commanding 1st Division was wounded, three Staff Officers of the 1st Division and three of the 2nd Division were killed. The General Officer Commanding the 2nd Division also received a severe shaking, and was unconscious for a short time. General Landon assumed command of the 1st Division.

RECOVERY OF GHELUVELT

On receiving a report about 2.30 p.m. from General Lomax that the 1st Division had moved back and that the enemy was coming on in strength, the General Officer Commanding the First Corps issued orders that the line, Frezenberg-Westhoek-bend of the main road-Klein Zillebeke-bend of Canal, was to be held at all costs.

The 1st Division rallied on the line of the woods east of the bend of the road, the German advance by the road being checked by enfilade fire from the north.

The attack against the right of the 7th Division forced the 22nd Brigade to retire, thus exposing

the left of the 2nd Brigade. The General Officer Commanding the 7th Division used his reserve, already posted on his flank, to restore the line ; but, in the meantime, the 2nd Brigade, finding their left flank exposed, had been forced to withdraw. The right of the 7th Division thus advanced as the left of the 2nd Brigade went back, with the result that the right of the 7th Division was exposed, but managed to hold on to its old trenches till nightfall.

Meantime, on the Menin road, a counter-attack delivered by the left of the 1st Division and the right of the 2nd Division against the right flank of the German line was completely successful, and by 2.30 p.m. Gheluvelt had been retaken with the bayonet, the 2nd Worcestershire Regiment being to the fore in this, admirably supported by the 42nd Brigade, Royal Field Artillery. The left of the 7th Division, profiting by their capture of Gheluvelt, advanced almost to its original line ; and connection between the 1st and 7th Divisions was re-established. The recapture of Gheluvelt released the 6th Cavalry Brigade, till then held in support of the 1st Division. Two regiments of this brigade were sent at once to clear the woods to the south-east, and close the gap in the line between the 7th Division and 2nd Brigade. They advanced with much dash, partly mounted and partly dismounted ; and, surprising the enemy in the woods, succeeded in killing large numbers and materially helped to restore the line. About 5 p.m. the French Cavalry Brigade also came up to the cross-roads just east of Hooge,

and at once sent forward a dismounted detachment to support our 7th Cavalry Brigade.

Throughout the day the extreme right and left of the First Corps' line held fast, the left being only slightly engaged, while the right was heavily shelled and subjected to slight infantry attacks. In the evening the enemy were steadily driven back from the woods on the front of the 7th Division and 2nd Brigade ; and by 10 p.m. the line as held in the morning had practically been reoccupied.

During the night touch was restored between the right of the 7th Division and left of the 2nd Brigade, and the Cavalry were withdrawn into reserve, the services of the French Cavalry being dispensed with.

As a result of the day's fighting eight hundred and seventy wounded were evacuated.

I was present with Sir Douglas Haig at Hooge between 2 and 3 o'clock on this day, when the 1st Division were retiring. I regard it as the most critical moment in the whole of this great battle. The rally of the 1st Division and the recapture of the village of Gheluvelt at such a time was fraught with momentous consequences. If any one unit can be singled out for especial praise it is the Worcesters.

STAUNCH DEFENCE BY THE THIRD ARMY CORPS, OCTOBER 20—OCTOBER 31

7. In the meantime the centre of my line, occupied by the Third and Cavalry Corps, was being heavily pressed by the enemy in ever-increasing force.

On the 20th October advanced posts of the 12th Brigade of the 4th Division, Third Corps, were

forced to retire, and at dusk it was evident that the Germans were likely to make a determined attack. This ended in the occupation of Le Gheir by the enemy.

As the position of the Cavalry at St. Yves was thus endangered, a counter-attack was decided upon and planned by General Hunter-Weston and Lieutenant-Colonel Anley. This proved entirely successful, the Germans being driven back with great loss and the abandoned trenches reoccupied. Two hundred prisoners were taken and about forty of our prisoners released.

In these operations the staunchness of the King's Own Regiment and the Lancashire Fusiliers was most commendable. These two battalions were very well handled by Lieutenant-Colonel Butler of the Lancashire Fusiliers.

I am anxious to bring to special notice the excellent work done throughout this battle by the Third Corps under General Pulteney's command. Their position in the right central part of my line was of the utmost importance to the general success of the operations. Besides the very undue length of front which the Corps was called upon to cover (some 12 or 13 miles), the position presented many weak spots, and was also astride of the River Lys, the right bank of which from Frelinghein downwards was strongly held by the enemy. It was impossible to provide adequate reserves, and the constant work in the trenches tried the endurance of officers and men to the utmost. That the Corps was invariably successful in repulsing the constant attacks,

sometimes in great strength, made against them by day and by night is due entirely to the skilful manner in which the Corps was disposed by its Commander, who has told me of the able assistance he has received throughout from his Staff, and the ability and resource displayed by Divisional, Brigade and Regimental leaders in using the ground and the means of defence at their disposal to the very best advantage.

The courage, tenacity, endurance and cheerfulness of the men in such unparalleled circumstances are beyond all praise.

During the 22nd and 23rd and 24th October frequent attacks were made along the whole line of the Third Corps, and especially against the 16th Infantry Brigade ; but on all occasions the enemy was thrown back with loss.

During the night of the 25th October the Leicestershire Regiment were forced from their trenches by shells blowing in the pits they were in ; and after investigation by the General Officers Commanding the 16th and 18th Infantry Brigades it was decided to throw back the line temporarily in this neighbourhood.

On the evening of the 29th October the enemy made a sharp attack on Le Gheir, and on the line to the north of it, but were repulsed.

About midnight a very heavy attack developed against the 19th Infantry Brigade south of Croix Maréchal. A portion of the trenches of the Middlesex Regiment was gained by the enemy and held by him for some hours till recaptured with the

assistance of the detachment from the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders from Brigade Reserve. The enemy in the trenches were all bayoneted or captured. Later information from prisoners showed that there were twelve battalions opposite the 19th Brigade. Over two hundred dead Germans were left lying in front of the Brigade's trenches, and forty prisoners were taken.

On the evening of the 30th the line of the 11th Infantry Brigade in the neighbourhood of St. Yves was broken. A counter-attack carried out by Major Prowse with the Somerset Light Infantry restored the situation. For his services on this occasion this officer was recommended for special reward.

On the 31st October it became necessary for the 4th Division to take over the extreme right of the 1st Cavalry Division's trenches, although this measure necessitated a still further extension of the line held by the Third Corps.

THE CAVALRY CORPS IN THE TRENCHES, OCTOBER 22—OCTOBER 31

8. On October 20th, while engaged in the attempt to force the line of the River Lys, the Cavalry Corps was attacked from the south and east. In the evening the 1st Cavalry Division held the line St. Yves-Messines: the 2nd Cavalry Division from Messines through Garde Dieu along the Wambeek to Houthem and Kortewilde.

At 4 p.m. on the 21st October a heavy attack was made on the 2nd Cavalry Division, which was

compelled to fall back to the line Messines-9th kilo stone on the Warneton-Oostaverne road-Hollebeke.

On the 22nd I directed the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade, less one battalion, to proceed to Wulverghem in support of the Cavalry Corps. General Allenby sent two battalions to Wytschaete and Voormezele to be placed under the orders of General Gough, Commanding the 2nd Cavalry Division.

On the 23rd, 24th, and 25th several attacks were directed against the Cavalry Corps and repulsed with loss to the enemy.

On the 26th October I directed General Allenby to endeavour to regain a more forward line, moving in conjunction with the 7th Division. But the latter being apparently quite unable to take the offensive, the attempt had to be abandoned.

On October 30th heavy infantry attacks, supported by powerful artillery fire, developed against the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, especially against the trenches about Hollebeke held by the 3rd Cavalry Brigade. At 1.30 p.m. this Brigade was forced to retire, and the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, less one regiment, was moved across from the 1st Cavalry Division to a point between Oostaverne and St. Eloi in support of the 2nd Cavalry Division.

The 1st Cavalry Division in the neighbourhood of Messines was also threatened by a heavy infantry column.

General Allenby still retained the two Indian Battalions of the 7th Indian Brigade, although they were in a somewhat exhausted condition.

After a close survey of the positions and con-

sultations with the General Officer Commanding the Cavalry Corps, I directed four battalions of the Second Corps, which had lately been relieved from the trenches by the Indian Corps, to move to Neuve Eglise under General Shaw, in support of General Allenby.

The London Scottish Territorial Battalion was also sent to Neuve Eglise.

It now fell to the lot of the Cavalry Corps, which had been much weakened by constant fighting, to oppose the advance of two nearly fresh German Army Corps for a period of over forty-eight hours, pending the arrival of a French reinforcement. Their action was completely successful. I propose to send shortly a more detailed account of the operation.

After the critical situation in front of the Cavalry Corps, which was ended by the arrival of the head of the French 16th Army Corps, the 2nd Cavalry Division was relieved by General Conneau's French Cavalry Corps and concentrated in the neighbourhood of Bailleul.

The 1st Cavalry Division continued to hold the line of trenches east of Wulverghem.

From that time to the date of this despatch the Cavalry Divisions have relieved one another at intervals, and have supported by their artillery the attacks made by the French throughout that period on Hollebeke, Wytschaete, and Messines.

THE THIRD CORPS HOLDS ITS GROUND.

The Third Corps in its position on the right of the Cavalry Corps continued throughout the same period to repel constant attacks against its front,

and suffered severely from the enemy's heavy artillery fire.

The artillery of the 4th Division constantly assisted the French in their attacks.

The General Officer Commanding Third Corps brings specially to my notice the excellent behaviour of the East Lancashire Regiment, the Hampshire Regiment and the Somersetshire Light Infantry in these latter operations ; and the skilful manner in which they were handled by General Hunter-Weston, Lieutenant-Colonel Butler, and the Battalion Commanders.

DOINGS OF THE INDIAN TROOPS IN THE CENTRE

9. The Lahore Division arrived in its concentration area in rear of the Second Corps on the 19th and 20th October.

I have already referred to the excellent work performed by the battalions of this Division which were supporting the Cavalry. The remainder of the Division from the 25th October onwards were heavily engaged in assisting the 7th Brigade of the Second Corps in fighting round Neuve Chapelle. Another brigade took over some ground previously held by the French 1st Cavalry Corps, and did excellent service.

On the 28th October especially the 47th Sikhs and the 20th and 21st Companies of the 3rd Sappers and Miners distinguished themselves by their gallant conduct in the attack on Neuve Chapelle, losing heavily in officers and men.

After the arrival of the Meerut Division at Corps Headquarters the Indian Army Corps took over the line previously held by the Second Corps, which was then partially drawn back into reserve. Two and a half brigades of British Infantry and a large part of the artillery of the Second Corps still remained to assist the Indian Corps in defence of this line. Two and a half battalions of these brigades were returned to the Second Corps when the Ferozepore Brigade joined the Indian Corps after its support of the Cavalry further north.

The Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade arrived in the area during the 1st and 2nd November, and the Jodhpur Lancers came about the same time. These were all temporarily attached to the Indian Corps.

Up to the date of the present despatch the line held by the Indian Corps has been subjected to constant bombardment by the enemy's heavy artillery, followed up by infantry attacks.

On two occasions these attacks were severe.

On the 13th October the 8th Gurkha Rifles of the Bareilly Brigade were driven from their trenches, and on the 2nd November a serious attack was developed against a portion of the line west of Neuve Chapelle. On this occasion the line was to some extent pierced, and was consequently slightly bent back.

The situation was prevented from becoming serious by the excellent leadership displayed by Colonel Norie, of the 2nd Gurkha Rifles.

Since their arrival in this country, and their occupation of the line allotted to them, I have been

much impressed by the initiative and resource displayed by the Indian troops. Some of the ruses they have employed to deceive the enemy have been attended with the best results, and have doubtless kept superior forces in front of them at bay.

The Corps of Indian Sappers and Miners have long enjoyed a high reputation for skill and resource. Without going into detail, I can confidently assert that throughout their work in this campaign they have fully justified that reputation.

The General Officer Commanding the Indian Army Corps describes the conduct and bearing of these troops in strange and new surroundings to have been highly satisfactory, and I am enabled, from my own observation, to fully corroborate his statement.

Honorary Major-General H.H. Sir Pratap Singh Bahadur, G.C.S.I., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., A.D.C., Maharaja-Regent of Jodhpur ; Honorary Lieutenant H.H. The Maharaja of Jodhpur ; Honorary Colonel H.H. Sir Ganga Singh Bahadur, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., A.D.C., Maharaja of Bikanir ; Honorary Major H.H. Sir Madan Singh Bahadur, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., Maharaja-Dhiraj of Kishengarh ; Honorary Captain The Honourable Malik Umar Hayat Khan, C.I.E., M.V.O., Tiwana ; Honorary Lieutenant Raj-Kumar Hira Singh of Panna ; Honorary Lieutenant Maharaj-Kumar Hitendra Narayan of Cooch Behar ; Lieutenant Malik Mumtaz Mahomed Khan, Native Indian Land Forces ; Resaldar Khwaja Mahomed Khan Bahadur, Queen Victoria's Own Corps of Guides ; Honorary Captain Shah Mirza Beg, are serving with the Indian contingents.

RENEWED GERMAN ATTACKS ON THE FIRST ARMY
CORPS, NOVEMBER 2—NOVEMBER 12

10. Whilst the whole of the line has continued to be heavily pressed, the enemy's principal efforts since the 1st November have been concentrated upon breaking through the line held by the First British and 9th French Corps, and thus gaining possession of the town of Ypres.

From the 2nd November onwards the 27th, the 15th and parts of the Bavarian 13th and 2nd German Corps, besides other troops, were all directed against this northern line.

About the 10th instant, after several units of these Corps had been completely shattered in futile attacks, a division of the Prussian Guard, which had been operating in the neighbourhood of Arras, was moved up to this area with great speed and secrecy. Documents found on dead officers prove that the Guard had received the Emperor's special commands to break through and succeed where their comrades of the line had failed.

They took a leading part in the vigorous attacks made against the centre on the 11th and 12th ; but, like their comrades, were repulsed with enormous loss.

Throughout this trying period Sir Douglas Haig, ably assisted by his Divisional and Brigade Commanders, held the line with marvellous tenacity and undaunted courage.

Words fail me to express the admiration I feel for their conduct, or my sense of the incalculable

services they rendered. I venture to predict that their deeds during these days of stress and trial will furnish some of the most brilliant chapters which will be found in the military history of our time.

OFFICERS HONOURABLY MENTIONED

The First Corps was brilliantly supported by the 3rd Cavalry Division under General Byng. Sir Douglas Haig has constantly brought this officer's eminent services to my notice. His troops were repeatedly called upon to restore the situation at critical points, and to fill gaps in the line caused by the tremendous losses which occurred.

Both Corps and Cavalry Division Commanders particularly bring to my notice the name of Brigadier-General Kavanagh, Commanding the 7th Cavalry Brigade, not only for his skill but his personal bravery and dash. This was particularly noticeable when the 7th Cavalry Brigade was brought up to support the French troops when the latter were driven back near the village of Klein Zillebeke on the night of the 7th November. On this occasion I regret to say Colonel Gordon Wilson, Commanding the Royal Horse Guards, and Major the Hon. Hugh Dawnay, Commanding the 2nd Life Guards, were killed.

In these two officers the Army has lost valuable cavalry leaders.

Another officer whose name was particularly mentioned to me was that of Brigadier-General FitzClarence, V.C., Commanding the 1st Guards

Brigade. He was, unfortunately, killed in the night attack of the 11th November. His loss will be severely felt.

The First Corps Commander informs me that on many occasions Brigadier-General the Earl of Cavan, Commanding the 4th Guards Brigade, was conspicuous for the skill, coolness, and courage with which he led his troops, and for the successful manner in which he dealt with many critical situations.

I have more than once during this campaign brought forward the name of Major-General Bulfin to Your Lordship's notice. Up to the evening of the 2nd November, when he was somewhat severely wounded, his services continued to be of great value.

REGULAR AND TERRITORIAL UNITS MENTIONED. PRAISE OF THE FLYING CORPS AND SIGNAL CORPS

On the 5th November I despatched eleven battalions of the Second Corps, all considerably reduced in strength, to relieve the infantry of the 7th Division, which was then brought back into general reserve.

Three more battalions of the same Corps, the London Scottish and Hertfordshire Battalions of Territorials, and the Somersetshire and Leicestershire Regiments of Yeomanry, were subsequently sent to reinforce the troops fighting to the east of Ypres.

General Byng in the case of the Yeomanry

Cavalry Regiments and Sir Douglas Haig in that of the Territorial Battalions speak in high terms of their conduct in the field and of the value of their support.

The battalions of the Second Corps took a conspicuous part in repulsing the heavy attacks delivered against this part of the line. I was obliged to despatch them immediately after their trying experiences in the southern part of the line and when they had had a very insufficient period of rest ; and, although they gallantly maintained these northern positions until relieved by the French, they were reduced to a condition of extreme exhaustion.

The work performed by the Royal Flying Corps has continued to prove of the utmost value to the success of the operations.

I do not consider it advisable in this despatch to go into any detail as regards the duties assigned to the Corps and the nature of their work, but almost every day new methods for employing them, both strategically and tactically, are discovered and put into practice.

The development of their use and employment has indeed been quite extraordinary, and I feel sure that no effort should be spared to increase their numbers and perfect their equipment and efficiency.

In the period covered by this despatch Territorial Troops have been used for the first time in the Army under my command.

The units actually engaged have been the Northumberland, Northamptonshire, North Somerset, Leicestershire and Oxfordshire Regiments of

Yeomanry Cavalry ; and the London Scottish, Hertfordshire, Honourable Artillery Company, and the Queen's Westminster Battalions of Territorial Infantry.

The conduct and bearing of these units under fire, and the efficient manner in which they carried out the various duties assigned to them, have imbued me with the highest hope as to the value and help of Territorial Troops generally.

Units which I have mentioned above, other than these, as having been also engaged, have by their conduct fully justified these hopes.

Regiments and battalions as they arrive come into a temporary camp of instruction, which is formed at Headquarters, where they are closely inspected, their equipment examined, so far as possible perfected, and such instruction as can be given to them in the brief time available in the use of machine guns, &c., is imparted.

Several units have now been sent up to the front besides those I have already named, but have not yet been engaged.

I am anxious in this despatch to bring to Your Lordship's special notice the splendid work which has been done throughout the campaign by the Cyclists of the Signal Corps.

Carrying despatches and messages at all hours of the day and night, in every kind of weather, and often traversing bad roads blocked with transport, they have been conspicuously successful in maintaining an extraordinary degree of efficiency in the service of communications.

Many casualties have occurred in their ranks, but no amount of difficulty or danger has ever checked the energy and ardour which has distinguished their Corps throughout the operations.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE

11. As I close this despatch there are signs in evidence that we are possibly in the last stages of the battle of Ypres-Armentières.

For several days past the enemy's artillery fire has considerably slackened, and infantry attack has practically ceased.

In remarking upon the general military situation of the Allies as it appears to me at the present moment, it does not seem to be clearly understood that the operations in which we have been engaged embrace nearly all the Continent of Central Europe from East to West. The combined French, Belgian, and British Armies in the West and the Russian Army in the East are opposed to the united forces of Germany and Austria acting as a combined army between us.

Our enemies elected at the commencement of the war to throw the weight of their forces against the armies in the West, and to detach only a comparatively weak force, composed of very few first-line troops and several corps of the second and third lines, to stem the Russian advance till the Western Forces could be completely defeated and overwhelmed.

Their strength enabled them from the outset to

throw greatly superior forces against us in the West. This precluded the possibility of our taking a vigorous offensive, except when the miscalculations and mistakes made by their commanders opened up special opportunities for a successful attack and pursuit.

The battle of the Marne was an example of this, as was also our advance from St. Omer and Hazebrouck to the line of the Lys at the commencement of this battle. The rôle which our armies in the West have consequently been called upon to fulfil has been to occupy strong defensive positions, holding the ground gained and inviting the enemy's attack; to throw these attacks back, causing the enemy heavy losses in his retreat and following him up with powerful and successful counter-attacks to complete his discomfiture.

The value and significance of the rôle fulfilled since the commencement of hostilities by the Allied Forces in the West lies in the fact that at the moment when the Eastern Provinces of Germany are in imminent danger of being overrun by the numerous and powerful armies of Russia, nearly the whole of the active army of Germany is tied down to a line of trenches extending from the Fortress of Verdun on the Alsatian frontier round to the sea at Nieuport, east of Dunkirk (a distance of 260 miles), where they are held, much reduced in numbers and moral, by the successful action of our troops in the West.

THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AND ROYAL ENGINEERS
COMMENDED

I cannot speak too highly of the valuable services rendered by the Royal Artillery throughout the battle.

In spite of the fact that the enemy has brought up guns in support of his attacks of great range and shell power, ours have succeeded throughout in preventing the enemy from establishing anything in the nature of an artillery superiority. The skill, courage, and energy displayed by their commanders have been very marked.

The General Officer Commanding Third Corps, who had special means of judging, makes mention of the splendid work performed by a number of young Artillery officers, who in the most gallant manner pressed forward in the vicinity of the firing line in order that their guns may be able to shoot at the right targets at the right moment.

The Royal Engineers have, as usual, been indefatigable in their efforts to assist the infantry in field fortification and trench work.

I deeply regret the heavy casualties which we have suffered ; but the nature of the fighting has been very desperate, and we have been assailed by vastly superior numbers. I have every reason to know that throughout the course of the battle we have placed at least three times as many of the enemy *hors de combat* in dead, wounded, and prisoners.

THANKS TENDERED TO FRENCH GENERALS

Throughout these operations General Foch has strained his resources to the utmost to afford me all the support he could ; and an expression of my warm gratitude is also due to General D'Urbal, Commanding the 8th French Army on my left, and General Maud'huy, Commanding the 10th French Army on my right.

I have many recommendations to bring to Your Lordship's notice for gallant and distinguished service performed by officers and men in the period under report. These will be submitted shortly, as soon as they can be collected.

I have the honour to be,
Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

J. P. D. FRENCH,
Field-Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief,
The British Army in the Field.

APPENDIX

Admiralty, December 5th, 1914.

THE following dispatch has been received from Field-Marshal Sir J. D. P. French, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., covering a dispatch from Major-General A. Paris, C.B., R.M.A., relating to the operations round Antwerp from October 3rd to the 9th :—

From Sir J. D. P. French, Field-Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief, to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

In forwarding this report to the Army Council at the request of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, I have to state that, from a comprehensive review of all the circumstances, the force of Marines and Naval Brigades which assisted in the defence of Antwerp was handled by General Paris with great skill and boldness.

Although the results did not include the actual saving of the fortress, the action of the force under General Paris certainly delayed the enemy for a considerable time, and assisted the Belgian Army to be withdrawn in a condition to enable it to reorganize and refit, and regain its value as a fighting force. The destruction of war material and ammunition—which, but for the intervention of this force, would have proved of great value to the enemy—was thus able to be carried out.

The assistance which the Belgian Army has rendered throughout the subsequent course of the operations on the canal and the Yser river has been a valuable asset to the Allied cause, and such help must be regarded as an outcome of the intervention of General Paris's force. I am further

of opinion that the moral effect produced on the minds of the Belgian Army by this necessarily desperate attempt to bring them succour, before it was too late, has been of great value to their use and efficiency as a fighting force.

J. D. P. FRENCH,
Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief.

From the Secretary of the Admiralty to Field-Marshal Sir J. D. P. French, Commanding-in-Chief. (Enclosure in No. 1.)

Admiralty,
November 2nd, 1914.

Sir,

I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith a dispatch from Major-General Paris, reporting the proceedings of the Division round Antwerp from October 3rd to 9th, with a view to its being considered by you and forwarded to the Army Council with your survey of the operations as a whole.

I am, &c.,

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

From Major-General A. Paris, C.B., Commanding Royal Naval Division, to the Secretary of the Admiralty. (Sub-enclosure in No. 1.)

October 31st, 1914.

Regarding the operations round Antwerp from October 3rd to 9th, I have the honour to report as follows :—

The Brigade (2,200 all ranks) reached Antwerp during the night October 3rd-4th, and early on the 4th occupied, with the 7th Belgian Regiment, the trenches facing Lierre, with advanced post on the River Nethe, relieving some exhausted Belgian troops.

The outer forts on this front had already fallen and bombardment of the trenches was in progress. This increased in violence during the night and early morning of October 5th, when the advanced posts were driven in and the enemy effected a crossing of the river, which was not under fire from the trenches.

About midday the 7th Belgian Regiment was forced to retire, thus exposing my right flank. A vigorous counter-attack, gallantly led by Colonel Tierchon, 2nd Chasseurs, assisted by our aeroplanes, restored the position late in the afternoon.

Unfortunately, an attempt made by the Belgian troops during the night (October 5th-6th) to drive the enemy across the river failed, and resulted in the evacuation of practically the whole of the Belgian trenches.

The few troops now capable of another counter-attack were unable to make any impression, and the position of the Marine Brigade became untenable.

The bombardment, too, was very violent, but the retirement of the Brigade was well carried out, and soon after midday (October 6th) an intermediate position, which had been hastily prepared, was occupied.

The two Naval Brigades reached Antwerp during the night, October 5th-6th. The 1st Brigade moved out in the afternoon of 5th to assist the withdrawal to the main 2nd Line of Defence.

The retirement was carried out during the night, October 6th-7th, without opposition, and the Naval Division occupied the intervals between the forts on the 2nd Line of Defence.

The bombardment of the town, forts and trenches began at midnight, October 7th-8th, and continued with increasing intensity until the evacuation of the fortress.

As the water supply had been cut, no attempt could be

made to subdue the flames, and soon 100 houses were burning. Fortunately, there was no wind, or the whole town and bridges must have been destroyed.

During the day (October 8th) it appeared evident that the Belgian Army could not hold the forts any longer. About 5.30 p.m. I considered that if the Naval Division was to avoid disaster an immediate retirement under cover of darkness was necessary. General De Guise, the Belgian Commander, was in complete agreement. He was most chivalrous and gallant, insisting on giving orders that the roads and bridges were to be cleared for the passage of the British troops.

The retirement began about 7.30 p.m., and was carried out under very difficult conditions.

The enemy were reported in force (a Division plus a Reserve Brigade) on our immediate line of retreat, rendering necessary a détour of 15 miles to the north.

All the roads were crowded with Belgian troops, refugees, herds of cattle, and all kinds of vehicles, making inter-communication a practical impossibility. Partly for these reasons, partly on account of fatigue, and partly from at present unexplained causes large numbers of the 1st Naval Brigade became detached, and I regret to say are either prisoners or interned in Holland.

Marching all night (October 8th to 9th), one battalion of 1st Brigade, the 2nd Brigade and Royal Marine Brigade, less one battalion, entrained at St. Gillies Waes and effected their retreat without further incident.

The Battalion (Royal Marine Brigade) Rear Guard of the whole force, also entrained late in the afternoon together with many hundreds of refugees, but at Morbeke the line was cut, the engine derailed, and the enemy opened fire.

There was considerable confusion. It was dark and the agitation of the refugees made it difficult to pass any orders.

However, the battalion behaved admirably, and succeeded in fighting its way through, but with a loss in missing of more than half its number. They then marched another 10 miles to Selzaate and entrained there.

Colonel Seely and Colonel Bridges were not part of my command, but they rendered most skilful and helpful services during the evacuation.

The casualties are approximately—

1st Naval Brigade and 2nd Naval Brigade, 5 killed, 64 wounded, 2,040 missing.

Royal Marine Brigade, 23 killed, 103 wounded, 388 missing.

In conclusion, I would call your attention to the good services rendered by the following officers and men during the operations—

OFFICERS.

Staff—

Lieut.-Colonel A. H. Ollivant, R.A.

Major Richardson, N.Z. Staff Corps.

Fleet Surgeon E. J. Finch, R.N.

1st Brigade—

Lieutenant G. G. Grant, R.N.V.R.

Sub-Lieutenant C. O. F. Modin, R.N.V.R.

2nd Brigade—

Commodore O. Backhouse, R.N., Commanding Brigade.

Captain W. L. Maxwell, Brigade Major.

Sub-Lieutenant H. C. Hedderwick, R.N.V.R.

Royal Marine Brigade—

Lieut.-Colonel C. Mc. N. Parsons, R.M.L.I., in command most of the time.

Major A. H. French, R.M.L.I., 10th Battalion.

Lieutenant D. J. Gowney, R.M.L.I., 10th Battalion.

MEN.

Naval Brigade—

Chief Petty Officer B. H. Ellis, No. 748, B Co., R.N.V.R.,
London.

Chief Petty Officer Payne, D Co.

Petty Officer (Acting) W. Wallace, O.N., Dev., 211,130.

Stoker Petty Officer W. S. Cole, O.N., Ch. 100,113.

Leading Seaman (Acting) H. D. Lowe, R.N.R., Dev.,
No. B. 2542.

Ordinary Seaman G. Ripley, new Army recruit, C Co.
(now R.N.V.R.).

Ordinary Seaman T. Machen, new Army recruit, C Co.
(now R.N.V.R.).

Royal Marine Brigade—

Sergeant-Major (Acting) Galliford.

Quartermaster-Sergeant Kenny, R.F.R., Ch. A. 426.

Sergeant G. H. Bruce, R.F.R., Ch. A. 631.

Lance-Corporal T. C. Frank, Ch. 17817.

Lance-Corporal W. J. Cook, Ply. 7685.

Private G. H. Hall, R.F.R., Ch. B. 194.

Private C. J. Fleet, R.F.R., Ch. B. 1585.

Private S. Lang, Ch. 18446.

Sergeant E. Walch (R. Naval Auxiliary Sick Berth
Reserve), S.B. 508.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

A. PARIS, Major-General,

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief

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BY

A. V. DICEY, D.C.L.

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HOW WE OUGHT TO FEEL ABOUT THE WAR

MY FRIENDS,—It is with the greatest pleasure that after a long silence I again address you. But the joy of meeting you once more is counterbalanced by the gravest sense of responsibility. It is hard to utter a word with regard to this terrible war which will be certain to do good. It is only too easy for any speaker by indiscretion of language to do considerable harm. All I can hope for to-night is, on the one hand, to avoid saying anything which does not represent what I believe to be the truth, and on the other hand to try to express the truth as I see it, with moderation and calmness. Do not in any case expect from me anything strange, astonishing, or paradoxical. I am attempting to put into words, as among friends, the thoughts which constantly occur to me with reference to the way in which Englishmen should look upon the war with Germany, and my thoughts, in so far as they are true, will be found to be, I expect and hope, very much your own thoughts. I am in no position to give authoritative counsel to any one, least of all would I offer it to that noble body of men, taken from all classes of the community, who, rich and poor alike, are risking limb and life in defence of the independence of England and of the British Empire. For such men I have nothing but praise and admiration. They are performing the highest duty of

¹ Lecture delivered at the Working Men's College, Crowndale Road, London, N.W., Nov. 21, 1914.

citizenship. They have known how to do right, and doubtless will with ease learn, if they have not already learned, the feelings which ought to be cultivated by the self-sacrificing defenders of the greatest and the freest State in the civilized world. My aim to-night is to address friends who, like myself, cannot enlist in the armies of our country, and to press upon them, as indeed upon every Englishman, the necessity of practising at this crisis of England's fortune the duty of justice and also the duty (though you may think the expression 'duty' is a strange one) of hope.

THE DUTY OF JUSTICE

Justice has two senses in each of which it is our strict duty to be just to the Government and the people of Germany.

(1) Justice means fairness of judgement or equity of feeling towards our neighbours, and especially towards our enemies. Now it is manifest that precisely because we are at war with Germany and her allies, because Germany threatens to destroy the prosperity of England, and because (though this may sound a hard saying) the Kaiser, his Government, and his soldiers have committed in the conduct of this war acts of barbarism, of cruelty, and of oppression, it is our clear duty to entertain equitable feelings—I do not say kindly feelings—towards the Kaiser and his subjects. Equity in such a case is part of the desire, which every good and wise man should cherish, to see and know the truth, for we certainly shall not take a true view of the conflict between ourselves and our enemies unless we try hard to consider what it is that may in truth be said in explanation or even in mitigation of the wrong they

are doing, or have done, to ourselves and to our friends. If you ask me what are the means by which something like a fair view of the conflict between us and Germany may be obtained, my answer is this: We ought to try to form an historical view of the war. We ought, that is to say, to look upon the war from something like the point of view from which it may probably be regarded by a fair-minded historian, writing in A.D. 2000. Let us try, in short, to look upon the events passing before our eyes much in the way in which we now look upon Waterloo and the long war which that battle brought to a close. Of one thing we may be certain. Our historian of A.D. 2000 will cast out of consideration, or at any rate hold of quite secondary importance, matters which at the present moment inevitably increase our detestation of Germany, and take a calm view of German policy—to an Englishman of to-day almost an impossibility. The character of the Kaiser, his boastfulness, his insolence, his recklessness, his tasteless appeals to Heaven, his mailed fist, and his other Imperial follies, may be important to our future historian as explaining the effect in England of the Kaiser's conduct. But as ultimate causes of the war which, according to my friend, Lord Bryce, already affects one-third, or it may be one-half, of the whole population of the world, these irritating circumstances will count for little. Still less will the random abuse of English caricaturists or poetasters greatly affect the permanent judgement of any capable historian. One example will sufficiently illustrate the sort of stuff which will be nothing to an historian, and ought to be nothing to the public of to-day. A gentleman who, as I am told, has some pretensions to be a poet, has published a Funeral March for Kaiser Wilhelm II. It consists of fifty verses and

more, in which the German Emperor is first sent to hell, and then is elaborately cursed in lines of this quality :

Fashion his bed
 Deep, deep :
 Earth o'er his head
 Heap, heap.
 Load upon load
 Let him not lack,
 Lest his abode
 Vomit him back.

Doggerel like this falls far below the rank of effective satire, but in truth a satirist is not the man we need to denounce the pedantic barbarism of Germany. What we lack is a poet who, like Wordsworth, could, with prophetic power, give full expression to English hatred of lawless despotism without by a single word compromising the dignity and the sternness of England's resistance. Our future historian, at any rate, will assuredly occupy himself mainly with the true causes of the determination not only of the Kaiser but of the German people to establish the supremacy of Germany throughout the civilized world. He will say something, no doubt, of the Kaiser's character, and possibly point out how often it has happened that a man who combines some talent with a singular want of sound judgement has lacked both the moral and the intellectual strength needed to support the infinite burden of absolute power. Wilhelm II is not the first ruler for whom a suspicion of madness may be hesitatingly pleaded against the charge of outrageous wickedness. It is, too, even now uncertain whether the Kaiser himself was not at one time inclined to check the desire for war entertained by his military advisers. An historian will certainly dwell on a cir-

cumstance to which neither we nor our enemies are, though for different reasons, inclined to give the prominence which possibly it deserves. The alliance between France and Russia may have struck many Germans with fear. The alliance was amply justifiable. It was necessary to the safety of both the allies. But it contained a menace to Germany. Nor was this latent threat the less terrible because the conquest of Alsace and Lorraine made it impossible for France to forgo lasting hostility to the German Empire. To the mind of an historical investigator it may occur that the Great Powers of Europe ought to have insisted in 1871 that the fate of Frenchmen, who detested the idea of being by force turned into subjects of Germany, should receive careful consideration, and should be determined not by a treaty forced by victorious Germany upon conquered France, but by a European Congress. On this view, the neglected duty of 1871 may be held in part responsible for the worldwide calamity of 1914. The impartial inquirer of 2000 will examine, as we ought even now to consider, how far a distinction should be drawn between the ambition of the German Government, with its Prussian officials, and the wishes of a large number of the Kaiser's peaceable subjects. This is a matter on which few Englishmen can now speak with certainty. My belief, not willingly entertained, is that a vast majority of Germans identify the worldwide predominance of the German Empire with the progress of mankind, and share the delusion that every blow struck at Germany is a deadly blow to the development of civilization. This is not the first time on which kings and people alike have imagined a vain thing. The reflectiveness of Bishop Butler suggested the question whether a whole nation might not go mad. The historical knowledge and

the analytical subtlety of Tocqueville convinced him that in periods of excitement madmen fit for Bedlam have exerted immense influence on the course of events. The Reign of Terror teaches the lesson that humane and just men may tolerate outrageous injustice when they have become convinced that the overthrow of terrible despotism may cause a reaction fatal to the liberties of their country. This toleration of ill-doing is a ghastly delusion. But it is an error into which some of the most generous of men have now and again fallen. This fact may at least remind Englishmen that the errors generated by a false political as by a false religious creed diminish the moral guilt of good men infected by its errors, and may explain the boldness of eminent professors—most of them far from wicked men—who, in childlike or childish ignorance of the conduct pursued by England and France, have stepped forward as apologists of German policy and crime.

The plain truth is, though this thought is often overlooked, that the equity which demands the careful consideration of every circumstance which explains the conduct of the Kaiser and his subjects, and sometimes may seem to mitigate its deep moral guilt, is a necessary condition for understanding the strength of the cause on behalf of which England and her allies have entered upon the most tremendous war which the world has ever witnessed, and their determination not to lay down their arms until the triumph of justice is complete. Equity does not mean leniency. It has no connexion with that flabby and miscalled 'charity' which assumes that, in every great moral conflict, each side has been partly in the right and partly in the wrong. This doctrine, with its specious appearance of tolerant good nature, can hardly be distinguished from the cynical dogma

sometimes summed up in the expression, ' Rogues all '. Such charity as applied to the present case means that if Germany has violated some obvious rules of international morality, no great European Power can claim that it has never committed acts of injustice. This plea is absolutely untenable. True equity is totally different from moral indifference. True equity is akin to judicial sternness ; it has no affinity to that miserable good nature which should be absolutely unknown to a just judge. It forces us then to consider what is the crime which we lay unhesitatingly to the charge of our foes, and why it is that we are determined that it never shall be committed again.

I will try to answer this question, as far as possible, in the words of my friend, Lord Bryce, who possesses the learning of a great historian and the political experience to be gained only from long years of work in the service of his country :

We are fighting against the doctrine that treaties may be broken whenever it is to the interest of the stronger Power to break them ; against the doctrine that whatever is necessary becomes thereby permissible ; against the terrible application of these doctrines which seizes innocent citizens and shoots them or treats them as hostages for the good behaviour of others whom they cannot control ; which destroys towns and works of art precious from their beauty and antiquity ; which, perhaps worst of all, besides levying enormous fines upon the citizens of a country which desires to be neutral, scatters, to the danger of peaceful passengers travelling in neutral ships across the seas, engines of swift and sudden destruction in places far removed from the direct scene of naval operations.

And I add that this false doctrine which tends to annihilate all the mitigations which have been introduced

into the practices of war by land would also logically justify the commission of further horrors, at which I doubt not every professor and general throughout Germany would now stand aghast. If it be true that a conqueror may add to the effectiveness of war by any cruelties the fear whereof reduces the conquered to submission, it is impossible to see why the slaughter of the besieged who resist their assailants for a longer time than the besiegers think reasonable, why the sale of free citizens into slavery, why the use of torture which the public morality of heathen Greece and Rome reprobated, should not be revived in order to ensure the world-wide propagation of German culture and German civilization.

(2) Justice has a second and most important sense different from fairness of judgement. It may mean the enforcement of just rules upon men or upon nations who violate principles essential to the prosperity of their neighbours. Every one admits that this is so with regard to ordinary criminals, and nations are occasionally called upon to do justice in this sense on any State, great or small, which violates principles the observance whereof is necessary to the peaceful progress of civilization. The deliberate violation of treaties amply justifies England, France, and Russia in their determination to enforce retributive justice upon Germany. But the German Government has, as I have already pointed out, committed an even more heinous offence than the mere technical breach of solemn agreements. Germany is attempting to establish for her own benefit the rule that Might is the same thing as Right. Hence this war, it has been well said, 'Is a conflict of principles of universal application. . . . It has become a collision of Ideals—the ideal of a gigantic military State resolved to

dominate all the neighbouring countries, and to propagate its civilization by the sword, against the ideal of peaceful communities dwelling in tranquillity, the great and the small together under the protection of international obligations solemnly guaranteed '—to which I add that such collisions can be determined by force alone.

It is, however, the necessary calamity of warfare that States which enforce international justice occupy the position at once of plaintiff and of judge. Hence England and her allies, precisely because they are the champions of justice, must abstain from two errors : They must refuse to confound retaliation with retribution. Let Germany pay amply for the wrong she has wrought, and give security that the wrong shall not be repeated. But let no one fancy that the destruction of the University of Louvain or the burning down of the Cathedral of Rheims should be punished by the destruction of the Cathedral of Cologne. A judge punishes but never imitates the atrocities of a criminal. The Allies, in the second place, must continue the campaign against the new barbarism until complete retribution has been obtained by satisfying the claims of the victims of German oppression, and, in so far as it is possible, by obtaining security that the crime of Germany shall never be repeated. How these ends shall be attained it is for statesmen to decide, and to decide with reference to the state of things when the war shall have come to an end. Compensation must be paid to Belgium for the outrageous wrongs inflicted upon a perfectly innocent State. France should, in the judgement of most Englishmen, at least recover all the territory she lost in 1871. Europe generally should, if possible, be relieved from the necessity for armaments, which make

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the burdens of an armed peace almost as heavy, and certainly more permanent, than the burdens of warfare. It is for no man to predict the means by which these ends are to be obtained ; all that a prudent observer can now say is that until they are obtained this gigantic war will have been carried on in vain by the defenders of international justice. The task before the Allies is of tremendous difficulty. Its performance is impossible without the cultivation of every manly virtue, and above all of hope.

THE DUTY OF HOPE

In a well-known sonnet Wordsworth terms hope ' the paramount duty that Heaven lays for its own honour on man's suffering heart '. The idea of hope as a duty is strange to modern England, for we confound with hope the sort of hopefulness which is quite as often a folly as a moral obligation. But the two things are utterly different. The hopefulness which makes a man expect that things will always go as he wishes them to go is the sign of a silly and feeble character. The Micawbers of ordinary life always expect that ' something will turn up ' for their own advantage. They in general come themselves to little good, and they constantly do much harm to their neighbours ; their hopefulness at the best is only a little less noxious than the dispiriting pessimism which depresses all energetic action, and sometimes all vigorous thought, but Micawberish hopefulness has little connexion with serious and solemn hope. Such hope really means that a man, after the proper steps have been taken for securing a good end, does not waste his energy by meditating upon all the possible or even all the probable accidents which may bring to failure

the most reasonable and best-laid plans. This is the kind of hope which in reality is essential, with most persons, for the performance of any great task, and certainly for the achievement of any of those great strokes of statesmanship or of generalship on which is grounded the fame of such men as Chatham, Pitt, Wolfe, Nelson, or Wellington. This is the hope which every patriot ought to entertain at any great crisis of his country's history. In nothing is the statesmanlike foresight or insight of Wordsworth more clearly seen than in the energy with which he preached the paramount duty of hope throughout all the terrible years between 1802 and 1814, when England was engaged in what seemed to many the forlorn or desperate struggle against the power, the fortune, and the genius of Napoleon.

During that era, which forms one of the historical glories of England, many Englishmen were for the most part oppressed by hopelessness. We cannot realize this fact, for we see the condition of England between 1803 and 1811 in the glorious light cast upon it by the triumph of Trafalgar, by the victories of Wellington in Spain, by the defeat of Napoleon in Russia, and by the final triumph of England at Waterloo. Nor was the hopelessness of many Englishmen in itself unreasonable. It was the simple fact that for the success in the conflict with Napoleonic despotism the cultivation of hope was the most difficult and yet the paramount duty of Englishmen. It is my firm conviction that at any moment the difficulties, the expenditure, the sufferings, and generally the effort, involved in this Holy War against the pedantic barbarism and oppression of Germany may again make hope the supreme duty of every patriot. For the purpose of the present address allow me to

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illustrate rather than prove my position, as the very inadequate but perfectly sincere preacher of hope, by a comparison between the state of England and of English opinion during 'the great war' (as we used to call it) against the tyranny of the French Empire, and the state of England and of English opinion during this far greater war against the despotism of the German Empire.

The condition and feeling in England is best and most accurately recorded in this sonnet of Wordsworth, written in 1806 :

Another year !—another deadly blow !
Another mighty Empire overthrown !
And we are left, or shall be left, alone ;
The last that dare to struggle with the Foe.
'Tis well ! from this day forward we shall know
That in ourselves our safety must be sought ;
That by our own right hands it must be wrought,
That we must stand unpropped, or be laid low.
O Dastard whom such foretaste does not cheer !
We shall exult, if they who rule the land
Be men who hold its many blessings dear,
Wise, upright, valiant.

You will never read a more important and more accurate historical document. England, though still full of latent energy, was also nearly driven to despair. Nor was this lack of hope at all unnatural. The United Kingdom contained then a population of from 18,000,000 to 20,000,000. An insurrection was at any moment possible in Ireland. The bloody insurrection of 1798 was well within the memory of all men. As to the war, the sympathies of Englishmen were divided. The vast majority of the electors who took any real share in political life supported the war with varying degrees of enthusiasm. But the Whigs as a party were, with

some brilliant exceptions, vehemently opposed to the war with France, and had many of them come, by the strange perversity of partizanship, to regard Napoleon—who detested parliamentary government, and who had reduced the greater number of European States to something like vassals of his Empire—as the representative of freedom. The economic conditions of the time were trying. The poor suffered greatly from taxation. The working of the Poor Law, which warded off immediate discontent as it banished the fear of starvation, was undermining the independence of the country labourer. The poorer classes in London, even in 1803, longed for peace, applauded the French minister who came to negotiate the Treaty of Amiens, and dragged his carriage in triumph to his house. England stood all but alone; no colony aided her with troops or money; the United States were unfriendly; Russia was the ally of France. Large portions of Europe formed technically part of the French Empire, so that it was possible to go from Paris to Hamburg without leaving the dominions subject to Napoleon. Germany, Switzerland, almost every continental State, was in truth subject to his will; fortune favoured him. Wherever he fought on land he gained new victories. The belief prevailed in England that, except on the sea, he was invincible. The maintenance of hope was not only a paramount duty, but a duty hard to perform.

Contrast the state of things in 1914. The whole of the United Kingdom is unanimous in support of the war. England is full of resources. The population of the United Kingdom has risen to more than 45,000,000. The United Kingdom has been transformed into the British Empire. We are waging our first great Imperial war. The most powerful of the British dominions,

great and free States as they are, Canada, the Australian Commonwealth, New Zealand, British India itself, send regiment after regiment to swell the British armies. France and Russia are both our cordial and active allies. The army sent forth by Great Britain to wage war with Germany exceeds 200,000 men ; it is far greater than any army sent forth either by England or by the United Kingdom during the whole of the great war with France. In every respect but one the British Empire is incomparably stronger than the Great Britain which gave force to the attack on Napoleon and, when he had aroused against him every nation in Europe, struck at Waterloo a final blow to his power. Add to all this that the vast hosts of Germany and of Austria have not produced to the knowledge of the world any general of Napoleonic genius, nor are the Germans in 1914 guided by a man who rivals in his control of scientific warfare the Moltke of 1870-1.

Yet there is one feature in the war of to-day which gives to it an element of danger to England and her allies which did not exist during the great conflict with Napoleon. As that conflict went on it became more and more apparent that it was a war between England and the allies she gradually acquired on the one hand, and one general of transcendent genius on the other. It was a contest between a powerful nation and one man. In this it resembled the conflict between Rome and Hannibal, probably the greatest commander whose achievements are recorded by undoubted history. In such a conflict the chances are ultimately in favour of the strong nation. We now know that after Waterloo Napoleon had only five years of life. The Imperial war of 1914 is a war between Great Britain and her allies on one side, and on the other, not one man, but Germany

with a population of over 65,000,000, whose manhood has for years been militarized—a nation in arms. Nor must it be forgotten that the 65,000,000 of Germany can command the support of the more than 45,000,000 of the Austrian Empire. Let us confine ourselves, however, to Germany. Great Britain and her allies are called upon to vanquish, not one man of genius, but the whole German nation, trained to the belief that the greatness, the glory, and the existence of the Empire depends upon the triumph of German arms. We have to vanquish the bravest and the best armed of nations, and to overcome not only its armies but its belief that every patriotic German must die gladly to ensure the victory of Germany. In plain truth we are at war with a nation not only of soldiers but of fanatics inflamed with ardent faith in a military creed. The resources of the United Kingdom and her allies are infinitely greater than was the power of the United Kingdom when in 1803 it defied the despotism and the armies of Napoleon. But the task laid upon England and her allies in 1914 is in itself far more arduous than the burden laid upon Great Britain in 1803.

This thought does not afford the least excuse either for indolence or for fear, but it does impose on every man throughout the United Kingdom the paramount duty of hope. No speaker can hope that his own language or thought will rise to the greatness of this supreme contest, but I wish to ensure that this address shall not conclude without your hearing from me words well worth the most serious and the most solemn attention. Let me quote to you the language on great occasions of three of the most illustrious of England's worthies. Take first the words of the most eloquent, the most patriotic, the most English of English historians when

summing up the career of the noblest among England's statesmen :

Chatham sleeps near the northern door of the church, in a spot which has ever since been appropriated to statesmen, as the other end of the same transept has long been to poets. Mansfield rests there, and the second William Pitt, and Fox, and Grattan, and Canning, and Wilberforce. In no other cemetery do so many great citizens lie within so narrow a space. High over those venerable graves towers the stately monument of Chatham, and from above, his effigy, graven by a cunning hand, seems still, with eagle face and outstretched arm, to bid England be of good cheer and to hurl defiance at her foes. The generation which reared that memorial of him has disappeared. The time has come when the rash and indiscriminate judgements which his contemporaries passed on his character may be calmly revised by history. And History, while, for the warning of vehemence, high, and daring natures, she notes his many errors, will yet deliberately pronounce that, among the eminent men whose bones lie near his, scarcely one has left a more stainless, and none a more splendid name.¹

Hear again the most English of England's poets when insisting both upon the duty of hope and upon the meanness of admiration excited by the triumphs of ruthless tyranny :

Here pause : the poet claims at least this praise,
That virtuous Liberty hath been the scope
Of his pure song, which did not shrink from hope
In the worst moment of these evil days ;
From hope, the paramount *duty* that Heaven lays,
For its own honour, on man's suffering heart.
Never may from our souls one truth depart,

¹ Macaulay, *Critical and Historical Essays*, p. 791. (A new edition, 1870.)

That an accursèd thing it is to gaze
On prosperous Tyrants with a dazzled eye ;
Nor, touched with due abhorrence of their guilt
For whose dire ends tears flow, and blood is spilt,
And justice labours in extremity,
Forget thy weakness, upon which is built,
O wretched Man, the throne of Tyranny !¹

Listen, lastly, to the prayer of Nelson, written down by himself for no eye but his own immediately before the battle of Trafalgar. You will at least understand why

England loves thee well, thou famous man,
Thou greatest sailor since the world began.

‘ May the great God whom I worship grant to my country and for the benefit of Europe in general a great and glorious victory ; and may no misconduct of any one tarnish it ! And may humanity after victory be the predominant feature in the British Fleet ! For myself individually, I commit my life to Him who made me ; and may His blessing light upon my endeavours for serving my country faithfully. To Him I resign myself, and the just cause which is entrusted to me. Amen. Amen. Amen.’

¹ Wordsworth.

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THE WAR AND THE BRITISH DOMINIONS

CONSIDERING that, upon the cynical violation of Belgian neutrality, the whole British Empire rallied to the support of the mother country with a unanimity perhaps without precedent, it may seem superfluous, and indeed almost impertinent, to justify by argument conclusions which a swift intuition has already reached. At the same time, fluctuations of opinion in a democracy are so frequent that it is well to guard against possible revulsions. It is a fact that many who now acclaim the necessity of Canadian intervention in a European quarrel were, quite recently, of a very different opinion. In February 1913 the Hon. C. Marcil protested in the Canadian Parliament against Canada entering upon the foreign policy of Great Britain. After quoting a list of British treaty obligations, which included the guarantee of Belgian independence and neutrality, he went on to declare that he had been elected to Parliament to deal with questions affecting Canada ; but, as for guaranteeing the neutrality of kingdoms beyond the sea, he was not prepared to enter into any policy of that kind. A short time after, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the revered leader of the Canadian Liberal Party, whilst declaring his conviction that ' War, thank heaven, is still remote ', added that ' defence, like charity, begins at home '. We know how the flood tide of Imperial patriotism at the time of the

South African War was followed by an ebb; and we shall be wise in endeavouring to prevent the possibility of any such reaction when the present crisis is past.

Nor need we quarrel with the temper that the remarks above quoted serve to illustrate. It was indeed perfectly natural that Canadian public men should desire to keep their country free from the taint of militarism and all that it implies. Many of us at home were as sincerely convinced as was Sir Wilfrid Laurier himself that the loud boasts of those who claimed for Germany a world-empire did not really represent the sober judgement of the great body of the German people, and that the kindly and genial folk with whom we came in contact would, sooner or later, be able to bring influence to bear upon the policy of their nation. We now know, however, to our immediate cost, though, we may hope, to our final salvation, that German militarism had struck deeper root in the soil of the nation than we believed, and that this is a struggle in which all who desire to end that militarism should bear their part. Throughout the Empire, men recognize that the war upon which we have entered, assuredly with no light heart, is a war of opposing principles, and therefore inevitable unless one or the other of the opposite principles should be willing to give way. The German is, above all, a theorist. Unlike the opportunist Englishman, who lives from hand to mouth, doing the work that comes to hand and leaving its justification to accident, the German is never content unless he creates for himself a system of philosophy which may explain and justify his conduct. It so happened that the creators of modern Prussia and of modern Germany, Frederick the Great and Bismarck, were men who combined intellectual eminence and moral cynicism to an extraordinary degree. Modern German

history, through the teaching of Treitschke, and modern German philosophy, through the teaching of Nietzsche, is the historical and philosophical vindication of the methods of these heroes. (It is true that the 'European' Nietzsche regarded with fastidious loathing the junker Bismarck. Still Bismarck represented Nietzsche's superman in the drab world of everyday politics.) But these theorists, having based on Bismarck their ideal, failed to profit by the teaching of that shrewdest of masters. Bismarck was throughout a thorough opportunist. If he had come to believe, as he never seems actually to have believed, that world-empire was a necessity for Germany; that Great Britain lay in the way of her necessary expansion, and that, to attain this object, the sea power of Great Britain must be rivalled, if not surpassed, he would have taken good care that his policy, on the continent of Europe, furthered this aim. He would not, by a truculent and aggressive diplomacy, have thrown Russia, as well as France, into the arms of England. The rulers of modern Germany were not filled with the caution of Bismarck. They sought, under wholly different conditions, to recall the ambitions of Napoleon, being themselves wholly destitute of the Napoleonic inspiration.

The continental position of Germany might not in any way affect the British Dominions; but, when she sought—as it is now clear that she did seek—to gratify imperial ambitions overseas, the whole situation, so far as they were concerned, became wholly altered. Considering the painstaking nature of the German character and the sums freely expended upon secret service, it is astonishing how crass has often been the ignorance displayed by Germans of the facts of the contemporary history around them. Thus, having postulated that the British race

was decadent, the main evidence for which was the refusal of the British democracy to undertake the obligations of compulsory military service, they proceeded to assume that, at the first breath of danger, the whole chaotic and amorphous fabric of the British Empire would crumble to pieces. Listen to the exposition of German beliefs by an impartial American observer, Professor R. G. Usher:

‘Why should the Colonies fight for the maintenance of an empire whose existence is not of benefit to them and whose destruction could not injure them? How could they furnish England any effective assistance in a war fought in the North Sea, the Mediterranean, or the Near East? Even should they send troops or supplies so far, their population is not large enough nor their resources sufficient . . . to make such support decisive for victory. *Besides, Canada would expose herself to assault from the United States*, a danger which the Germans seem to think sufficiently real to detain the Canadian regiments at home; Australia would be exposed to the Japanese, of whom the Germans think they stand in daily fear; in Africa the English confederation is exposed to the much more real danger of an attack from German East or West Africa, and, besides, is sufficiently imperilled by the disparity of numbers between the whites and the natives. Indeed, it is conceivable that in Africa the English Colonies would be in such danger from the outbreak of a war with Germany that they would be compelled in self-defence to sever their connexion with the Empire. The loyalty of the Colonies, as a whole, has been verbal, personal, a matter of sentiment, with which interests have never been allowed to clash. That it will stand the strain of real sacrifice the Germans believe highly improbable.’

So much for German prescience; but what is the final cause of such anticipations? The British democracy may or may not have been wise in refusing compulsory

military service, but that its refusal did not spring from cowardice was abundantly shown when, at the first recognition of the seriousness of the situation, recruiting went up by leaps and bounds. The organization of the self-governing Empire is no doubt unsatisfactory and illogical and can hardly be permanent; though one cannot discuss the style of architecture when the house is on fire. Nevertheless the fact remains that, under this defective system, there has grown up amongst millions of free men a temper of passionate loyalty to the Empire, as representing cherished ideals.

If, then, this war is a conflict of principles, what are the opposing ideals which so closely concern every member of the British partnership? On the one hand there is the ideal of strength, the effective, disciplined organization of a whole people working for a single object. Efficiency in war is the ultimate aim; though to secure this efficiency it is necessary also to secure the proper organization of all other resources, mental, moral and material, which make for such efficiency. It has been the wisdom of Germany to recognize that, without such adjuncts, the sword of militarism might break in the handling. By the extreme upholders of this ideal war is regarded as a good in itself, the ultimate justification of human effort. Others, more moderate, would maintain that war is not an end in itself, but merely an obstacle to be passed, on the road to power. In either case the conclusion is the same. The end justifies the means. Necessity knows no law; and, if paper obligations and the dictates of 'slave-morality' (that is, of Christian ethics) bar the way, we must hack through.

Opposed to this principle and this ideal, what is the principle and ideal for which British Imperialism is contending? (It is unfortunate to be compelled to use the

words 'Empire' and 'Imperialism', when the ideas involved are so different from those usually connected with those terms ; but unfortunately their use seems inevitable.) The answer is a difficult one, because, as we have seen, the British temperament is not given to theorize, and the British Empire itself has developed in a very diverse, haphazard fashion. Perhaps the best definition for our purpose is that of the late Professor J. A. Cramb, a brilliant student, who died before he could know how true had been the forecast of the inevitableness of the coming contest between German and British ideals.

'If I were asked,' he said, 'how one could describe in a sentence the general aim of British imperialism . . . I should answer . . . to give all men within its borders an English mind ; to give all who come within its sway the power to look at the things of man's life, at the past, at the future, from the standpoint of an Englishman ; to diffuse within its bounds that high tolerance in religion which has marked this Empire from its foundation ; that reverence yet boldness before the mysteriousness of life and death, characteristic of our great poets and our great thinkers ; that love of free institutions, that pursuit of ever higher justice and a larger freedom, which, rightly or wrongly, we associate with the temper and character of our race, wherever it is dominant and secure.' 'To give all men within its bounds an English mind—that has been the purpose of our Empire in the past. He who speaks of England's greatness speaks of this. Her renown, her glory, it is this, undying, imperishable, in the strictest sense of that word. For if, in some cataclysm of nature, these islands and all that they embrace were overwhelmed and sunk in sea-oblivion, if to-morrow's sun rose upon an Englandless world, still this spirit and this purpose in other lands would fare on untouched amid the wreck.'

This language is no doubt vague. Still it possesses a

clear meaning to those who know the Empire's history. But it is with this spirit, as much as with the material resources of the Empire, that the German ideal is at war. At the present moment, whilst the mouthpieces of the German Government have no terms strong enough to express their hatred and contempt of the English national character, they cover with clumsy flattery the Americans, who represent, no less than the English, the qualities which the Germans resent. The German governing classes believe that there is no possibility of a strong, efficient government under democracy. But democracy is, of course, flesh of the flesh and bone of the bone of the English-speaking peoples throughout the world. Again, the individualism, which is everywhere the characteristic of the race—even where, as in Australasia, in some directions State-socialism prevails—is anathema to the German mind. What discipline and regulations have done alike for German knowledge and German trade, we may freely acknowledge; but let us not forget that the gain is won at the loss of much which we hold most dear.

Still, it may be said, at least in the Dominions, which do not come into immediate contact with Germany, the German spirit is not our spirit and German ideals are not ours; but may we not each continue in our respective course without necessarily coming into conflict? To this the answer is that the German ideal is not content to reign in the abstract theories of German historians and philosophers. It claims to make good its position in the active life of world-politics. Already far-seeing Americans have recognized that, were Germany to come out victorious from the present war, it would probably become necessary for the United States to alter its whole manner of living, and, by means of a strong fleet and a powerful army, to prevent the possibility of attack by

Germany. And, in this state of things, what would be the position of the British Dominions? It is improbable that Germany would desire at once to annex them as portions of her Empire. She would probably, at first, be content to put pressure to bear so that they should sever their political connexion with Great Britain; and then would attempt to obtain the monopoly of their trade by enforcing preferential treatment. Were emigration from Germany again to become necessary or expedient, the emigrants would be encouraged to go to Canada or Australasia; by which means the German element in these communities would be strengthened. Meanwhile, in various directions the emissaries of German 'culture' would be spreading their nets. Elsewhere German action might be more direct. According to the summary of his speech telegraphed to England, General Smuts has recently stated that there is evidence in the hands of the South African Union Government of German intrigues against British South Africa. It is impossible for us here to know the character of such evidence; but we all remember the exultant message which the German Kaiser dispatched on receiving the news of the foolish fiasco of the Jameson raid. It showed better than reams of commentary how close was the attention being paid by Queen Victoria's august grandson to the possibilities of trouble for the British Empire. Happily for Great Britain, 'by a certain divine good fortune' the members of the German governing classes excel in offending those whom it is their interest to conciliate. Thus, after the treaty of Vereeniging, Transvaal farmers trekked into German South-West Africa to escape the humiliation of British rule. Most of them, however, soon found their way back, recognizing that the whiplashes of British dominion were far lighter than the scorpions of German authority. Similarly, if,

as seems probable, German ambitions looked forward to a time when a weak, nominally independent India should be under the aegis of Germany, it was obviously her policy to establish friendly relations with individual Indians. But what happened? On the punitive expedition of the concerted European Powers against the Chinese the treatment by the Germans of distinguished members of the fighting races of India was so intolerable as almost to lead to a breach of the peace. It is reported that an eminent Indian chieftain resented so deeply the slights put upon him that it was difficult for him at a later date to treat with proper civility the German Crown Prince. In going to the front, at the age of seventy, he is gratifying his feelings of personal resentment as well as those of Imperial loyalty.

But if these things have happened in the green tree, what will happen in the dry? The citizens of the British Dominions, no less than the citizens of the United States, are a proud people, not accustomed to toe the line at the command of any one. Consider them confronted with the overwhelming insolence of a Germany that had humbled their past bulwark, the sea power of Great Britain. Doubtless for Canada and Australasia, no less than for the United States, the new situation would demand a new policy, and, so far from the devil of militarism being expelled, it would invade the New World, with seven more devils in its wake. On the other hand, by championing the cause of Great Britain and by throwing the whole weight of their resources into the scale of her fortunes, the British Dominions can help to remove that mountain of militarism which we all recognize as the obstacle in the way of peaceful progress. For who, during the last fifty years, has set the pace in the headlong race of naval and military expenditure, which

has been hurrying the nations of Europe to the grim alternatives either of eventual bankruptcy or of such a dénouement as is now being enacted before our eyes? Who will dare to deny that it has been Germany which has compelled the French and British democracies to spend money on armaments which their own interests dictated that they should spend on purposes of social reform? In 1906 and 1907 the British Government sought to give an example for Germany to follow; but the only result of Great Britain slackening the pace in the matter of ship-building was that Germany increased her efforts so greatly as to make fresh exertions on the part of Great Britain inevitable. Those of us who have followed day by day the story of the devastated fields and villages of Belgium and of France will assuredly recognize that, under present conditions, the maintenance of British supremacy at sea is for us a matter of life and death. It would be out of place to enter upon a question which has been the subject of acute controversy in Canada; but at least it may be said that, if the strain upon British resources has been so great that the offer of Canadian assistance was warmly welcomed, the whole secret of that exigency lay in the action of Germany. If the British Empire holds together, and if some scheme of Imperial union is finally elaborated, doubtless the Dominions, having a voice in the decision of Imperial policy, will take their share of the liabilities of Imperial defence. But if the stronghold of militarism be once struck down, there is no reason why such a share should not be moderate and modest. If at the close of the war the Allies should be triumphant, Great Britain might well demand, as her share of the spoil, the destruction of the German super-Dreadnoughts, leaving to Germany the cruisers which are necessary for the protection of her mercantile

marine. It is by such means, rather than by the enunciation of pacifist maxims, some of them profoundly repugnant to deep-seated instincts of human nature, and all of them subject to the risk that when most needed they are most disregarded, that the British Empire may, through the blood and carnage of this war, emerge to a better day, to bring about which the Dominions, by partaking of the toil and trouble, would have done their part.

But, while the righteousness of the war may well commend itself to the consciences of peace-loving Britons throughout the Empire, on the ground that it is a war against the principles and ideals of militarism and all that militarism implies, there are special reasons why men who believe both in the supremacy of law and in the supremacy of liberty should give the cause of Great Britain their whole-hearted support. The Prime Minister has declared that we are fighting on behalf of the sanctity of the written word and of the independence of the small nations. The American Press was quick to recognize the significance of the German Chancellor's contemptuous allusion to a scrap of paper. It took at once the point that documents, such as Magna Charta and the American Constitution itself, were equally mere scraps of paper. Unless nations, no less than individuals, fulfil the obligations to which they have given their formal guarantee, public life becomes a mere scramble in a calculation of the strength of opposing forces. How little the German Chancellor realized the Anglo-Saxon reverence for the sanctity of the plighted word is shown by his late addition of the insulting suggestion that, if France had been the first to violate Belgian neutrality we should have accepted such violation with ready acquiescence. But the subjects of the British Crown in the Dominions, no less than the citizens of the United

States, know what it is to depend upon a written Constitution, and, under the subtleties of a federal system, to have the respective powers of the central and provincial authorities duly interpreted by the decisions of the Courts. They, least of any men, are likely to hear with patience flippant sneers at the sanctity of the written undertaking. Against this Anglo-Saxon principle of respect for paper guarantees Germany sets up the plea that necessity knows no law. Yes, but what necessity? It is the necessity of the mailed fist, of the strong man armed, who sees by such violation a short cut to the object aimed at. To the new religion of Odin is added the new morality that might is right. For long one hesitated to believe statements so shocking to the old-fashioned beliefs of Anglo-Saxondom. But competent observers assure us that what we deemed the morbid megalomania of incipient insanity has become the avowed creed of numbers of intelligent Germans.

‘Ye have heard how in olden times it was said, blessed are the meek for they shall inherit the earth; but I say unto you, blessed are the valiant for they shall make the earth their throne. And ye have heard men say, blessed are the poor in spirit; but I say unto you, blessed are the great in soul and the free in spirit, for they shall enter into Valhalla. And ye have heard men say blessed are the peacemakers; but I say unto you blessed are the war-makers, for they shall be called, if not the sons of Jahve, the children of Odin, who is greater than Jahve.’

The Anglo-Saxon peoples may not too scrupulously live up to the ideals of their professed Christianity, and may sometimes expose themselves to the charge of hypocrisy so often made against them; but, at least, we may claim that we have not poisoned the wells of our beliefs, and that we are not prepared to give the go-by to all

that we have held to be progress by a blind reversion to the faith of a past barbarism. What a man believes, however, is a matter between him and his God. It is when belief influences action that we have a right to consider it. And, without question, the new religion has a counterpart in the field of morals which the world at large finds itself forced to observe closely. Even while encumbered to some extent by the thorns and briars of a nominal Christianity, Bismarck could say :

‘That any one should act in politics out of complaisance or from a sentiment of justice, others may expect from us, but not we from them.... Every government takes solely its own interests as the standard of its actions, however it may drape them with deductions of justice or of sentiment. . . . My belief is that no one does anything for us unless he can at the same time serve his own interests.’

But, when we come to writers such as General von Bernhardi, we find the doctrine, that morality consists in the pursuit of the interests of a dominant Germany, naked and unashamed. It is in full accordance with the state of things, as we understand it, in a world where *ἔβρις*, the insolence of man, finds its inevitable Nemesis in the Power which lures it to its doom, that German militarism, to judge it by its fruits, does not lead to a more conspicuous valour than that produced by the old-fashioned beliefs of other peoples. The German soldier has doubtless the qualities of discipline and courage necessary for his profession ; but he is certainly no braver than the Russian, the Frenchman, or the Englishman, and, when the qualities of intelligence and initiative are required, he is notably inferior to the man who has been taught to develop his own individuality and not to be a mere passive wheel in a huge machine. Still the monster of

militarism, with its god, which is but the devil of ordinary folk, and its moral creed, which to us Philistines is the negation of morality, rests on a strong foundation of laborious spadework and systematic organization, and requires for its complete overthrow equal effort and equal industry on the part of all those who believe in the opposite ideals of peace and freedom.

But, if the whole trend of the militarist movement runs directly counter to human progress as conceived by the English-speaking races throughout the globe, especially revolting to our notions was the particular manifestation of its spirit which this gospel gave at the outbreak of the war. If there was a principle dear to the heart of nineteenth-century Liberalism, it was the principle of nationality. In one sense Germany herself has done lip-service to this principle, because Pan-Germanism proclaims that all, whether they will it or no, who have Teutonic blood in their veins, shall be brought back to the fold of an enlarged Germany. Unfortunately for such pretensions, the tendency of latter-day research has been to throw serious doubts on the confident statements regarding the race question of a previous generation. Professor Sayce has pointed out that it is impossible to maintain that the English of to-day are a Teutonic people, and we may also ask how far does Prussia consist of a stock purely Teutonic. Races inevitably tend to mix ; and it is on something more solid than mere race origin that ideas of nationality, if they are to bear fruit, must base their claim. A common history, common sentiments, common sufferings, a common religion, all take their share in developing the complex idea of nationality. Moreover, we know that while Germany has talked much of Pan-Germanism, she has dealt ruthlessly with the members of other races over whom she had dominion.

So hard has been the lot of the Prussian Poles under these apostles of culture and of light—their language tabooed in the schools, their lands acquired under compulsion—that they welcome the coming of the Russian Tsar, believing that some form of autonomy under the Russian autocrat would be far preferable to their present condition. Of the temper of Alsace and Lorraine it is superfluous to speak. These provinces were once German ; and yet after more than forty years of German rule they are as French in their sympathies as when they first came, after the war of 1870, under German domination.

It is unnecessary to enlarge here upon the most recent example of German respect for the principle of nationality. It is true that the German Chancellor has more than once insisted that Germany had no quarrel with the liberty and independence of Belgium. She only demanded that German troops should be allowed a free passage through Belgian soil. As, however, the inevitable result must have been that France would have claimed the same privilege, and that, in consequence, free and independent Belgium would have become the cockpit of the contending Powers in a war which was no concern of hers, what sort of liberty or independence would such a state of things have implied ?

Upon the other hand we may, without cant or boasting, claim that the British Empire has, generally speaking, encouraged the national idea in its component members. The two exceptions that will be thrown in our teeth by no means prove the contrary. The case of Ireland is too complicated and too difficult to enter upon in a brief survey, but at least it may be asserted that, whatever may have been the sins of omission or commission in England's behaviour towards Ireland, for the last forty years, at any rate, there has been no desire, on the part of either

political party in Great Britain to repress the national aspirations of the Irish, so far as they were compatible with the interests of the Empire as a whole. The trouble has been to decide whether or not particular measures were or were not open to this criticism. So also in the case of South Africa, the Dutch republics were overthrown, not because they strove for Dutch Afrikanerdom, but because, in the opinion of the majority throughout the Empire—whether that opinion was right or wrong concerns not the argument—their attitude, as guided by Kruger, forbade that position of equality for British subjects in their midst which Great Britain, as the paramount Power in South Africa, claimed to be their due. How loyally and earnestly the British Government has sought to make partnership in the Empire consistent with the legitimate aspirations of Dutch nationalism is shown by the fact that the Dutch General Botha, who commanded the Transvaal forces in the South African War, is now the loyal Prime Minister of the self-governing British South African Union. It is further shown by the fact that the South African Government is doing its part in the work of resisting German pretensions.

We can indeed confidently affirm that wherever European settlement has been possible on a large scale, the British Empire has tolerated, if not encouraged, colonial nationalism. Canadian historians, of Anglo-Saxon origin, have criticized and condemned the policy which encouraged the continuance and persistence of French customs and ideals in an English-speaking world. But whatever our opinion of such criticisms—and one may be allowed to suggest that it is not such an easy matter to uproot a historic past as some high authorities seem to imagine—at least this is clear, that the adoption of such a policy, even in the dark days of the eighteenth century, plainly

showed that British Imperialism had already recognized its aim to be unity through diversity. Difficult as it may be for the logical systematic German mind to realize, it is still the fact that different kinds of patriotism may co-exist side by side simultaneously in the same man. Thus a French Canadian may be a fervent French nationalist in his devotion to the French language, customs, and religion ; he may also be a Canadian patriot in his love for Canada as a whole. Lastly he may realize that such patriotism is not incompatible with a larger patriotism, the devotion of the British peoples throughout the world to that Empire which, however embryonic may be its form, still represents the ideal of a partnership of free communities, the greatest instrument for good which the world has ever seen. In its large tolerance of races and of methods the British system has at least laid to heart one of the divine maxims :

‘And John answered and said, Master, we saw one casting out devils in thy name ; and we forbid him because he followeth not with us. And Jesus said unto him, Forbid him not, for he that is not against us is for us.’

Upon the other hand, what has been the attitude of German Imperialism towards the various currents of German nationalism which went to fill the mighty stream of a United Germany ? A brilliant writer supplies the answer :

‘The Prussian deference to authority, the Prussian capacity for discipline, the Prussian concentration on material aims—these are the leading principles of the German Empire State. Foreign as they were in some respects to the other peoples of Germany, they have been accepted because of their success. The whole nation reacted against its past after the victories of 1866 and 1870, and the potent organization of the State

seized upon that reaction and stamped its character upon the new generation which has since arisen.'

'The key to practically everything intolerable in modern Germany is Prussian dominance. Bismarck fastened this Prussian autocracy, with its reactionary and militarist discipline, upon the whole German people, and gave it unassailable power over the national destiny. The German of all kinds is docile to authority; he accepts, indeed he demands, the guidance of the State. Professional Germany, literary Germany, even artistic Germany . . . caught in the reaction from national inefficiency, and dominated by the success of Prussian leadership in two wars, have taken the Prussian mould as completely as the army or bureaucracy. Even social reform is no exception; as pursued by Germany it is one of the most potent instruments of State control which Prussian policy has devised.'

'Under Prussian influence, German theories have indeed hardened into a drilled and disciplined national monomania.'

Can anything be imagined more repellent to the instincts and ideas of Anglo-Saxon democracy throughout the world?

But if these things are so, it surely follows that the present war, being one of principles and ideals, is a war with which the whole future of democracy, as conceived and worked by the Anglo-Saxon peoples, is most closely concerned; and that it is a war which, once entered upon, must be fought to a finish until the giant of militarism be brought to its knees. It would be intolerable that we should sacrifice our best and bravest; that Belgium should have suffered such unutterable horrors; that France should have been devastated, only that the old vicious circle of competing armaments should haunt us once more. We believe—and have reason for our belief—that by a supreme effort now the world may be relieved from this nightmare of unending competition. A war to end

war may well receive the approval of even the convinced pacifist.

There is one remark which may be added regarding the conditions of peace. Most people in this country would, probably, prefer that, upon the triumph of the allies, Great Britain should by her behaviour make good the claim that she had been fighting for sacred principles and not for her own aggrandisement. At the same time we must remember that the time is past when Great Britain could impose her will upon the Empire at large ; and it may turn out that the interests of certain portions of the Empire may stand in the way of the restoration of some of the colonies wrested from the Germans. Thus Australia and New Zealand, which have always resented the presence of foreign flags in the Pacific, may demand that Samoa and the Bismarck Archipelago shall remain British possessions. Should this follow, we shall, no doubt, be accused of hypocrisy. We shall be told that the cause of Belgium was merely a blind, and that our real motive in entering upon war was aggrandisement. Men easily believe what they wish to believe ; and so, no doubt, the charge will find a ready hearing in many quarters. None the less will it be wholly false. At the first starting of German South-West Africa the British and Cape Colony Governments no doubt took up a dog-in-the-manger attitude. But after the first Great Britain has seen the growth of German expansion without jealousy, and Herr Dernburg (the same Herr Dernburg who is now carrying on a campaign in the United States to throw on England the blame of the continuance of the war) bore witness to the assistance received by the German colonial officials from the British authorities. Whoever knows anything of the British Empire of to-day knows that what occupies the minds and energies of

statesmen and administrators is not the question of its increase, but of its development. Halfpenny newspapers may talk cheerfully of adding by a stroke of the pen German South-West and East Africa to the Empire ; but responsible officials who know the difficulties in the way may be less ready to welcome a new burden of responsibilities. Be this as it may, nothing can alter the fact that Great Britain entered upon this war with clean hands, and that she will not soil them during its continuance.

It is, one recognizes, a dangerous thing to constitute oneself judge in one's own cause. As a rule truth lies in the mean, between the extremes of rival litigants. Thus, though we know the resistance to Napoleon's aims to world-empire to have been righteous and necessary, we still recognize that Napoleon, in his assertion of the doctrine, *la carrière ouverte aux talents*, and in his promulgation of the Code that goes by his name, represented much against which the crowned heads of Europe were vainly contending. Often the deeper is our knowledge, the stronger becomes the case that can be made for the side which has failed and is therefore discredited. But there are limits to these grounds for cool-headed doubt and scepticism ; and, when the case of our adversary can be decided by his own admissions, it would be the merest pedantry to affect an attitude of uncertainty. The question of Servia does not greatly interest the ordinary Englishman ; though no one can read the British White Book without arriving at the conviction that Austria did not intend that Servia should comply with her conditions, and that the German Ambassador, at any rate, encouraged Austria in this attitude. But, when Germany proceeded to violate the neutrality of Belgium on the avowed ground that the measure was a political necessity, and that the

Germans must hack their way through, the issue became plain to the simplest understanding. Hardly and reluctantly the passions and jealousies of nations have allowed the breakwaters of international law to be erected against the waves of their onslaught. It is because the individuals and peoples of the British Empire recognize that they are fighting to maintain these bulwarks against the aggressions of a cynical militarism that, wherever the *pax Britannica* has made its home, there all men are agreed to carry to a fit conclusion a Holy War.

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IS THE BRITISH EMPIRE THE RESULT OF WHOLESALE ROBBERY?

AMONG the charges which the peace-loving and humanitarian Teuton hurls against his backsliding British cousin is the assertion that Great Britain has owed its empire to the practise of the most wholesale robbery, the suggestion being that a Power whose hands are so foul can hardly pose as the champion of public rights or of the sanctity of treaties. It has, therefore, seemed worth while to devote a few pages to the actual historical facts with regard to the growth of the British Empire.

The subject is a complex one, and does not readily lend itself to facile generalization ; but from a close inspection certain general conclusions seem to emerge. If we were German philosophers we might say with Herr Neuman, a Radical, according to *The Times*, of high character and repute, that wars in the past, no less than to-day, involved 'changes of organization in the process of human evolution', and that the British Empire was the outcome of such a change ; but, being mere empiricists, we prefer to deal with the facts of the case.

It is impossible, however, to ignore certain broad principles underlying the facts. It seems a law of life that, when a nation has reached a certain stage of internal development, it finds in overseas expansion

a natural and healthy outlet for its superabundant energies ; and we in England have never denied the natural and, indeed, inevitable character of the claim of the new German Empire that it too should find its place in the sun of overseas expansion ; though, if it has found the best spots of the earth already occupied, that is Germany's misfortune, and not Great Britain's fault.

In any case, when the British Empire was being founded, the one enemy was Spain, and we may freely admit that if England did not succeed in snatching Spanish possessions, it was her poverty and not her will which was at fault. Spain, to our ancestors, represented the Scarlet Woman of the Apocalypse ; and any measures taken against her would have seemed justified to the half-buccaneering, half-religious, temper of the time.

But the Spanish power, though on the wane, was still too strong for a frontal attack ; and so the English colonial Empire began in a quarter where, owing to the absence of the precious metals, Spain had not attempted to effect an occupation. Whether we say that the British colonial Empire began with Newfoundland, over which in fact territorial sovereignty was not made good till very many years after the formal annexation by Sir Humphrey Gilbert, or with the foundation of Virginia in 1607, it is equally false to suggest that our Empire took its rise in violence. What happened was peaceful occupation of, apparently, vacant lands ; though afterwards, no doubt, trouble sometimes arose from the neighbourhood of aboriginal Indians. The most sensitive Teutonic conscience, however, could scarcely require that the vast continent of North America should have remained permanently

unoccupied, so as to furnish hunting-grounds for a few scattered Indian tribes.

Of the thirteen colonies that formed the original United States, there was only one which owed its origin to capture. That the American colonies developed as they did, in the difficult circumstances of the seventeenth century, was mainly due to political and religious reasons. New England owed its existence and its rapid growth to the use of colonies as safety-valves for religious dissent, when the Church of England was predominant at home. Similarly Virginia received a large influx of population when the Royalist party in England found themselves worsted. Again, a peace-loving Quaker founded the 'holy experiment' of Pennsylvania; and the later colony of Georgia was started on philanthropic lines, as a home for impoverished debtors.

Enough has perhaps been said to show the general character of the first British colonial Empire; but it has been already admitted that there was one exception, and that exception we have no desire to shirk. It is true that New Netherland was, in a time of apparent peace, calmly taken by England. Historians differ as to the amount of moral turpitude involved. Economic causes had brought it about that the United Netherlands had succeeded to Spain as the enemy to be feared. There had been already war between the two countries; and its close had brought no permanent peace. Relations with Spain had accustomed men to sporadic hostile proceedings in the far seas, even when peace prevailed in Europe. The English Navigation Laws, which were enacted in the interests of the English shipbuilder and merchant, were meaningless so long as

Dutch shipping had a legitimate *point d'appui* in the very centre of the English colonial system. It has further been pointed out that the Dutch were making attacks upon English forts in West Africa; so that the moment was not one of complete peace. Still, whatever excuses may be offered, the transaction was not one of which Englishmen have reason to be proud; English diplomatic action at the Hague can best be described by saying that it resembled German diplomatic action at Brussels before the violation of Belgian neutrality. In theory, English statesmen had always maintained that the Dutch were trespassers in a part of North America included in the English claim; and so, when the Dutch protested against the capture of New Netherland by force, the English ambassador arrogantly replied that 'the king did not look upon himself as obliged to give any account of what he did in relation thereunto . . . no more than he should think himself obliged . . . to have their consent in case he should think fit to proceed against the Dutch that live in the Fens in England'. But, whatever were the faults of the original proceedings, there can be no doubt as to the wisdom of English action afterwards. The conditions granted upon the surrender have been termed 'the most favourable ever granted by a conqueror'. The new English governor organized the government with an almost imperceptible interruption of the past state of affairs. The day after the surrender the local municipal bodies assembled and transacted business as though nothing had occurred. Most of the Dutch inhabitants came forward and took the oath of allegiance to their new sovereign, continuing almost undisturbed in their daily pursuits. The rule of the

Dutch West India Company had been wanting in tact or sympathy; and, though a representative assembly was not at the time set on foot, the Dutch inhabitants seem to have acquiesced cheerfully in the new situation, and to have had no scruples in becoming, almost at once, good English subjects. An American historian writes: 'Putting aside the methods employed, the acquisition of New Netherland was by all means the wisest and most beneficial act of colonial administration performed in this period. . . . By the reduction of the Dutch, the English colonial possessions were territorially rounded up and brought into continuous contact with one another, and the monopoly of colonial trade, then so much sought after, could, it was thought, be more easily enforced now that there were no foreign ports in the midst of the colonies. The object was entirely in accord with the economic theory of the times and the *practice of other nations*, and the English ministers were justified in their desire to bring it about, if not in the means by which they accomplished it.'

After all, for us now, the practical question is not how our remote ancestors acquired this territory, but the actual use that was made of it, when acquired. Here we can claim a record which no hostile criticism can upset. Take as a crucial example this colony of New York. Started as we have seen by wrongdoing, one would naturally, therefore, expect it to be a vulnerable spot. It is surely, then, significant that at the time of the American Revolution, when, for reasons too complex and involved to be entered upon here, the first English colonial Empire was broken in pieces, the province, where the loyalists were the most numerous, and which longest clung to the Imperial connexion, was the one

province which owed its origin to foreign settlement. When we compare the political assimilation of the Dutch in New York to the English system with the manner in which men originally of German stock, and whose ancestors were part of the German Empire, have refused to accept the beliefs and ideals of modern Germany, we may well ask whether Germans would not be better employed in examining the nature of their own political system, than in casting stones at us for the way in which our Empire was acquired.

It is hard for us now to realize that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the West India Islands appeared, from the point of view of the colonial system, of greater importance than were the continental colonies. Jamaica, the largest English possession in this quarter, was won from Spain as compensation for the failure of the English expedition against Hispaniola; but Barbados and other English islands owed their origin as parts of the Empire to peaceful occupation by settlers; and though in the eighteenth century islands changed hands according to the issue of wars, there is nothing in the English record to show that, in this part of the world at any rate, England was at all more grasping than her neighbours.

At the close of the seventeenth century the scene had shifted; and henceforth, for more than half a century, the conflict was between England and France for hegemony in North America. In this conflict it is impossible to deny that France was the aggressor. Like others after him, Louis XIV aimed at securing for France pre-eminence both on the continent of Europe and overseas. The French of New France were numerically very inferior to their southern neighbours; and, from

a military standpoint, it was no doubt true that only a bold offensive could make up for the lack of population. When we consider the respective populations of the French and of the English colonies, the wonder is not that the English finally prevailed, but that success was so long delayed, and that so often it looked as if, in spite of their inferiority in numbers, the French would yet gain the day. Be this as it may, the French, having deliberately chosen to be the aggressors, could not complain if, by the arbitrament of war, they found themselves gradually stripped of their American possessions. Acadia or Nova Scotia was the first province to be lost under the terms of the Peace of Utrecht; and the true charge that can be brought against the English is, not that they annexed a province which had been a continual menace to New England in the hands of their adversaries, and to which they had in the past set up claims, however shadowy, but that having annexed it they did little or nothing to make their occupation effective. The banishment of the Acadians in 1755, of which Longfellow has written, though at best a bad business, was, perhaps, rendered necessary by the shirking of responsibilities by successive generations.

So far from Great Britain having shown extreme greed in the eighteenth century in extending her Empire, her action, at each settlement of claims, was so moderate as to give the Opposition in Parliament the excuse for crying out that the interests of the country were being betrayed. The same fault was found with the Peace of Utrecht and with the Treaty of Paris of 1763. The restoration of Cape Breton to France, by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, in exchange for Madras, gave

grave offence to the New England colonies, and was a contributing cause to the estrangement which arose between the Americans and the Mother Country. Owing to the influence of sea-power it is an undoubted fact that Great Britain acquired a giant's strength by the close of the Seven Years' War. Granted her opportunities, it cannot be shown that she used them inordinately. It is true that Canada became British by conquest; but it must be remembered that French Canada was for practical purposes only a portion of the present province of Quebec, and that none of the seven other provinces (besides Nova Scotia and Quebec), of which the Dominion consists, owed their origin in any way to war or conquest. Ontario, or Upper Canada, as it was then called, and New Brunswick, owed their existence to the presence of American loyalists, men who faced ruin and exile that they might maintain loyalty to their King and Empire. Prince Edward Island, though it had been part of the French province, only became a living community after the British conquest. The western provinces, British Columbia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, took their rise in circumstances very different from those of warfare, unless indeed we can speak of a war with the wilderness. But even confining our attention to French Canada, there has been nothing in its history as a British possession that calls for serious complaint. From the moment of its acquisition it was sought, by careful consideration of French laws and customs, to secure the loyalty and affection of the new subjects. Mistakes were, no doubt, made. The grant of a representative assembly in 1791 to a population untrained in local self-government was a doubtful blessing, and want of tact on the part

of British Governors, coupled with want of moderation on the part of French politicians, brought about a political deadlock which ended in an abortive rebellion. But, at the worst, the French Canadians had no deep-seated feelings of resentment. In 1775 they had, with a few exceptions, turned a deaf ear to the voice of the American charmer ; and when once, under responsible government, they were allowed a fair share in the management of their own affairs, they showed themselves as loyal to the British Empire as were their Anglo-Saxon fellow-subjects. France has forgiven the loss of French Canada ; the French Canadians, in spite of occasional grievances, such as none of us is without, are a prosperous and contented people, and have no wish for the sympathy or crocodile's tears of the proved enemies of the cause they hold most dear, the maintenance of separate nationalism within a political union.

Though it is difficult to judge in one's own cause, the plain facts surely disclose the singular moderation of the British Government in the matter of colonial annexations after the overthrow of Napoleon. This moderation must not be put down to any notions of altruistic morality. The truth was that the loss of the American colonies had, for the time, killed enthusiasm for colonial expansion of the old type ; and a Government of aristocratic sympathies and prejudices was not quick to recognize the importance of tropical possessions for the new industrialism which was rapidly developing. Under the Treaty of Paris of 1814, Great Britain ceded all the West Indian Islands which she had conquered from France, with the exception of Tobago and St. Lucia (Trinidad was also retained,

but this had been a Spanish possession). In explaining and justifying the treaty, Lord Castlereagh, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, affirmed that it was expedient freely to open to France the means of peaceful occupation, and that it was not the interest of this country to make her a military and conquering, instead of a commercial and pacific nation. From the point of view of students of world-empire such a remark sounds singularly fatuous; but it shows that a British Minister, whom modern historians are inclined to regard as the best War Minister of his day, was not only far from desiring to apply to their extreme the consequences resulting from sea-power, but apparently refrained from considering. When conquered colonies were retained, it was as a defensive measure, to prevent aggression. Thus Mauritius remained British not because of its own intrinsic importance, but because of its harbour and of the mischief it had caused when in the hands of France. In the same spirit Lord Castlereagh maintained, with regard to the Newfoundland fisheries, that it would have been 'invidious and would only have excited a feeling of jealousy to have tried to exclude France from the share in that fishery which had been secured to her by her two preceding treaties with Great Britain'.

As a further illustration of the argument, take the treatment accorded to the Dutch colonies after the peace. It is true that Cape Colony, which had been restored to Holland at the Peace of Amiens, was finally retained by Great Britain. The following very general account of the complicated transaction which ended in the English keeping the Cape is quoted from a work of authority. 'On March 13, 1813, the British Govern-

ment, made a treaty with the Swedish Government agreeing to transfer to Sweden the West Indian island of Guadeloupe, which the English had taken from the French, in consideration of certain trading privileges to be given to British ships in specified Swedish ports. In the following year, however, by the general Peace of Paris, signed on May 30, 1814, it was agreed that Guadeloupe should be given back to France. Compensation was due to Sweden, and it was agreed that such compensation to the amount of one million sterling should be made good by Holland out of her colonies, then in possession of the English, in consideration of the incorporation of the Belgic provinces with Holland. This compensation Great Britain agreed to pay on behalf of Holland, and in addition, to advance two millions sterling towards improving the defences of the Netherlands; and to bear further charges, not exceeding three millions sterling, towards the general expenses of setting up the new Dutch-Belgian kingdom. In return, the Cape, and what is now British Guiana, were finally ceded to Great Britain, being practically bought for the sum of six millions.' Whatever be thought of the wisdom of this transaction—and the subsequent history showed that the hasty transference of the Belgic provinces to Holland was mistaken and ill-advised—it cannot be said that, considering the necessity of the Cape Colony to Great Britain as a half-way house to India, this annexation can be cited as an example of the arrogant insolence of the robber State in despoiling its weaker neighbours. Even more significant is the case of Java. In the first quarter of the seventeenth century the English East India Company, of which a word will be said later in another connexion, made

efforts to obtain an equal footing with its great Dutch rival in Java and the Spice Islands. These efforts proving unsuccessful, the English were compelled, practically, to confine themselves to the trade of continental India. The Napoleonic Wars gave the opportunity to alter this state of things. The Java expedition of 1811 was a perfectly legitimate warlike operation, necessitated by French aggression. Java was occupied with little trouble, and an English Governor was appointed who is now generally recognized as one of the most distinguished builders of Greater Britain. During the four years Sir Stamford Raffles remained in office he laboured strenuously on behalf of the people entrusted to him. The government of the Dutch Company had been, it is generally admitted, very inefficient; and, though with the fall of the Company at the time of the French Revolution an improvement had been made, there had not been time for the changes to produce much result. Raffles recognized that Java might become another India. He was keenly interested in its welfare and development; and, though his sanguine and eager nature may have exaggerated the value of the measures he took—improvements on paper which required for their working a greater number of European officials than were at his disposal—undoubtedly he did a great work, considering the shortness of his period of rule. The restoration of Java to the Dutch was doubtless a measure both of political justice and expediency. It would have been idle to expect from Holland feelings of friendship, if the jewel of its Eastern possessions had not again been placed in its hands. Nevertheless, a robber State, such as we read of in German invectives, would not have allowed so valuable

a prize, when once within its clutches, to escape from its power. The subsequent peaceful occupation of the port of Singapore was not, in its direct results, compensation for the loss of Java.

Returning to Africa, what strikes the student, if he attempts to follow the course of British colonial policy during the nineteenth century, is its uncertain and fluctuating character. In Cape Colony the Dutch became discontented, not so much because they were at issue with British methods of government as because the missionary influence, which was strong with the Home Government, caused a treatment of the native question which seemed the height of folly to the Dutch mind. The 'trek' of the Dutch farmers, which gave birth to the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, owed its origin to this cause. The British Government attempted to maintain an impossible position. They held that the farmers, who had 'trekked', remained British subjects, yet they were not willing to assume the responsibility of governing the new settlements. No wonder that the Boers were puzzled and soured by the attitude of the British authorities, and that what was really hesitation and uncertainty should seem to foreign critics mere Machiavellian hypocrisy. In fact, cross currents were at work. The British officials on the spot recognized, for the most part, the necessity of a policy of expansion, in view of possible dangers from native risings. The Home Government, on the other hand, which had to find the money for what was done, not unnaturally desired to restrict, so far as possible, the sphere of Imperial obligations. For either policy there was something to be said; what was indefensible was a policy of see-saw, which advanced only to recede,

and then once again advanced when the circumstances had become more difficult. With the details of this unfortunate chapter in our colonial policy we are not here concerned; but whatever were the blunders and misfeasances of British statesmanship, at least those blunders and misfeasances showed that it was not actuated by a fierce greed of empire.

The same conclusion can be drawn from the history of other parts of Africa. Although there were British settlements along the coast of West Africa in 1865, the spirit of the time was expressed in the Report of a Select Parliamentary Committee, which advised in that year

‘ That all further extension of territory or assumption of government or new treaties offering any protection to native tribes would be inexpedient, and that the object of our policy should be to encourage in the natives the exercise of those qualities, which may render it possible for us more and more to transfer to them the administration of all the governments with a view to an ultimate withdrawal from all except, probably, Sierra Leone ’.

No doubt to German critics this Report will seem only a further instance of English duplicity and cunning; but we, who know England, know very well how strong was the public opinion which it represented. But, it may fairly be asked, if this was so, why has the result proved so different from what had been thus foreshadowed? The answer is a double one, depending upon two wholly different reasons. In the first place, it proved altogether impossible to act as the Report suggested. The effect of contact with European civilization is to undermine the foundations of the native system of government, and to produce a state of anarchy which necessitates further intervention. Take

as a crucial example the case of the Gold Coast. This colony had behind it the strong native kingdom of Ashantee. It became necessary to punish the aggressions of the Ashantee king, whose power was broken in 1874. The intention at the time was, after punishing the Ashantees, to leave their kingdom undisturbed. In fact, however, the destruction of their capital was followed by the defection of several of the outlying provinces, which it became necessary to absorb in the British Protectorate. The weakness and the scandalous character of what remained of the Ashantee kingdom led, in 1896, to its being formally annexed to the British Empire. The collapse of the Ashantee kingdom is a conspicuous instance ; but this is not the only region in which the breaking up of the native tribal system and the resulting anarchy have been important factors in the progress of expansion.

It would, however, be idle to deny that another influence has been at work making for the enlargement of our African Empire. British statesmen, content with what Great Britain already possessed, showed a curious lack of imagination in apprehending the natural ambitions of other nations. But, when it was realized that there was to be a scramble for the portions of Africa not already appropriated, the British, who had been pioneers in the work of colonial expansion, once more showed that they did not mean to be left behind in the race. Mr. Scott Keltie, in his admirable work on *The Partition of Africa*, gives two maps, the one of Africa showing European possessions before the Berlin Conference of 1885, and another showing its political divisions in 1895, which bring out the facts more than pages of comment. Whereas at the earlier date European

possessions for the most part were confined to a fringe of coast, at the later, Africa is carved out amongst the European Powers. No doubt the appearance of Germany upon the scene, as a colonial Power, was a main contributing cause to this forcing of the pace. Unhappily, there was mutual misunderstanding between England and Germany on colonial questions.

The British Colonial Secretary was at the time Lord Granville, one of the most able and most convinced adherents of what is known as the 'Little England' faction. In 1873 he had written to the British Ambassador at Berlin that he did not feel 'the slightest jealousy of the Germans acquiring colonial possessions'; and that nothing seemed more improbable than that any substantial difference of opinion should arise on these questions between Great Britain and Germany. When, therefore, the hands of the Home Government were forced by men on the spot, who did not mean that Great Britain should be crowded out of her share, Germany may well have considered that she had been somehow deceived. On the other hand, Bismarck had told the same Ambassador at the same date that he desired neither colonies nor fleets. 'Colonies, in his opinion, would only be a cause of weakness'; and, therefore, when some ten years later a policy of German colonial expansion was entered upon, it came in the nature of a surprise to British statesmen. Moreover, the manner of its inception was not such as to win British favour to German enterprise. The British Foreign Office was informed that the German Consul-General, Dr. Nachtigal, had been commissioned 'to visit the west coast of Africa in order to complete the information now in the possession of the

Foreign Office at Berlin on the state of German commerce on the coast. He will put himself into communication with the authorities in the English possessions on the said coast, and is authorized to conduct, on behalf of the Imperial Government, negotiations connected with certain questions'. After this it is only natural that the annexation of Togoland and the Cameroons by this Dr. Nachtigal should have occasioned some resentment as well as surprise; and that it should have been followed by British annexation of the Oil Rivers and the mouth of the Niger. Mr. Scott Keltie comments :

'There was naturally jubilation in Germany over the success of the smart policy of Bismarck, while in England reproaches were freely heaped upon the Ministers of the time for their blindness. . . . Lord Granville naïvely reproached Prince Bismarck for intentionally misleading him . . . while Bismarck taunted Granville for his want of penetration, and maintained that his little ruse was altogether justifiable.'

Less open to criticism was the action of Germany in the same year in annexing Damaraland and Namaqualand (the present colony of South-West Africa). In this case both the British and the Cape Colony Governments had received a warning, though the nature of that warning had been such as to lull their suspicion. Still they had taken up the indefensible position that it was possible to refuse to incur responsibilities and yet to prevent others from entering upon the task.

But though we have no right to complain of the annexation of South-West Africa, neither have the Germans cause for grumbling if their presence in this part of the world militated in favour of a forward policy in British South Africa :

‘The Bay of St. Lucia [writes Lord Fitzmaurice, Lord Granville’s biographer] on the coast of Zululand, was considered at the time to be nearly the only good harbour, besides Delagoa Bay, which belonged to the Portuguese. It was also intended to be a possible terminus of a future line of railway from the Transvaal to the coast. The watchful eye of Herr Lüderitz (the founder of German South-West Africa) had for some time past been fixed on the spot. . . . And little doubt existed that communications were being carried on at this time with emissaries of the Transvaal Republic, which diplomatically could not be avowed. But the scheme of a German annexation leaked out, and, at the end of 1884, the British flag was hoisted at St. Lucia Bay.’

At the same time the westward extension of the Transvaal was blocked by the annexation of Bechuanaland; whilst the charter of the United South Africa Company in 1885 secured for the Empire what is now Rhodesia.

Turning to East Africa, whilst it is true that Germany by her action in 1885 stole a march upon Great Britain, we need not therefore grudge her the colony then acquired. It would seem that the extreme complacency shown by Lord Granville to German claims helped to bring about a friendly arrangement by which British East Africa and Uganda were recognized as British. If these possessions are likely to prove more valuable than the German, Germany has assuredly no cause for complaint; because, in effect, the British took her leavings.

It was natural that, where national rivalry and competition were at work, there should be some ill-feeling; but assuredly there was, neither at home nor in our colonies, any special desire to thwart Germany. So

long as French expansion was confined to the north, with a view to connecting the Senegal with the hinterland of Algeria, the British saw no reason to object. But, when the region of the Niger was in question, French claims were as resolutely opposed as were those of Germany in any part of the world. It may be annoying to foreign observers to find that at this critical time, when (according to their fine theories) the British race should have shown its decadence, strong men such as Sir W. Mackinnon in East Africa, Sir George Taubman Goldie in the region of the Niger, and Cecil Rhodes in South Africa, in spite of some apathy in Great Britain, succeeded in holding their own in the struggle for the partition of Africa ; but that is no reason why the British should be blamed for behaving precisely in the same way as other nations. In fact, relations with Germany over a colonial question never became so critical as they were with France when, on the reconquest of the Sudan, Lord Kitchener found himself confronted at Fashoda with the French flag. France, at the present time, owes Great Britain no grudge because, sooner than risk the possession of the upper waters of the Nile falling into foreign hands, we were prepared to go to war. What reason is there why Germany should brood over past transactions in which, in point of fact, she was as successful as her rivals ?

It must always be remembered that—though a later generation, taught by Treitschke and adopting his doctrine, has come to believe in world-empire and maritime supremacy as Germany's sacred mission—at the time of the starting of her existing colonial Empire, colonial questions were mainly regarded by Bismarck as pawns in the political game between the rival Powers

Profoundly sceptical (as we have seen) as late as 1873, there is no evidence that Bismarck ever became a thorough convert to the creed of the expansionists. According to Busch, he said in January, 1886: 'In colonial matters we must not take too much in hand at a time, and we already have enough for a beginning.' He added the suggestive remark: 'We must now hold rather with the English, while, as you know, we were formerly more on the French side.' (The last elections in France had shown that it was hopeless to attempt a Franco-German *rapprochement*.) To Bismarck, colonial questions and the question of Egypt were mainly interesting as a means of embittering relations between France and England, and of inflicting pin-pricks upon an English Liberal Ministry. It is often the case that when a man is suffering from some mental or moral malady he suspects others of the disease which afflicts himself; and so it is natural to read that 'the policy of England has constantly been to sow dissension between the continental Powers, or to maintain existing discord on the principle of *duobus litigantibus tertius gaudens*, and to use the one against the other, so that they should be weakened and damaged for the benefit of England.'

It is amusing to compare with this Lord Ampthill's judgement. Lord Ampthill (Odo Russell) was one of the ablest Ambassadors that England has ever had, and this was his opinion:

'Compelled [he wrote in August, 1884] by the colonial mania which has gradually come to the surface in Germany to act contrary to his better convictions in the Angra Pequena question, he [Bismarck] has discovered an unexplored mine of popularity in starting a colonial policy, which public

opinion persuades itself to be anti-English ; and the slumbering theoretical envy of the Germans at our wealth and our freedom has awakened and taken the form of abuse of everything English in the press.'

If British statesmen erred, it was probably in overrating the seriousness of Bismarck's hostility. He had no intention to proceed to extremities, and he had the strong man's respect for a rival that knew his own mind. On the other hand, concessions made to conciliate Germany failed of their mark. Thus, after it had been decided to proclaim a protectorate over the whole of New Guinea, except that portion of it already occupied by the Dutch, a suggestion of German opposition caused Lord Granville and Lord Derby to decide to limit annexation to the southern portion of this land. This decision not only was distasteful to several members of the Cabinet, but gave serious offence in Australia, whilst it failed to secure the good will of Bismarck. In fact, at the time that a British envoy from the Colonial Office was carrying on at Berlin confidential conversations, the German flag was being hoisted in what became German New Guinea. 'The German Government,' Mr. Meade wrote to Lord Granville, 'have behaved very shabbily to you'; but complaint, a trifle querulous, did not alter accomplished facts.

The mention of New Guinea brings us to a quarter of the world where it can hardly be said that the spirit of ruthless annexation has brooded over the waters of British policy. There is no definite evidence that the foundation of New South Wales had any other object than to provide a settlement for the convicts, who could no longer be sent to the North American continent,

though it is possible that the motive for annexing so huge an area was to ward off the possibility of the French seeking for colonial possessions in the neighbourhood. The Home Government for a long time opposed the colonization of New Zealand, and only yielded when their hands had been forced by private enterprise; though here again, in the case of the South Island, it was shown that Great Britain was not prepared to allow the fruit she had been so long reluctant to touch to be gathered by France.

When the Australasian colonies had developed, the Mother Country showed no favour to their doctrine that the Pacific should be a British lake. In 1860 Great Britain declined the offer of Fiji, though she was driven to accept it fourteen years later. Mr. Basil Thomson, who speaks with authority on the Western Pacific, wrote, in 1900, that 'our policy has been a policy of reluctance to acquire territory. Open markets and coaling stations were not thought of thirty years ago'. Thus Germany and France, in spite of grumbling from Australia and New Zealand, were allowed to make good their position in Samoa, New Caledonia, and other islands. That Australasian complaints were not animated by any feeling of hostility to Germany is shown by the fact that the Anglo-French *condominium* in the New Hebrides is a special subject of criticism. It is true that of recent years the British flag has been hoisted over all the unoccupied islands that can be of use to British interests; but this does not alter the fact that, for very many years, doubtless out of no special magnanimity but out of regard for our interests elsewhere, British policy in the Pacific was so complacent in the matter of foreign competition

as to excite serious dissatisfaction in our own colonies. This question, however, need not detain us here, as it is not concerned with the subject of this pamphlet.

The Empire of India is so vast and its position so different from that of the tropical colonies—its affairs being entrusted to a separate department of State—that we have difficulty in realizing that to a foreign observer India stands on the same footing as the other colonial possessions ; but it is of India that our critics are mainly thinking when they term our Empire the fruits of rapine and robbery. What, then, are the facts on this important matter ? There can be no question as to the peaceful character of the early English East India Company. Its one object was successful commerce, and with the object-lesson of the Imperial Dutch East India Company before their eyes, shrewd observers, like Sir Thomas Roe, sought to warn the English Company against schemes of territorial sovereignty. The two causes which brought about the foundation of the English Empire were the downfall of the Mogul power, and the attempt of Dupleix in the middle of the eighteenth century to secure India for France. The apathy of the French Government at home and the genius of Clive put an end to Dupleix's dreams of empire ; whilst the gradual break-up of the Mogul power reduced the British authorities to the alternative of either tolerating anarchy or assuming some form of control. At first it was sought to act behind the screen of the native sovereignty, but the weakness of the native rule necessitated more and more interference. The great struggle in Europe with Napoleon had its counterpart in the East. The grandiose schemes of Bonaparte aiming at world-empire gave justification for a forward

policy on the part of Lord Wellesley. But whilst its territories were enlarged by its servants, the East India Company was ruefully counting the cost. It was able to recall Lord Wellesley, but his policy was too deeply grounded on the necessities of India not to prevail; and, under his successors, the boundaries of British India were step by step extended. It would need a volume to discuss in detail these separate annexations, but it may be said that in each case local circumstances were put forward to justify such annexation, and it seems certain that, as a rule, they were the result of the decay of the native Governments. Even since the trend of opinion has been against new annexations, general political considerations have necessitated, both on the west and on the east, new additions to the Indian Empire.

That Great Britain has no desire to destroy native Governments where they can govern efficiently, is shown by the case of the native States of the Malay Peninsula. By conserving old titles and old feudal institutions as far as possible, by dealing gently with local prejudices and by acting through the medium of the native rulers, British residents at the courts of these rulers have been able to bring about a material and moral improvement to which it would be difficult to find a parallel elsewhere; while they have been able to avoid that break with the past which so often has produced disastrous results in the history of native races. The example of the Federated Malay States may, at least, serve to suggest that when annexations have come about, they have been the outcome, not of any special ambitions or megalomania on the part of the British Government or its officers, but

because, either from their inherent weakness or from contact with European civilizations, native Governments have tended to fall to pieces as the winter snows melt before the sunshine of spring; and, when the choice lies between anarchy or the assumption of rule, no people of Imperial instincts can hesitate as to their course.

No doubt it is naturally provoking to Germany that when, at last, she appeared upon the scene as a colonizing Power, the best places in the globe were already appropriated; but it is not our fault if the Monroe Doctrine warns her off the provinces of Brazil, where there is already a large German population. In truth the action of Germany in venting her spleen upon us rather reminds one of the action of an angry child who, having bumped his head against a wall, proceeds to pinch his little brother. No doubt in the making of the British Empire, as in other human transactions, things have happened that one may wish might have happened otherwise. But enough, it is hoped, has been said to show that, if Great Britain was fortunate in her opportunities, her use of them was assuredly not more unscrupulous than the use made of their opportunities by other nations. It has been seen that a certain confusion and uncertainty has been caused by the conflict between the views of statesmen at home and of administrators on the spot, so that the foreign observer might find himself, to his cost, backing the wrong horse. Undoubtedly this ambiguity goes far to explain the charge of hypocrisy and double-dealing which is brought against British statesmen; though for a student of Bismarck's methods it is difficult to say when German indignation is genuine or when it is assumed.

The above pages have been written to meet the common accusation that the British colonial Empire is the fruits of robbery, but the writer cannot disguise his opinion that such a charge is generally made with the tongue in the cheek. The upholders of the doctrine that might is right have little to find fault with us on this score. The true gravamen of the charge, made against us by Treitschke and his followers, is that we are the weak and unworthy successors of strong men, that our maritime and colonial supremacy exists upon past prestige, and that the British Empire is a huge bladder waiting to be pricked. How far we are the effete and decadent creature of Treitschke's imaginings is a question upon which an Englishman, at the present time, can hardly pronounce an impartial judgment. It will be for future history to decide how far the happenings of this great war may throw light upon the answer.

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POLAND, PRUSSIA AND CULTURE

It is hardly necessary at the present moment to offer apologies for a pamphlet on the above subject. The war which is now going on has been proclaimed to be a struggle to free small nationalities from oppression; and Poland, in the early stages of the conflict, was singled out as one of those which were to be emancipated. A short account, therefore, of the life of this people may not be without interest for English and American readers; and a member of a nation hitherto oppressed and outraged may be permitted to remind the world of some part of her sufferings, as well as to give a few typical features of her present life.¹ The case for Poland need not be urged afresh. But the efforts which the Prussians are everywhere making to represent themselves as the champions of culture justify an account of the barbarities which they commit daily, and which are characteristic of their methods alike in peace and in war.

Prussia is the worst enemy of Poland. The best proof of that fact is to be seen in the present German character of the country east and north of Berlin, all of which was formerly Slavonic. For a long time past German colonizers have come into Russian Poland as a kind of advance guard of the *Drang nach Osten*. I should like

¹ The writer feels bound to acknowledge his debt of gratitude to his friends Mr. C. K. Allen and Mr. T. B. Kittredge for their assistance kindly given him by revising this pamphlet.

to remark here, that I am not going to treat of the complicated problems arising out of the relations between Poland and Russia : recriminations would be useless at this stage, and there is ample room for hope. But while in that direction we are met by an open problem, the question as to the relations between Prussia and Poland is definitely settled. A victorious Prussia would indeed mean a constant bar to the development of Poland, further oppression for Prussian Poland, and the Germanization of a large part of Russian Poland. Also let it be remembered, that whatever injustices Russia has committed against Poland have been universally known and condemned ; the deeds of Russian bureaucracy were even attributed to Russian society, despite the latter's higher ideals ; while Prussia, though guilty of more serious wrongs, has succeeded in making the world believe in her culture. That is why one would like to take an early opportunity of stating some hard facts about her vaunted humanity.

Comparatively few people in England are acquainted with the facts which I propose to discuss. I shall try, as one of a nation of over twenty millions, to state facts which I believe are matters of common knowledge to every member of that nation. At the same time, I wish to make it clear that I am speaking for nobody but myself, and that what I intend to say concerns either matters well known to everybody intimate with Polish affairs or personal impressions of conditions which each reader can verify for himself.

The inquiry will be twofold :

(1) What do the Poles stand for in their national culture ?

(2) What is the meaning, in point of culture, of the German hostility to the Poles ?

What do the Poles represent in civilization ? Naturally it is difficult for a member of the nation in question to answer such a question. He may be accused of partiality and exaggeration, or he may overlook something of importance. The life of the Polish nation is too complex to admit of any short answer being given to the question I have proposed. I shall therefore confine my attention to one or two characteristic features of national development. The absence in England of reference-books with detailed statistics makes it difficult to give more than general indications.

First of all, in estimating the part played by Poland in the progress of civilization, one must remember her unfortunate position. A member of any nation with political independence can always work with one single purpose. In business, scholastic work, military service, he is always serving not only his own interest but his nation. Not so a Pole. Whatever new work he may take up, he must always remember that it is for him also to defend his national heritage against his enemies. Those enemies are armed ; he is not. They control legislative bodies ; he must obey their orders, or be treated as a revolutionary. They are powerful, and can make friends ; he has nothing but what God has given him and what he can win for himself. At the very best, he is graciously allowed to enjoy a few of those rights which everywhere else are considered the birthright of man ; but usually even that privilege is denied him. To understand Polish psychology, one must realize that two attitudes may be taken up in regard to Polish conditions. One is that of the cold chronicler, who simply records facts : to him, the Prussian Expropriation Law, the sufferings of children, the punishment of patriots, are merely items in a series of statutes, in

a treatise on pedagogy, in criminal statistics. But there is another and a more human point of view. You must yourself be able to feel deeply if you wish to understand what is felt, for instance, by an Austrian Pole, when he hears of the wrongs suffered by his compatriots in Prussian Poland. Unless you accept the evidence of those who have observed this people, unless you have been in Polish patriotic meetings, unless you have heard a national song sung secretly, with tears in the eyes—it is not easy to understand what the Polish spirit really means. And Poland of to-day is not a country of wealth and power which can reward her devoted sons with highly-paid positions and orders and titles. The Pole considers himself the son of a poor mother, whom he sees bound hand and foot, and whom he earnestly desires to make free and happy.

I should like to dispel at once a very common delusion, which arises from the oft-repeated calumnies of Poland's enemies. Polish patriots have often been represented as the sons or friends of a corrupt aristocracy, who desire a re-established Poland for their own selfish purposes. That view shows only a profound ignorance or a wilful misrepresentation of the life of the people. Polish patriotism is in the fullest sense a popular sentiment. Have the detractors forgotten that in the interval between the second and third partitions (1793–5) it was the peasants who took up—I was going to say arms, but alas! they had no arms: they took their scythes and turned them into swords—peasants, I repeat, who went into the field in thousands to face the enemy? Their leader was the famous Tadeusz Kosciuszko (*pron.* Kostewshko). It is said that the populations of boroughs were neglected or oppressed: was it not the heroic population of Warsaw, was it not a humble shoemaker (Kilinski) who

most nobly defended Polish liberty ? Much, very much, may be said against some of Poland's former rulers ; and many of her nobles have been far from guiltless. But does Poland stand alone in this respect ? Was not the 'Holy Roman Empire of the German nation' torn by the struggles of petty princes and counts and barons ? What of the Rhine Federation of 1806 ? The Polish burghers and peasants, one may say without exaggeration, fully understood that it was their country, and not any privileged class of their nation, which they so passionately defended. I do not mean to underestimate the great part played by the nobility in Polish history. Their mistakes were common mistakes of their times. But they were, and they still are, on the whole, as patriotic as any section of the community, and from their ranks have come some of the greatest of Poland's sons.

Austria attempted to counteract the revolutions of the 'forties by stirring up a peasant war against the nobility. (The condition of the peasantry, be it remembered, depended on, and could only be reformed by, the Austrian Government itself.) The attempt resulted only in a few outrages sanctioned by the Governments' benevolent neutrality ; while the town of Lwów (*pron.* Lvooff) did revolt—but against the Government ! At the same time a movement was being carried on in all parts of Poland, mostly against the Governments' wishes, to democratize the country. In 1848 the Poles were hailed as the champions of liberty in Berlin : they played a prominent part in the Austrian Constituent Assembly, which was suspended after a short time and superseded by a system of rigorous absolutism.

In spite of repeated prosecutions, the movement to popularize patriotic ideas, as well as to spread education among the poorer classes, was never suppressed. Advan-

tage was taken of every possible opportunity to carry on the propaganda ; consider, for example, the development of schools in Galicia, where, to some extent at least, this function has of recent years been in the hands of Poles. We say to some extent ; for the expenses had to be approved, directly or indirectly, by the Government, and only a few sources of revenue were available. It must be remembered that, down to the 'sixties, the Austrian Government had done its best to crush Polish patriotism, and had denied the Poles any effective part in the administration of their own affairs ; the development of Galicia, therefore, must be considered as dating only from that time. Where, in any part of Poland, the Government attempted to repress Polish education, a system of 'illegal' teaching grew up. At the risk of imprisonment, Polish ladies would gather round them children of the poor, and do what in every other community would be considered not a crime but a work of charity—teach these children their own language and history. Coming home from their work, mothers would spend the evening in giving their children the cherished advantages they could not gain at school ; for there it was a foreign language and history, not their own, which was offered them. Where it was lawful or, at all events, possible, students and others from the so-called 'intellectual' or educated classes would devote their spare time and much of their meagre income to the cause of enlightening Polish peasants and workmen, and assisting them in the struggle for their daily bread. To go out into the country, to lecture on some subject of general interest, in particular on Polish history, is the pride of many Poles. The system, though best organized in Galicia, is to be found throughout Poland. In Galicia, the Society of Popular

Schools (known familiarly as the T.S.L.) has branches in thousands of villages, and numerous organizations in the larger towns. Where the work already done by the local school is adequate, the branch contents itself with imparting elementary general knowledge to the peasants, developing their social life (there are, for instance, many amateur performances of music and drama), and instructing them in subjects of everyday utility; there is usually a small library; the local subscription is at most 1s. 8d. a year. Where local education is not efficient, or where none exists, schools are organized. In towns, *mutatis mutandis*, similar work is done. A number of other organizations exist which aim at the moral and physical development of the Pole.

Much the same is to be said of the economic development of the people. The Polish peasant, as well as the burgher or landlord, has been taught to understand that his national existence is closely connected with his economic strength. He is economically weakest where he is politically strongest—as in Galicia. Every political concession has been bought at the price of bearing a heavy economic yoke, which was imposed on Galicia as far back as the eighteenth century. From that time onwards Galicia has been a hinterland, and even her liberation from German imposts was obstructed by the Austrian Government as much as possible. Where ‘iron war’ is being relentlessly waged on them, the Polish peasant and burgher adopt the only weapon which is left to them—that of economic organization: Polish industrial enterprise was carried on in Prussia against the will of the Government, which on the other hand lent all its assistance to German trade. Yet the Poles managed to augment their national wealth, much to the exasperation of German economists. No statute,

no *Landrat*, no police, were powerful enough to check this development. Law after law was passed, Pole after Pole was ill-treated, *Landrats* were constantly changed : but still the nation grew from strength to strength. And when the most drastic steps were taken by the authorities, the Poles replied by organizing a boycott of all German goods as well as of all Germans imported by the Government to aid in Germanizing the country.

One of the best evidences of the democratic character of Poland's economic development is the vigorous growth of co-operative societies. In all three parts of the country these societies have rapidly spread, and at present are conspicuously worthy of study and imitation. Whenever an opportunity presents itself of carrying on this movement by legal methods, they are extended in all directions, so that there is now a perfect network of societies out of which larger and larger units are gradually formed. The best known are the 'Farmers' Circles', which exist in almost every village.

The boycott, to which I have just referred, is used by the Poles as a defensive weapon against German aggression. Russian Poland has been for many years flooded with German colonists. Prussian Poland is, in fact, regarded by the Prussian Government as a kind of promised land for Germans instead of Poles. Since the Prussian Government began to increase its persecutions of the Poles—at the same time assisting Germans with every kind of encouragement—a boycott has been organized against German tradesmen in Prussian Poland, and against all German produce in Russian and Austrian Poland. The movement is taken up with unbounded enthusiasm by young and old alike. I have seen school-children going from shop to shop, asking for articles such as pens, paper, &c., and reporting to the Press or the

'boycott organizations' ¹ the names of traders who had offered German, or even 'suspected' goods. It must be remembered that the Poles can nowhere employ the weapon of tariffs; for instance, goods brought from Warsaw to Cracow are often subject to heavier duties than those coming from Berlin. Needless to say, the Germans used every possible ruse to circumvent the watchful boycotters, while they compelled the Prussian Poles to give a large measure of publicity to their business. Notwithstanding their efforts, the work was done thoroughly and well.

The political struggle for existence could do much to make life difficult for the Poles; but it did not entirely absorb the attention of the nation. It did not exclude a strong, though hampered, cultural life. It is hardly necessary to remind my readers of world-famous names like those of Mme. Curie-Sklodowska the scientist, Sienkiewicz the novelist, or Paderewski the musician. But I may be allowed to add that they are by no means accidents of national life and character. The work of culture is carried on unceasingly. The Germans, with their sixty millions, have more than twenty universities; the ten millions of German Austrians have five; the Poles, with over twenty millions, have—two! In these two, it is true, there is no branch of human knowledge which is not taught. Still, the numbers speak for themselves. There are many Polish scholars of great eminence—though unfortunately they are often taken for foreigners! It happens only too frequently that the results of Polish academic labour are appropriated by

¹ A body of this kind exists in Lwów under the name of 'Organization of Boycott of Goods coming from Prussia and the German Empire', and had, when I was last in that city, its own publication, called *Bojkot*.

the learned pretences of others. Hence the desire of many Poles to write in no language but their own; hence, also, the fact that so few people in England are acquainted with the work of a scholar (to name only one) who should be well known to anybody who is interested in Polish or Slavonic legal history—I refer to Professor Balzer, of the University of Lwów. There are many others equally zealous, if not equally illustrious. To the excellent academic work which is being done much is contributed by the numerous learned societies and their publications. There is a special society devoted to the promotion of nearly every branch of knowledge. Here again the smallest actual result is achieved in Prussia, where every nerve is strained and every faculty engaged in defending what remains of national property. Where the pressure of material conditions is not so severe, intellectual work goes on without pause, the central control being vested in the Polish Academy, whose numerous publications may be found in more than one English library.

It must always be borne in mind that all this work is carried on with, at most, comparatively slight assistance from the Government. Generally it receives no assistance at all and has to contend with the greatest difficulties. It should be clearly understood who is chiefly responsible for this work. It may be interesting to note that the Polish learned community (whatever its varying political sympathies) is to a large extent of democratic origin.¹ The same is true of the students. Many of them, sons of poor farm-labourers, come up to

¹ There are, of course, many distinguished scholars of noble descent, e. g. Count Tarnowski, the President of the Academy; the late Count Dzieduszycki; Count Pininski; Professor Starzynski, the late Rector of Lwów University, and others.

the university and work six or more hours a day just to earn their scanty livelihood. It is not uncommon to find among them men who even contrive to send a little money to support an aged mother or help to send a brother to school. The time left over from that which is spent in earning a living is devoted to university work, or even to work in some society which helps to provide education for the poor.¹ I have seen many examples of this kind in my own university. Of course, some attempt has been made to give assistance to those who have to struggle against such difficulties. 'Societies of fraternal help' have been organized, and are doing admirable work in the universities. 'University houses,' which provide cheap lodgings, have also been built. The principle of national self-help is applied wherever possible.

A characteristic and curious feature of Polish culture is the peasant-poets. They are not merely isolated cases; they are very popular—not least among their fellow peasants. One of their number, a member of the Reichsrat and the Galician Diet, some time ago by accident lost his seat in the Diet. The city of Lwów offered him a seat, and he was elected after a campaign lasting only a few days. The works of these poets are not treated as mere curiosities, but accepted as expressions of those feelings which are not only characteristic of the Polish mind but common to humanity at large. In this connexion mention should be made of the Polish patriotic songs. They form a group by themselves; there are hundreds of them, expressing those sentiments of hope and fear

¹ The poverty of most Polish students is incredible. An inquiry organized a few years ago by a personal friend of mine, Dr. Zylski, has revealed the most appalling conditions,

and love and sorrow which ever since the last quarter of the eighteenth century have filled the hearts of all true Poles. Though generally composed by obscure authors, they are known everywhere throughout the country. There is no great event in Polish history, no battle of the revolutions,¹ no famous case of persecution, which is not commemorated by its own song. From the period of the Napoleonic wars up to the present time, collections of these songs have been owned by many Poles, and the utmost persecution has not been able to make them surrender these treasured possessions.

In the quality and output of their literature the Poles may claim, I think, that they are not behind any other nation of the present day. There are so many writers in different branches of literary activity that it is difficult to give any accurate or even approximate account of their productions. Prus-Glowacki tells in a brilliant novel the story of a Polish peasant in Russian Poland who is beset by German colonists eager to snatch his land and ready to employ every means to ruin the heroic defender of his ancestral land. The poetess Mme. Konopnicka sings of village life, while her friend Mme. Orzeszkowa leads a vigorous attack on social superstitions. The poet of radicalism, Zeroniski, places his hero amid the events which in Napoleonic times filled Poland with conflicting emotions, and pictures the development of his mind from early youth to mature manhood. Tetmajer, a son of the Polish highlands, sings their beauty and the life-story of their sons and daughters. Village life is faithfully described by Reymont ; Ujejski's illustration of Chopin's *Marche Funèbre* lends a new beauty to that famous work ; Asnyk, social reformer as

¹ There was a time when even German poets, like Lenau, sang of Polish patriotism.

well as singer of love-songs ; Mme. Zapolska, whose fascinating novels expose with a strong realism social vice and hypocrisy—these are only a few names taken at random from many.

What has been said may give some impression of Polish civilization—an impression which, I feel sure, does not err on the side of exaggeration. I have tried, except for one or two minor references, to confine myself to what has been done in the last decades of the nineteenth and first years of the twentieth centuries ; there are large fields of successful Polish activity, especially in the fine arts (e.g. in painting the works of Grottger, Siemiradzki, Matejko, and so many others) to which I have not referred. I have purposely refrained from going further back and from mentioning Poland's three greatest poets, as well as others of her famous sons and daughters. I hope that I have said enough to show that this nation is worthy of the assistance of other nations who stand for civilization and culture. There is surely no need to plead that she is entitled to *existence and independence* ; my intention is merely to show that her inward life has been so vigorous, in spite of all difficulties, that in helping her more powerful nations will be helping the cause of culture and humanity. Can the same be said of Prussia? That leads us to the question, What is the meaning, from the point of view of culture, of the struggle between Germans and Poles ?

There are three arguments which are generally put forward whenever the Germans, and more especially the Prussians, set themselves to subdue a smaller nation : they are—(1) The racial struggle ; (2) The defence of culture ; (3) Example. As to the racial struggle, it is usually carried on against Slavs, sometimes against Latins ;

but the struggle itself is not necessarily confined to those races, for Prussia has not hesitated to oppress Teutonic Danes. Moreover, until quite recently, the Prussian ruling classes would have repudiated any idea of relenting their persecution of the Poles 'lest Russia might be alienated'.¹ Frederick II and Frederick William II did not mind combining with Russia to carry out the partitions of Poland. But wherever possible the 'racial struggle' serves as an excuse and a catchword. Usually some person of weight and authority comes forward to urge upon the German world the necessity of carrying on the struggle. To mention only one example: it was no other than Theodor Mommsen who, seventeen years ago, considered it his duty to stir up Austrian Germans against the Slavs, the majority in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy being Slavonic. He received a spirited reply from a distinguished Pole in the person of Professor Balzer.² The great German historian had to be reminded that, when the Germans overran the Roman Empire, they had not the slightest solicitude for the civilization of the conquered country, and did not keep back on account of their own barbarism; that it was a poet of his own nation, Schiller, who said, 'There is room on earth for everybody.' What would a German say, asked Professor Balzer, if he were charged with being less civilized, say by a Frenchman or Italian, merely because German culture began comparatively late and for long was based on foreign, especially French and Italian, models? But the lesson apparently was not enough for Prussia. On every possible pretext the

¹ See *The Times*, December 30, 1901, p. 3, col. f.

² Professor of Polish Legal History in the University of Lwów, Member of the Polish and Bohemian Academies, and Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy.

'holy war' is still preached. A nation which is not German is, it would seem, destined only for the hostility of the Teutonic peoples.

Two other arguments are particularly dear to the Germans: they are fighting for civilization, and they are setting a profitable example to the world. No deed so barbarous which may not be justified on one or other of these grounds. Such arguments are particularly prominent in the struggle against the Poles. The Kaiser once stated, in Gniezno, that 'the name of German connotes civilization and freedom for all in religion as well as in thought and activity'.¹ I should like, therefore, to give some slight account of one or two of the most glorious achievements of Prussian culture in Poland. I shall try for the most part to confine myself to the twentieth century.² I must add that what I am about to say does not pretend in the slightest degree to be a full account of the immense tragedies which are the fate of millions of Poles in Prussia. Comparatively few of them are even ever reported: their occurrence is a fact of daily life in Poland and there is no necessity to repeat what everybody knows and feels.

It is difficult to know where to begin. But we may take as a first example the case of the Polish schoolboys in 1901. Some sixty of them were tried on a charge of

¹ *The Times*, August 11, 1905, p. 3, col. f.

² As a rule I shall refer to accounts published in *The Times*. Where that is impossible, the references are to Buzek's *Historia polityki narodowościowej rządu pruskiego wobec Polaków* (*History of the Nationalist Policy of the Prussian Government against the Poles*), Lwów, 1909. The work covers the period 1815-1908: Dr. Buzek is Professor of Administrative Law in the University of Lwów, and member of the Reichsrat and was chairman of its Committee for Social Insurance. A copy of his book is in the British Museum,

belonging to a 'secret society'; out of the number nearly fifty were convicted and sentenced, some of them to three months' imprisonment. The dark and dangerous purpose of this criminal confederacy was 'the study of the Polish language, literature, and history'. A still more heinous offence, in the eyes of the Court, was that the society was intended 'to promote the revival of Polish national feeling'.¹ The boys were sent to prison, to be instructed in the virtues of civilization—to learn, in the Kaiser's words, 'freedom in thought and activity'. Even this privilege was not considered sufficient. According to Professor Buzek's account, the boys, besides being imprisoned, were expelled from their schools—some of them, indeed, precluded from all the higher schools in Prussia. Their crime was manifestly greater than that of the German schoolboys who formed secret drinking societies, and who before that time had been disciplined only by the school authorities.²

The boys had not yet served their sentences when certain Poles were guilty of another and an equally odious crime. The Germans had, in the second half of the nineteenth century, abolished teaching in Polish. Attendance at school is compulsory; and Polish children therefore had to read and learn everything in German. Only by the most heroic efforts could their parents find time to teach them Polish writing; but they contrived to do so, in spite of all obstacles. Religious instruction was the only subject which could be taught in Polish in the schools—and that only here and there,³ not by any

¹ *The Times*, September 11, 1901, p. 3, col. d; September 14, 1901, p. 6, col. c. Note that in 1815 the King of Prussia in his proclamation assured the Poles that 'they need not give up their nationality'.

² Buzek, p. 487. ³ *The Times*, October 30, p. 5, 1906, col. d.

means universally. Wherever they could do so, the Germans substituted their own language for Polish, even in the teaching of religion. It happened that in Wrzesnia (in German, Wreschen) certain children 'refused to pay any attention to religious instruction imparted in the German language'. They said simply, 'We are Poles, not Germans, and do not wish to know anything about the German religion'. Some twenty of them, therefore, were 'detained, and, on their still proving obdurate', fourteen of their number received 'corporal punishment'.¹ Speaking of this incident in the Landtag, the Prussian Minister of Public Instruction said: 'the teacher had merely enforced a pedagogic principle, the excellence of which had been proved for two thousand years.'² But the barbarous Poles could not perceive the excellence of the principle nor the superiority of a German to a Polish prayer. The punishment inflicted on the children 'led to a great uproar among the parents and friends of the children, some of whom succeeded in forcing their way into the school, while the punishment was being administered, and were only expelled by the aid of the police'.³ A physician, Dr. Krzyzagorski, certified that the children's fingers were so swollen that they could not close their hands.⁴ 'For the violence then displayed, and for opprobrious and seditious language towards the inspector and the other school authorities,' twenty-five persons were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment⁵—one of them, a mother of five children to two and a half years.

¹ *The Times*, November 20, 1901, p. 5, cols. d, e.

² *Ibid.*, January 14, 1902, p. 3, col. e.

³ *Ibid.*, November 20, 1901, p. 5, col. e.

⁴ Buzek, p. 467.

⁵ *The Times*, November 20, 1901, p. 5, col. e.

It was after these highly cultured proceedings that Henryk Sienkiewicz, the author of *Quo Vadis?* addressed an open letter to (if I remember aright) the Kaiser. I may be permitted to quote from it at some length, for the reader will find in it, I think, an expression of what many must be feeling to-day :

. . . Not a hand had been raised against the master executioners. Not a single deed of violence had been perpetrated. And yet the Prussian Courts of Justice condemned the parents of those poor children who had been tortured in the Prussian schools, because, moved by despair and pity, they allowed words of indignation to escape their lips against such schools and such masters. . . . We . . . who, since a fraction of our nation has formed part of Prussia, are well acquainted with that *milieu*, we alone have no right to be surprised . . . One of their own authors, a German, once expressed the characteristic opinion that it was a mistake to think that an immoral policy did not deprave society and its future generations. What was bound to happen did happen. Ever since the time of Frederick II and even a still more remote period, Prussian policy has been but a series of crimes, of deeds of violence, of knavery, of humility towards the powerful, of tyranny towards the weak, of falsehoods, of violated treaties, of broken promises.

That is not only the opinion of foreign historians, but it is also that of independent German historians themselves. How, then, can we be surprised that in such circumstances a decomposition of souls should follow, that the sentiment of justice and truth should have degenerated, that moral sense should have completely disappeared, and that in the midst of the general depravity the school should have become an instrument of torture and the debased Courts of Justice the tools of savage instincts and of violence ? . . . The only consolation in all this is that it cannot last. . . . Christian and cultured nations cannot submit to barbarism for any length of time. Nor can the German people be for

ever subjected to the Prussian element. . . . The future must bring, and unquestionably will bring, expiation and a gigantic evolution.¹

At that time the Kaiser was talking about sculpture, the relation of art to nature, and ideals. 'For us,' he said, 'for the German people, great ideals have become permanent possessions, while other nations have more or less lost them.'²

The case of Wrzesnia, of course, aroused a storm of indignation among the Poles. The German Government did its utmost to force her Austrian ally to prevent the Galician Poles from openly condemning Prussia; and the notorious Prince Eulenburg, then German ambassador at Vienna, had to exert himself very energetically to put down these scandalous Polish assaults on Prussian culture.³

Without tracing in detail the further development of this question, I will point out only one significant fact. Those 'wicked boys', as an influential Berlin journal described them, had been punished; but the 'example' was not sufficient. The series of tragedies continued. In 1906, M. H. de Noussaine, of the *Écho de Paris*, published a letter which had been addressed to him, undertaking at the same time to furnish the Prussian authorities with names and details. I will give a few extracts:

The Prussian Government persists in endeavouring to give religious instruction in German to the Polish children in most of the schools. . . . The children and their parents, above all among the working classes, are determined to resist this abuse of power. Hundreds

¹ *The Times*, November 29, 1901, p. 5, col. e.

² *Ibid.*, December 20, 1901, p. 3, cols. c, d.

³ *Ibid.*, December 6, 1901, p. 5, col. c.

of children have spontaneously declared to their teachers that they will not use a single word of German. They persist in their refusal in spite of being beaten and locked up in the dark. They can be seen in tears, begging the priests to pray to God to have pity upon their sufferings. . . . The school teachers and the Government are exasperated, and persecute both parents and children in an unheard-of fashion. The children are locked up, not even being allowed to return to their homes for dinner. In many schools the teachers have flogged the children until they lost consciousness.¹

The result was that nearly fifty thousand children throughout Prussian Poland 'went on strike'.² They refused 'to answer questions in German in the religious instruction classes, preferring to be kept in and even to be flogged'.³ The Prussian Government faced this shameful revolt with 'calmness and deliberation', as was semi-officially announced; in other words, it enumerated the draconic penalties which it proposed to inflict on rebellious parents and children.⁴ Is it necessary to add that they carried out their intention? Nevertheless, the number of the 'strikers' steadily increased, until it reached a hundred thousand. The Government employed all the coercive methods it had threatened, and many others besides. Thus, under a rule that parents are punishable for the non-attendance of their children at school, many parents were penalized, on the ground that by their disobedience the children were 'absent in spirit'. In some fifty cases, brothers of the children involved were expelled from the public school (*gymnasium*), for the sons of parents who taught their children to disobey the authorities were

¹ *The Times*, October 12, 1906, p. 3, cols. e, f.

² *Ibid.*, November 2, 1906, p. 3, col. b.

³ *Ibid.*, October 27, 1906, p. 7, col. b.

⁴ *Ibid.*, November 2, 1906, p. 3, col. b

thought likely to exercise a bad influence over their fellows.¹

A short time before these events a member of the Pan-German party had advocated the religious instruction in their native language of the Hereros of South-West Africa.² The same privilege was not considered fitting for the Polish nation.

The case of the children is not unique, nor even the most glaring of many others which might be cited. Let us take another example. In 1908 an imperial statute enacted that, except in international congresses, only the German language could be used in public meetings. An exception was made in the case of districts where at least 60 per cent. of the population had always been accustomed to use the native tongue. If, therefore, a Pole who has been expropriated by the Commission and who is unable to buy land, goes, let us say, to Westphalia, he cannot speak Polish in a public meeting; and the presence of 41 per cent. of Germans in any particular district of Poland makes it a crime to speak the Polish language in public meetings. And even where it is permissible to do so, the privilege is only temporary, for it extends only to 1928; and the restrictions and conditions imposed are, to any reasonable mind, intolerable.³

For many years it has been the established practice of the Government not to appoint any Polish officials or civil servants in the Polish provinces. Those who were admitted before this prohibition came into operation, or who agreed to serve in other parts, are subject to many restrictions. While engaged in their official

¹ Buzek, p. 474.

² *The Times*, December 7, 1906, p. 5, col. e.

³ S. 12 of the *Reichsvereinsgesetz*, 1908; as to other points of the Law of Association, cf. *The Times*, February 7, 1914, p. 7, col. c.

duties, for example, they must not use a single word of Polish. In 1898 the authorities of Gdansk ordered that every schoolmaster should be answerable to the Government if members of his family spoke Polish in private life.¹

The perfidy which characterizes the struggle is, if possible, even greater than its brutality. The Poles are German subjects ; in fact, in matters such as conscription or taxes, they are Germans. But they are Poles—and enemies—whenever there is an opportunity to violate their rights. The references made to the Poles by ministers in Parliament are invariably contemptuous or insulting. Singing the Polish anthem is now, of course, a crime. Yet in the Franco-Prussian War, Prussian generals ordered it to be played when Polish conscripts were sent to the attack. On one occasion the president of a Polish society was prosecuted and convicted, because on one of the society's excursions some Polish songs were sung. The Public Prosecutor admitted that the words were harmless, but held that the melody was likely to provoke a breach of the peace.²

The same policy does not shrink from encouraging immorality if it suits its ends to do so. Only recently there was considerable discussion in the Prussian Diet about a white slave trader in a Polish town, who was granted immunity by the police because he was doing useful service as a political agent.³

Out of the taxes paid by Poles, as well as by others, a 'settlement commission' was established in the 'eighties

¹ Buzek, p. 513.

² Judgement of the Court at Grudziadz, April 29, 1905 ; Buzek, p. 527.

³ A part of this case is stated in *The Times*, February 21, 1914, p. 8, col. c

to promote German colonization in Polish districts. The commissioners paid high prices, encouraged Poles to sell their land, and subjected those who were unwilling to do so to all kinds of disabilities. But they met with little success ; and in the year 1908 an Expropriation Act was passed, in open violation of the German Imperial Constitution, and as another shining example of Prussian civilization. In the Polish provinces, where the interests of *Deutschtum* require it, the Settlement Commission could effect the expropriation of the landowner in order to make room for German colonists. The first case under this enactment was that of a Polish widow with two children. The land had been owned by her husband's ancestors for an exceedingly long time ; but the tenant was ruthlessly evicted to make way for the grasping Prussian.

The Expropriation Act can be employed for many purposes. It was primarily intended to enable the Commission to acquire land, since the Poles refused to sell a 'satisfactory' quantity of it. It was also intended to ruin as many Polish landowners as possible ; and therefore the compensation given is assessed according to a semi-official estimate—much lower, of course, than the actual value of the land. When the proprietors sold voluntarily, they could ask only a sacrifice price, for they knew that the Commission might at any moment step in and offer even less. Conversely, if a Pole wishes to buy land, he is unable to offer a price as high as would be asked of and could be paid by German purchasers, for his tenure is never secure from the Commissioners, and he is always liable to be called on to sell at a loss.

I should add that the Government spares no pains to make the methods of its officials as vexatious as possible

to all Poles who are true to their nationality. A special bonus (*Ostmarkenzulage*) in addition to their salary is awarded at the discretion of the Government to its officers in Prussian Poland in proportion to the zeal which they display in the discharge of their duties. The reader may judge for himself what kind of 'zeal' such a system is likely to inspire in the Government's 'publicans and sinners'.

Sufficient has been said, I hope, to provide an answer to the questions I asked at the beginning of this pamphlet. The reader of the facts I have stated may find himself able to agree with Professor Balzer's words :

To a great part of the German peoples, the interests of culture have always been associated with the State interest, i. e. the State interest has been in the first place. They carried civilization to the Slavonic East to gain for themselves political advantages, and they did not hesitate to give up the cause of culture wherever their own egoistic political interests required some sacrifice. Politicians and Germanizers, in a higher degree than civilizers, they perpetually identified the idea of culture with the idea of their own State and their own nationality; they believed and wished to persuade the world—they even wanted the world to believe them—that the way to civilization leads only through Germany, and that there can be no better fortune for other peoples than to attain by that way to greater perfection. They proclaimed themselves chosen guardians of all who began to engage in the pursuits of culture later than themselves, without asking whether those others desired such guardianship, without reflecting that they could work for culture independently, having been endowed by God with the same abilities as Germans. . . . The Germans offered culture to the Slavs, usually at the price of 'their giving up the greatest treasure, their own nationality; where the Slavs would not pay that price, the Germans simply obstructed their independent development and did not allow them to carry on the work of civilization.

... German culture is neither the first, nor the last, nor the only culture which leads to perfection. . . .’

May I, in conclusion, suggest to the reader one lesson among the many which will come out of the present great struggle ? When the war is over, however much of promise and hope it may ultimately mean for Poland, she will undoubtedly be left in a condition of tragic desolation and misery. But every endeavour will be immediately used to make good her enormous losses ; Europe will have learned that no great Power can safely allow a weaker nation to be oppressed, for the crimes committed against one people, if left unpunished, are likely to be repeated against others ; and it may be hoped that people in the West will look at Poland through their own, and not ‘through German eyes’. If the Western nations will try to come into closer contact with their Eastern friends, they will find much of interest, much that they will consider worth knowing and perhaps admiring. They will find a civilization which has grown up without the aid of militarism, and a principle of national solidarity and self-reliance combined with respect for individual rights. Above all, they will find true, devoted, and patriotic hearts. Perhaps they will see less wealth and material power than elsewhere ; but they will also see less hypocrisy and more sterling humanity.

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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ITALY SINCE 1870

FOREIGN policy is, as a rule, a matter of business, not of sentiment, and for no country is this more true than for Italy. Her history has repeatedly impressed upon her the lesson that friends in international politics are only less dangerous than enemies ; and the eternal laws of geography have made her policy, of necessity, opportunist and complicated. It must, again, be remembered that the modern kingdom of Italy is not yet fifty years old : the taxes are heavy, Lombardy in the North and Romagna in the East have economic difficulties to cope with, while the South has been handicapped by illiteracy, crime, and earthquake. A new and anxious colony has just been acquired in Tripoli, and a policy of risk or adventure is the last thing to be expected from Italy for some years to come. One other general consideration offers itself. Italy will pursue her own policy ; the days of tutelage are over, and no amount of literary, artistic, or moral sympathy will deflect her path, or incline her to a policy which does not offer her manifest advantages.

For the present purpose, the modern policy of Italy may conveniently be divided into two epochs : the first runs from 1870 to 1896, the second is from 1896 to the present day. Not that the year 1896 marks an abrupt or sweeping change, but a different trend or atmosphere is certainly associated with Italian policy from that date. From 1848 to 1870 Italy was engaged in the urgent work of achieving her national unity. The stages were

slow, and each advance was purchased at a fearful cost of men, treasure, and morale. On the whole Italy worked out her own salvation. England lent her a lofty and spasmodic patronage ; Austria thrice fought her ; Napoleon III helped her to Lombardy in 1859, but either discouraged or positively vetoed her acquisition of Venetia, Central Italy, and Rome ; Prussia gave her Venetia in 1866 to purchase her assistance against Austria, but forced a peace upon her which left the Trentino and Istria, which were essentially Italian territory, still in Austrian hands. Only the accident of the Franco-Prussian War allowed Italy to make Rome her capital so early as 1870.

One feeling above all was inherited from this period of struggle : it was a deep-rooted and a well-justified suspicion and dislike of France. The Emperor Napoleon III had used Italy for his own purposes against Austria, but he had no intention of creating a strong national State on his southern frontiers. For the limited assistance he gave, he took as his price the province of Savoy and the district of Nice, and though he was forced by the intensity of national feeling to allow Italy to take the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the Duchies of Parma and Modena, and the bulk of the Papal States in 1861, he firmly vetoed the occupation of Rome itself. At his insistence and by his help Garibaldi's dash on Rome was frustrated at Mentana, and under the French clerical influence he maintained a garrison in Rome till 1870. It was small wonder that his appeal to Victor Emmanuel for help against Germany fell on deaf ears : it is certain that the whole generation of Italians who had lived through the years of emancipation retained a dislike of France that vitally affected later history. Another motive, also, gave impetus to this hostility.

Italy, by reason of her geographical position, is a maritime Power: it is against her interest that any other Power should dominate the Mediterranean by a navy of great superiority, by colonies on the North African coasts, or by a commercial monopoly in the Near East. Now France had taken Algeria in 1830, and any extension of her dominion in Africa alarmed Italian susceptibilities. In 1878 the friends of Turkey, who had supported her against Russia and Roumania, exacted their pound of flesh; Cyprus was assigned to Great Britain, while at the Congress of Berlin in the same year it was agreed by Great Britain and Germany that France might take Tunis. This she did in 1881, and as the direct consequence Italy made the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Before we enter on the results of this momentous step, or show what it enabled Italy to do and what it forbade, we must explain the general conditions of the Alliance, as they appeared to Italian eyes.

The Alliance was, of course, advantageous to all three partners, or they would not have made it. To Germany it meant a new link in the chain of isolation that Bismarck tried without ceasing to draw round France: it promised a naval base in the Mediterranean and a colonial rival for France and Great Britain. To Austria the treaty provided some freedom from the agitation of the Irredentists, the party who claimed the Trentino and Istria as part of Italy still unredeemed (*irredenta*), and it gave some additional support against the advance of Russian influences in the Balkans. But to Italy it was a matter of life and death. Italy was outside the charmed circle of Powers: every other country had had some aspiration fulfilled at the Congress of Berlin, Italy alone went begging. The Pope and the Ultra-

montane party in Europe still hoped to re-establish the Temporal Power ; the military strength of Germany was the sole hope for Italy to keep what she had or to ensure future progress. With France estranged and Russia uninterested, Italy might hope to get at least as much from Austria by the good offices of Germany as by maintaining an impotent hostility towards her. It must, again, never be forgotten that while Bismarck held office (that is, till 1890), participation in the Triple Alliance did not involve for Italy the strained relations with Russia and with Great Britain which its more recent developments have implied. Bismarck made it one of his maxims not to alienate Russia, and more than once a league of the three emperors entered into his plans. It is equally plain that, so long as Lord Salisbury presided over the Foreign Office, the relations of France and Great Britain were so hostile that Italy lost nothing, so far as British goodwill went, by being a member of the Triple Alliance.

The outstanding figure in Italian politics from 1878 to 1896 was undoubtedly Crispi. He belonged to the Revolutionary generation ; he had helped Garibaldi in his attempt to raid Rome ; he had a candid dislike of France, and scented the Vatican in every breeze from the Riviera. His letters seem to show a susceptibility to flattery of which Bismarck took the fullest advantage, and while Crispi was in power the Triple Alliance had no more eloquent and unhesitating friend.

And there is no doubt that in choosing to adhere firmly to this Alliance the Italians held on to the only constant and solid fact that existed in European politics between 1882 and 1896. Germany and Austria formed a coalition whose interests were perfectly consistent, whose objects were entirely concerted. Meanwhile,

France and Great Britain were sparring over Egypt, Indo-China, or Morocco. Great Britain and Russia more than once nearly came to blows over Afghanistan and the road to India. By enlisting in the Triple Alliance Italy secured the friendship of Great Britain, and it seems agreed that in 1887 a convention was made between the two countries whereby Great Britain undertook to safeguard Italian interests in the Mediterranean as against France. The Triple Alliance was renewed in 1887 for a further term of six years, and this time the terms were more generous to Italy ; her allies guaranteed her interests in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean, a concession no doubt mainly due to Austrian fears of Russian action and doubts as to the future of the Balkans since the blow for freedom struck by Bulgaria in 1885.

Whatever one's opinion of the moral aspects of Bismarck's policy, it must be confessed that it was superlatively clever. Anxious to consolidate the position of Germany in Europe and to complete the humiliation of France, he encouraged all the possible rivals of Germany to carry their ambitions into the scramble for places in the sun in Africa and Asia. The English in Egypt offset the French in Tunis ; the Russians in Merv and Penjdeh balanced the English in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan. Pursuing the same policy of pin-pricks to France, he urged Crispi to realize the old ambitions of Italy to become a colonial Power, and since it was impossible in those days of Anglo-Turkish friendship to take Tripoli, Crispi devoted his attention to the Red Sea. In 1870 a private company had bought, with the help of public money, the port of Assab on the Abyssinian coast, and this was in 1882 transferred to the State. In 1885 Massowah was occupied and gradually developed into the Colony of Eritrea ; in 1889 the Italian strip of Somaliland was added.

Relations with France, which were bad enough in any case, were greatly embittered by the Italian repudiation of the commercial treaty dating from 1881 ; a treaty which, the Italians claimed, hampered their industry unfairly. A severe tariff war continued for nearly ten years. After 1886, Italian workmen were maltreated in the south of France, and disputes as to the status of each other's citizens in Massowah and in Tunis made things worse. The effect of these events was seen in the renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1891 : this was to last for another six years, or, if not then denounced by one of the allies, for twelve years ; a clause was also inserted whereby Italy pledged herself in case of need to send two army corps through the Tyrol to attack France.¹

This marks the zenith of the Alliance : from that time it is possible to mark the tide setting, though very slowly, the other way ; the Alliance needs more effort to keep it alive, the influence of Germany as middleman between Austria and Italy is called for a little more every year.

The commercial war with France and the withdrawal of French capital caused great distress in Italy, but this was nothing in comparison with the moral havoc and the dreadful blow to the national prestige brought about by the collapse of their colonial policy. In 1891 the Emperor Menelek tore up the treaty he had made, and forbade the Italians to penetrate farther into Abyssinia ; after some years of border warfare Crispi adopted an energetic policy, and in 1895 ordered an army to occupy Adowa, the capital of Tigré, a State tributary to Abyssinia. On March 1, 1896, the battle of Adowa was fought ; the Italians lost 10,000 men killed and wounded, were forced to recognize the complete independence of

¹ This clause, it is understood, was dropped when the treaty was renewed in 1902.

Abyssinia by a treaty of November, and abandoned the protectorate they had claimed. This was the end of the policy of adventure, and when in 1899 the Government pegged out a claim in China like other Great Powers and proposed to occupy the Bay of San Mun, public opinion in Italy forced them to withdraw. Labour troubles and political factions were disorganizing the State, and in the last five years of the nineteenth century Italy was in a sorry state. But while she was setting her house in order, the whole face of European politics was being changed.

The first consequence of Bismarck's disappearance was a better understanding between France and Russia, which began in 1891 and grew in strength. Pan-Slavism—the dream of a Confederation of all the Balkan Slavs with Holy Russia—became every day a more tangible force in politics. Almost simultaneously, Italy began to mend her relations with France: in 1896 Visconti Venosta brought about a Franco-Italian Convention which settled disputes of trade and navigation rights in Tunis, and in 1898 a new commercial treaty was completed. In the same year the long period of Anglo-French rivalry in Egypt culminated in the Fashoda incident, and thereafter ended. The South Africa War at the end of the century had this import for Italy, that the German attitude to the war and the passing of the German Navy Law of 1900 destroyed the friendship of Germany with Great Britain. In 1904 the arrangement known as the 'Entente', between France and Great Britain, first became a matter of public knowledge; it was especially directed towards the mutual safeguarding of British supremacy in Egypt and French supremacy in Morocco. The test of these new arrangements and of the change in Italian sympathy came at the Conference of

Algeçiras, which was held in the winter of 1905-6. There two facts of great importance were clearly established : that England and France stood or fell together, and that the Triple Alliance had a rift in it, or at least a limitation. It was plain that Italy would not jeopardize herself for German colonial ambitions.

Two great questions of the future began to cast their shadows before : the vast designs of Germany and the aspirations of the Balkan States. In view of these the Powers in 1907 began to adjust their conflicting interests in the Mediterranean and other spheres, and to gird up their loins for more grave struggles. England, France, and Spain came to agreement as to their respective spheres of influence in Northern Africa and as to the naval situation. Great Britain and Russia settled for the moment their disputes in Persia and Thibet. Great Britain, France, and Italy signed a treaty to regulate the affairs of Ethiopia and the Red Sea. It was therefore from a much more detached point of view and with a more elastic system of foreign relations that Italy undertook the question which is so vital to her, the future of the Balkans.

It is the first maxim of her policy that no other State shall dominate, by military or commercial superiority, the coast of the Adriatic which constitutes her strategic frontier on the east. The Romans and the Venetians had to master the Adriatic, and so must modern Italy. Her eastern coast is flat and exposed, and there is no good harbour south of Venice. But the other side of the Adriatic is indented with many magnificent natural harbours ; Austria has Trieste, Fiume belongs to Hungary, Cattaro is geographically Montenegrin but in fact Austrian ; and in Albania lies Valona, only forty miles away from Bari. Racial sympathies attract Italy to this

coast too. There are said to be over three million people of Latin origin in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Istria in particular is largely Italian. Trieste, though not all the ground behind it, is Italian in mind, and the city sent a wreath to King Humbert's funeral, bearing the legend 'Trieste to her King'. The marriage of the reigning King, Victor Emmanuel III, to Princess Helena of Montenegro in 1896 made another link between the two Adriatic shores. In 1878 Austria was allowed by the Berlin Congress to 'occupy' Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the district (Sandjak) of Novi Bazar that runs between Serbia and Montenegro. Italian jealousy was roused, and Crispi was advised by Bismarck to take part of Albania. Italy was not ready for such a great enterprise, and her position in the Alliance was far too weak for many years to come to dream of open action in this direction. But she has pursued, particularly since 1896, the policy known as the 'peaceful penetration' of Albania. While Austria has taken the Catholics of Northern Albania under her wing, while Austrian Franciscans have used education to induce Austrian sympathies among the rising generation, and the steamers of the Austrian Lloyd Company have pushed commercial feelers in every direction, Italy has not been idle. Italian schools have been founded at Scutari and Durazzo, consuls have opened up markets, the Pughia Steamship Line has very largely supplanted the Austrian Lloyd. Feeling each other's support essential in other spheres and unable to agree in this, Italy and Austria have compromised their claims on Albania; in 1907 the two Foreign Ministers, Aehrenthal and Tittoni, agreed that it was undesirable to divide Albania, and that it was necessary to establish an autonomous Albania, independent of Turkey.

The years that saw Russia first deeply immersed in

the Japanese War, and then to some extent in a state of collapse, witnessed a fresh burst of Austrian activity in the Balkans. In January 1908 Aehrenthal announced that the Turkish Government had given Austria a concession to construct a railway in the Sandjak from Uvaes to Mitrovitza; this would have linked up the Austrian railway system in Bosnia to the Turkish main line to Salonika, and threatened to put the commercial supremacy of the Balkans in her hands. Servia at once protested, and proposed to make a line from the Danube to the Adriatic, thus turning the stream of trade from East to West, not to mention military considerations. Italy, it is worth noticing, supported the Servian alternative, and the Banca d'Italia promised £1,600,000 to the undertaking. But in July came the outbreak of the Turkish Revolution and the first breath of the great tempest that has destroyed so many Balkan landmarks. In the autumn the German Powers determined to test the situation. On October 7 an imperial rescript of the Emperor Francis Joseph declared the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and restored the Sandjak to Turkey; Bulgaria, by previous arrangement, at the same time declared its complete independence of the Porte. The annexation did not please Italy, and the small crumb of comfort that Austria gave her by abrogating Article 29 of the Treaty of Berlin and allowing Montenegro more freedom of action in her own ports was not looked upon as adequate compensation, rather as an act of tardy recompense. Tittoni's handling of the situation was considered weak, and if the Slav States had risen to the opportunity, it is possible that Italy would have ranged herself on their sides. But when Servia appealed to Russia for support, she found no response. Russia was not yet sufficiently recovered from

her troubles to face the German ultimatum ; England was not directly interested, and so the occasion passed.

Still nothing since 1909 has improved the real relations of Italy and Austria. If Austria has rejected with contumely the proposal for an Italian University at Trieste, Italy in 1911 took a step that threatened at one time a rupture of peaceful relations. Turkish misgovernment did not improve after the Revolution, and the Young Turks showed that they had inherited most of the corruption and cruelty of the old régime without its capacity. It is too early yet to write the history of the negotiations that led up to the Italian declaration of war and the seizure of Tripoli. We have seen that Italy had long claimed Tripoli as her due, but why did she choose September 1911 ? It is certain that German men of commerce were invading ground there that Italy had marked out as her own, and that Germany had ideas of taking the harbour of Tobruk. It is possible that Great Britain, alarmed at German designs on the roads to the East, and grateful for Italian support in the Agadir affair, advised or countenanced the move as checkmate. Italy clearly thought that she must act if she was not to be anticipated in Tripoli by some other Power. Her colonies hitherto had disappointed her. Eritrea and Somaliland had a total area of only 186,000 square miles, a population of about 850,000, almost entirely native, and extremely limited trading prospects ; Tripoli had once been a Roman province, it lies opposite her very doors, it is over 400,000 square miles in extent, a considerable Italian and European population was settled there, its commercial possibilities not dazzling but certainly worth developing. Although considerable sacrifice has been incurred, the result has, on the whole, been a triumph for the New Italy ; the

Army proved its competence, and men of all parties have united at last for a common patriotic object. Nothing of late years has done more to restore national self-confidence, and the effect on international relationships was equally important.

We may treat the foreign policy of Italy since 1911 as forming one epoch. The Triple Alliance, with the commercial treaties that perhaps made it most valuable to Italian feeling, was renewed in December 1912 for a fresh term of five years, but it is not inconsistent with that to say that the ties which bind Italy to her allies have since 1911 been seriously relaxed. The Italian attack on the Turks, the chosen clients of the German Powers, was a distinct affront to them: in the Agadir crisis Italy definitely cast her weight against the German scheme for acquisitions in Morocco itself: the Austrian veto against any attack on the Turks from the Adriatic hampered the Italian operations in 1911, and was naturally contrasted with the friendly attitude of Great Britain, who made all communication between Constantinople and Tripoli through Egypt impossible. The strenuous efforts of the Kaiser to improve the relations of his allies did something, but in any case very strong reasons compelled the Marquis di San Giuliano to accept a renewal of the Alliance, in spite of severe criticism. It was impossible to expect very cordial support from France for the Italian policy in Tripoli, which did not improve her position in Tunis. Neither from France nor from Great Britain could any great readiness be expected to accept a war with the Sultan, the head of Islam and the faith which millions of their subjects professed. The German Powers could at least use their influence with the Young Turks to secure a Turkish evacuation of Tripoli and to get for Italy rights of

occupation in the Aegean Islands. But it was no doubt the prospect of imminent warfare in the Balkans which chiefly induced the Italian Court to seek the shortest cut out of the Turkish War and to seek an understanding with Austria. With Great Britain Italy was on friendly terms in every sphere, with France a clear agreement was come to (October 1912) in regard to Morocco and Libya, but both Great Britain and France were the allies of Russia, the protector of the Balkan Slavs, and it was the vision of a great advance by Slavs or Greeks to the Adriatic which filled Italy with misgivings. In October 1912 Count Berchtold and the Marquis di San Giuliano agreed to maintain, so far as possible, the *status quo* in the Balkans—Italy, it would seem, promising to help Austria in preventing a Servian advance in Albania, while Austria undertook to check Greek pretensions in the north of Epirus or on the vital harbour of Valona. The overwhelming success of the Balkan League between October and December 1912 no doubt surprised Italian diplomacy, as it did all Europe. To a great extent acceptance of the accomplished fact was forced on the Triple Alliance, for it was impossible to refuse the demands of four peoples in arms and intoxicated with victory. It is improbable that Italy played any part in the successful intrigue of the German Powers to divide the League, to set Bulgaria against her allies, and to save Adrianople, from which Turkey might fight another day. But when in December Austria mobilized to force the Servians to leave Albania alone, and early in 1913 advanced the scheme of an independent Albanian principality, Italy felt bound to join her. The Montenegrins were all this winter besieging Scutari, and hoped to annex it; if that was more tolerable to Italy than to Austria, the Servian claims on Alessio, Durazzo, and S. Giovanni di Medua

were most distasteful. Not that Italian feeling was opposed to the Serb aspirations ; on the contrary, it is likely that Italy would look with kindliness on a union of Servia and Montenegro, which would form a powerful bulwark against Austria. But Italy could never tolerate any other Power in Albania. Hence her opposition to the Serbs : hence, also, her objections to single Austrian action against Montenegro at Scutari, and her preference of a concerted effort by all the Powers to settle the Albanian question.

But it may be said with some safety that the events of the last year have changed the situation in Italian eyes. Her natural antagonism to Austria is unchanged, but the other factors in the general European system, that made that antagonism count for little, have been greatly modified. The balance of power in the Balkans has altered altogether. The German plans to increase the power of Bulgaria and Turkey have completely failed ; Roumania—half Latin and half Slav—has broken away from German leading-strings, and in conjunction with Greece forced a settlement last year that left both Turkey and Bulgaria weakened and impoverished. It is now impossible to deny or to stultify the claims of the Slavs and Greeks to expansion ; it might be perhaps easier to transact a bargain with them, possibly through the medium of their natural allies of the Triple Entente. Tripoli is a problem no more : France and Great Britain have recognized the Mediterranean interests of Italy to a great extent, and possibly it would be to their profit to give these interests yet fuller scope. Albania is still in disorder ; Italy may look with favour on the claims of Essad Pasha, in default of a better, to rule free Albania, but there are no signs that Austrian influence could be usefully employed to check Greece or Montenegro. Italy

is more likely to seek some agreement with Roumania, a State, like Italy, free of all binding alliances, a State of the Slavs, but not tied to them, a State like her whose interests in the Balkans require a balance of forces. When Italy declared her neutrality in the present conflict, she took the greatest step, and it will need more than gusts of popular sympathy to take her further. Racial considerations by themselves rarely determine policy; the relations of the two Latin States, Italy and France, are hardly yet sisterly; rather those of sisters-in-law. Nor must we minimize the difficulties of a forward policy. If Trieste is Latin, the Alps in winter are coldly neutral, and the hinterland of Istria has no clear or easily-defined Latin frontier. Even if Italy would care to occupy Lissa or some other of the islands, she could hardly embark lightly on a big campaign in the Adriatic. The need for economy is still great, and her expenditure in 1913 on the Army (£16,960,000) and the Navy (£10,240,000) proves it.

It would be as reasonable to say that Italy might claim Malta and Corsica with expectations of immediate success as to anticipate an early advance on Istria or the Trentino. Yet the logic of facts remains. Italy has proved 'felon' (for such is the German charge) to the Triple Alliance: it is probable that she will seek to confirm her friendship in other quarters.

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1914

THE VALUE OF SMALL STATES

BY

H. A. L. FISHER, F.B.A.

VICE-CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD

THIRD IMPRESSION

Price Twopence net

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

HUMPHREY MILFORD

LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW

NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY

THE VALUE OF SMALL STATES

UPON the old controversy between Brutus and Caesar the last two generations in Germany have had no difficulty in coming to a decision. The republic is decidedly out of fashion, and with it the whole fabric of idealism upon which in 1848 republican conclusions were wont to be erected. The modern German is all for Caesarism, for a big state, a big army, a big navy, and for a long course of progressive national expansion under the dazzling guidance of the Hohenzollern house. Of the old gentle cosmopolitan feeling, which suffused the literature of the classical period, there is now not a trace surviving. *Weltbürgertum* has given place to the *Nationalstaat*, just as the delicate melodies of Mozart have been succeeded by the obstreperous and clashing brilliance of Strauss. The eloquence of Schiller is still popular, but the sentiment which inspired such a piece as the History of the Revolt of the United Netherlands is as dead in Germany as Kant's famous dream of Universal Peace. Realism is the fetish of the hour. Politics must be real or they are despised as shadows; and when a German speaks of *Realpolitik* he means a policy based on material interests, supported by brute force and liberated from the trammels of the moral conscience.

It is not surprising that the triumphs of German Caesarism in the world of fact and idea have led to a very general disparagement of the value and utility of small states. The argument may be gathered from

the pages of Treitschke or indeed from any of the numerous journalists who have drawn their political sustenance from that bitter and uncompromising apostle of imperial methods. It runs very much as follows. In a small state civic life must necessarily be petty, humble, unambitious. The game of politics must centre round small issues, and thus circumscribed in scope, loses the ethical value of scale. Great affairs envisaged on a large horizon have a power of stirring the passionate and imaginative elements in man, which are apt, save in the rarer cases, to respond to stimuli in proportion to their magnitude. Existence in a small state may be elegant, charming, idyllic, compatible with the production of literature and art, but it can never be swept by the great passions which move the world. A small state may create among its members a mild humdrum kind of affection for its history and institutions, but can never be a source of that triumphant pride and hope which lifts citizenship up to the plane of heroism. In a sense it may be said that the history of small states is wound up. They may linger on, preserved by the mutual jealousies of rival Powers or because it is worth nobody's while to attack them, but their bodies will be starved and anaemic and their souls mere echoes of the great movements of mind and emotion which are liberated, almost automatically, by the diurnal movement in great and powerful nations of the social and political machine. Sooner or later the small states will go. They will be absorbed in larger political aggregates. They will follow the line of historical development which has created the large modern states of Europe out of a mosaic of tiny and warring fiefs. And nobody will regret their demise, least of all the citizens themselves.

Indeed, from the point of view of peoples like the Belgians or the Dutch, the moment of inevitable absorption cannot be too rapidly hastened. Only then will they be compelled to discard trifles and to 'think imperially' of serious things. Their geography, political and intellectual, will be enlarged. The art of war will be earnestly practised. The spectator will suddenly become an actor. Great tides of national passion and aspiration will sweep into the tiny state, chasing away impurities, like the majestic ocean suddenly admitted in overwhelming might into a network of landlocked and stagnant pools.

The disciples of Caesarism will even proceed to contend that patriotism in its fullest sense is only possible to large nations. Great states march on, little states mark time. The movement of the great state is continuous and imposing, and, as in the case of other orderly developments, its future can be forecast with a certain degree of exactitude. Guided by the hand of God, the mighty organs which are the chosen vessels of the highest culture upon earth take up, one after another in due sequence, each item of their sacred and providential programme. Thus we have a long historic process ending in the formation of the Prussian kingdom, succeeded by another process leading to the establishment of the German Empire, and to be followed by a third process in the course of which the German Empire will become a world-power, not only supreme on the continent of Europe but exercising a predominant political influence over the whole surface of the globe. Great states have a destiny of which their citizens are conscious. *Et quasi cursores vitai lampada tradunt.* Men come and go, the seasons wax and wane, but each generation in its own brief allotment of life is sustained

by the consciousness that it works on a providential plan, fulfilling one of the grand and mysterious processes of God for the improvement of the world by the spread of German culture. So did the divines of the Dark Ages applaud the forced conversions of Charlemagne.

Even in matters of technical equipment Destiny is said to have decided in favour of the big battalions. It is freely argued in Germany that a perfect organization of educational machinery is only possible to the opulence and minute articulation of a great nation, for the more powerful the state, the richer will be the fund available for museums, art galleries, and libraries, and the larger the class capable of enjoying them. Great states in fact resemble great businesses which on a given expenditure of capital realize a higher rate of profit than their smaller rivals, command wider markets, and exercise a stronger power in barter and sale.

It is easy to understand how the Germans have arrived at this confident and unqualified conclusion as to the worthlessness of small states, seeing that their own late arrival into the circle of the Great Powers was due to the long continuance of that *Kleinstaaterei*, that small-state system, which attracts so much hostile fire from the ranks of the Prussian historians. The humiliations suffered by Germany at the hands of Napoleon, the glory of the War of Liberation, which may be called the first common act of the German people, the fatal relapse into the old system of loose impotent federation, and finally the foundation of the German Empire under Prussian hegemony—these sharply contrasted periods of national history all point to the same lesson, the paralysis bred of disunion and the power generated by unity.

Even now the disciplinarian conscience of Prussia

judges that the unity of Germany is all too imperfectly achieved. There are the separate states, there are the suppressed nationalities, there are the active and contentious political parties whose struggles impair the majesty of the Reichstag, and whose criticism weakens and perplexes the direction of imperial policy. When the Social Democrats, or the Poles, or the Catholics of the Centre embarrass the Government, good German imperialists look with envy at the social and religious cohesion of Great Britain. There is then no ground for wonder if, to the patriotic German of modern times, a contracted spirit of localism, only to be eradicated by a strenuous effort of the national will, seems to be the principal flaw in the political character of the German race, as it has undoubtedly been the chief source of German political impotence in the past. And we can easily see how Germans, realizing the evils of past disunion, and exercising that tendency to generalize which is inveterate in the Teutonic intelligence, come to the conclusion that the happiness and advance of mankind are bound up in the expansion of great states and in the disappearance of small ones.

It must be confessed that this general attitude is affected by considerations of a different order. Outside the limits of the German Empire lies a *Germania irredenta*, a line of small states inhabited in whole or part by men of German stock and once included in the imperial orbit.

‘Of the territory’, writes Dr. Rohrbach, ‘which belonged to the German Empire five hundred years ago and was inhabited by men of German stock, more than a third has been abstracted from modern Germany—the German lands of Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland. If you add in the Livonian

territories from the Memel to the Gulf of Finland, where it is true the mass of the peasantry was not German, but where the townsfolk and the knights were German and the princes and nobility members of the Holy Roman Empire, then modern Germany is only half the size of Germany at the end of the Middle Ages. We leave out of our consideration those territories which at the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century were only bound to the Empire by a loose connexion and belonged naturally to France and Italy, like the Free County of Burgundy, the duchies of Savoy, Milan, Mantua, Verona, and confine ourselves in the first place to territories inhabited by ancient German settlements, and secondly to the Slavonic lands of the East which were comprised in the German colonizing movement. To these Bohemia at that time belonged, for its penetration by German influence was only checked by the counter reformation. It was not till about 1400 that the Kingdom of Poland pushed the German frontier further west. Posen and a piece of West Prussia and Schleswig, though not entirely inhabited by Germans, constitute the only territorial gain which the modern German Empire has to show in comparison with the old Empire. But what are these gains in comparison with the losses! The ring of territories encircling modern Germany, inhabited by more than 20,000,000 men of German stock, politically and even in national sentiment estranged from German thought.'

To a person imbued with a belief in the historical mission of Germany this contraction of the imperial orbit, so accurately described by Dr. Rohrbach, is one of those disagreeable facts only to be fitted into a rational scheme of the Universe if they are destined to be speedily reversed. Sooner or later Providence must intend that the broken unity of the mediaeval German Empire should be reunited to the parent stock. And

so the argument descends from the high plateau of general ideas to the low ground of political appetite which is watered by the streams of national memory.

In view of this interpretation it is pertinent to ask what the world has gained from small states in the past, how far they justify their existence in the present, and whether they are likely to perform any valuable function in the economy of the future.

Almost everything which is most precious in our civilization has come from small states, the Old Testament, the Homeric poems, the Attic and the Elizabethan drama, the art of the Italian Renaissance, the common law of England. Nobody needs to be told what humanity owes to Athens, Florence, Geneva, or Weimar. The world's debt to any one of these small states far exceeds all that has issued from the militant monarchies of Louis XIV, of Napoleon, of the present Emperor of Germany. It may, perhaps, be objected that the apparition of artistic, literary, or scientific genius is an incalculable matter of hazard unaffected by the size of the political community in which the great man happens to be born, and that we are only entitled to infer from these examples that a small state may provide an atmosphere in which genius may thrive. It is, however, a relevant answer to much of the criticism now levelled in Germany against small states, to remind ourselves that in the particular points of heroic and martial patriotism, civic pride and political prudence, they have often reached the highest levels to which it is possible for humanity to attain, and that from Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle, as well as from the illustrious school of Florentine historians and publicists, the world has learnt nine-tenths of its best political wisdom. America has particular reasons for gratefully

recognizing one of the smallest and most illustrious of the city states of Europe. The seed of modern democratic theory was sown in Geneva, and being scattered on the hither shore of the North American continent by small communities, organized on the model of Calvin, burgeoned into the great Republic of the West.

Nor is it fanciful, in estimating the causes which contributed to the peculiar brilliance first of the Greek and then of the Italian city state, to attribute some weight to the question of size. Indeed, if we do this, we shall only be echoing the voice of antiquity itself. In the famous passage in which he depicts the lineaments of the ideal state, Aristotle gives the opinion that a city so large that its citizens are unable to hear the voice of a single town-crier has passed the limits of wholesome growth. This conclusion was based on the view that every citizen must take a direct part in the political deliberations of the state to which he belongs. Indeed, had the states of antiquity exceeded the limits compatible with direct government, the world would have lost a good part of its political education. As it was, the contracted span of these communities carried with it three conspicuous benefits. The city state served as a school of patriotic virtue, not in the main of the blustering and thrasonical type, but refined and sublimated by every grace of instinct and reason. It further enabled the experiment of a free direct democratic government to be made, with incalculable consequences for the political thinking of the world. Finally, it threw into a forced and fruitful communion minds of the most different temper, giving to them an elasticity and many-sidedness which might otherwise have been wanting or less conspicuous, and stimulating, through the close mutual competition which it engendered, an

intensity of intellectual and artistic passion which has been the wonder of all succeeding generations and such as can never be reached in great states organized for the vulgarity of aggressive war.

So much at least will be generally conceded. The question for us, however, is not to assess our debt to the city states of the past, but to consider what arguments may be found for safeguarding the existence of the smaller nation states of the modern world. And first of all it is relevant to ask whether there may not be some advantage to humanity at large arising from the fact that certain communities are withdrawn by reason of the scale from the competition of armaments. To certain military minds in Germany it seems to be a lamentable thing that any community of human beings should be organized on a basis of peace, or that the policy of any Government should be steadily directed towards the preservation of its subjects from the horrors of war. Let us assume for a moment that this extravagant 'proposition is true, and that the Swiss, the Danes, the Dutch, and the Belgians would be greatly improved in their general morality if they were thrown into some big military empire with an aggressive world-policy and a Providential destiny to impose its culture on the world, and all the other familiar paraphernalia of the Potsdam philosophy. We have still to ask ourselves the question whether, even from the selfish point of view of the Great Powers who are blessed with the moral luxury of a conscript army, there may not be some convenience attaching to the continued existence of small oases of peace in a world nervously equipping itself for Armageddon? Has Italy no cause to be grateful to the Swiss Confederation? Would the Scandinavian kingdoms preserve their unruffled

neutrality if the Danish peninsula were swallowed up by Germany? And has the disappearance of Poland really benefited the two greatest partitioning Powers whose past appetites have brought them the heritage of restless anxiety which belongs to the vigil of coterminous states? Indeed it is not easy to measure the injurious consequences which have grown from the disappearance of that middle kingdom of Lotharingia which once served as a buffer between France and Germany, or from the extinction of the Polish nation at the close of the eighteenth century. By common confession European diplomacy suffers from nerves; and the nervous tension is necessarily increased with every addition to the ranks of the rivals. The entanglements likely to give rise to conflict are proportionate to the number and weight of the Powers which stand inside the ring. Every ally who joins one or other of the coalitions brings with him a whole cluster of new interests which the coalition is bound to defend, and thereby increases the chance of war. Every Power which stands aside lessens the general strain and contracts the area of inflammable controversy.

But the advantages to be derived from the existence of small buffer states are subject to the clear condition that their independence and neutrality are respected. Let us consider for a moment what the world would have gained if the German Emperor and his advisers had all along regarded the violation of Belgian neutrality as an unthinkable crime. Not only would Great Britain be now at peace, but no general European war would have taken place at all. The challenge to Russia was thrown down by Germany because it was calculated in Berlin that by marching through Belgium the Germans could easily crush France before the

Russian peril became insistent. It is absurd to speak of the violation of Belgian neutrality as a 'bitter necessity' forced upon a reluctant country in an unforeseen emergency. It was, on the contrary, the deliberate groundwork for a careful edifice of aggressive diplomacy. The entire plan of the campaign against France was framed on the supposition that the Germans would march through Belgium. The whole scheme of operations against Russia was based on the belief that the total weight of the German military power could be thrown on the eastern frontier by reason of the rapid and crushing success which a German army, advancing through the Belgian gateway, would be able to achieve in France. And upon these two military calculations the ambitious edifice of German world-policy was built. All the plans of the General Staff were secretly framed on the supposition that Belgium would be treated as part of the German Empire in the event of war. It was with this prospect in view that Germany thought it safe to defy Russia in 1909 and to repeat the defiance in 1914. And though it would be difficult to set bounds to the military presumption of Germany, it may be safely assumed that if the Belgian doorway had been patently barred, the diplomacy of the German Empire would have been tuned to a more modest key. The moral of all this is clear enough. The small states should not be abolished: on the contrary, their neutrality should be supported by a guarantee so formidable that the strongest Power would never be tempted in future to infringe it.

We may test the value of these communities by another criterion. The Hague Tribunal has been the object of much silly depreciation, and the military parties in the world are never tired of giving voice to the contempt

in which they involve the whole principle of arbitration. It is true that the belief in the value of pacific solutions chiefly flourishes in small unmilitary states like Holland or in that large and imposing aggregate of small civilian states which goes by the name of the United States of America. And it is equally true that no nation has yet consented or, in the present state of public ethics, is likely to consent to refer matters affecting its 'vital interests, independence, or honour' to an International Tribunal. Nevertheless a considerable number of arbitration treaties have been concluded agreeing to refer differences to the Hague Tribunal; and in the course of the North Sea incident of 1904 the strained relations between England and Russia were greatly eased by the fact that the Hague Conference had already provided a method of procedure by which the dispute might be adjusted without loss of dignity to either side. Arbitration cannot banish war, but it can diminish the accumulation of minor grievances which, if untended, are apt to create that inflamed state of public opinion out of which wars easily arise; and in the case of larger disputes recourse to arbitration has at least the advantage of gaining time. Now the condition of mind which supports the principle of arbitration, and which provides facilities for recourse to it, is only made possible by the existence of communities organized for peace, and standing outside the armed and vigilant rivalries of the great continental Powers.

It is symptomatic of the Prussian spirit to disparage any manifestation of natural feeling which runs counter to the assumed necessities of a militant Empire; and so in books written even by such eminent and moderate men as Prince von Bülow, the late Chancellor of Germany, we find a fixed intention to suppress, so far as

may be, the national characteristics of the Poles, Danes, and men of Latin race who have been incorporated in the Empire. We in England, who have some experience of minor nationalities, cannot read of the recent developments of Prussian policy in Poland without feeling how unintelligent and oppressive it is, and how much better it would be in the interests of internal peace and consolidation, if Germany would throw her mind into a generous and liberal attitude towards the men of alien type whom she has absorbed by conquest. But it is part of the Prussian genius—if a drillmaster can have genius—to regard all variety, not only as troublesome, which it often may be, but as injurious, which it very seldom is. Indeed, one of the principal arguments in favour of the preservation of the small states of Europe (and the same argument applies to the preservation of the state system in America) lies in the fact that these small communities do vary from the set type which is imprinted by steady and powerful governments upon the life and behaviour of the larger Powers. The mere fact of this variety is an enrichment of human experience and a stimulus to self-criticism and improvement. Indeed, the existence of small states operates in the large and imperfect economy of the European system very much in the same way as the principle of individual liberty operates in any given state, preventing the formation of those massive and deadening weights of conventional opinion which impair the free play of individuality, and affording a corrective to the vulgar idea that the brute force of organized numbers is the only thing which really matters in the world.

The critic of small states may also fairly be asked what he means by the word 'civilization'. If civilization is a phrase denoting the sum of those forces which help to

bind men together in civil association, if it means benevolence, dutifulness, self-sacrifice, a lively interest in the things of the mind, and a discerning taste in the things of the sense, then there is no reason to think that these qualities are the special prerogative of great states. Indeed, there is a certain type of harsh and stoical patriotism which, by reason of its austere and arrogant exclusiveness, is inimical to the growth of civilized feeling. It is not confined to big states, for it was present in ancient Sparta; nor is it the necessary accompaniment even of huge military monarchies. But it is the spirit of modern Prussia, a spirit consistent indeed with the heroic qualities of the barbarous ages, but lacking the sane and temperate outlook of civilized life. All through history the great enemy of human reason has been fanaticism. And there is no reason to believe that the fanaticism of a military state, served by the most destructive artillery in the world, is any bit less injurious to mankind than the spirit which for many centuries of history condemned the religious heretic to the torments of the stake.

It is difficult rightly to assess the contributions which the smaller states of Europe have made during the past century to the sum of human culture. Nor would a mere list of eminent men such as Ibsen and Maeterlinck, of whom every cultivated person has heard, or Gramme, the Belgian inventor of the dynamo, or Van 't Hoff, the famous Dutch chemist, prove more than the indisputable fact that intellectual life of the highest quality may be carried on in such communities. It is of course possible that, if Holland were forced into the German confederation, Dutch painting, which has now reached a level far higher than any attained in recent years in Germany, would suffer no eclipse, and that the Dutch universities would persevere in their work of scholarly theological

exegesis. It is possible that, under the same conditions, the wonderful perfection to which the little kingdom of Denmark has brought the arts of dairy-farming and agriculture would still be maintained. But it would depend entirely upon the degree of liberty and autonomy which a German emperor might be willing to concede, whether this would be so or not, whether the natural currents of hopeful energy would continue to flow or whether they would be effectually sealed up by the ungenial fiat of an alien taskmaster. Upon this it is unnecessary to speculate. But it is strictly pertinent to the argument to remember that the three small states, whose existence is closely and specially threatened by the expansion of Germany, have each developed not only a peculiar and strongly marked economy, but certain special excellences and qualities such as are most likely to be developed in an atmosphere of comparative tranquillity. Thus, apart from the school of landscape painting, the Dutch have set a model to the world in all that pertains to the scientific classification and management of archives, vanquishing in this particular even the French, whose organization of historical learning is so justly famed. Denmark, too, has its own speciality in a very perfect organism for co-operative production in agriculture.

Indeed, one of the advantages flowing from the existence of smaller states consists in the fact that they serve as convenient laboratories for social experiment—a point likely to be appreciated in America, in view of the great mass of material for the comparative study of social and industrial expedients which is provided by the enterprise of the American State legislatures. Such experiments as women's suffrage, or as the State prohibition of the public sale of alcoholic drink, or as a thoroughgoing

application of the Reformatory theory of punishment, would never be seriously discussed in large, old, and settled communities, were it not for the fact that they have been tried upon a smaller scale by the more adventurous legislatures of the New World. Man is an imitative animal, and a study of such an organ as the *Journal of Comparative Legislation* exhibits the increasing uniformity of the problems which confront the legislator, and the increasing monotony of the solutions which he finds to meet them. All over the world industrial, educational, penal legislation tends to conform to type. And within limits the tendency is the necessary and wholesome consequence of the unifying influence of modern industrial conditions. But our enlarged facilities for imitation present obvious dangers, and among them the fatal temptation to borrow a ready-made uniform which does not fit. Small states may fall into this pitfall as well as big ones, but at least their continued existence presents some guarantee for diversity of life and intellectual adventure in a world steadily becoming more monotonously drab in its outer garment of economic circumstance.

No historical state can be driven out of its identity without suffering a moral impoverishment in the process. The evil is not only apparent in the embitterment and lowering of the citizens of the conquered community, whether they are compelled to the agonies of a Polish dispersion, or linger on nursing their rights and wounded pride in the scene of their former independence, but it creates a problem for the conqueror which may very well harden and brutalize his whole outlook on policy. It is never good for a nation to be driven to the employment of harsh measures against any portion of its subjects.

Upon whatever plausible grounds of immediate expediency such measures may be justified, they invariably harden the tone of political opinion, and create an atmosphere of insensibility which spreads far beyond the sphere of the special case and occasion. The acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany is a case in point. The result of the forcible incorporation of these provinces in the German Empire has been bad for the governed and equally bad for the governors. Coercion is a virus which cannot be introduced into any part of the body politic without risk of a general diffusion of the poison.

It is no idle fancy to suppose that the kind of policy which the Prussian Government has thought fit to adopt towards the alien nationalities of the German Empire has reacted upon its treatment of those German parties whose views do not accord with the strict official convention. No Conservative English statesman would ever dream of denouncing English socialists as Prince von Bülow denounces the social democrats of Germany. But then no English statesman, Liberal or Conservative, would dream of treating any portion of the British Empire as Prince von Bülow treated the German Poles.

It is impossible accurately to assess the value to a nation of the self-esteem which is the legacy of its history. People who weigh everything in material scales may find nothing worth preserving in the historical consciousness of the small nations of Europe. They will argue that the Dutch, the Belgians, the Danes, the Swiss, might be incorporated in the German Empire not only without pain but with a positive accession of material comfort and wealth, and a larger political outlook in the future.

They will even deny that there need be any

moral impoverishment in an exchange of historical memories, under which the incorporated Dutchman would hook himself on to the German pedigree and count Bismarck and Moltke among his deities, while the Dutch sea-dogs of the heroic age would give their names to the cruisers and submarines of the incorporating Empire. In all such reasoning there is very little allowance for the facts of human nature or for the working of the moral principle in man. As no individual can break violently with his past without a moral lesion, so too the rupture of the historical continuity of a state carries with it an inevitable weakening and abasement of public ideals, which may continue for several generations. We need not labour to establish a principle which is grounded on such obvious facts of individual consciousness. But one historical instance may be adduced in support. When in 1580 Portugal was annexed to Spain, then reputed to be the most formidable empire in the world, she suffered a moral as well as a political eclipse from which she has never since recovered. Her nerve seemed to go and by swift stages she sank into listlessness and decay.

Nowhere is the shaping power of this historical consciousness more evident than in the peasant nations of the Balkan Peninsula. These rude and valiant democracies live upon the memories of the past to an extent of which sophisticated peoples have little notion. The great ballad which commemorates the battle of Kossovo, fought against the Turks more than five hundred years ago, is still one of the most important political influences among the southern Slavs. Nor has the memory of the empire of Stephen Dushan, under whom Serbia was the leading Power in the Balkans, ever been allowed to fade among the Serbs, despite tragedies sufficient to

break the spirit of a less stalwart race. To rob the Serbs of their political independence according to the present plan of the German Powers would be a measure difficult to surpass for cruel and purposeless futility. A race which had succeeded in preserving its historical consciousness through centuries of grinding Turkish tyranny would not be likely to renounce its past or its future under the guns of Austria. And even if the improbable came to pass, and a conquered Serbia were to become an obedient and contented fraction of the Austrian Empire, forgetful of heroic ballads and of a long tradition of hardiness and valour, would there be no loss of moral power in the process? To those who measure all virtues by the standard of civic virtue, by intensity of emotional and practical patriotism, the loss would be beyond dispute. A great incentive to the performance of unselfish action would be destroyed, a source of heroic and congenial activity would disappear never to be replaced. Under the hypothesis the Serbs would sink below the level of their blood kinsmen the Slovaks, who, despite the manifold oppressions of their Hungarian masters, still nurture a flame of protesting nationalism. From such political apostasy no nation could ever expect to make a complete moral recovery.

It may be objected that the whole process of European history is summed up by the absorption of the smaller in the larger states; and that if Hanover is reconciled to absorption there is no reason why Holland, Denmark, and Belgium should lodge a protest in advance against their impending fate. To this contention there is a simple answer. These outlying nations can only be brought into the German fold under compulsion. Their frame of mind is not German, their habits are not

German, their history for the last four centuries has served to multiply points of difference from Germany. They have no desire to submit themselves either to the military or to the financial system of the German Empire. They are not ashamed of their present condition, and are singular enough to hold that human happiness and goodness do not depend upon the size of an army or navy or a budget. It is enough that the citizen of each of these states can call his country his own. Patriotism has nothing whatever to do with spatial extent nor are emotions to be measured by square miles. Great empires are generally full of the variances of unassimilated and discontented men ; and though a country may be weak and small, it may yet be capable of inspiring among its inhabitants the noblest and purest forms of affectionate devotion.

Indeed, the supreme touchstone of efficiency in imperial government lies in its capacity to preserve the small state in the great union. If the British Empire has succeeded in retaining the affections of its scattered members, the result has been due to the wise and easy tolerance which has permitted almost every form of religious, political, and social practice to continue unchecked, however greatly they may vary from the established traditions of the English race. Thus in the Province of Quebec we suffer the existence of a French ultramontane state based on the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, and preserving even to this day many of the social features of a French colony in the age of Louis XIV, a community more extreme in its ecclesiastical rigour than any Roman Catholic state in Europe, and in language, religion, and social habits presenting the sharpest contrast to the English provinces of the Dominion of Canada. The same careful deference

to the pre-existing conditions is shown in every part of our Indian administration, which carries tenderness to the religious scruples of the Mohammedans and Hindoos to a point of delicate solicitude, which no Government in the world has ever before attempted, and only the most practised experience can supply. These, however, are not the methods of the German Empire, nor can they be the methods of any empire which practises a uniform and universal system of military conscription. As soon as the words State and Army become coterminous, a philosophy of violent unification is set up within the body politic, which sooner or later carries everything before it, save the spiritual forces which cannot be broken by any machinery, however despotic and powerful. The Germans have not succeeded in winning either the Poles or the Danes or the Alsatians to their rule, because they have repeated the mistake which England made in Ireland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and which England has never since ceased to lament. They have attempted to manufacture German citizens by violence ; and the history of Alsace-Lorraine under imperial rule has shown how little the policy of violence, however carefully it may be masked by specious political concessions, is availing to change the spiritual allegiance of a people. Indeed the case of Alsace-Lorraine supplies a fair indication of the misfortunes which would ensue upon the compulsory annexation of any one of the small states of Europe by a big military Power. It is not to be imagined that the forced union of these two provinces with Germany has been productive of material injury. On the contrary, they have shared in the expanding industry and commerce of the Empire, and any loss in population due to the emigration of the French has been more than compen-

sated by an influx of Germans. Nevertheless, they have been and continue to be unhappy under the Prussian yoke, Alsace more unhappy than Lorraine, but both sensible of the fact that while material interest binds them to Prussia, the voice of spiritual affinity unites them with the French Republic.

Statistics indeed prove that, even allowing for immigration, the Germans are still in a minority in the two provinces; but this fact in itself is not sufficient to account for the continuing attraction of the French Republic, despite the strong material inducements offered from the other side. The phenomenon indeed is worthy of attention. Here are two provinces which have never enjoyed political independence or the sense of cohesion which such independence confers. For the greater part of their history they have counted as members of the German confederation; for Alsace only became part of France in 1648, and Lorraine was not effectively incorporated in the French monarchy till 1764. And yet, though they have been replaced in their original German connexion, the natives remain French at heart. The explanation is simple. The French Revolution initiated these two provinces into the democratic ideals of the modern world, which the majority of the inhabitants still continue to prefer to the Prussian doctrine of blood and iron and to the methods of the Prussian garrison at Zabern.

The truth is that the quantitative estimate of human values, which plays so large a part in modern political history, is radically false and tends to give a vulgar instead of a liberal and elevated turn to public ambitions. There is no virtue, public or private, which cannot be practised as fully in a small and weak state as under the sceptre of the most formidable tyrant who ever

drove fifty army corps of conscripts to the slaughter. There is no grace of soul, no disinterested endeavour of mind, no pitch of unobtrusive self-sacrifice of which the members of small and pacific communities have not repeatedly shown themselves to be capable. These virtues indeed may be imperilled by lethargy, but they are threatened even more gravely by that absorbing preoccupation with the facts of material power in which the citizens of great empires are inevitably involved.

The great danger of Continental Europe is not revolution but servitude. This war could never have been possible if the intellect of Germany had been really free, if a servile Press supported by a system of State universities had not instilled into the vast mass of the German people ruthless maxims of Caesarism, for the most part repugnant to their real temperament and nature. There are other military autocracies besides Germany, and other countries in which political thought is fettered by the Government. But whatever may be their several shortcomings, the smaller states of Europe are not among the despots. Here at least men may think what they please, and write what they think. Whenever the small states may come up for judgement the advocate of human freedom will plead on their behalf.

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

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PART I

I HAVE been asked to put down briefly and in homely language some account of the German Empire, how it grew to be what it is to-day, and what its present aims and its present temper are. The simplest and, I think, the truest way of putting the case is, that the present temper, and the present and recent aims of the rulers of the German Empire do not at all fairly represent the aims and temper of the great majority of the German people in normal times. Nothing shall persuade me that the German people as a whole (I know hardly anything of the governing classes or the professional soldiers of Germany) wanted this war. But I fear that they have been blown up by those governing classes into a sort of madness which has made them believe that they wanted it. They are, as a people, intensely patriotic—one might almost say their only God is the 'Fatherland', for even the best of them are strangely untouched in their daily lives by any ordinary religious feelings. They are also intensely patient and laborious, full of the 'domestic virtues', and yet admirably drilled to fight. There is in most of them a curious vein of sentimentality, which often makes them ready to accept, as true, ideals and ideas which are in reality false. Some people used to say that Germans saw everything 'distorted through a haze of tobacco-smoke and philosophy'. I think it is quite possible (for their newspapers

are almost wholly controlled by their Government, and are most unscrupulously made to tell lies for its ends) that a majority of the German people really believe that they have now been attacked quite wantonly by France, Russia, and England.

Not only their newspapers but also their schools and universities are wholly in the hands of their Government; all professors and schoolmasters are salaried State-agents; and all know that their promotion, and even the retention of the places they hold, depend on their teaching and preaching exactly what the Government wishes. I can't speak for their priests or other ministers of religion, but, so far as I know, in the Protestant parts of Germany no one listens to them or goes to their churches, and not many well-educated people do so in the Catholic parts. But the average German believes in culture, and soaks himself in it to a far higher degree than the average Englishman. I have sometimes thought that the German gets his culture a little too cheap; for it is better that the highest things should come to us after some effort made by ourselves than that we should be spoon-fed with them by the State.

In one at least of the arts, and that one of the highest, namely music, Germany has been for two centuries supreme, and three-fourths of Germans are truly musical and music-loving. And in every little town of three or four thousand people the best music is to be heard constantly, publicly, and almost for nothing. In the other arts, like painting and sculpture, the Germans excel in details but are wanting in inspiration. In poetry, in philosophy, in history, and in every branch of science, they may claim equality with, if not superiority to, any nation in the world. Then

they are also a great manufacturing nation, with rich iron-works and steel-works, especially in the countries just east of the Rhine, and a great corn-growing and wood-growing and grass-growing nation. Above all they are the most expert merchants in the world ; the German commercial traveller knows three languages for the English traveller's one, and he pushes his wares everywhere.

In private life there is one striking difference between the Germans and ourselves, and it is this : in England the gentlemen wait upon the ladies, in Germany the ladies wait upon the gentlemen. The difference is, I think, in our favour ; it is not a pretty sight to see a burly professor, however deep his culture, sitting and drinking his beer and smoking a very rank cigar at his dinner table, while his wife constantly gets up to pour him out another glass or to fetch him another cigar. The quantity of beer (light and wholesome indeed compared to English beer) that a German will drink is perfectly incredible ; incredible also is the number of cheap cigars he will consume in a day. He seems to need very little exercise and to take almost none ; he begins his day's work much earlier than we do, and, if he is at all well-to-do, knocks off much earlier ; but he spends most of his evenings in beer-gardens, or at concerts to the accompaniment of more beer. Even the schoolboys play few games and do not care for them ; on the other hand, they do a great deal of exceedingly useful gymnastics, which form part of the compulsory programme of work in every school.

You will think, then, that it is strange that a nation with all these natural aptitudes for the arts of peace, and for the enjoyment of the modest pleasures of a quiet life, should be so willing to plunge into war at the bidding of a few, or a comparatively few, very wicked individuals.

And I am bound to admit that, till 1911, I never could bring myself to believe that they, or indeed any nation claiming to be civilized and to be one of the European family, would ever again enter upon a war of pure aggression for merely selfish ends. If for no other reason, the risk that the aggressor must inevitably run seemed to be too impossibly great. To use a sporting phrase, a nation acting in this way would be backing itself at too long odds. It shall be my business, in a second paper, to try to explain why Germany has dared to lay such enormously long odds on herself against Fortune. Meanwhile, it may be useful to remember that there are about sixty-five millions of these sober steadfast people, and that their country is situated in the centre of Europe, with only a very short bit of coast-line facing *open* water (for you can hardly call the Baltic open water). That open water is the very dangerous and sandy North Sea. They feel themselves strangled, and they want more room and more ports.

My earliest recollections of infancy carry me back to the days of that first serious effort of Prussia, then, as now, the leading military power of Germany, to open a larger window to the sea; I refer to the shameless game of grab which she played on Denmark in 1864. Nominally Austria and the other States of Germany were playing on her side; but they were only dragged into it, and Prussia was really 'centre-forward', 'half-back', and 'full-back' also in the game. I remember how passionately Danish we children were; my nurse sewed me a little Danish flag which I wore over my heart, and we sang a nursery rhyme about 'poor doggie Denmark with never a bone'. The Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were the two choice bones which the Prussian mastiff then stole from the dear little Danish terrier (who fought

most gallantly but was hopelessly beaten). These duchies had belonged to the Danes ever since the time of our King Canute, eight hundred years ago ; and it was Canute who had wrenched them from a peculiarly hard-fisted German Kaiser. The pretexts upon which Prussia acted in 1864 are unimportant and would not interest my readers ; but both then and now it was and is universally admitted that she had not a shadow of *right* upon her side, and acted simply as a strong robber. It was a part which for two hundred years she had been well accustomed to play.

What was her object ? it was to get to bluer water. The only water that Prussia then *legally* controlled on the open sea was at the port of Emden, in the old duchy of East Friesland (a Prussian theft of 1744) at the back of Holland, and there the water is, from the great line of sand-banks outside, more brown than blue. Hamburg and Bremen, at the mouths respectively of the Elbe and the Weser (themselves by no means too blue), were not then Prussian cities, but free members of a curious body of States called the Germanic, Confederation. Naturally enough Denmark has not forgotten or forgiven the theft of her duchies, whose population, still largely of Danish blood, is compelled to learn the supremacy of the Kaiser as an article of faith, and even to sing 'patriotic' German songs to celebrate the glories of Germany.

You see I have begun with this particular theft because it was the one which made a deep impression on my own mind in childhood. But we must now go back a bit ; and we shall see that such a theft was by no means a new thing in Prussian history. The present royal family of Prussia had ruled in the sandy flats of Brandenburg, whose capital city is Berlin, since 1415,

and an iron race of rulers they had proved themselves to be. They and all other German princes and States were members of a body called the 'Holy Roman Empire'; this body had claimed, as far back as the year 800, to be in some mysterious way the successor of the real old Roman Empire, which had virtually come to an end in Western Europe in 476, though a shadow of it lingered in the East at Constantinople till 1453, when the Turks overthrew it. When we are thinking about the Middle Ages we commonly speak of this strange league of German States as 'the Empire', and sometimes as 'the German Empire'. As a witty Frenchman once said, 'it was not an Empire at all, it had nothing Roman about it, and it certainly wasn't Holy.'

There were no 'natural' frontiers to Brandenburg; so the saying ran that it must always have a 'frontier of men', that is, an army out of all proportion to its scanty population. Its rulers were called 'Electors' of Brandenburg long before they were called Kings; and when, in 1701, they got the title of 'King', they called themselves not 'Kings of Brandenburg' (for that would have offended the sentiment of the conservative Germany of those days) but 'Kings of Prussia', a duchy far away to the east on the Russian border, which these Electors had appropriated by two most adroit tricks in 1525 and 1618.¹ The last of the Electors who was not a King, Frederick William, called the 'Great Elector', grabbed right and left, and to three of the four points of the compass; and in his reign (1640-88) the map of Prussia began to resemble the outstretched wings of a headless and tailless bird of prey. Berlin lay somewhere

¹ The crowning-place of the Prussian kings is still at Königsberg in Eastern Prussia, a city which our good Russian friends are besieging while I write (Sept. 9, 1914).

about the place where the heart would have been if Prussia had possessed one. It was the son of this man, called Frederick I, who took the royal title; and it was Frederick's son, Frederick William I (1713-40), who was the real founder of the modern Prussian army. He had a passion for collecting very tall soldiers—the regiment of 'Potsdam giants'—he would give almost any sum for a man eight feet high, and he employed agents all over Europe to kidnap these giants for him. His contemporaries thought that

'he only made himself and royal Pots-
—dam silly';

in fact they thought him mad. But there was a method in his madness. If he invented the ridiculous goose-step, the tight uniform, the savage punishments by cruel drill-sergeants, and all the other military devices for turning an intelligent citizen into a clockwork machine, and strangling his mind as well as his body, Frederick William also got out of this machinery perfect obedience, and perfect movements of large bodies of men together; and he taught his machine its lesson so thoroughly that, when it came to be used in war, it knew exactly what to do and did it at the right time. It also knew that its officers and drill-sergeants would shoot it if it fell back, so on the whole it was safer to go forward. So successful was this Prussian army in the next reign that all European Powers, by no means to their own profit, took, at one time or another, to copying it; we are not wholly quit of its baleful influence yet. And moreover, we must not hastily despise it: a *measure* of machinery is necessary for all armies, and perfect obedience is absolutely necessary for all. Against unintelligent armies who have *not* got this machinery, the Prussian system is bound to carry everything before

it. But against armies of intelligent men, like our own and the French, it can only succeed by mere weight of numbers, and at the most appalling cost to itself. Let us hope that it is on its last trial at this moment, and will never reappear again.

King Frederick William I was so fond of this wonderful army of his, that he never or hardly ever used it in battle; and his reign is honourably distinguished in Prussian history by the fact that he grabbed very little from his neighbours. He died in 1740, and his son, Frederick II (1740–86), was a very different sort of fellow. Most people have heard something of him by the name of ‘Frederick the Great’. The famous Scottish historian Thomas Carlyle wrote, in the middle of the last century, a ‘History of Frederick the Great’; it is a truly wonderful book, and I confess to being very fond of reading it. But its author believed too much in the doctrine of ‘strong men’, almost in ‘strong-men-at-any-price’, and you may remember that he also made a hero out of that arch-bully Napoleon. Frederick II might truly be called ‘the Great’, from his careful husbandry of the resources of his country, from his scrupulous care for her commercial and agricultural interests, from his own frugality, toleration, and industry, from his justice to his own civilian subjects. But it was not these things that procured him the title from his contemporaries; rather it was the fact that, having shamelessly set himself to grab the property of his weaker neighbours, he knew how to defend his thefts by feats of arms which astonished his own generation and remain memorable even to our own.

His first and most shameless theft, for which even he pleaded no excuse, was that of the rich province of Silesia, which he took from Austria in 1740; and this acquisition

added the tail, on the map, to the Prussian bird of prey. He fought and won three great wars for its defence. We English hated him cordially at first, and he was helped by the French, then, and for long after, our rivals and enemies. But he was quite ready to betray these allies, and the result was that in 1756 the French helped the Austrians against him, and so we, for our own safety, were obliged to help Frederick. So came about the famous 'Seven Years' War' (1756-63), which finally secured Silesia for Prussia, and gave us Canada and the victory over the French in India. We then called Frederick the 'Protestant Hero' (he was, by the way, an avowed atheist and openly scoffed at religion); and when you see a public-house with the sign of the 'King of Prussia' over it you may be pretty sure that it dates back to the middle of the eighteenth century. Frederick was not in the least grateful; he complained because we would not go on fighting just as long as suited his convenience, and hated us heartily till the day of his death.

It was he also who suggested the famous crime of the First Partition of Poland (1772), which is at the root of much of the Eastern troubles of Germany to-day. Poland was at that time, with the exception of Russia, the largest country on the map of Europe. But it was miserably poor, it had a scanty and down-trodden population, and was ridiculously governed by a lot of greedy nobles, whose habit was to elect as king the weakest man they could find. So, Prussia leading the way, the three Eastern Powers, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, each grabbed a piece of this hapless country, leaving a mutilated carcass in the middle, which was to be divided later on. Austria got the richest, the only rich piece, Galicia, out of which the Russians are turning her while I write; there are valuable mines

and salt-works in Galicia. Prussia got the most convenient piece, a strip on the Baltic coast, which completed, or almost completed, the right wing of the bird of prey. Russia alone had any sort of excuse for her theft, for the Poles, though Roman Catholic in religion, were of Slavonic race, and Russia is the natural head of all the Slavonic races of Europe. Two other partitions of the carcass of Poland followed, in 1793 and 1795, and at the last of them it was declared that 'Poland has ceased to exist'. You might as well say that Belgium has 'ceased to exist' because the Germans have conquered it and wasted it to-day. The Polish people certainly did not cease to exist, and have cried to Heaven for revenge, especially on Prussia, ever since. Austria on the whole has treated the conquered Poles fairly well, and Galicia has not been unhappy under her rule. Russia, too long swayed by German influence and example, has treated them badly, although the Russian Emperor, Alexander I, after defeating Napoleon (1812), got a good deal of Poland back from Austria and Prussia (1815), and wanted to rule the whole as a constitutional king; but his Germanized soldier-statesmen would not allow him to be too merciful. Prussia at the beginning of the period 1772-1914, and again at the end of it, for the last forty years especially, has treated them infamously (she was not so cruel from 1815 to 1870), simply turning them out of their lands to make room for German colonists. This fact will not be forgotten when our allies in the grey greatcoats get to Posen, the capital city of Prussian Poland; and the Tsar has now solemnly promised to restore to the Polish people the whole of their old kingdom, and all the liberty they desire, under Russian protection, and not to lay down his arms till he has done so. Russia, is in fact, now as much the champion of

the oppressed Slavs in the East as the French and English are of the oppressed Belgians in the West.

Soon after the death of Frederick the Great of Prussia came the famous French Revolution of 1789; and in 1792 began the twenty-three-year-long war that resulted from it. During those years France was, at one time or another, at war with every great State and with nearly every little State of Europe; and I am afraid that she trampled on, and extinguished the independence of, every little State she could reach. But, though she did these things, she had at first some plausible pretext, if not some excuse. She had risen in 1789 against her own Government, not because it was on the whole tyrannous or oppressive (which it was not), but because it was ridiculously behind the times, ridiculously inefficient, and so clumsily worked that it involved a lot of little oppressions and injustices to particular classes, interests, and individuals. Frenchmen were far ahead of other nations in intelligence, and they could not stand the mere *stupidity* of the old system any longer. Also they wanted a guarantee against possible oppression, some form of parliamentary government, a full measure of what we in England call 'common-law rights', and equal taxation. As is usual in revolutions, and especially French revolutions, they went much too far, went in fact to absurd extremes, killed their innocent well-meaning young king, committed a lot of abominable crimes, and overthrew many venerable things which they had better have preserved.

They were so much in love with their own new ideas that they thought they could make themselves, and all the rest of mankind, happy for ever by proclaiming a few simple principles of 'natural law' and attempting to put them in practice. Soon they began to cry out to their

neighbours across the Rhine and in Belgium, 'Go and do likewise; overthrow your Governments, and you will be happy for ever; let us all dance round the tree of liberty.' These proceedings irritated and not unnaturally frightened the German princes, many of whose States really were tyrannously governed; and so Prussia led the way in a sort of 'crusade' against these new principles of liberty which France was practising and preaching. Austria, slow, dogged old creature, much as she hated her Prussian neighbours, felt bound to follow suit. Then France blazed up in amazing wrath, and proclaimed herself a Republic. Her defence of her frontier, heroic enough on land (1792-4), was the more heroic when, from February 1793, the weight of the British fleet was thrown into the scale against her at sea. What, you will ask, what in the name of Freedom, were *we* doing in a coalition with those stupid German tyrants against a gallant people, striving first for its own freedom and then proclaiming freedom to all peoples from the house-tops?

Stop! we were doing then very much what we are doing to-day; *we were defending the public law of Europe*. France, in her impetuous enthusiasm for her new-found liberty, declared that she cared nothing for treaties; she was going to tear them all up, and would compel the Belgians, the Dutch, and the West-Germans to form themselves into little republics under French protection. 'What!' cried these dear passionate apostles of freedom, 'you don't want to be republicans? you don't want to upset your own infamous kings?' (by this time Frenchmen had got to believe all kings to be infamous creatures; they called our good old George III, a bull-dog Briton if ever there was one, a 'gory tyrant', and all other names they could think

of) 'then, by Heaven, we'll make you do so. You shall eat liberty at the point of the bayonet, we will choke you with freedom.' Well, naturally, this was too much for a sober, quiet, law-abiding people like the English; and the tearing up of European treaties, together with the French threat to our oldest allies the Dutch, produced immediate war. With the interval of two years, 1801-3, that war lasted for twenty-two years; and at the end of it even Napoleon, when beaten, called the British 'the most constant, the most generous of his foes'.

Alas! there is a great deal of human nature even in apostles of Freedom. The French soon forgot the missionary part of their business, but the pleasure of conquering other peoples remained. For a long time, however, they *professed* they were trying to benefit the peoples they attacked. 'We are coming for all your goods,' they cried to us. 'Yes, damn you! and for our chattels too,' replied the British. But they never came here, though they kept us long a-quake with the threat that they would come. Old Lord St. Vincent once growled out in the House of Lords, 'I don't say the French can't come to England; I only say they can't come by sea.'

They got to most other countries during those terrible years; and they played with the maps of Germany and Italy as a child plays with the pieces of a puzzle-map, and made and re-made them at their good pleasure. At last they broke. They broke against two great nations; the one Spain, an old nation with a glorious past, a very weak and absurd government, but a people passionately devoted to its independence and its flag; the other Russia, then a comparatively new-comer into the European family, extraordinarily backward, but deeply religious and patriotic. 'Holy Mother

Russia ' girded her slow strength and hurled the impious invader back across her own snows :

How far is St. Helena from the Beresina ice ?

An ill way, a chill way, the ice begins to crack.¹

During all these wars whenever there was a State, small or great, to be defended against French aggression, Great Britain constantly poured gold and supplies into its lap. She was able to do this solely because her fleet could keep the sea and could throttle the trade of France and of her dependants. She was far too slow, then as always, to send her own sons to fight ; her army was ridiculously small, though larger, in proportion to her population, than it was when the present war opened ; but she kept on adding and adding to that gallant little army, and in the last years was able to send quite a respectable number of men across the seas.

It is a very much more dangerous and infinitely more savage enemy that we have to meet now. Bloody and cruel deeds were occasionally done in hot blood during the old wars, and by the armies of all nations, our own included ; but I am sure that, between 1793 and 1815, no such horrors were ever perpetrated by any army *on a system and by order* as have been perpetrated by the Germans in Belgium during the last five weeks. No one then, not even Turks, cut the wrist-sinews of wounded soldiers, or drove screens of women, children, and old men before them into battle ; no one fired upon hospitals, or ill-treated the doctors or nurses at the front ; no deed like the destruction of Louvain, nothing like the bombardment of other unresisting, unfortified towns (after they had been evacuated by hostile troops)

¹ Napoleon's worst disaster on his winter retreat from Russia happened at the passage of the river Beresina. Within three years from that date he was a prisoner at St. Helena.

has been done, so far as I can recall, for nearly 300 years in Europe; if submarine mines had been invented, none of the maritime powers of the old war days would have strewn them on peaceful trade-routes. In particular the French and English, when they met, always fought each other like gentlemen, and cared humanely each for the other's wounded. How many tales our grandfathers, who fought in those wars, used to tell of the soldiers of the two armies meeting, on outpost duty in a wood, or at horse watering on opposite sides of some Spanish river, and exchanging courtesies and good-humoured chaff in the intervals of having to exchange musket shots. God help us all, those days seem to be past, and we are faced with a foe for whom the laws, not to speak of the courtesies, of civilized warfare have ceased to exist! But let us make no mistake; German officers and German privates are not acting thus because they are naturally more cruel than other soldiers; but because they have been ordered to do it on system, to strike terror into the *people* of their enemies. The systematic destruction of Belgian cities is for the same purpose. The Kaiser's advisers (I don't believe it is the Kaiser himself who is to blame; I don't even believe he wanted to go to war, but his brutal military party and his cold-blooded financiers drove him to it) have told their army that, by striking such terror, they will end the war the more quickly. Let us hope that they have made here the most foolish as well as the most wicked of their mistakes. And let us beware lest, when our turn comes to drive them back over the Rhine, over the Weser, over the Elbe, we imitate their awful example. We must show ourselves Christian soldiers and Christian gentlemen; we must let the penalty of the war fall in full measure

only on those few who made it, on the German Government, not on the German people, or on the venerable monuments of German antiquity.

But to return to my task : what was Prussia doing during the twenty-three years of war between new France and old Europe ? Prussia had begun this war in 1792 ; she was the first to scuttle out of it, and to scuttle out for a price, in 1795. She then concluded a separate peace, getting for herself a little more territory east of the Lower Rhine, and a promise of neutrality, while the French were settling with her ally Austria on the Upper Rhine. Into that neutrality during the next eleven years, 1795–1806, she sank deeper and deeper, and buried her head, ostrich-like, in the sands of Brandenburg ; keeping, however, always ready to pop up whenever any other power made a treaty with France which might possibly lead to a few more crumbs of German territory falling into her own mouth. Several such crumbs actually did fall, and the left wing of the Prussian bird of prey was all but completed before 1806. While Prussia was hiding her head, France grew and grew ; grew from the desperate Republic on the defensive to the triumphant Republic on the aggressive, from the Republic to the Consulate (1799), from the Consulate to the Empire (1804) under the lead of the greatest soldier of all history, Napoleon Bonaparte. The curious thing is that Prussia was still *believed* to be a great power, and the fame of the great Frederick was still protecting her ; her army was still believed by others, as well as by herself, to be invincible. Power after power knelt to her, and implored her to come forward and strike a blow to liberate Europe from the French ; but all she did was to say to France, ‘ What will you give me *not* to come forward ? Will you give me

Pomerania ? Saxony ? Mecklenburg ? oh ! *will* you give Hanover ?' Napoleon, who of course saw through all this, estimated Prussia at her true worth, entrapped her into committing an appalling crime of treachery against Austria and Russia until he had smashed these powers at Austerlitz (1805), and meanwhile tossed Hanover to her as a bone to a greedy dog. Prussia lay down and licked his boots.

But it happened that, in the next year, it suited Napoleon to make an offer of Hanover back to England (Hanover was then the family property of our George III) in return for peace, which he thought we might be induced to conclude ; and Prussia found this out. To have the price of her treachery torn from her, before she had well occupied it, was too much even for her. She flung off her neutrality ; and Napoleon, whose army was just then at the height of its perfection, smashed her to bits in two battles on the same day. And that was the end of *old* Prussia ; and one can hardly help saying that she got her deserts.

The years that immediately follow, 1806-15, are the real hero-time of Prussia. The conqueror ground her to the earth and imposed humiliation after humiliation upon her ; he clipped off her two wings and parcelled them out to more submissive dependents, he threatened to clip off her tail as well ; he reduced her army to 42,000 men and compelled it to serve him in 1812 in his mad enterprise against Russia. The country was indeed purified through suffering, and threw up one or two really able statesmen, who began (they had to work very much in secrecy at first) to heal her wounds. They introduced a few (too few) steps in the direction of greater freedom for civilians ; and they introduced the system of short service for their little army, so that, though

only 42,000 men were enrolled at any given moment, every two years another 42,000 were trained, and thus there was a large reserve upon which to draw. The result was that, when Napoleon was beaten in Russia, there was a 'nation in arms' (and mad for vengeance) to catch him on his way home in 1813. That nation carried its slow, vacillating, timid king off his feet and played (1813-15) the chief part, after England and Russia, in the overthrow of the French Empire.

And in 1815 Prussia claimed the reward she had so fairly earned. She gave up, indeed, a good deal of Poland to Russia, and she got half Saxony instead; but her great gains came on the West, for she acquired the whole of Westphalia (now the 'black country' of Germany, where the great iron-works are and where those terrible Krupp guns are made); and above all she got both banks of the middle Rhine, of which river she was henceforth to be the guardian. Austria, on the other hand, who had borne, for an infinitely longer time, the burden of the resistance to France (she had fought four successive times, and hardly ever acknowledged that she was beat) took her rewards far away in Italy; where, I am sorry to say, she soon became the typical German tyrant, hated if ever tyrant was hated by the Italians.¹ Austria thus practically ceased to be a German power, though both she and Prussia remained nominally members of a Germanic Confederation (1815-66) which included thirty-nine separate German States, with a federal assembly to regulate it. Some of these States were of considerable size, like Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, Saxony, and Hanover; others were merely

¹ The Italians, somehow or other, thirty-two years ago, allowed themselves to be bamboozled into a Triple Alliance with Austria and Germany, out of which they have got no good whatever.

ridiculous 'Counts of Schnippy-Schnappenhausen'. Now Prussia was not popular among the peoples of these little German States, who wanted to drink their beer, and listen to their divine music, and write their deep books on philosophy like good peaceable men; and these men said from the first that Prussia meant to be too masterful. Prussia, for her part, did not like it when some of the other German princes introduced free government into their States; she liked it still less when she was compelled to introduce some parody of free government into her own State after a real popular rising in Berlin in 1848. And all the little States were inclined to look for support against Prussia towards poor old Austria,¹ who, by the way, hated free government almost more than Prussia did, and had a much worse revolution of her own in 1848. The result was that the secret jealousy and hostility between Austria and Prussia was prolonged and grew more bitter down to 1866.

The forty-nine years which came after 1815 were, however, on the whole peaceful and prosperous for all Germany; and they produced a nation which was eminently peaceful, frugal, and learned—till 1870. Parliamentary government, not wholly unlike our own, grew up in most of the States and there was a Customs-union (*Zollverein*) for all Germany. Alone, in the far north-east one group of German families remained discontented with the new state of things; these were the old

¹ It is worth noting that the wisest of Prussian statesmen, Baron vom Stein, actually wished in 1815 to revive the old German Empire, which Napoleon had extinguished in 1806, and put its crown, not on the head of his own master the King of Prussia, but on that of the Austrian sovereign, who had worn it for nearly four hundred years, 1438–1806.

aristocracy of the poor sandy heaths of Brandenburg and Pomerania, and of the rich grass- and corn-lands of East Prussia. Such men had their roots deep in the soil, and grew to hardy manhood under the inclement skies of the Baltic shore. Culture in the German (or in any other) sense they had absolutely none, and desired none ; freedom they hated ; parliamentary government they despised ; riches alone, and principally the riches of other people, they coveted. Their ideals were, and remain, those of the days of Frederick the Great, the ideals of conquest, of war for its own sake, the ideals of ' blood and steel '. These are the men we are fighting now, and we shall find them a hard nut to crack. They had little political influence in Germany until they found a leader of supreme brain-power and utter unscrupulousness in Otto von Bismarck, by birth (he was born in Waterloo year) one of themselves. Gradually, under his guidance, they became the leading influence in the parliament of the Prussian kingdom ; and he himself got considerable influence in the Federal Assembly which, materially strengthened after the events of 1848, sat for the whole German Confederation at Frankfort.

In many ways the spirit of such men is invaluable to a nation, and there is much that is very noble in that spirit. It is not unlike the spirit of old Rome. Rome conquered the world, and with the sword ; and it is impossible to deny that she undertook, piece by piece, that world-conquest at first for selfish aims. But wherever she went she brought peace, order, the greatest system of law the world ever knew, and also, what we are too apt to forget, the learning and light (almost a divine light) of Greek culture, very close in the wake of her armies. She *did* civilize the world, and to her protecting

care of the Christian faith, as well as of law and order, Europe and America owe it that their civilization is both purer and more firmly rooted than the older civilizations of China and India.

But these modern Prussian imitators of the old Romans have nothing behind the sword to bring to the conquered peoples; they do not offer 'liberty to all peoples' as the French Revolutionists did, nor Greek learning as the old Romans did, nor even a purer religion which the early Mohammedan conquerors honestly believed they were offering. No; they are 'coming for our goods and our chattels too', and for nothing else. They are coming to get the ports of Belgium and Holland, yes, and the ports of Great Britain too, that they may compel all the world to buy cheap German manufactures and nothing but cheap German manufactures. They are coming to get our colonies, which are filled with Germans because no German will go to their own. They are coming to get the iron-mines of Eastern France, because their own are not sufficient to supply the workshops of Western Germany. They are also coming for enormous sums in sheer hard cash, which, if they are victorious, they will call 'war-indemnities'. They have already demanded eight millions sterling from Brussels, which works out at about £8 per head of the population of that city. As I say to the boys whom I try to enlist in our new army, 'What do you think your lot will be, if we are beaten now?' 'Pretty uncomfortable, sir, I expect.' 'Yes,' I reply, 'you will be then a conscript in a German army sent to fight America or Japan.' For the ambition of the Prussians will not stop short at the limits of this old Europe after they have ruined it.

But—forgive me—I keep getting off the point. By

about 1860 Bismarck was the most influential statesman in Prussia, and was already dreaded and hated by the peaceable South Germans. He had thoroughly captured his King, William I, a man of quite the old-Prussian type, but so stupid as to allow himself to be led to lengths to which his own ambition would never have taken him. Bismarck was the author of the next three Prussian wars of aggression : of that which stole Schleswig-Holstein from the Danes in 1864, of that against Austria in 1866, of that with France in 1870. The story of the first of these wars ought to bring a blush to every English cheek. Why did we stand aside and let the good, brave Danes be crushed ? Both honour and interest should have forbidden such a desertion of our duty, for the power that holds the sea ought always to interfere to protect a weak maritime nation against a strong land-power ; and, as for our interest, the result has been that Prussia has acquired two priceless strips of coast, one on the Baltic and one on the North Sea, at the base of the Danish peninsula, has built a canal from sea to sea, and has filled all her coast-line, new and old, with arsenals, dockyards, and warships, built but for one end, namely, to wrest our colonies and our ancient heritage of sea-power from us. Please note that, on the map, the acquisition of Schleswig-Holstein gave to the Prussian bird of prey quite a new feature, a neck and a sort of head.

Four years later, Bismarck, who always saw far ahead, thought that a little blood-letting on a more serious scale was needed ; and so he most wantonly attacked Austria, who was very weakly supported by the Southern German States. It was no business of ours to help Austria, but it was the business of the French, and they soon paid the penalty for neglecting to do so. To do

the French justice, they had very recently been fighting to help several of the Italian States to throw off the heavy yoke of Austria, and they were not in a particularly good temper with the latter power. Austria, whom the men of blood and steel now determined to clear completely out of Germany, had a long, and in some ways a very honourable, history; in particular she had been the bulwark of South-Eastern Europe against the Turks for several centuries. But she was sadly disunited in herself; her Emperor (poor old man, he is eighty-four this year, and has been on his throne since 1848) ruled over four separate branches of the human family—over Germans in Austria; over Hungarians, who are remote kinsmen of the Turks, in Hungary; over Slavs, who are near kinsmen of the Russians, in Poland, Bohemia, and Croatia; and over cruelly oppressed Italians in his own southern Tyrol and at the head of the Adriatic. All these he ruled from a German city, Vienna, and by German methods, which all of them disliked very much. He had lost nearly all Italy, but he still held Venice, the great port at the head of the Adriatic, and he only lost it when the war of 1866 with Bismarck began. Several of these different races had been in periodical insurrection against the Austrians; the Hungarians especially, a fine patriotic people, had given them a lively time as late as 1848 and on many previous occasions. And the Austria of 1866 was a very slow, stupid, and tired power, and the machine-made Prussian army, with its new ‘needle-guns’, rolled it over and over in seven weeks of war. Bismarck was wise enough not to impose hard conditions; he simply excluded Austrian influence from the remainder of Germany, set up, under the presidency of Prussia, a new Confederation which was called North German, but which

really included, very much against their will, the small South German States as well. Henceforth, as he foresaw, Austria, if she were to go on existing at all, would peaceably sink into the position of a dependent ally of Germany, and Vienna would take her orders from Berlin. This is why one is so sorry for the Austrians to-day. In the same year Bismarck annexed Hanover; 'mediatized' it, as he said, this charming diplomatic word having been invented in order to avoid calling a spade a spade or a theft a theft.

From the moment of his accession to power in Prussia there was one State with which Bismarck was careful to keep on very friendly terms, and that was Russia. He was far wiser than his successors of to-day, for he knew the strength that lay behind the river Niemen; at the same time, it was very largely his skilful and unscrupulous cajolery which led the Emperors of Russia of those days to play into the hands of Germany, and to refuse to listen to the cries for help from their own Polish cousins. And so, having freed his hands on the south and east, the wily Bismarck thought, in 1870, the time was come for his last and greatest conquest, that of France. He meant this conquest to be the signal for the re-establishment of the German Empire with its crown on the head of his own master, William I. It is humorous to learn that this crown was the very last thing old King William of Prussia desired.

France was then very weakly and badly governed by a very weak and rather bad man called the Emperor Napoleon III (1851-70). Heaven knows why he was called the third Napoleon, for there had never been a second, and most people thought the first had been more than enough. The French army was as brave and gallant as it always is, but it was shockingly

led ; and the poor Emperor lived in dread of a revolution at home, for his corrupt government was very unpopular in Paris. Everything was ready in Prussia, and the Prussian machine was perfectly equipped, with stores, guns, food, roads, railways, maps, post-offices and so on. A Hamburg friend of mine, who fought all through the last half of the war, told me that he was able to send from the front a post-card to his mother every day. In France nothing was ready, and the French staff-officers had maps of Germany but none of their own country ! The result was that a few terrible battles, in which the French displayed the most wonderful heroism under the most perfectly incompetent leaders, finished the first part of the war, that on the frontier, in a month. The South German States, little as they liked the war, had been jobbed and bribed and bullied by Bismarck into taking a hand in it ; and it is characteristic of the Prussians, that, whenever they were in a tight place, they put forward South German troops to take the worst punishment. A Bavarian professor of my acquaintance used to tell us a story of his experiences of this kind at the battle of Gravelotte : ‘ We was very much afraid of ze Frenchmen, but we was driven on by our officers. First ze colonel, he was shot down, and I feel glad ; zen our two majors, zey was both shot down, and I feel more glad ; zen, one by one, all ze ozer officers, zey all fall, and I feel most glad ; and at last ze zenior zergeant, he step up and he cry, “ Men, I take ze command ! Backwards ! double-march ! ” and we ran like ze hare, and we never stop till we was safe in ze rear. Ach, me, I am not a war-man.’

So cleverly, however, did the Prussians move their troops that they were able to shut up several whole armies of Frenchmen in particular fortresses, and to

starve them into surrender. You will notice that, in the war that is now going on, the French army has refused to allow itself to be shut up into fortresses. If it has had to execute a great retreat, it has at least kept the open field. Well, on September 4, 1870, the Emperor Napoleon III surrendered to the Germans at Sedan, and a republic was proclaimed in Paris; and, though it had hardly any regular army left in the field, this new government set itself first to defend Paris to the last, and secondly to *create* armies, to make armed men spring out of the sacred soil of France. Such armies did actually spring up, and occasionally hurled back the columns of the invaders. But it was all in vain; armies cannot be created, however great the patriotism of a nation, however great the intelligence of its soldiers may be, in a few days or a few weeks; and, when such soldiers are sent into the field untrained, only disaster after disaster can follow if they meet the *trained* forces of the enemy. Thus the new French armies of those days were able to display their own gallantry to any extent, and even to give the Prussians a great deal of trouble at particular points, but not to affect seriously the inevitable event of this terrible war. Paris, though very poorly fortified and very poorly supplied with food, was able to stand a fearful siege; but, it too, at last had to surrender to mere famine in the spring of 1871.

It was in this war that a peculiarly repulsive habit of the Prussians showed itself, so far as I am aware, for the first time; I mean the habit of ascribing all their victories to the direct favour of Almighty God. Now, I hold that a nation which is being attacked and is fighting for its hearth and home, for its women and babes and all it holds dear, or for some other very

sacred cause (for instance, to throw off the yoke of a tyrant or to win its right to worship God as it pleases), may and ought to call constantly and even publicly on the name of the Most High for help. But when this is done by a nation which has deliberately and unprovoked, and merely in order to increase its own power and riches, attacked another peaceable neighbour, it is simply the most blasphemous hypocrisy. Such hypocrisy the Prussians practised continually in 1870, as they are practising it in even more odious circumstances to-day. *Punch* was not far wrong when it parodied old King William's telegraphic messages to his wife during the 1870 campaign in the following words :

By grace divine, my dear Augusta,
We've had another awful buster !
Ten thousand Frenchmen sent below,
Praise God from whom all blessings flow.

You will observe, if you study the language which that monarch's grandson, the present Kaiser, holds, or is made by his military friends to hold, that he speaks as if he regarded himself as the junior (nay, almost as the senior) partner of Almighty God in the business of conquering what he calls 'effete nations'. We English, as Mr. William Watson wrote the other day in his fine sonnet, published in *The Times*,

We are not on such easy terms with Heaven
as the Kaiser and his gang. But we and the French and Belgians are fighting a defensive war, if ever there was one in history ; and I think we should do well, whether we happen to be Protestants or Catholics, to be very often on our knees, both at home and in church, in all humility. The Germans seem to me to have got altogether the wrong brand of God, a sort of superior

War-Lord who delights to drink the blood of his enemies.

The result of the war of 1870-1 was exactly what Bismarck had intended to bring about, the proclamation of the new German Empire, with a federal council of princes, and a parliament, called the *Reichstag*, for the whole Empire, whose crown was to be hereditary on the head of the kings of Prussia. Henceforth the lesser States of Germany were simply vassals of Berlin; Berlin is the centre of the whole, and a very wicked, profligate, luxurious city it is, gorged with riches, yet seamed in places with the most horrible poverty, and with the largest population of habitual criminals of any European capital. The chief influence therein, after that of the group of Prussian soldiers, is that of the rich bankers, manufacturers, and shipowners, who have helped to make this present war because they thought it would fill their pockets. The rest of Germany has been steadily 'Prussianized'. 'Are these the fortifications of Dresden?' I once asked a dear old Saxon lady, who was taking me for a drive round the walls of the Saxon capital city; 'No, my dear,' she answered, 'these are the fortifications of Berlin.' But Prussia has spared no pains since then to conciliate all the other German States, and has given them an ample share of all the riches and power and influence that have poured in upon her since 1870; and the result has been that they have acquiesced in, and too many of them have even welcomed, their Prussification and have accepted the Prussian military ideal of 'conquest for conquest's sake'. This is what Bismarck instilled into them as the main duty of German men.

My own German friends of those days, merchants in Hamburg, professors in Dresden and Munich, school-

masters in several other places, had always hoped that the supreme position won in 1870 for their 'Fatherland' (which they all adore) would result in a century of peace, and in the cultivation of really friendly relations with all other European States, and especially with France and England ; Russia, I am bound to admit, they always spoke of with fear—her vast size, her unlimited resources, her supposed Asiatic leanings, all combined to make her look like an ogre. But it has all gone just the other way. The magnitude, and the comparatively small cost, of the German victory of 1870 threw far too many Germans, even those outside the charmed circle of Prussian noblemen and financiers, very much off their balance. While some of them have said, ' We gained so much by the sword that we ought to have another try and gain a lot more in the same way,' others have said, ' We gained so much by the sword that it is impossible that we should keep it long, unless our sword is incessantly shaken in the faces of those whom we then robbed.' And so I am sure that the victory of 1870 has been, if we take its effects all round, a most disastrous thing for the German people. On France, on the other hand, the defeat, cruel as her suffering was at the time, has had a purifying effect, not unlike the effect that a far shorter period of suffering, in 1806–1815, had upon Prussia. The ' Second Empire ' in France, namely, that of Napoleon III, was a very corrupt and a very frivolous period, and Paris was then almost as wicked a city as Berlin is now. Outwardly it has always been a frivolous-looking city, and French life has always seemed to sober English people too gay and pleasure-loving to be sound. But few English realize how deep and true, under the surface of wit and gaiety (and too often of profanity), French home-life has always been. Very few English

people know much about French homes, fewer still ever see inside them. In them the mother rules supreme, and French mothers, from peasant to duchess, are the best maternal race in Europe. Where good mothers rule, the nation will be sound. Governments may come and go, and their external forms may change, but the French and not the Germans are the heirs of old Rome, and their women are the true successors of those old Roman mothers, of whom their menfolk's highest praise was to say, 'She stayed at home, she span wool' (or, as we should say, 'she knitted socks').

From France the victorious Germans took in 1870 the very rich provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. This was no 'crime against nationality' or against history, as the partition of Poland had been. Both had been provinces of the old German Empire, and had been comparatively recent thefts by France, Alsace in 1648, half Lorraine in 1559, half as late as 1738. They were, and are, largely German in speech and race. Yet—what queer things national antipathies and national sympathies are!—their inhabitants were for the most part passionately attached to France, and if there was one thing they loathed in the world it was a Prussian. France had governed them most kindly, and had endeared herself to them by a thousand ties. Too well the Alsatians knew the cruel treatment they would receive from Prussia, and they were not wrong in their forecast. Something like one-quarter of the Alsatian population actually gave up their homes and settled in other French provinces, and for four-and-forty years Alsace has cried day and night to France to come and deliver her. You may have heard that over the Eastern Railway Station in Paris there stands a statue of the Alsatian capital city of Strassburg. Every year it has been

covered by pious hands with a new veil of crape to indicate the mourning city. When the present war began the Alsatians resident in Paris climbed to the roof of the building and tore off the veil ; and there the great gaunt stone woman stands bare to the autumn sky—the strange symbol of a German city, stretching out her hands to Frenchmen to come to liberate her from German tyranny. All attempts to Prussianize Alsace have been utterly in vain ; not quite so wholly vain have been the Prussian operations on Lorraine. Besides taking these two provinces, the Germans demanded the payment from the French Republic of the huge sum of two hundred and forty millions sterling. They thought that the loss of such a sum would ruin France for ever ; as a matter of fact, she raised it within a year from the peace. ‘Oh!’ said the Prussians, quite disgusted at this proof of their beaten enemy’s resources and frugality, ‘next time we will make them pay two thousand millions, we will bleed them white.’

You will naturally say : Why did we, and why did Austria and Russia, not come to the help of France ? Well, Austria for her part had been far too hard hit in 1866, and had, besides, little reason to love Napoleon III, who had done nothing to save her then. Russia was lulled to sleep by Bismarck’s skilful phrases, and believed, foolishly enough, that her interests were more German than French. But England ? Well, it must be confessed we too had little reason to love the scheming old French Emperor, and in those days no special reason for loving the new French Republic. Germany had as yet no fleet, her interests did not seem to cross ours anywhere in particular. ‘If either of you attack Belgium,’ we said both to France and Germany at the beginning of the war, ‘it will at once bring us in’ ; and it is quite

probable that Mr. Gladstone, who was then Prime Minister, would have felt obliged to strike for Belgium. But Bismarck was far too prudent to incur this risk, and was wise enough to leave Belgium severely alone. Gladstone also had too little conception of the permanent duty of England to uphold the weak against the strong ; he knew nothing about foreign countries except Italy, and he had, in fact, no real grasp of the map of Europe, no foresight into the dangers of the future. So we said in a magnificent kind of way that the war was 'no concern of ours'—as if *any* great upheaval in Western Europe could leave England unconcerned !

From that hour France has set herself to reorganize her national existence. She has gone into training, like an athlete who has been badly beaten in one great race because he was out of training when called upon to run. In particular she has revived the memory of the 'Maid sent from God whose name was Jeanne', who delivered her in the fifteenth century from the cruel conquest of her northern provinces by our King Henry V. We English called that Maid 'Joan of Arc', and, to our lasting shame, being unable to beat her in the field, we caught her and burned her as a witch in the market square at Rouen. A few days ago I saw a photograph of a band of English Red-Cross nurses grouped round the pedestal of her statue which stands on the place of her martyrdom. 'I will go and save my brave friends of Compiègne,' the Maid once cried, and it was in going to save them that she was captured. Did not her spirit hover over that forest of Compiègne a few days ago and protect the descendants of her former English foes, when English cavalry made that wonderful charge upon the German guns and captured ten of them ? For my part I believe that,

whenever French soldiers have charged their enemies on French soil for France's sake, they have seen in their imagination the Maid in full armour riding at their head.

But France has also been scrupulously careful to avoid giving any sort of offence, or any cause of quarrel on which the Germans, ever watchful to seize some pretext, could fasten. Every time France has seemed to be growing too strong Germany has tried hard to pretend that she was in some way wronged ; France has turned the deafest and politest of ears. I don't for a moment say that, if at any time Frenchmen had felt that they *were* absolutely ready, they would not have picked up the glove Germany tossed at them ; but they would never have tossed the glove at Germany themselves. And it is only too evident that the French army was not as ready even as Frenchmen hoped when this war began six weeks ago.

This patient, honourable attitude of France, under the most dire provocation, has gained for her not only the respect and admiration of the lesser States of Europe, but also the friendship and alliance, first of Russia, then of England. In the minds of all three of these nations the conviction has been growing, for several years past, that Germany has merely been waiting a favourable opportunity to spring upon us, yes, upon all three of us, either at the same moment or one after the other ; and we have realized that in a quiet, and always defensive, union between our three selves both our honour and our truest interest lay. I need not go into the details or the dates of the several ' quaking fits ' into which Germany has thrown us since 1870 ; the first was in 1875, the last in 1911. That last is burned into my mind by a curious experience ; in the August of that year I was returning from Iceland in a Danish steamer,

and, when we touched at the Faroe Isles on the voyage home, we were told that news had just been received that Germany had declared war on Great Britain. You may imagine what an uncomfortable three days we had till we got into Leith, and learned that the danger had been spirited away, and the contest deferred for three precious years, by the skill and patience of our present Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey. And what Europe owed then to his skill is as nothing compared to what it owes to his firmness, his loyalty, to-day. I think his name will go down to history linked with that of Queen Elizabeth, who for twenty years by her patient diplomaey averted the danger from Spain, till her sailors were strong enough to encounter the Spanish Armada, and with that of Lord Castlereagh, who had to face the incredibly difficult task of making, and then keeping together, the union of the jealous monarchs of Austria, Prussia, and Russia from 1812 till the final overthrow of Napoleon three years later.

In the second part of this paper I shall hope to show in rather more detail what the real aims of the rulers of Germany, when they began this war, actually were.

C. R. L. F.

OXFORD, *Sept.* 9, 1914.

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THE GERMANS AND WHAT THEY COVET

‘Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s land, thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s sea, nor his forts, nor his ports, nor his shops, nor his ships, nor anything that is his.’

HAVE you not sometimes been struck with the rather tame conclusion of the Ten Commandments, as they appear in our English Bible and Prayer Book ? After the prohibition of such things as we all admit to be very terrible sins, murder, adultery, theft, perjury, we are told that we must not ‘covet’, as if that were the last and most heinous sin of all. Surely the word ‘covet’ must have changed its meaning during the last four hundred years ; for if not, it is clear that most people are terribly wicked sinners at every hour of their lives. What small schoolboy does not covet the jam rolls in the pastrycook’s window, what nursemaid does not covet the hats displayed by the milliner ? My own deeply corrupt nature is illustrated by my life-long covetousness of my neighbour’s flower-garden, or, in my more scarlet-sinful moods, of his trout-stream. Yet I can hardly believe that I shall be ‘brought into judgement’ for what seem to me little more than innocent dreams about rose-trees and three-pound fish.

The fact is that the word *has* changed its meaning. The two instances of covetousness which are branded with infamy in the Old Testament are those of Ahab, who coveted Naboth’s vineyard, and of David, who

coveted Uriah's wife ; each was a piece of detestable tyranny exercised by the strong against the weak, and in David's case it was accompanied by the most dastardly treachery. The commandment ought, if it is to express its full old Hebrew meaning, to run somewhat thus : 'Thou strong man, thou shalt not scheme to take away, forcibly or fraudulently, from thy weaker neighbour anything that is his'.

In my first paper, published a few days ago, I tried to explain what the Germans, and especially the Prussians, who now control Germany, are like ; what their Empire is ; and how it has grown up. My present paper shall be devoted to explaining what they covet, in the older sense of that word ; what they purpose to take, by fraud or force or both, from neighbours whom they believe to be weaker than themselves. But I shall continue to make use of the word 'covet', for it is both short and convenient ; just as I shall continue to speak of our present enemy as 'the Germans', while I am really meaning the Prussian military fanatics who at this moment dominate Germany.

Now these people have set about their breach of the tenth commandment very systematically ; and, in order to clear the way for this process, they have begun by rewriting several of the other commandments, especially the first, second, sixth, and eighth. For the first and second they, by a curious alliance between some of their most learned professors and some of their most distinguished soldiers, now united to preach their new gospel, have substituted something which we might paraphrase thus :—

'Thou shalt have none other God but Force. Thou shalt make several different kinds of graven images of Force, and thou shalt write their names upon

the posts of thy house and on thy gates, and they shall be to thee as frontlets between thine eyes. Thou shalt also make a graven image of the German Man in full armour, and thou shalt bow down to him and worship him, and shalt call him the king of men, the Superman.'

This Superman was the special invention of a philosopher called Nietzsche, who spent his life in railing against the 'superstition', as he called it, of Christianity, and against the virtues of pity, mercy, and love, which are, he said, the most distinctive doctrines of that superstition. You need not remember anything else about Nietzsche, except that he went stark staring mad before he died. But while he was going mad (and it would be only charitable to suppose that he was never very sane), he contrived to bite a great many of his countrymen, and to instil a good deal of his poisonous doctrine into those he bit.

For the sixth commandment the same ingenious combination of philosophers and soldiers has substituted something like this: 'Thou shalt murder all who stand in the way of the triumph of thy New God.'

The 'effete' nations of Europe and America look upon war as something terrible, wicked, to be avoided at any cost but one. To us it is the last remedy of the oppressed and the dishonoured. All aggressive war, all war to obtain more power, territory, or riches, is simply wrong, contrary to Christianity and to elementary morality. But to the new school of Germans, which grew up under the protection of Bismarck and was full of the memories of Frederick the Great, war has become 'a holy thing', 'a handmaid of culture', 'a weapon of Almighty God' (for they still use, as I told you in my last paper, the name of the God of the Old World which

they are trying to destroy), 'a medicine applied by God to heal a sick world', and so on. These phrases are actual quotations from one of their most distinguished professors of history, Treitschke.

For the eighth commandment, which in our version is usually taken to be directed against fraud and cheating, as well as against robbery with violence, they have invented a new one which may perhaps be simply stated in the words 'Thou shalt not stick at fraud'. If you want to see what they mean by this, listen to one of their most distinguished generals, Bernhardt, whose book *Germany and the Next War*, first published in 1911, reached its sixth edition last year, and has probably reached a good many more editions in the last few weeks:—

'As soon as we are ready to fight,' says Bernhardt, 'our statesmen must so shuffle the cards that France shall appear to be the aggressor; then perhaps Russia may be induced to remain neutral. Neither France, England, nor Russia have any need to attack us in order to defend their own interests; and, all the time we wait without attacking them, they will prevail over us by diplomatic means, as they did in 1911 and 1912. So what we must do is to take up some political move which, without appearing to be an act of aggression, shall be so injurious to French or English interests that one or other of them will be forced to attack us. Pretexts for this move can easily be found in Africa or in Asia.'

In recasting the tenth commandment, the Germans have simply omitted the word 'not', and substituted 'and' for 'nor' and 'everything' for 'anything'.

Fraud and force; these be thy gods, O Germany! And the people bow the head and worship. This creed is expounded to the German boys in their schools, to the

German labourers in their workshops, and to the German soldiers in their barracks, daily and systematically; and it is also proclaimed to the world in lectures, in books, and in speeches delivered all over Germany. Let me, after a study of some few of these evidences, try to explain the essence of this creed and to reduce it, as the arithmetic books say, 'to its lowest terms'. They would run somewhat thus:—

(1) 'The German race is the highest, strongest, and noblest in the world; it is specially called to civilize the lower races such as the Slavs, and to reinvigorate the effete races such as the Latins (in whom of course, besides Frenchmen, they include Italians and Spaniards) and the English. Before these can be civilized and fitted to receive German culture, they must be conquered; the process will be as good for them as it will be for us.'

(2) 'We do not say "*Might is Right*", but we say, *Might gives right*, and even imposes a *duty* of conquest on the mighty person who possesses it.'

(3) 'Besides, or in the process of, conquering these lower and these effete races, we must reclaim into the fold of Germanism the many millions of persons of German descent, of German or half-German speech, who are scattered all over the world. We will begin with the Flemish population of Belgium (a dialect of German is the speech of at least half King Albert's subjects), then go on to the whole of the population of Holland, and about half of that of Switzerland; and we may as well make a big mouthful and pretend (it will be only a pretence, but a necessary and useful one, specially based upon our new eighth Commandment) that the inhabitants of a long narrow strip of Eastern France also are of German descent. Thus, instead of a nation of sixty-five, we shall be a nation of eighty-nine millions. And when all these have been gathered in there will be one fold under one Kaiser.'

Suppose now that we button-hole one of the believers in this creed, and ask him for some necessary explanations :—

‘Why, my friend, do you not take at once the ten millions of Germans now subject to Kaiser Francis Joseph of Austria? These are infinitely more suitable sheep for your fold than Flemings, Dutchmen, or Swiss or Eastern Frenchmen.’

‘Well,’ says Herr von Potztausend-Götterdämmerung, ‘we do not mention these, at present, of course not; Francis Joseph is a very old man and . . .’

‘Nor do you, I observe, mention the several millions of Germans, whose ancestors wandered out (it is your own word for emigration) and settled in the present Baltic provinces of Russia, who gave Russia, in fact, all those bad German traditions of government which she is only now shaking off?’

‘Well, no,’ he replies, ‘we do *not* mention these people; to do so would raise problems for the solution of which even the German Superman is at the moment hardly prepared.’

‘Nor the twenty millions whom you have “lost” in America?’

‘For America,’ he replies, ‘we Germans have the very greatest respect and reverence; she cannot be called an effete nation, though, of course, it is deeply to be regretted that her success (a quality which in itself we adore) has come to her from the arts of peace rather than from the only true art, war; but at least these twenty millions, if they are to be irrevocably lost (which perhaps they will not always be), have spread the ideals of German culture through that vast and young continent. As for the few millions of us who have emigrated to South America, they are rapidly attaining supremacy

among the effete Latin races there ; and, when the time comes they will act in our vanguard for the occupation of . . . ’

‘ Did you ever hear of the Monroe doctrine, my worthy friend ? A battle royal between your supermen and the Yankees would, I fancy, be a sight for some of your new supergods. But please do not let us look too far ahead. Rather let us go on to the next step in your European world Empire.’

‘ It is well,’ he will reply, ‘ we approach the end ; we shall next hold out the torch of German culture, in the mailed fist of Germany, to your own countrymen. You, too, are of German blood ; the Angles and Saxons came from Germany fifteen hundred years ago and imposed such German culture as they knew on the effete Romanized Celts of Britain, is it not so ? ’

‘ Yes, that is often said ; we used to be taught at school that “ they slew them all so that they left none alive ”, at least no one in Eastern Britain. I always found it difficult to believe ; but, now that I see what you mean by German culture, I begin to think it may really have been true.’

‘ So, then, we shall cause these out-wandered men of ours to return to the fold, together with all that are in your colonies also ; how many millions will that make ? ’

‘ Indeed, sir, you must consult the almanack prepared each year by my countryman, Mr. Whitaker ; I cannot remember the figures, but, at a venture, let us say sixty millions.’

‘ And then will come the turn of the Scandinavian race, the Swedes, the Danes, the Norwegians ; their blood is but little more remote from ours than is your own. Our ancestors worshipped the same war-gods in the primæval forests. So that is all arranged.’

Here let us say good-bye to Herr Potz ; he and his millions begin to become a bore. What I mean to indicate is that Germany, actually and in the near future *aspires to the dominion of the world and to nothing short of that dominion*. The picture of her aims which I am going to draw may seem so absurd that some of my readers will exclaim at once ' Impossible ! '

But, stop ! in the first place, would not most reasonable Englishmen have said ten years, ten months, ten weeks, ago that the scenes that have been enacted during the last few weeks in Belgium were impossible ? In the second place, I am going to quote some of the actual writings of the German war-leaders themselves, and in these you will find both the initial steps in the conquest, and the means by which it is to be carried on, clearly outlined ; you will find some of the spoils actually earmarked and apportioned.

And, in the third place, I am not supposing that this world-conquest is designed to be a matter of a year or two. But what, no doubt, they immediately hope is, first a year of victories so complete that all the now existent resources of the three great allies, France, England, and Russia, will be shattered and, before the end of 1915, Germany will be able to impose her own terms of peace ; then that against the two former she will be able to take such steps that they shall never lift their heads as great powers again. Even then anything like annexation would still be a dream of the future. Germany would call her next steps ' peaceful penetration ', ' an open market for German goods ' (and for no other goods), and other fine names ; and to this the smaller powers of the rest of Europe would gradually be obliged to give in. There would still remain as ' Powers ' in the world, Russia, the United States of America, and Japan,

and each of these might very well cost the most superb of German supermen a very long war. But, if such wars were successful (and we must remember that Germany, if she once smashed England and France, would be mistress of nearly all seas, and that the arm of sea power is long) it is probable that, within fifty years from to-day, all the world would take its orders, both military and commercial, from Berlin.

It is because of this danger that the present war is different from any other war in the history of the world, and is, indeed, a Holy War, a war both for the immediate and for the distant future, a war for civilization, a defensive Crusade. The great Napoleon had dreams not unlike some of the dreams of the present ruler of Germany; but I think that, even if he had been victorious to the end of his life, the keen sense of humour possessed by his French subjects would have prevented their realization. The Germans, like Napoleon himself, are deficient in this saving quality of humour, and they will not mind being laughed at as madmen if they can succeed as tyrants.

The German people as a whole have never avowed these intentions; still less has the German Government put them forward as a programme. If you read the debates that take place in the German Parliament (called the *Reichstag*) you will find only occasional mention of them, and German ministers will receive such mention with a polite and deprecatory smile. Nevertheless these intentions have been publicly avowed in newspapers and speeches for the last twenty-three years, and every year they have gained more acceptance in all ranks of the nation. Remember that all great changes, all great reforms, all great wars, have been begun by earnest minorities, whose task has been to convert majorities to their own views.

In 1891 was founded the body which has inaugurated and carried through this change in German public opinion, the famous 'All-German League'. The year before, Bismarck had been dismissed because he was not 'go-ahead' enough for the present Kaiser, then a young man. Some of you may remember the picture in *Punch* called 'Dropping the Pilot'. Pilot Bismarck went home to Pomerania in a shocking temper, which he spent his remaining years in displaying to the world. But his main crime, in the eyes of the young men who stood before the new Rehoboam, had been to consider that 'Germany was satisfied', that she had bitten off, in 1870, as much as she could chew, and ought not to display any more land-hunger at present.

The spirit which founded the League had, however, been active from the very morrow of the victories of 1870; and the present Kaiser had been captured by it long before he came to the throne. The membership of the League was at first small, and was confined to a few extreme men; but with each year of its existence it has grown, until at the present day it is believed to number something like half a million of the 'intellectuals of Germany'. It has four great provincial branches, one in each of the four districts of Germany, and these are divided into two hundred and ten local branches. It has offered annual prizes for the best patriotic works expressive of its own ideas; one of the last of these, 'Germany as a World Power' (1911), is a sumptuous volume, to which some of the most learned men in the country have contributed; it has 850 pages and 5,000 illustrations; it is beautifully bound, and is sold for the ridiculous price of four shillings—barely enough to cover the cost of binding. The League has published besides an 'All-German Catechism', with question and

answer, every line of which expresses the doctrine of aggressive war as the highest duty of German men ; and it issues a weekly newspaper *All-German Leaves* (or 'pages') in the same strain. It is governed by an executive directory of six persons, a committee of twenty, and a council of a hundred ; among these are found not only leading soldiers, army contractors, and navy contractors, but several newspaper editors and a large number of University professors and teachers. It has founded, encouraged, or affiliated, an enormous number of lesser patriotic leagues, some of them with queer names like 'Odin' (the heathen god of primitive Germany), the 'Hammer League', the 'German-speech League', the 'War League', the 'Colonial League' ; it is in close relation with the enormously popular Navy League ; and its last triumph has been the ironically named 'League for the Defence of Germany' (1912). Most of these leagues have ladies' branches and juvenile branches, as well as their main society.

But the most important success of all is that the All-German League has now got either the controlling influence over, or the opportunity of freely expressing its opinions in, nearly all the most widely read of the German newspapers. The most go-ahead paper of Germany, *The Future*, edited by Maximilian Harden, though not officially a League paper, is wholly devoted to expounding the ideas of the League. The *Gazette of the Rhineland and Westphalia*, published at Essen, where Mr. Krupp builds the big guns, is entirely in the interest of the League—which is the interest of Mr. Krupp—and is the loudest in the yelping train. The *Daily Look-Round*, the *Cross Gazette* (Roman Catholic), the *Empire's Post* are League papers pure and simple ; and each year the most respectable papers such as the

Cologne Gazette and the *Munich Latest News* have published more and more of the inflammatory League-stuff.

The League makes a great point of being 'above party', and professes to ignore the many 'parties' in the German Parliament. This is not difficult, for there are many of these parties, and each one has little power of itself; the ordinary German cares very little for 'politics' in the parliamentary sense of the word. His politics (all honour to him for the sentiment) are comprised in the words 'my country's interest before my own opinions or my own ease'; and it is not always his fault if he misconceives the interest of his country. The Government, by which I mean the Kaiser and his ministers, has often professed to look askance on the League and on the League newspapers; it has occasionally published contradictions, in its own chief organs, of some of the sentiments of the League. Even Bismarck more than once rapped the League over the knuckles. *But every time the Government has entered upon anything approaching an open struggle against the League, the League has won;* and the Government has had to beat a hasty, and often an undignified retreat. The person in the Empire who has had to beat retreat most frequently is William II himself. I wrote in my former paper that I was sure that the Kaiser had been forced into this war, which he had not desired; I tell you now that this war has been but one more, and the last, triumph of the League. William II had fostered the spirit when he was young, just as his son, a man of thirty, has been fostering it for the last ten years; but when years and responsibility began to show the Kaiser the rocks ahead of his country, he did not find it easy to repress the spirit he had

fostered. He has liked being called 'William the Peaceful', and he has really wished to deserve the name; but for the last ten years the League has hurled the name at him as one of contempt, and has as good as threatened him with deposition if he does not obey its behests. Take the following extract from Daniel Frymann's book *If I were Kaiser* (1911):—

'The disastrous activity of William II and the failure of his councillors [to cheat or bully the French out of Morocco in the crisis of 1911] have rendered the present form of Government insupportable. The absurd poltroonery of the most highly placed persons, and the complete set-back they have given to German ambition, have at length raised the question whether it is not urgent for us to establish a system of parliamentary government.'

The League, in fact, believed, and perhaps was quite right in believing, that a parliament, freely elected and uncontrolled by a crown, would be more likely to vote Germany into an aggressive war than the Kaiser and his ministers. Early last year the *Gazette of the Rhineland and Westphalia* (February 14, 1913) actually invoked the memories of the popular revolt of the year 1848, and called for a revolution in order to promote the longed-for policy of war. There are in the German Parliament parties calling themselves 'Radicals' and 'Socialists', and the industrial army of Socialism is believed to be better organized in Germany than in any other country in the world; the great Socialist leader used to be called 'King Bebel', and to be contrasted with King William. Bismarck hated these fellows, and really exercised a good deal of absurd tyranny against their leaders; he dissolved two parliaments in the teeth of constitutional law because of their opposition; but,

now, behold, the Socialists have all but unanimously supported a policy which goes beyond anything that Bismarck ever dreamed of.¹

The great chance for the League to air its now fully matured views seems to have come about 1904-5, when the one power that all Germans dread, Russia, had her hands tied with her Japanese war. From that hour its leaders have never ceased to preach 'Now is the time to attack England or France, or both'; and it must be owned that William the Peaceful's vanity, and his passion for making speeches and journeys, too often got the better of his statesmanship and induced him to play into the hands of the League. He has been the most unstable of kings; now the League have thought they held him, now he has escaped their clutches; and we have just seen how they spoke of him on such occasions. In 1905 they got him to go to Tangier and make one of his most indiscreet and provocative speeches; from that hour till this they have never ceased to cry out 'Morocco!' 'Morocco!' *West Morocco for Germany* is the title of a most popular League pamphlet written by the barrister, Herr Class, the president of the League-directory (1911). There is not a great deal about Morocco in this work, but there is a great deal about 'what we intend to take from France' in France herself; and, during the Moroccan negotiations of 1911, the German Government made

¹ Bismarck's chief difficulties were over the laws for the increase of the German Army; in 1887 there were less than 30 Socialists in the Parliament, but they were unanimous and sufficed to turn the scale against him; in 1893 they numbered 40, and again they triumphed over Bismarck's successor. In 1913 estimates were carried which increased the army in time of peace beyond any dream of Bismarck's fancy; though there were 110 Socialists present, they did not venture to oppose the increase.

Class expunge a passage from this widely-read book, lest it should upset the agreement that was being made. The book was well calculated to do so, for it calmly stated that the Germans coveted a strip of France from Nancy southwards to Toulon and northwards to the mouth of the Somme. But when, to the infinite wrath of the League, the Agreement of 1911 had been made, the author at once restored the passage to the new edition of his work, and no one dared to molest him. Well might the German negotiator say to the French and English on that occasion, 'We don't want war, but public opinion in Germany is "nervous" and may easily get out of hand.' 'Public opinion' was that of the all-victorious League.

But, long before this Moroccan question, the Kaiser's policy in China in 1897 and 1900, in Turkey from 1898, his attitude to England during the Boer War, his Bagdad Railway business—all these were instances of the triumph of the League's policy over the intentions of a ruler, impulsive and vain indeed, but not naturally either such a fool or such a knave as to wish for an aggressive war. In October, 1908, the poor gentleman, in a moment of ill-judged expansiveness, granted an interview to an English representative of the *Daily Telegraph* and spoke warmly about his affection for England and his desire for peace. The forces of the All-Germanists were so great that in the German Parliament there was actually a debate on the Kaiser himself, as if he were a bill or a policy, and he got a most frightful scolding. The Chancellor of this nominally all-powerful sovereign was obliged to announce 'that in the future, both in his private conversations and in his public speeches, His Majesty would impose upon himself the reserve which is indispensable to the continuity of his policy and

the authority of the Crown'. What a humiliation for any king! What a 'climb-down' for the grandson of Victoria the Great! It was wholly a League victory; and please take note that it was immediately followed by a series of much harsher laws against the inhabitants of the three irreconcilable provinces of the Empire, the Alsatians, the Danes in Schleswig, and the Poles in Posen; for it was one of the favourite cries of the League that these peoples should be Germanized by force since they would never become Germans by persuasion.

The activity of the League has not been confined within the frontiers of the Empire itself, and it has, in particular, set before itself the task of keeping the Kaiser's ally, Austria, in the strait paths of Germanism. It has branches and affiliated leagues in every province of Francis Joseph's dominions, all pledged to the one object of all-German propaganda and to the cry of 'down with the Slavs'. When, in 1897, the Austrian Government proposed, through its chancellor, some milder laws for the Slav population of Bohemia (they were to be allowed among other benefits the free use of their mother tongue) up sprang the League in a fury and held indignation meetings all over Germany. Those German statesmen who set (and who did not?) a high value on the Austrian alliance were really alarmed, and took strong measures to suppress some of these meetings. But the League won; the Government of Vienna at least knew when it was beat, if that of Berlin didn't; the chancellor was dismissed, and the laws in favour of the Bohemian tongue were repealed. The unfortunate heir to the Austrian monarchy, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, whose murder was the spark that set all the world on fire, was believed to favour the Slavs, and

the League, considering that his accession might prove a serious thing for some of its views, can hardly have seen his disappearance from the world without some joy. Many people, indeed, have speculated on the possibility that the crime of June 28 may have been planned rather in Berlin than in Belgrade. In *If I were Kaiser*, Frymann had treated Francis Ferdinand to the explicit threat that if, when he came to the throne, he did not maintain the absolute supremacy of the twelve million Germans over the twenty-four million Slavs of his dominions, he could look for no support or alliance from Berlin.

I hope I have not lingered too long over this portion of my subject, but I wanted to show you both where the centre of the war-propaganda lies, and how completely those monarchs to whom peaceful peoples like the English and Americans attribute enormous power, may really be at the mercy of an organization controlled by a handful of bankers, merchants, ship-builders, gun-makers, professors and soldiers. The League has breathed the ideal of aggressive war into Germany, and has triumphed over the written constitution which vested the highest power of the land in William the Peaceful. Whether that spirit prove victorious or defeated in the present war, it is difficult to suppose that Kaiser-rule will be again tolerated by Germans.

And now I want to return to and develop, at a little greater length, my first theme, 'What they covet.'

Let us ask ourselves first which of the three great allies France, England, or Russia does Germany hate most, at which is the propaganda of that All-German League first directed? I have not the slightest doubt that it is England. Treitschke's whole animus was directed against England to the day of his death; and

Treitschke did more to form *educated* opinion in Germany than any one. To Max Harden, the able editor of *The Future*, England plays Carthage to Germany's Rome, 'and Carthage must be blotted from the map.'

It is true that Germany hates France as well ; and it is also true that in her hatred for each of these countries you will find two separate well-springs which I will call respectively 'petty jealousy' and 'grand jealousy'. Germany's 'petty jealousy' of France is based upon the events of the past and the present ; her 'petty jealousy' of England is based on the events of the present and the forecast of the future. She repents bitterly that she did not in 1870 erase France from the list of nations, that she did not impose tenfold the war-indemnity and twofold the sacrifice of territory that she actually imposed on her conquered enemy. She can never forgive that enemy for her marvellously quick recovery from that disaster ; she can never forgive her the fact that, even in defeat, Paris remained the intellectual and fashionable capital of the world. Germany cannot forgive Frenchmen their wit, their good manners, their much longer history as a civilized nation, and the infinitely greater consideration it procures them.

The corresponding 'petty jealousy' of England is based on matters that go somewhat deeper ; what Germany cannot forgive us is our political success in spite of our apparent indifference to success ; they stare and gasp at our party strife, at our calm acceptance of shocks, political, financial, economical, which would upset them altogether. They think a country must be rotten to the core which can tolerate one-tenth of the freedom that we tolerate and display the nonchalant temper that we display through it all. Then again, though the All-German

League may, in its passionate moods, occasionally play with the idea of popular government, it is quite obvious that a really free government of a great country by its own people, is the very last thing that would form a good or permanent basis for the ideals of the League. A country so governed is not likely to be ready for aggression or to desire aggression ; alas, we see, from our own case to-day, that, though such a country is ready enough to prepare for defence *when* the aggression has come, it is only too fatally unready for defence *in case* an aggression may come. Such an attitude of our 'too free' country the Germans despise ; but of the spirit that can, even now, rise superior to this grave mistake they are profoundly jealous. And if they are jealous of our present success, how infinitely more jealous are they when they set themselves to forecast the future.

Here their 'petty' begins to merge itself in their 'grand' jealousy of England. We block the way. Our oldest oversea settlements were made when Prussia was a little state with barely a window even to the Baltic ; but from the reign of Elizabeth to that of George V, our colonial Empire has been growing. More grievous still is it that our colonies don't seem inclined to break off from us ; the more freedom we allow them the closer they cling. It has been a fixed idea of more than one European rival of ours that we have always 'grievously oppressed' our great dependency India ; and lots of stupid (but few really disloyal) Indians have quite recently been making absurd speeches, and have even played with 'bombs made in Germany'. 'India therefore,' think the Germans, '*must* be ripe for rebellion.' They will be considerably astonished when the Indian troops display their valour and their marvellous

horsemanship in front of the German lines, as they will within a very few weeks. Need I pursue this subject any longer? There is our empire of colonies and dependencies, knit together by the almost invisible line of a few grey hulls and a few tracks of smoke across the pathless seas; the heart of it all is a little island in the North Sea. That island blocks the way to the expansion of Germany. More horrible still, it does not appear to block the way to the expansion of France, or of Russia, or of any other power that will live at peace with us, and not lay down a new set of commandments in the place of the old set. Most horrible of all is the fact that Germany, when she does, by sheer bullying and persistence, get a few thousand acres of tropical swamp out of England or France, seems to be quite incapable of colonizing them with her own or any other subjects. The Germans have not the temper of the colonist, nor the genius for colonial expansion. They are ready enough, 'far too ready', says the Kaiser, 'to emigrate to other people's colonies, and to thrive beyond measure in lands wherein others have done the pioneer work and the spade work, but they will not do it for themselves. They cannot assimilate—witness the Danes and Poles and Alsatians—conquered races; but they can very readily be assimilated to the races of those foreign countries in which they settle. When it comes to races with skins of a different colour from their own they are even more hopelessly at sea.

Yet when we come back to the question of 'What do they covet?' you may be very sure that the British colonies are what they covet before everything else. Let us for a moment consider that point in more detail. If Germany dictates to the three great allies a 'Peace of London', she will demand from us three primary cessions: (1)

our colonies ; (2) our fleet (of course there won't be much of it left if she ever gets here) ; (3) an enormous sum in hard cash, which she will call a ' war indemnity '.

She would then probably go on to stipulate that for the future we should ' make our policy conform to German views ', and would, in order to secure this end, maintain a German garrison in our island. She would not starve our population, and she would do all she could to keep our industries alive—for her own benefit. Probably each of our great industrial, shipping, or mercantile businesses would be obliged to ' conform its policy ' to that laid down by a German ' Director of British Industries '. This would be the first act of the drama. The next would be some sort of federal incorporation of Britain in the New German Empire. Our king, supposing they left us one, would have a seat in the German Federal Council, and would be like one of the comic-opera German kings who are now vassals of Berlin (Saxony, Wurtemberg, Bavaria). It would be a humorous situation for us, would it not ? I know a green island beyond St. George's Channel, as rich in humour as it is in gallant men, that would give our new masters a good deal of trouble before it accepted such a situation. Indeed, I rather fancy that, if such a dreadful state of things ever did come to pass, it would be from Ireland that the first dawn of deliverance would come.

Of course, long before any such peace could be dictated, Germany would have become mistress of the ports of Belgium, Holland, and Northern France ; it is probable that one of the main reasons impelling her to the shameless violation of Belgium, with which she began this war, was a desire to get hold of Antwerp and Ostend as bases of attack upon England. The three Scandinavian

kingdoms would, no doubt, make a long and gallant resistance before they too suffered an incorporation into the New Empire ; but, with the sea power in German hands, such resistance would, in the end, be vain. Holland might very probably be the last power to be absorbed, not because she would oppose a more effective resistance, but because her own ' Low-German ' blood might be trusted to be won over to the All-German idea the more easily the less coercion was applied.

' The World,' says Paul Rohrbach (in his book, *The German Idea in the World*), ' has no longer need of little nationalities. If they are to give full effect to their ideas of culture, and to gather up the results of their scientific discoveries, they must fall into line with the world-power of Germany ; they need a broad basis for their civilization to develop on.' This, of course, applies to the Flemings, Dutch, Danes, Swedes, Norwegians, and Swiss. As for the military use of Belgium and Holland, Herr Frymann whom I have already quoted told us plainly, three years before the attack on Belgium, that this attack would lay the first plank in the German bridge to England and France,

' for we cannot tolerate on our north-west frontier those little States which give no guarantee against their violation by England and France ; so, when we decide on war, we shall summon them to join us or be treated as enemies '.

Holland, indeed, has been far too slow to realize her own danger. The penetration of Germany into Switzerland, however extensive and indeed enormous (she controls very largely the Swiss railways, and a great proportion of the chief industrial concerns in Switzerland are run by Germans), has been hitherto peaceful ; how long would it have continued to be so ?

These little powers, however, are as mere rocks in the ocean of German covetousness. After England it is from France that Germany covets the most ; after ourselves France is the only Western power towards whom she feels the nobler passion of the ' grand jealousy '. The French fleet, and the very rich French colonies of Algiers and Morocco—these are no doubt important objects of German desires. But more than these it is the rich land of eastern France, an extension of Alsace and Lorraine to north and south and west, that Germany is after. So far as I can make out from the All-Germanist writings—but they vary in the degrees of their desires—the new German frontier would start from the city of Nancy in the centre, and one straight line would run north to the English Channel at the mouth of the river Somme, and another south to the Mediterranean at the mouth of the Rhône. This would give the Germans five more ports of first-class importance, Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne on the northern, and Marseilles and the great French dockyard and arsenal of Toulon on the southern sea. It would give them all the rich ironworks of the district of Lille, which are to the German soldiers a point of prime importance, because their own iron mines are within measurable distance of giving out, and it is believed that Mr. Krupp will within the next twenty years actually be obliged to go to other countries to get the iron of which to build his guns. It would give them the great fortresses of Lille, Maubeuge, Verdun, Toul, and Belfort, which (no doubt by an unforgivable oversight) Bismarck omitted to annex in 1870. To these cessions they would no doubt add another enormous war-indemnity and ' bleed France white '. There would be no need for them to annex the rest of her territory ; western France at least has no drop of German blood

in her, and she would be quite sufficiently erased from the list of Great Powers. Nor would Germany wish to add to her world-tasks that of keeping down the city of Paris. As a precaution she might perhaps stipulate that France should reduce her army to one-tenth of its present size.

But, you will say, the Germans have already completely failed to Germanize the Alsatians, and almost wholly failed with the Lorrainers; will they not also fail with this new and much larger strip of French territory? Ah, there they have a much better plan, or two alternative plans, to set in motion. The first is that of our friend Frymann, and he expresses it thus:—

‘We shall exact from France the cession of so much territory that we can be for the future in security. *This territory will be evacuated by all its French inhabitants.*’ (He admits that this sounds horrible.) ‘But it is necessary to speak of the subject publicly in order that our enemies may learn that such an extreme idea does find apologists in Germany, . . . and when we reflect upon the peculiar situation of the German people, shut and barred in, in the centre of Europe and exposed to the danger of having its population simply stifled unless it can get air, we must agree that we may be forced to demand the evacuation of the territory which will be ceded to us by our enemies, both on our western and our eastern frontier’ (i. e. in Polish lands which Russia will cede, as well as French lands).

German ‘colonists’ are then to be imported into these territories; they will be fruitful and multiply therein. You see the model which the All-Germanists set before themselves? It is that of the old Assyrian and Babylonian kings of the Bible who moved whole populations before them. They, indeed, left deserts behind them; but the German will soon make this French

desert blossom with the rose of German culture, and ring with the forging of German guns.

For many of the All-Germanists, however, this idea has seemed too horrible, and a second alternative has been proposed. I will select as a good example of this plan what K. F. Wolff wrote in *All-German Leaves*, the official organ of the league, in the September of last year. Let us not clear the men out, is his argument, but simply deny them all political rights, and all civic rights, for ever :—

‘There are two kinds of races, master-races and inferior-races.’ (An old Greek would of course have spoken honestly of slave-races, but our learned German philologist is too mealy-mouthed to do this.) ‘Political rights belong to the master-race alone, and can only be won by war. This is a Scientific Law, a law of Biology. The rights of *men* may be, and ought to be, allowed to the inferior-race, and these include individual liberty, the right to work, and the right to express opinions; but all other rights belong only to the master-race. The master-race should be rich in men; only the races which are so are properly master-races. It is *unjust* that a rapidly increasing master-race should be struggling for room behind its own frontier while a declining inferior-race can stretch its limbs at ease on the other side of that frontier. The inferior-race will not be educated in the schools of the master-race nor will any schools be established for it, nor will its language be employed in public.’

So the language will die out, and the inferior-race will decline still further. Probably in its despair it will occasionally rise against the master-race; let it do so; but, when it does, shoot it down without mercy (his words are ‘it is necessary to use the most violent means to suppress such insurrection, and not to encumber the prisons afterwards’).

‘Thus,’ says this amiable Mr. Wolff (who makes, you see, no pretence of concealing himself in sheep’s clothing) ‘the conquerors can best work for the annihilation of the conquered, and break for ever with the prejudice which would claim for a beaten race any right to maintain its nationality or its native tongue. The conqueror will stand up for his privilege, he will commit no injustice, he will show himself chivalrous, he will not compel any of the conquered to associate with him, or to fight in his army’ [let us be thankful for that Wolfish mercy] ‘well knowing that this last duty belongs only to the master-race. To make war and conquests is noble, to mock or ill-treat the vanquished is ignoble and unbecoming to a high-spirited race which feels itself called to the dominion of the world.’

Pretty drastic, isn’t it? And so now we English and French know what to expect from German culture, chivalry, and nobleness.

I am told, though I have not seen it, that there is, or was quite recently, to be seen in Paris a caricature by a famous Alsatian artist called M. Zislin. Somewhere about the date of the Russo-Japanese War, William II, who had a real fear of an invasion of Europe by a Japanese and Chinese army, and was fond of talking about the ‘Yellow Peril’ (i. e. the danger of an attack by these ‘yellow’ races on the white European races), commissioned his own court-painter, called Knackfuss, to paint him an allegorical picture representing the several nations of Europe grouped upon a large rock, looking eastward into a yellow dawn out of which the myriad legions of these dangerous races were advancing. Well, M. Zislin improved on this spirited German idea, and drew a sketch of the several nations of Europe and America, with France, England, and Russia as their leaders, watching from the same rock a bright *red* dawn out of

which the legions of the All-German peril were advancing. Parody is an easy form of humour, but they say the Kaiser did not see the fun of it.

Again I must recall myself and my readers to the thread of my argument. We have seen what the victorious Germans mean to do to us Western nations when we are beaten to our knees; there remains the extremely serious question, what do they intend to do with Russia in similar circumstances. It is a very curious, and even an ominous, fact that here we have nothing to guide us. Beyond truculent, but always vague, denunciations of the Slavs as an inferior race, and a few hearty promises to make a desert (fit for subsequent colonization by German culture) of their own Polish provinces and of so much of the present Russian Poland as they can grab, I can find nothing in the speeches or writings of the All-German Leaguers to indicate how they propose to solve the problem of dealing with a beaten Russia. The reason is, I think, fairly clear. Russia is the only state of which Germany stood in real dread on August 1, 1914. Her already vast population of 170,000,000 is believed to be increasing annually by 2,000,000 which is exactly double the normal rate of increase of the 65,000,000 of Germans themselves. Her army is increasing in arithmetical progression proportionate to this increase of population. Her last nine years are believed to have been a period not only of amazing prosperity and economic advance, but also of moral and spiritual awakening, which has come without the loss of one jot or tittle of her older sources of strength. By these 'older sources' I mean her almost universal grip of the idea of the eternal union between religion and patriotism, which stood her in such good stead in the dark days of Napoleon's invasion in 1812.

In a vague way she has long regarded herself as the champion and head of the weaker Slav peoples and nations ; but till quite recently this feeling has been hindered by the oppressive action of her own Government towards its Polish subjects. Quite suddenly, as it were, the scales have dropped from her eyes, and any Russian Tsar or minister who now attempted to oppress any other Slav nationality would get short shrift from the Russian people. All this is part of the moral awakening of ' Holy Mother Russia '.

What, then, could a victorious Germany do to such a power ? Russia has few manufacturing centres which could be ' ruined ' out of hand by a German army. She has already a considerable gold reserve (I mean, accumulated hard cash) but hardly enough to tempt a Germany satiated, as we have been supposing our victorious supermen to be, with a couple of thousand millions sterling from both France and England. Her fleet is respectable but barely more than respectable. The Germans would probably take that ; they might give Finland to Sweden and perhaps take Riga and some other Baltic ports for themselves ; they might just possibly take the whole Baltic coast. No doubt Germany's new ' natural ally ', Turkey (what a charming natural ally for the apostles of culture to possess !), might be bolstered up to occupy some of the Black Sea coasts. But would any of this *ruin* Mother Russia ? I doubt it profoundly. She would but retreat to her snows and her Asia, to her vast mineral wealth in the Ural mountains, to her millions of acres of waving corn-fields in Siberia. In these unmolested and unmolestable fastnesses she could afford to wait and recreate her patient strength till the ' New Empire ' of Germany began to crumble from its own superfluity of naughtiness.

This is, as I say, all mere guess-work ; but it is not to be supposed that the Germans, who move through historical time with the map of the immediate future (a map 'made in Germany') in the hands of their staff-officers, have *no* plan for the solution of the problem. And if you ask me to hazard a guess concerning the way in which they hope to solve it, I will only put two such guesses before you : (1) they probably expect, in some way or other, to reassert their old ascendancy over the Tsar himself, when they have beaten him ; they will 'make him make peace', and will promise him German support to secure his throne against the very certain anger of his people. Or else ; (2) they suppose that a Russia, cut off from the Baltic and the Black Sea, and thereby from all European trade and all incentive to self-development, will lazily relapse into its mediaeval condition of half-barbarous isolation. Well, I don't know which is the more absurd or the more childish expectation ; and, if either of these guesses is anywhere near the truth, as representing the German forecast, it only shows that the German leaders are as blind and stupid as they are wicked.

No, the real loss to Russia of a wholesale defeat of the three great allies in this present war would be that, for some time to come, she would lose her recently acquired proud position of champion of the Slav races ; and these (large populations but little 'powers') would be left sticking between the Devil of Germany, the deep sea of Austria, and the half-stranded shark of Turkey. I cannot see what the most victorious Germany you can imagine would do with all these peoples—I even forget half their names—for they are an ugly lot to tackle. To remove them wholesale, to drive out Serbs, Czechs, Poles, Ruthenians, Wallachians,

Albanians, Bulgarians, Montenegrins, Roumanians, &c., would be a task beyond the powers of William the Peaceful or Nebuchadnezzar the King. To reconcile them would be impossible; they have had some thirteen centuries of experience of the gentle art of being 'agin the Government' whatever form that government may have taken. To civilize them would seem to be an even more impossible task, and especially impossible if conducted by German men on German methods. Perhaps, then, Germany's best solution of the Balkan and Polish problems, after the destruction of Russia as a European power, would be found in encouraging these peoples to devour one another in the fashion of the Kilkenny cats. Those animals, you may remember, ate each other up all but the tips of their tails.

I have but one more point to which I wish to call your attention. I have tried to show you what the Germans have been coveting for the last ten, twenty, thirty, or forty years. It remains for us to consider why they have decided to put their covetousness to the test of experiment in 1914. I may be wrong, but it seems to me that they have had a good many reasons for striking now. A good many things may have been opening the eyes of this syndicate of wickedness to the knowledge that they have been building on a volcano, or at least on mined ground. First, they have probably not been feeling very happy about their machine-made army; there comes a point in the building of a great machine when your wheels get *too* large, your gear too intricate, and the machine is apt, as they say of a helmless ship, 'to take charge of itself'. The vaster the machine, the more dangerous any side-slip may be.

Secondly, the men that run the machine may not be fulfilling all the expectation of their owners. No doubt

you know that in the earlier phase of the recent Balkan War the Turks got well beaten by the 'inferior races' of the Balkan Peninsula—by the Bulgarians, the Serbs, the Greeks—and only got a little of their own back when these jolly fellows began to squabble over the spoil. Now the beaten Turkish army had been quite recently 're-made in Germany', that is to say, it was trained by German officers on German methods, and was armed with Mr. Krupp's latest brand of German guns. Even if we suppose (as no doubt we fairly may) that Mr. Krupp cheated the poor Turks and didn't waste his best guns on them, the failure of the Turkish army was not a pleasant subject for Germans to reflect upon. And they were at least determined to prove, on another and better field, that failure was not a necessary result of their system.

Thirdly, in 1914 they could still count on one ally, Austria. Who could tell that they might be able to count on her in 1915? The old emperor's death, even if it were to happen in peace time, would in all probability split the Austro-Hungarian monarchy into several fragments. No other ally for Germany was possible; for Italy, though for thirty-two years a member of their 'Triple Alliance', was manifestly not to be trusted to act against France and England. If Italy does strike, she is far more likely to strike for us than against us. They, the Germans, have felt that every year that has passed has but added to the burden of fear and hatred with which the other powers of Europe, great and small, have regarded them; so there was no use in waiting any longer.

Fourthly, and far more important than all the above reasons, we have the fact that the enormous increase of the mineral, agricultural, and manufacturing output of

Germany herself has, instead of leading to greater contentment and prosperity inside, actually been leading in the reverse direction, towards an economic and financial crisis. There are not nearly enough markets or outlets for this newly accumulated wealth. It is manipulated by financiers for their private ends, and these have speculated with it beyond the bounds of prudence. Much of German capital is locked up in hazardous enterprises both inside and outside Europe. Credit was not actually impaired in the early months of 1914, but it was in danger of being impaired ; creditors were becoming 'nervous' ; and a 'sensitive' condition of credit is a very dangerous condition. The last loans of the German Government were not at all readily subscribed : the expenses of the army had frightened all who were willing to lend, and the expenditure on public works and on experiments in 'state socialism' frightened them even more. Moreover, the increase of population has, during the last ten or more years, led to a necessary importation of corn and meat on a very large scale, and this to feed a country whose fleet emphatically does *not* command the seas of the world. The agricultural interest has cried out against this importation, and the Government had to conciliate it by imposing a high tariff on such imports—result, the prices of food have gone up, and there has been a quarrel between the country producer and the town consumer of food. On the other hand, for want of a market, the prices of manufactured articles have actually gone down. The manufacturers have not dared to stop the output of their goods for fear of angry workmen and strikes ; and they are hard put to it to pay wages. This, above all things, is at the bottom of the cry for more colonies, and for larger markets abroad. And the trade that has

been hit hardest of all by this want of markets is just the iron trade, whose fluctuations affect, not only the provinces of the Rhine and Westphalia, but the province of Silesia as well, in fact the naturally richest provinces of the Empire.

But the governing classes, the Prussian noblemen, the great financiers, the great shipmasters, and the great manufacturers know perfectly well that anything like an economic or commercial crisis, anything like a general collapse of credit, nay, anything like what English financiers call a 'panic', would bring them toppling to the ground. France could survive a good many panics, though she would squeal very loudly when they came. In England city men used to say there was 'one panic every nine years'; 'I say, Jim,' says one street boy to another in one of the early pictures in *Punch*, 'vots a panic?' 'Blow'd if I know,' replies the other, 'but there's vun to be seen in the City' (1841). So we take our panics calmly. Germany cannot afford to do so. Indeed, she cannot afford to take anything calmly, and she does not try.

There remains, then, for the German—loose and absolved from the older form of the Ten Commandments—but one resource, War. His own goods (credit, capital, finance, or whatever you like to call them) may fail him. But his fist is mailed; his machine is ready; his neighbour is weak. His new God calls upon him, and he strides forth—into Belgium—the Armed Superman.

C. R. L. F.

OXFORD, Sept. 12, 1914.

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‘JUST FOR A SCRAP OF PAPER’

IN the now historic meeting between Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador at Berlin, and the Imperial Chancellor, Dr. von Bethman-Hollweg, the latter expressed considerable surprise that Great Britain was about to enter into war with a friendly nation ‘just for a scrap of paper’. To do justice to the Chancellor, his surprise seems to have been very real and his agitation no less real. The fact that this surprise was real should be carefully noted by Englishmen. That the idea of the disarmament of the nations, or their partial disarmament, has not been agreeable to Germany is well known; but that she should consider that treaties solemnly entered into are not worth the paper on which they are written was, however, a revelation for which Europe was entirely unprepared.

On August 2, a German *ultimatum* was presented to Belgium. Provided no opposition was made to the passing of German troops through the country, Belgium’s independence would be respected. The news which reached England on August 3, that German troops, before the declaration of war, had violated the French frontier at four points and committed acts of war, was somewhat surprising. Their invasion of Luxemburg was in direct contravention of the Treaty of London which was concluded on May 11, 1867, and was signed by Great Britain, France, Russia, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary. The invasion of Luxemburg was stated not to imply any hostile intentions against the Grand Duchy. That invasion threw a lurid light on the conception of honour and good faith

prevalent in Prussian circles, and therefore it is not surprising that a German *ultimatum* should have been presented to Belgium, though France had agreed to respect Belgian neutrality. As in the case of Luxemburg, but in a manner more binding, the neutrality and independence of Belgium had been solemnly guaranteed by Prussia, as well as by England, Austria, Russia, and France, in 1839. In August 1870 fresh guarantees of the neutrality of Belgium were obtained, from the French and German Governments, by Lord Granville, England being then prepared to resist, by force of arms, any infringement of that neutrality.

The surprise expressed by the Imperial Chancellor in his interview with Sir Edward Goschen was no doubt intensified, owing to the undoubted fact that it had been taken for granted, by the German Government, that the English ministry was fully engaged in Irish and domestic matters.

There were thus some excuses for the Chancellor's surprise. Belgium, in his opinion, would not suffer more than a temporary inconvenience from the passage of German troops through her territory. And further, it was unlikely that Belgium could offer any serious opposition without the support of Great Britain. Such support must have seemed absolutely impossible according to the information possessed by the German Chancellor.

England has for many years been infested by spies, who were to be found in every grade of British society, and who regularly notified their views of the political situation to the German authorities. Foreigners, however, have never yet been able to form correct estimates as to the course which Englishmen would take at a given crisis. Still, the reports of spies, and the speeches of ministers, together with the events of May, June, and July in Ireland, would seem to have fully justified the

Chancellor in his belief, that Ireland was on the verge of a civil war, which nothing could avert.

Moreover, the Chancellor did not in the slightest degree realize that a German invasion of Belgium would be regarded, to use the words of Mr. Gladstone, as ‘the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history’, and that these words expressed accurately the view held, not only by all English-speaking people, but by all those who have regarded the plighted word of nations as something which could not easily be disregarded.

Had, however, the Chancellor studied the history of Western Europe, or even glanced through its pages, he must have realized that Great Britain has always been keenly interested in the country now known as Belgium, no less than in the fortunes of Holland. Edward III’s entry into the Hundred Years’ War, in 1338, was due to a variety of causes; but one of the chief was the evident determination of the French king to dominate Flanders; and Edward’s policy in resisting that attempt has many points of resemblance with that adopted by the younger Pitt in 1792-3.

History does indeed, in a way, repeat itself. It is exactly a hundred years since Great Britain’s efforts to save Europe from subservience to the French Emperor were rewarded by the occupation of Paris, and Napoleon’s imprisonment in Elba; while, a century before Napoleon was consigned to his island prison, Great Britain had resisted and overthrown the ambitious schemes of Louis XIV, one of whose aims was French domination over Belgium and Holland. The European revolt against the aggressions of France had opened in 1688, and in 1689 William III entered upon that struggle against the ascendancy of the French nation which was so satisfactorily continued in Queen Anne’s reign. Again, just a century before the accession of William III, which was

in itself an event of overwhelming importance to the balance of power in Europe, the English navy, by defeating the great Armada, had not only saved Holland, but had struck a blow at Spanish ascendancy from which it never recovered. Thus, in the fourteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, Great Britain has steadily pursued a policy of incalculable advantage to Europe. Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV, and Napoleon had adopted an aggressive policy which proved intolerable to all their neighbours. With these monarchs the present German Kaiser must now be numbered, as a ruler whose later policy has been a continued menace to the peace of Europe.

All these sovereigns entirely failed to understand the British character, and the real aims and strength of the British nation. In his preparations for the invasion of England, Philip II made it evident that he was absolutely ignorant of the progress of the British fleet, due to the efforts of Hawkins, or of the importance to England of the independence of Holland. Louis XIV, too, confidently expected to establish his supremacy in the Channel, if not indeed to effect the invasion of England ; while Napoleon showed all through his marvellous career an extraordinary ignorance of the importance of sea power.

The present German Kaiser has indeed proved superior to Napoleon in his recognition of the value of sea power, and has made prodigious efforts to place Germany on an equality with Great Britain in respect of naval strength. But he, like Napoleon and Louis XIV, has badly blundered in one most important respect ; like them, he has entirely misunderstood the meaning of events in England—events which he imagined would either lead to civil war or to the prolonged weakness of the British Empire. Louis XIV was at first convinced that, using James II as his tool, he would be able to hamper

England by means of Irish disaffection. Disappointed in this calculation, he felt certain in 1701 that the dissensions of the English Parliament, and its dislike of William III, would prevent that monarch from embarking on a policy of serious opposition to France.

The situation in England, just before the Spanish Succession War, was indeed not very dissimilar from the state of things which we have lately witnessed in Parliament. On both occasions civil war must have seemed to a foreigner the only possible solution of the political situation. And yet no sooner had Louis threatened the independence of the Netherlands, than all parties forgot their differences, and presented a united front to France. After the Treaty of Amiens, Napoleon similarly convinced himself that the weak Addington ministry would never resent his policy of calmly ignoring the stipulations of that treaty, and of the Treaty of Lunéville lately concluded with Austria. By the latter treaty he had engaged to withdraw all French troops from Holland as soon as the war between France and England was concluded. No one was more astonished than Napoleon when he found that in consequence of his refusal to evacuate Holland, he was involved in a war with Great Britain, a war which only ended with his fall. He had evidently anticipated the non-renewal of hostilities for at least five years, during which interval he could build up a strong French navy, and investigate the possibilities of French expansion in India and Australia.

The danger to England from the occupation of Holland or Belgium by a great European Power had, as we have already remarked, been fully recognized from the days of Edward III, and had been resisted by successive British Governments. It seems not improbable that the present German Kaiser, like Louis XIV and Napoleon, had thought that the wrangles in the British Parliament

betokened national decay. The Kaiser and his advisers were of the opinion that England, entangled in civil war in Ireland, and occupied with party squabbles at home, would stand by while the German Empire crushed France and defeated Russia. Those tasks accomplished, the inevitable attack on England could be made whenever the moment seemed opportune to the war party in Berlin.

The liberties of Europe are now in as great danger as they were in the days of Philip II, Louis XIV, and Napoleon, should England, France, and Russia not carry out their intention of continuing the war until the Kaiser has been compelled to renounce his aggressive policy, until his fleet and army have been rendered powerless, and the Kiel Canal neutralized.

Certainly, to most foreigners the history of English politics during the last few years must have seemed to foreshadow a long period of weakness, both at home and abroad. And now what is the situation? As in 1702 and as in 1803, domestic quarrels in England are postponed, all parties in Parliament are united, and Englishmen, relying on the justice of the cause for which they are contending, have entered in full confidence upon the greatest struggle in modern times. Like Napoleon, the Kaiser had counted on a period of peace with England for a few years, and while engaged on the invasion of France had no expectation of meeting with any opposition from a nation whom the Prussian war party has for many years openly despised. During the next few years, the defeat of the French nation would have brought immense relief to the financial situation in Germany, and would have rendered France incapable of aiding the 'contemptible' British Empire.

All these expectations have now disappeared, and with them the hopes of establishing German supremacy over Belgium and Holland, and of thus carrying out a policy

begun with the seizure of Schleswig and Holstein, the acquisition of Heligoland, the formation of a strong navy, and the construction of the Kiel Canal. The immediate cause of this sudden overthrow of these hopes and plans is to be found in the over-confidence of the Prussians, which was illustrated by the Chancellor's unaffected surprise at hearing that Great Britain would resent the temporary occupation of Belgium. To him the engagements made by Germany in 1839 and 1870 were not worth the paper on which they were written. Such treaties were mere ‘scraps of paper’, not deserving of the consideration of a great military power such as the Kaiser controlled, and could not be allowed to stand in the way of the diffusion of the *inestimable advantages of German civilization*.

Englishmen ought not to have been surprised at the attack on France by Germany nor at the violation of Belgian neutrality. Writers like Treitschke and Bernhardi have made no secret of their opinions, which for many years have been accepted and acclaimed in Germany. They have openly advocated the creation of a ‘new phase of Empire’ which implies the world-wide dominion of Germany. Germany's duty, according to Bernhardi, was to overwhelm France before she had time to develop the three-years system; and, France once humiliated, the annexation or complete submission of Holland and Belgium would follow. The Chancellor declared, in a speech reported in *The Times* on August 11, that he fully realized that the disregard of Belgium's neutrality was contrary to international law, but that, in view of the necessity of crushing the French nation in the shortest possible space of time, no other course was open to Germany.

Probably many Englishmen have not appreciated till quite lately the importance of the ties which bind us to Belgium, or the immense importance to England

of the independence of such states as Holland, Switzerland, and Belgium. By this time many Germans appreciate full well the immensity of the blunder—it might with more accuracy be styled a crime—of the invasion of Belgium. That invasion, if not protested against, would have rendered the position of Switzerland, of Holland, and indeed of all the minor states of Europe, most precarious ; it would have destroyed all sense of security in Europe ; it would have rendered treaties absolutely valueless ; it would have laid Great Britain—without allies—open to well-deserved invasion. The future of Europe as a civilized continent hung upon Great Britain's attitude towards the ' scrap of paper '.

It is likely that, in the west and south of Germany, there will be found many who understand and appreciate the position, the only one possible, taken up by Great Britain ; but, if so, their views are not those of the dominant Prussian war party. It is difficult for many Englishmen to realize that, though Germany is practically composed of a number of, one might almost say, nations, some of whom are far beyond others in civilization, it is ruled by a small clique. The Prussians control the governmental machine in Germany ; and, as recent events have shown, they are still in somewhat the same stage of civilization as they were when Great Britain helped to rescue them from the domination of Napoleon. Their conduct on the march to Paris in 1814 was very similar to that which marked their attack on Belgium in last August, and which justifies their new and generally accepted designation of ' Huns '.

These Prussians have no respect for treaties, they have an openly expressed contempt for all other nations. The severity, if not brutality, of their military methods, renders it necessary for the more civilized nations to take stern measures, so that Europe shall never again be exposed to the attacks of such savages.

The German Chancellor has lived in a period when there is no longer any hope of the maintenance of a concert of Europe, which must depend for success on the willingness of all the Great Powers to accept its decisions. Bismarck, however, ‘in the interests of German unity, made the concert unworkable and left Europe faced once more with the era of unrestricted, international struggle.’ That era has been marked by violations of the Act of the Congress of Berlin, and of the Act of Algeciras. It has seen the Agadir incident, and last month the German invasion of Belgium. It is time that a fresh attempt should be made to enforce respect for international treaties, and to defeat the German principle that might, not right, is the foundation of European policy.

This war, upon which Great Britain has entered, will have many results, some of which can be anticipated with confidence. It may, perhaps, lead continental nations to understand the character and aims of the British nation. Even as late as September 7, a German newspaper, the *Vossische Zeitung*, buoyed up its readers with the possibility of an early change in the British Government, and it questioned whether a new ‘Cabinet of the stamp of John Morley would bind itself to the pledges of Grey and Asquith, or whether a successor of Poincaré would bind himself to the promises of the Bordeaux refugee’. Such nonsense, however, is taken seriously by many Germans. This only shows their extraordinary ignorance of the situation, and of the grim determination of all members of the British Empire to have done with the ‘mailed fist’ once and for all. ‘Just for a scrap of paper!’—The German Chancellor apparently thought that the violation of the Belgian frontier was justifiable simply because—‘rapidity of action was the great German asset’. *Necessitas non habet leges* was his opinion, and therefore treaties into

which Germany had entered were mere waste paper. It was, he declared, 'a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality'. The Chancellor evidently hoped that 'the fear of consequences' would deter Great Britain from taking action. On this point he was rapidly undeceived by Sir Edward Gosechen, who explained that 'fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements'.

In spite of the 'Scrap of Paper' the Germans attacked Belgium. That in itself renders it impossible to expect loyalty to any treaty from Germany in the future. Moreover, by letting loose swarms of Huns upon defenceless towns like Louvain and Tirlemont and Dinant, and allowing them to destroy priceless art and architectural treasures, and generally to pillage and burn, Germany has shown Europe that her triumph and that of her 'Huns' would throw civilization centuries back, and would eliminate the word 'Honour' from all dictionaries. The colossal mistake made by the war party in Berlin, in deciding to ignore the neutrality of Belgium, now stands revealed.

By the invasion of that country the German armies did indeed gain a considerable military advantage, and were able during August and the early days of September to advance steadily on Paris. But in doing so they encountered from the Belgian, English, and French armies an unexpected resistance, while, at the same time, the shocking cruelties of their troops excited the indignation of the whole civilized world. The contempt of the magniloquent German Government for a 'scrap of paper' will bring untold, but well-deserved, misery on the German nation; it will disabuse the world of any doubt as to the strong ties which bind the British Empire together; it will ensure to Europe a long period of peace.

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THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE WAR

THE German Chancellor, in his speech in the Reichstag on August 4, said : ‘ Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, this is contrary to the dictates of International Law.’ We start, then, with a clear admission that Germany commenced the present war with a violation of the Law of Nations by entering the territory of two States the permanent neutrality of which had been guaranteed by all the Great Powers of Europe, including Germany herself. The entry of German troops into Luxemburg and Belgium was not only a violation of the treaties guaranteeing their neutrality, but was contrary to Article 2 of the Fifth Hague Convention of 1907, which forbids belligerents to move across the territory of a neutral Power troops or convoys either of munitions of war or of supplies. We might, I think, add to the violation of treaties and of the common law of nations the further acts of entering French territory with armed forces, and so commencing hostilities, without any previous ultimatum to France or without any previous declaration of war, in accordance with the Third Convention signed at the Hague in 1907 by Germany and France, and subsequently ratified by both Powers. We might, I think, also add that, before war was declared by either Germany or

¹ A lecture delivered at the London School of Economics and Political Science on the 8th October, 1914.

Great Britain, the former laid mines in the North Sea, in waters open to the traffic of all the nations of the world, and, in particular, waters in which thousands of fishermen of all the northern States of Europe earn their livelihood, and from which they provide food for millions of their fellow countrymen.

But I prefer to deal first with the violation of International Law, which is admitted by the highest official of the German Empire, and to examine the excuse which he offers for it. The defence is necessity.

The German doctrine of Necessity put forward by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg is no new doctrine; it is to be found in the writings of several German international lawyers and is a military maxim they have adopted. It is worth while spending a little time in examining the principle which, by making necessity a rule instead of an exception, would, if accepted, result in an annihilation of the laws of war, written and unwritten. This doctrine is stated by one German writer in the following terms: 'A violation of the laws of war must be regarded as not having taken place if the military operation is necessary for the preservation of the troops or the averting of a danger that threatens them and cannot be averted in any other way, or even if it is advantageous either for the effectual carrying out of a military enterprise not inadmissible in itself or the securing of its success.'¹ 'The laws of war cease to be binding,' says another authority, Lueder, 'when the circumstances are such that the attainment of the object of the war and the escape from extreme danger would be hindered by observing the limitations imposed by the laws of war.'² These views are in accordance with

¹ Meurer, cited by H. Wehberg, *Capture in War*, p. 4.

² Lueder, in *Holtzendorff's Handbuch*, p. 255.

a German maxim, *Kriegsräson geht vor Kriegsmanier*—‘Necessity in war overrules the manner of warfare’. It is justified by Lueder on the ground that commanders will act on it whatever is laid down. ‘It ought to happen because it must happen, that is, because the course of no war will in such extreme cases be hindered and allow itself to end in defeat, perhaps in ruin, in order not to violate formal law,’ thereby, as Professor Westlake says, reducing law from a controlling to a registering agency.¹ The German theory introduces a new meaning of the term necessity different from that which finds acceptance in the Hague Conventions. These Conventions everywhere recognize that circumstances may occur when a commander finds himself unable to comply with the strict letter of their provisions. It was with a view of diminishing the evils of war, ‘so far as military necessities permit’, that the Powers adopted the regulations for land warfare. But the content of this term as it is used therein may be understood from the preamble to the Convention, which admits the incompleteness of the Code and declares that in cases not included the populations and belligerents remain under the protection and rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience. The ordinary laws of war, with the occasional exceptions due to military necessity, are acknowledged by the German authorities, but on them they superimpose their own theory of *Kriegsräson*, by virtue of which they may all be cast to the winds. ‘It is not, then,’ as Westlake says, ‘a question of necessity of war, but of necessity of success’—a very different thing, and results, as he

¹ *International Law, War*, p. 127.

points out, in this, that 'the true instructions to be given by a State to its generals are : Succeed—by war according to its laws, if you can—but at all events, and in any way, succeed'. 'Of conduct suitable to each instruction,' he adds—and the words have surely a prophetic ring—'it may be expected that human nature will not fail to produce examples.'¹

The German doctrine is subversive of all the laws of warfare which have grown up during the past century in the interests of non-belligerents and of the combatants themselves : it leaves these rules mere discretionary ideals to be obeyed or broken according to the will of a government or commander determined to win by any means and at any costs.

'We are in a state of necessity,' said the German Chancellor in regard to the violation of the neutrality of Belgium, but it was a necessity of the kind contemplated by the German maxim. It was a 'necessity' prepared by the Germans themselves ten years ago ! There is clear and irrefutable evidence that the German move was no sudden manœuvre called for by the anticipated violation of Belgian territory by France. The plan of campaign had been settled by the general staff as long ago as 1904 ; strategic railways were built for the purpose, the plan was set forth in a memorandum of General von Schlieffen and sanctioned by the German Emperor in 1909. It was no secret, it had been published.²

To justify the violation of the territory of a friendly State, said the Government of the United States in 1838—and their view was accepted by our own Govern-

¹ op. cit., p. 128. See also L. Oppenheim, *International Law*, War, § 69 ; T. E. Holland, *War on Land*, p. 12.

² See *Spectator*, September 19, 1914.

ment—it is needful ‘to show a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation’. Such a necessity as this the Germans could not show. From whatever point of view we examine the necessity for the attack on Belgium, the evidence of treachery, and complete and callous disregard for international obligations by Germany, is overwhelming.

There is in German law a defence allowed in certain cases which are covered by the term *Notwehr*, a term which I understand cannot be properly translated. It is—according to Article 53 of the German Criminal Code—‘such defence as is necessary to avert an immediate unlawful attack on oneself or another’. It is not, strictly speaking, identical with self-defence or self-preservation, but approximates to it. The meaning of the speech of Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg seems to be clearly this: ‘We have guaranteed the neutrality and inviolability of these two small States; we find that the observance of the guarantee would inconvenience us in a course of action on which we have decided; it is therefore necessary for us to ignore this word “neutrality”, and to disregard this “scrap of paper”, for if we do not, France will. Self-preservation stands as the first law of individuals and States; our existence may be irreparably threatened unless we take this step, therefore International Law must on an occasion such as this be broken.’ I take, then, the German standpoint for the moment—let us assume the German Chancellor had consulted some English text-book on International Law to see what was said there on the subject of self-preservation. ‘The right of self-preservation,’ says Hall, ‘in some cases justifies the commission of acts of violence against

a friendly or neutral State, when from its position and resources it is capable of being made use of to dangerous effect by an enemy, when there is a known intention on his part so to make use of it, and when, if he is not forestalled, it is almost certain that he will succeed, either through the helplessness of the country or by means of intrigues with a party within it.'¹ Grotius, also, the founder of the science of modern International Law, allows the occupation of neutral territory in certain cases under his law of necessity.

Hall, however, to illustrate his proposition, discusses the British operations against Denmark, and the bombardment of Copenhagen, in 1807.

Can these violations of Luxemburg and Belgium be in any degree compared with the British action in 1807? In July 1807 Canning received information that, by secret articles of the Treaty of Tilsit, Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal were to be compelled by France and Russia to join in the war against Great Britain, thereby largely increasing the French fleet. Napoleon was in great need of ships for his proposed invasion of England. Denmark was certainly powerless to resist the demands of France, the possession of her fleet would have been of the greatest assistance to Napoleon, and would have provided him with the means of making a descent on the British coasts. Such were the facts which came to Canning's knowledge, and it was evident to his Government that Napoleon had to be forestalled. He therefore instructed his agent to demand from Denmark an explanation of their policy, a treaty of alliance with Great Britain, and the deposit of the Danish fleet. Denmark was offered the most solemn pledge that if the British demand was

¹ *International Law* (fifth edition), p. 272.

complied with every ship would, at the conclusion of the general peace, be restored to her 'in the same condition and state of equipment as when received under the British flag'. Denmark, acting within her undoubted right, treated the British demand as a hostile act, and only after the bombardment of Copenhagen did the Danes decide to surrender their fleet. This high-handed proceeding of Great Britain against a small State has naturally been severely criticized, and is condemned by many continental writers. I am unable myself to join in this condemnation. I agree with Hall that the occurrence is a matter for extreme regret, but that 'the emergency was one which gave good reason for the general line of conduct of the English Government'. That being so, I have to ask whether the action of Germany can be justified for similar reasons.

In 1807, Great Britain had been at war with France for more than ten years. Napoleon had overthrown Austria, crushed Prussia, and for the moment obtained the alliance of Russia. His methods were severe and unscrupulous. It was known that he would be deterred by nothing which stood in the way of the achievement of the object dearest to his heart—the overthrow of Great Britain. It is now held that Canning acted on imperfect evidence, but the information he received was well in accord with the plans which Napoleon might have been expected to form, and Canning took a step which to the other neutral Powers seemed a violation of the principles of neutrality, which it must be remembered were not so well established then as now. But even so, England's proceeding was at the time 'regarded as little better than piratical', and the attack on Denmark was followed by a loss

of reputation which for the moment outweighed the material gain to her navy.¹ We know to-day more of the inner diplomacy which caused Canning to take this step than was known to his contemporaries, and the circumstances surrounding the seizure of the Danish fleet and the violation of Denmark's neutrality by Great Britain are, I submit, far removed from comparison with the outbreak of the present war.

To-day, Great Britain, Germany, and Russia, at the very outset of the war, issued their respective cases to the world ; they entered their pleadings before the court of the public opinion of the nations. It is, therefore, no question here of secret treaties, mutilated dispatches, and imperfect information. All the Powers concerned have made public the evidence on which they rely for a justification of their proceedings. If we accept Hall's statement of the law and apply it to the German invasion of Luxemburg and Belgium, Germany, to obtain exoneration on the ground of self-preservation, would have to prove that there was clear evidence of the intention of her prospective enemy, France, to march across the territory of Belgium in order to gain a strategic advantage in an attack upon her territory, and that Belgium's condition rendered her too weak to resist such a violation of her neutrality by France. On these points the evidence against the German contention is clear. Denmark, in 1807, had no strong Power to whom to turn for defence against Napoleon, she lay at his mercy ; but Belgium was not dependent solely on her own strength. Germany had in 1870 received striking proof that England would under no circumstances tolerate a violation of Belgian neutrality, for at the outset of the Franco-German

¹ *Camb. Mod. Hist.*, vol. ix, p. 298.

War she entered into identical treaties with both belligerents, whereby she undertook to co-operate with either of them against the other in defence of Belgium, if either violated its territory. But Germany had much more recent evidence of a like nature. On July 31 Great Britain asked France and Germany for engagements to respect the neutrality of Belgium. France at once gave the undertaking; Germany replied in evasive terms. Germany therefore had the clear and definite promise of France not to violate Belgian territory in case of war; she had ample evidence that Belgium herself and Great Britain as her guarantor would resist any violation of her neutrality by France. The case against Germany is further strengthened by a statement of the Belgian Minister of War, which appeared in *The Times* of September 30, 1914. The whole paragraph is as follows :

The German Press has been attempting to persuade the public that if Germany herself had not violated Belgian neutrality, France or Great Britain would have done so. It has declared that French and British troops had marched into Belgium before the outbreak of war. We have received from the Belgian Minister of War an official statement which denies absolutely these allegations. It declares, on the one hand, that 'before August 3 not a single French soldier had set foot on Belgian territory', and, again, 'it is untrue that on August 4 there was a single English soldier in Belgium'. It adds :

For long past Great Britain knew that the Belgian Army would oppose by force a 'preventive' disembarkation of British troops in Belgium. The Belgian Government did not hesitate at the time of the Agadir crisis to warn foreign Ambassadors, in terms which could not be misunderstood, of its formal intention to

compel respect for the neutrality of Belgium by every means at its disposal, and against attempts upon it from any and every quarter.

The comparison between Belgium in 1914 and Denmark in 1807 breaks down on every point.

The position of Great Britain in the great European war is different from that of her allies. Germany declared war against Russia on August 1 and against France on August 3, though war between Russia and Austria—for we must remember that Austria is, ostensibly at any rate, the prime cause of the whole catastrophe—did not commence till August 6. As against Russia and France, Germany was the aggressor. But the Declaration of War, or rather the ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war, was made by Great Britain to Germany on August 4, and a state of war commenced as from 11 p.m. on that day. Technically Great Britain took the aggressive against Germany. International Law, unlike municipal laws, is destitute of a judiciary; there is no legal court before which nations can be arraigned, it leaves it to them to decide when they must resort to force to support their demands. It cannot determine the various causes for which war may justly be waged, but it can lay down that under given circumstances there has been a violation of a rule of International Law or international obligations. Whether such violations are of a sufficiently grave character to justify resort to war is a matter for international morality, but, as I pointed out in an inaugural lecture in this place only just three years ago, situations sometimes arise in which the acceptance of peace would be felt by a nation to be an intolerable humiliation, and when a State could have no alternative but war to preserve its legitimate

self-respect and dignity.¹ War is sometimes the only means by which the liberty of a people may be preserved or obtained. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his famous Mansion House speech during the Agadir crisis in 1911, emphasized the fact that Great Britain had more than once in the past redeemed continental nations from overwhelming disaster and even from national extinction. That is the position to-day.

‘We are at war to-day,’ said the German Chancellor in the now historic interview with Sir Edward Goschen in Berlin on August 4, ‘just for a word—“neutrality”, a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper.’ But this scrap of paper represents the very fundamentals on which the law of nations is based. It represents a treaty of guarantee entered into by the Great Powers of Europe for a small State whose position as a buffer between two Great Powers, France and Germany, would necessarily have been precarious without a guarantee of the Powers. It represents an obligation ‘which’, as the Prime Minister has said, ‘if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated’. The manner in which the violation of a solemn pledge is viewed by the parties to this dispute is the measure of the spiritual and moral forces on both sides; war becomes a struggle between these forces, and as Clausewitz, perhaps the greatest of all writers on military strategy, says, ‘in war such a struggle is the centre of all’.²

Underlying the observations made by the German

¹ *War and the Private Citizen*, p. 8.

² See S. L. Murray, *The Reality of War*, p. 13.

Chancellor, both in his interviews with the British Ambassador and in his speech in the Reichstag, there is a principle which, if accepted, would shatter not only the whole fabric of the Public Law of Europe but of Public International Law in general. This principle, too, is the groundwork of the basis of the policy which has been systematically pursued by both Austria and Germany since the former with the latter's assistance in 1908 tore to shreds a large part of the Treaty of Berlin without the assent of their co-signatories, and entered on the path which led direct to the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, an ultimatum launched with the connivance of Germany by a Great Power which denied to the smaller the elementary rights of an independent sovereign State. Ever since the close of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, when the balance of power in Europe was for the time disturbed to the advantage of the Powers forming the Triple Alliance, Germany and Austria have acted in defiance of the principles which normally underlie the whole code and system of international intercourse. The visit of the German Emperor to Tangier in 1905, the Congress of Algeciras, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, the visit of the *Panther* to Agadir in 1911, were all steps downward from the standard of international ethic which deems war to be but the last resort of nations, and only to be appealed to when diplomacy has failed. These acts afford evidence of the application of the doctrine that war is 'politics par excellence', and lead direct to the enunciation of the principle that 'might is right'; that the Society of States or Family of Nations based upon equal justice and equality before the Law of Nations is a useless and unworkable fiction; that there is no room in the world for International Law to regulate

the mutual intercourse of sovereign independent States. They show the increasing insistence on the part of Germany for a dominating and supreme control in European politics.

For what are the presuppositions on which International Law is based? They are the principles (advanced by Grotius in 1625, acknowledged by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, and extended and applied by subsequent generations of statesmen and jurists) that the independent sovereign Powers of the civilized world form a Family or *Societas*; that all the mutual intercourse of these Powers is conducted under, and their relations to each other are governed by, rules which they regard as being binding on themselves with a force comparable in nature and degree to that binding the conscientious person to obey the laws of his country. Further, that, notwithstanding the great differences which exist in size, population, wealth, and other qualities, all are, as subjects of the Law of Nations, equal. It is not contended that as regards the influence which accompanies physical strength or a highly developed civilization all States are or ever will be equal to each other, but that their equality is a legal consequence of their independence. Further, it follows that all these independent States have a moral nature, that the statesmen who conduct their business of mutual intercourse must conform to certain ethical standards, that they are actuated by a sense of right, and feel themselves under an obligation to act in accordance with it, and therefore that good faith is predicated of all their dealings. Consequently, the contracts or treaties which States make with each other they recognize as binding, and only to be terminated according to accepted rules. When several States are parties to the same transaction, any modifica-

tion must be made with the assent of all. 'We cannot recognize the right of any Power or State to alter an international treaty without the consent of the other parties to it,' said Sir Edward Grey in 1908, 'because if it is to become the practice in foreign politics that any single Power or State can at will make abrupt violations of international treaties you will undermine public confidence with all of us.'

The treaties, the breach of which Germany acknowledges, are Treaties of Guarantee, and it must be admitted that treaties of this nature have not always been enforced by the guarantors by force of arms. The interests of the guaranteeing States have always been the determining factor in their political action. All treaties of this character are made for particular political purposes, and that fact has perhaps been one of the reasons why statesmen, and text-writers dealing with the acts of statesmen, have often pointed out their weakness. Some of the guarantors must of necessity nearly always be unable to interpose by force in defence of a guaranteed State, and must limit their aid to the exercise of their influence on behalf of a State whose independence, integrity, or neutrality they have guaranteed. The cynical view of Frederick the Great that 'All guarantees are like filigree work, made rather to please the eye than to be of use' reads very like the view of the German Chancellor. Gentz takes a different view: 'I know well', he says, 'that guarantees on paper are feeble means of defence; however, one would be wrong to neglect them, for they furnish, at least to those who wish to do their duty and fulfil their engagements, a legal means of action when circumstances call them to it.' 'However,' says Geffcken, a distinguished German writer who quotes this authority, 'the interest

of the guarantor will always be a great weight in the balance. The guarantees of the neutrality of Belgium and of Switzerland have stood the test, that of the integrity of Turkey has not.' ¹ This statement of Gentz is important: 'They furnish to those who wish to do their duty and fulfil their engagements a legal means of action when circumstances call them to it.' This is the British position to-day. We have interposed to defend a State whose neutrality we have guaranteed; we step in, and do our duty by so doing; we take part in the war by right; it is a war in defence of justice and good faith in international dealing; it is a fulfilment of a legal engagement.

It is contended, however, with some authority, that treaties which in their origin and from their nature were clearly intended by the contracting Powers to be perpetual are all entered into on the tacit condition known as *rebus sic stantibus*, that is, if vital changes in circumstances occur, the parties shall be exonerated from any further compliance with their terms. In other words, 'they were concluded in and by reason of special circumstances, and when those circumstances disappear there arises a right to have them rescinded.' ² The German Chancellor did not take this ground, though his fellow-countryman Bernhardi does in reference to the treaty guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality. Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg distinctly recognized the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, and in his overtures to Belgium promised to restore her condition if she accepted his terms for the violation of her territory. Belgium rejected the overtures, and Great Britain, recognizing both the funda-

¹ A. G. Heffter, *Europäische Völkerrecht* (ed. F. H. Geffcken), § 97.

² J. Westlake, *Peace*, p. 295.

mental principle of *pacta servanda sunt*—treaties must be kept, and the other doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus*—circumstances have not changed, took the only step open to her and declared war on Germany.

But we may ask, Have the circumstances changed since the Treaty of Guarantee was entered into? Would not Germany be justified in appealing to the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus*? This involves the further question, What led to the treaties whereby Belgium's neutrality was guaranteed, and what is the special interest which calls for British intervention in the war? Why did Great Britain in 1831 and again in 1839 solemnly pledge herself to a treaty which her statesmen must have foreseen would at some time, sooner or later, lead to our having once again to take part in a war on the Continent of Europe? The answer to this question brings us to a doctrine which, if not a fundamental principle of International Law, is nevertheless, in one form or another, 'a political principle indispensable to the existence of International Law in its present condition'.¹ I mean the need for the maintenance of a balance of power among the States of Europe.

In 1813 the Powers allied to overthrow Napoleon, and with a view to limiting the power of France and its expansion to the north, and having, as they subsequently stated in a protocol of December 20, 1830, 'the object in view of forming a just equilibrium in Europe, and assuring the maintenance of the general peace',² they joined the Belgian provinces which had formerly formed part of the Austrian dominions to Holland. This union was subsequently confirmed in

¹ L. Oppenheim, *Peace*, § 136.

² C. Dupuis, *Le principe d'équilibre*, p. 217.

1815 by the Congress of Vienna, and the newly-established kingdom of the United Netherlands was declared neutral by the Powers party to that Treaty. This arrangement, which neglected all the sentiments of language and religion and the traditional hostility of the Belgians and Dutch, was destined to fail, as all artificial attempts to work out a mathematical balance of forces among the nations must, and in 1830 a revolution broke out in Belgium. The Dutch were expelled, the Powers which had established the new kingdom in 1815 met in conference, and, after lengthy and dangerous delays, they were able to solve in a peaceful way, under circumstances peculiarly difficult, a singularly complicated problem. The kingdom of Belgium was established, it was to form an independent and perpetually neutral State, it was bound to observe such neutrality towards all other States (Art. 7). This was provided by the Treaty of London of 1831, and finally ratified by the Treaty of London of 1839, to which Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia were parties. The object of the Powers first in creating the United Netherlands, then in creating the kingdom of Belgium, and again, in 1867, in neutralizing the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, was to provide for the continued existence of these small States as buffers between adjacent Great Powers which, apart from such guarantee, might be tempted to acts of aggression against them to the detriment of the peace of Europe. The neutralization of Belgium was undoubtedly inspired by the fear which Europe had of seeing Belgium united with France, to the detriment of the balance of power.

There is, I venture to think, considerable misunderstanding of the meaning of this expression, and it is associated in some minds with 'an accompanying

disregard of all moral obligations', and characterized as bringing 'disgrace upon international politics'.¹ The significance attached to a balance of power has varied from time to time, but in one form or another it is as old as the beginnings of international politics. It took the form at one time of an insistence on the maintenance of the condition of the map of Europe as prepared by some international congress, first the Treaty of Westphalia, later the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, in which the expression is used for the first time—and many wars were waged with the avowed object of preventing any change. It has played a part in our own legislation; for the Army Act in its preamble states that among the reasons for the maintenance of a standing army in time of peace was the balance of power. The doctrine in its form of the maintenance of the *status quo* has been strongly opposed by many statesmen and writers, who have laid stress on the manifold abuses to which the application of the theory has led, for it has undoubtedly been used in the past to hinder the legitimate progress and increase of States. It was an application of one view of this doctrine that led to the iniquitous destruction, by a combination of the more powerful, of smaller States which were even subdivided and split up at congresses of the Great Powers, so as to be thrown into the balance of the European equilibrium. It was seen at its worst in the policy of Napoleon III, and his demands for compensation when any of his neighbours received any accession of strength. Such a theory of the balance of power is I think worthy of condemnation. But the doctrine in the form in which it is supported by statesmen and

¹ Letter of the Bishop of Hereford in *The Times*, August 12, 1914.

publicists to-day has a meaning which is vital to the existence of the family of nations, and is intimately bound up with the principle of self-preservation and independence. It was the application of this principle which in our own history was responsible for the alliance of Queen Elizabeth with our rivals the Dutch against Philip II of Spain ; it was in furtherance of its maintenance that we fought Louis XIV, that Wellington fought in the Peninsula, and Nelson at Trafalgar, and that the allies triumphed at Waterloo. It was definitely stated in the preamble to the Treaty of March 12, 1854, between France and England, that it was to maintain the balance of power that the allies in the Crimean War sought to check the aggrandizement of Russia. The reason why some form of the balance of power, as I understand it, must lie at the root of the modern Law of Nations arises from the fact that it comes into play when one of the members of the great international society so far forgets its social obligations as to engage in a course of action endangering the vital interests of the whole society. Dr. Lawrence puts the position in words with which I heartily agree, when he says :

If, therefore, a powerful state frequently endeavours to impose its will on others, and becomes an arrogant dictator when it ought to be content with a fair share of influence and leadership, those who find their remonstrances disregarded and their rights ignored perform a valuable service to the whole community when they resort to force in order to reduce the aggressor to its proper position. As the duty of self-preservation justifies intervention to ward off imminent danger to national life or honour, so the duty of preserving international society justifies intervention to bring to an end conduct that imperils the existence or healthful order of that

society. . . . The balance of power, understood in the sense just indicated, ought to be maintained not in Europe only, but in all quarters of the globe.¹

This, it may be said, is putting the case from the point of view of an English writer, but appeal for support can successfully be made to French and other continental writers.²

Geffcken's note to his edition of Heffter's *Europäische Völkerrecht*, a German work of deservedly high repute, emphasizes the fact that there is no possible security for the international life when one State has over the others so great a preponderance as to allow it to threaten their liberty of action, their interests, and their integrity. The desire even to obtain such a predominating position is, he holds, itself to be condemned; the fear alone of a common resistance by the other nations ought to be sufficiently strong to hold in check such aspirations. Dealing in this connexion with the position of the smaller States of the world, Geffcken points out that it is essentially one of the tasks of the balance of power rightly understood to watch over the preservation of the small States, provided they are able to fulfil the conditions bound up with independence; for the more the small States are absorbed by the great, the more frequent will collisions between the latter occur. As for the idea put forward by Lasson that the small States are a perpetual danger to peace, the apple of discord between the Powers, and the natural causes and certain theatres of war, he pertinently asks when have Holland, Belgium, or Switzerland ever fomented discord among neighbouring States. All

¹ *International Law*, p. 133.

² See Despagnet's *Droit International*, § 180.

their interests are bound up with the maintenance of peace.¹ We may go further, for the small States, and especially the neutralized States of Belgium and Switzerland, have played, during the nineteenth century, an invaluable part in the life of the family of nations, and have done much for the advancement of International Law. We recall that the capital of Holland has been the scene of the Hague Conferences, and is the seat of the International Court of Arbitration, that Brussels and Berne are the centres of nearly all of the international organizations which the increasing economic complexities of modern life have brought into being. We remember that various international conferences have met in the capitals of these States, that the conventions for the care of the sick and wounded of the armies in the field were signed at Geneva, and that they owe their initiative to Switzerland.

We are apt to lose sight of the fact that the immediate cause of this great European War lies in the extraordinary demands made by Austria on Serbia. The ostensible reasons for Austria's ultimatum were the circumstances surrounding the assassination of the Crown Prince Ferdinand of Austria and his consort at Sarajevo in June of the present year. The Servian Government was charged with being cognizant of the conspiracy and the plot which resulted in the assassination of the Austrian heir apparent. But so far the allegation has not been proved, and we have had evidence—as in the Friedjung trial—of the capacity of Austrian officials to forge such documents as may be necessary to sustain a serious political charge. Be that as it may, the answer of Serbia accepted the demands of Austria in all but two points, and these she was prepared to

¹ *op. cit.*, § 5.

leave to the arbitrament of the Hague Arbitration Tribunal. Serbia, again, is an example of a small State standing in the way of the ambitions of a Great Power, and making a valiant defence of her liberties. She bars the advance of Austria to the Aegean, she blocks the way of the Austro-German movement to control the Balkans, she impedes the desires of the Germanic world for an expansion which would include the control of the Dardanelles, Asia Minor, the Euphrates valley, and the sea routes to Egypt and India. Just as England could not be a passive spectator of the overthrow of Belgium, so Russia, for equally powerful reasons, could not silently witness the subjugation and annihilation of a small neighbouring Slav Power by her ambitious Teutonic neighbours. In the latter case, especially the strong sentiment of nationality, which has been the chief mainspring of the political movements in Europe during the nineteenth century, operated as forcibly as any desire for the maintenance of the European equilibrium. In the west England has Belgium, in the east Russia has Serbia, to support and maintain. In each case the Power nearest and most capable steps in to assert rights conferred on it by treaty. But though the immediate cause of the present war may be put down to Austria's menaces to Serbia, every day that elapses, every new diplomatic disclosure that is made, points to a deeper and more widely rooted cause—namely the increasing domination of Europe by the German Empire. I have already referred to the stages in her movement towards the assertion of a predominance in Europe. Even had Germany left intact the territory of Belgium and Holland, and begun war by an invasion of French territory, England would, in my opinion, have been bound in the interest of self-pre-

servation to have stepped in and supported France. 'When a State remains a passive spectator of the complete overthrow of the balance of power which it could have prevented, it loses not only its political prestige, but it has to suffer the disastrous consequences of such non-intervention.' This is the opinion of Professor Geffcken on the abstract question ;¹ it is the opinion of Admiral Mahan in relation to the attitude of Great Britain in the present war.²

The policy of non-intervention is, as a general rule, sound, and should be the normal guide for pacific statesmen, but it is apt at times to be very short-sighted. When a State from motives of selfishness, merely because it does not appear at the time that it is in any danger itself from the aggression of one State against another, allows the weaker State to be crippled or crushed, the consequence of such a policy is apt to weigh heavily on it: it has to pay in the long run a heavy price for assuming a position of splendid isolation. Prussia, in 1805, stood aside and allowed Napoleon to overthrow Austria, but her own turn came next year in the crushing defeat at Jena and the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Tilsit. France, again, in 1866, stood aside and witnessed the overthrow of Austria, thereby allowing Germany to complete the preparations which led to her defeat in 1870. Nay, I would go further and say that had England not stood aside at that time, had she interposed her powerful assistance on behalf of the French people after the fall of the Second Empire, the whole history of the last forty-four years would have been changed. The victory of Germany, as consecrated by the terms of the Treaty of Frankfort,

¹ Note to Heffter, § 5.

² See *The Times*, August 5, 1914.

with the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine against the passionate protests of the inhabitants, involved the whole of Europe in constantly growing expenditure for the maintenance of huge armaments, which have been an incalculable drain on the wealth of the world and a standing menace to its peace.

The maintenance of the balance of power, as I understand it, and as I have endeavoured to describe it, as a corollary of the doctrine of self-preservation of States, thus becomes in my opinion essential to liberty—liberty of States to live their own lives, to develop themselves on their own lines; liberty for every State to pursue its own ideals of excellence without rivalry or contempt for others. This freedom is threatened with overthrow and annihilation when any one State presumes to act as the arrogant dictator of other members of the family of nations, and seeks to impose by force of arms its ideals of culture and civilization on all and sundry, to the detriment of their personalities and self-development. We have lived through an era of nearly half a century of aggressive militarism; we have as a result witnessed a growing disregard for the sanctity of international obligations, and even for the decencies of international comity. ‘Shining armour,’ ‘mailed fists’, and swords rattling in their scabbards have appeared to support breaches of international obligations, and demands for economic compensation from pacific nations. The Concert of Europe broke down at the critical moment. A crisis has been reached in the development of the civilization of Europe, and on its solution depends the advance or retrogression of all the ideals which free and self-governing peoples hold most dear, both in their own internal organization and in their future international relations. Liberty and freedom of action can

only come to individuals in the truest sense when these are governed and regulated by law ; and the Law of Nations, self-imposed and lacking in a central executive and administrative authority, must increasingly provide and safeguard the means of self-realization and equality of opportunity of its members. States must always remain unequal in size, power, and influence ; but the maintenance of the doctrine that all the members of the international society are nevertheless entitled to equal rights and equal mutual consideration, has largely contributed in the past to the happiness of mankind, ' though it is constantly threatened by the tendencies of each successive age '.¹ The doctrine of equality witnesses to the influence of idealism in the development of the Law of Nations, but that law is still far from being in a position to give full effect to the principle. What will be the changes, if any, in the organization and rules for intercourse of ' the family of nations at the close of the present war is a matter for speculation by theorists, and will be one for practical solution by statesmen and diplomatists. That the present will be the last war in the history of the world no one who takes a wide view of history will be likely to affirm ; that it should make wars increasingly difficult and rare in the future is an aspiration with which all will concur. ' Until there is established some form of international police power, competent and willing to prevent violence as between nations,' breaches of the Law of Nations will have to be put down by force by individual States or combinations of States ; and an era of disarmament is not, in my opinion, yet in sight, though the burden may, I hope, be lightened. After each great upheaval of the nations such as we are witnessing to-day, such as was

¹ H. S. Maine, *Ancient Law*, p. 101.

witnessed in the ages of the Wars of the Reformation, of Louis XIV and of Napoleon, proposals for an era of perpetual peace have always been put forward: the projects of Henry IV and Sully, of Saint Pierre, Rousseau, Bentham, and Siéyes bear witness to the ardent desires of statesmen and philanthropists for a speedy realization of the time when the Millennium shall be reached. Unfortunately, they also bear witness to the futility of man's endeavour to hasten the slow grinding of the wheels of God.

We all of us chafe at times at the want of progress which society seems to be making by the ordinary means of development, and long for some stupendous *coup* by which the wrongs of men may be righted and injustice be for ever prevented. The infallible lesson which the history of the past centuries teaches us is the certain though sometimes slow punishment which awaits the persistent wrong-doer, the inevitable retribution which falls upon the breaker of the laws of God and nations. The criminal State is arraigned at the bar of humanity, and history records its sentence.

We do well to cherish high ideals for the future of international relations, but it is necessary that these ideals should be those not of one State only but of all the members of the international society. The Law of Nations can only progress and develop as the ethical standard of each State is steadily elevated. The death-blow must be given everywhere to the anarchical doctrine that might is right, that war is a necessity to political idealism and politics *par excellence*, instead of being the evidence of the failure of diplomacy and the last resort in case of the clash of irreconcilable national ideals. If the present war results in the firmer acceptance of the sanctity of treaties, the complete destruction

of the German doctrine of necessity justifying any and every breach of the laws of war, guarantees the safety of small States and provides means for a more general acceptance in international disputes of the Law of Nations, applied by an international body in lieu of the arbitrament of the sword, it will not have been in vain, and it will form a notable epoch in the development of the Law of Nations and the civilization of the world.

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EDITORIAL NOTE

IN 1912 Dr. Pearce Higgins published a book entitled *War and the Private Citizen* (London : P. S. King & Son) which has been highly praised by lawyers but is less known to the general public than it should be. By his courtesy and that of Messrs. P. S. King & Son, we are able to reprint from that book some pages which are specially interesting and instructive at the present moment.

H. W. C. D.

NON-COMBATANTS AND THE WAR

I

WAR is not a condition of anarchy ; contests between States are regulated by the laws of war, and much has been done in recent times to bring about a uniformity in regard to the legitimate practices of war. The Instructions issued to the United States armies in 1863, which were prepared by Dr. Francis Lieber, mark an important stage in the movement towards a more complete statement of these rules. They were issued again without modification for the government of the armies of the United States during the war with Spain in 1898.¹ They were of considerable value to the Conference at Brussels in 1874, when an attempt was made to obtain a declaration of the laws of land warfare acceptable to the Powers of the world. The Brussels Conference did not succeed in this, but the Declaration which it drafted was in nearly all its essentials accepted by the First Hague Conference in 1899, and is the basis of the 'Regulations' annexed to the Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on land. These Regulations were amended by the Second Hague Conference in 1907, and the Convention to which they are annexed has been signed by nearly all the Powers in the world.²

¹ G. B. Davis, *Elements of International Law*, p. 505.

² For texts of these Conventions see A. Pearce Higgins, *The Hague Peace Conferences*, pp. 206-72 ; for the Brussels Draft Declaration (with cross-references to the Hague Regulations) see *ibid.*, p. 273.

The object of these Regulations was strikingly put by the distinguished Russian Plenipotentiary and Publicist, M. de Martens. They are, he said, to provide Statutes for a Mutual Insurance Society against the abuse of force in time of war, with the object of safeguarding the interests of populations against the greatest disasters that could happen to the ordinary populations in time of war. The emphasis laid on their importance in regard to the civilian population is noteworthy. The Powers who are parties to the Convention agree to issue to their armed forces instructions which shall be in conformity with the Regulations (Art. 1), and any belligerent party which violates their provisions is liable to make compensation, and is responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces (Art. 3).

Besides the Regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906—to which also nearly all States are parties—regulate the treatment of the sick and wounded in land warfare, and a Convention entered into at the Hague Conference of 1907 applies the same principles to naval warfare.

International agreements, however, form only a part of International Law, and the preamble to the Convention on the laws and customs of war on land recognizes the incompleteness of its provisions, and states that until a more complete code of the laws of war can be issued, the High Contracting Parties think it expedient to declare that ‘in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience’. The

written laws of war must therefore be supplemented by the rules of customary International Law, the evidence of which is to be sought in the works of International lawyers, while the facts on which those rules are based are to be found in historical, judicial, and diplomatic records. All of these rules are to be observed in the spirit of humanity, which prohibits the infliction of needless suffering to individuals and mere wanton destruction of property, and to be enforced with the knowledge that the enlightened conscience of the world demands their observance in a spirit of good faith and honourable adherence to international agreements. Recent wars testify to the restraining force of the rules of International Law.

One fundamental principle on which I wish to lay great emphasis stands out from what has just been said, and it is this, that all is not fair in war. The international conventions I have referred to, and the usages of nations for a century past, prove conclusively the falsity of the popular saying. Great restrictions have been imposed on the unlimited power of a belligerent in regard both to the combatant and non-combatant members of the enemy state. The rule that 'the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited'¹ has received almost universal acceptance. The amount of violence which is permitted to a belligerent by the laws of war is that which is necessary to enable him to attain the object desired, and the natural end of the art of war, says Clausewitz, the great master of strategy, is the complete overthrow of the enemy. In other words, a belligerent who wishes to bring his war to a successful termination may bring such pressure to bear on his adversary—that is,

¹ Article 22 of the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare.

primarily on the armed forces of his adversary, but incidentally and often directly also on the civilian population—as will bring about the complete submission of the enemy as quickly as possible, and with the smallest possible expenditure of blood and treasure. ‘War means fighting,’ said the great Confederate General Stonewall Jackson. ‘The business of the soldier is to fight. Armies are not called out to dig trenches, to throw up breastworks, to live in camps, but to find the enemy and to strike him; to invade his country and do all possible damage in the shortest time. This will involve great destruction of life and property while it lasts, but such a war will of necessity be of brief duration, and so would be an economy of life and property in the end. To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure all the fruits of victory is the secret of successful war.’¹ And these views were more concisely stated by the American Instructions: ‘The more vigorously wars are pursued, the better it is for humanity. Sharp wars are brief.’ But all this must be subject to the qualification that it be done in accordance with the rules of International Law, both customary and conventional, rules which have come into being chiefly under the guidance of military commanders themselves, and have been dictated by the necessity for the due maintenance of discipline, by humanity and regard for the public opinion of the civilized world. ‘Men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another, and to God.’²

¹ G. E. R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*, vol. i, p. 176.

² Article 16 of United States ‘Instructions’.

II

It is the modern practice when an army invades the enemy's territory, for the commander to issue a proclamation addressed to the inhabitants announcing that he is making war only against the soldiers and not against private citizens, and that so long as the latter remain neutral, and make no hostile attempts against his troops, he will, as far as possible, spare them the horrors of war, and permit them to continue to enjoy security for person and property. It is one of the greatest triumphs of civilization to have brought about the distinction between the treatment of combatants and non-combatants. Private citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, or carried off to distant parts, nor exposed to every kind of disturbance of private relations. The credit for this alteration of treatment is due in the first place to belligerent commanders themselves, for they alone had and have the power to enforce the rules which have grown up ameliorating the condition of the peaceful citizen. Self-interest has played a by no means unimportant part in bringing about this change; commanders discovered that by giving protection to the civilian population, by buying their provisions instead of plundering them wholesale, better discipline was preserved among their own troops, and greater freedom for their operations was ensured. Yet even now the lot of the private citizen in an invaded territory is far from being a happy one.

In order that the civilian population may receive such improved treatment it must remain strictly non-combatant and refrain from all intermeddling in hostilities. Full belligerent rights are accorded (1) to the armed forces of the belligerent State, including under

this designation those in the regular army, volunteers, territorial troops, and such irregular troops as comply with the requirements of the first Article of the Hague Regulations. These conditions are that such forces (a) must have at their head a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) they must have a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) must carry arms openly; and (d) conform in their operations to the laws and customs of war. The armed forces complying with these requirements (some of which, especially the use of a distinctive sign, are equivocal) always have attached to them a certain number of non-combatants to whom also belligerent rights are granted, such as telegraphists, veterinary surgeons, canteen-contractors, and others. They fight if necessary, and should be included under the term combatants, though Article 3 of the Hague Regulations designates them as non-combatants.

Belligerent rights are also granted (2) to the population which rises in arms at the approach of an invading army in an unoccupied territory; such persons if they take up arms spontaneously in order to resist the invading troops, without having had time to organize in conformity with the first Article of the Regulations, are to be considered as lawful belligerents if (a) they carry arms openly and (b) observe the laws and customs of war. This recognition of the right of a whole population to rise *en masse* and defend itself against an approaching invader was obtained only after strenuous contention on the part of Great Britain and some of the smaller States of Europe. For the great military Powers which have adopted universal military service in some form or another, the question of granting this recognition had not the importance that it possesses for other States such as our own, where the great mass of the

manhood of the nation has received no military training. As it is, the Article still seems defective. There will remain the difficulty of distinguishing between such levies *en masse* and sporadic outbreaks in unoccupied districts in the absence of a commander responsible for the acts of his subordinates. The German General Staff, in its official work on the laws of land warfare, states that the demand for subordination to responsible heads, for a military organization, and for distinctive marks, cannot be given up without engendering a strife of individual against individual which would be a far worse calamity than anything likely to result from the restriction of combatant privileges.¹ This question is by no means settled. One fact, however, is clear: the belligerent character only attaches where the rising is one of considerable dimensions. Cases of isolated defence by individuals of their homes are left outside these regulations. The citizen who committed acts of hostility without belonging to a force complying with the requirements of the Hague Regulations would find himself dealt with as severely as was Mr. Browne in *An Englishman's Home*, who for defending his house against the invaders of the 'Nearland' Army, was taken and put to death before it. Men and squads of men not under strict discipline, not forming part of the army or of a levy *en masse*, at the approach of the invaders, who commit hostile acts with intermitting returns to their homes and vocations, divesting themselves of the character or appearance of soldiers, have no cause for complaint of an infringement of the laws of war if when they are caught they are denied belligerent rights, and put to death.

¹ *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege*, pp. 7-8; J. M. Spaight, *War Rights on Land*, p. 55.

None of the Regulations referred to affect the treatment of risings by the inhabitants in territories occupied by the invading army. The customary rule of International Law is that all such persons are liable to the severest penalties. 'War rebels,' says Article 85 of the American Instructions, 'are persons within an occupied territory who rise in arms against the occupying or conquering army or against the authorities established by the same. If captured, they may suffer death, whether they rise singly, in small or large bands, or whether called upon to do so by their own, but expelled, Government or not.'¹

There is, however, another case in which private citizens have often been granted the rights of belligerents, (3) namely, where they have assisted the army of defence of a besieged town. The historic defence of Saragossa, in which even the women assisted the gunners, and the more recent defence of Plevna, afford examples of such treatment.

So long therefore as non-combatants refrain from direct participation in the war they are immune from direct violence, but they are liable to personal injuries which may result from the military operations of the armed forces of the belligerents. Among such operations are bombardments which accompany the sieges of defended towns. The Hague Regulations lay down certain rules for the general guidance of officers in conducting sieges. The attack or bombardment by any means whatever—this includes dropping shells from

¹ Of the treatment by the Italians of the Arabs in the Oasis of Tripoli in October, 1911, I say nothing, as there appears at present to be a hopeless contradiction in the reports in the press. There seems, however, to have been a rising in occupied territory, which is always severely dealt with.

balloons and airships—of *undefended* towns, villages, dwellings or buildings is forbidden (Art. 25). The commander of the troops attacking a defended town before commencing a bombardment, except in the case of assault, must do all that lies in his power to give warning to the authorities (Art. 26). In sieges and bombardments, every precaution is to be taken to spare, as much as possible, buildings devoted to religion, art, science, and charity, historic monuments, and hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided that they are not used at the same time for military purposes. The besieged is to indicate these buildings or places by some special visible sign, which is to be previously notified to the assailants (Art. 27).¹ The pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited (Art. 28). This last prohibition marks a great advance in the customs of war, and with one or two exceptions due to special circumstances has been well observed in modern times.

The siege and bombardment of a town is an operation of war which bears most cruelly on the ordinary civilian population; the private citizens who are living in their own homes and who generally are not allowed to leave, even if they should wish to do so, are subject to all the dangers of falling shot and shell, and not infrequently their houses are directly bombarded by the assailant in order to bring pressure to bear on the commander of the besieged town so that he may be induced, by the

¹ In case of bombardment by naval forces there is a similar injunction to the commandant to spare such places. The duty of the inhabitants is to indicate these buildings by special signs consisting of large, rectangular rigid panels, divided along one of their diagonals into two coloured triangles, black above and white below. 9 H. C., 1907, Art. 5. (See *Hague Peace Conferences*, p. 356.)

sufferings of the inhabitants, to surrender. It must be noticed that it is only *undefended* towns which may not be bombarded. The distinction is not between fortified and unfortified places. Modern engineering skill has shown the futility of endeavouring to draw such a distinction. Plevna, till Osman Pacha threw himself into it with his army, was as open a town as any English country-town to-day. Ladysmith, Mafeking, and Kimberley were all unfortified till the British troops took in hand their defences.

The injury which may be inflicted on private citizens by bombardments may be illustrated by the bombardment of Strasburg by the Germans in 1870, when 448 private houses were utterly destroyed, nearly 3,000 out of a total of 5,150 were more or less injured, 1,700 civilians were killed or wounded, and 10,000 persons rendered homeless ; the total damage to the city was estimated at nearly £8,000,000.¹ The great damage done to Strasburg was chiefly due to the fact that the forts and ramparts were so close to the town that they could not be shelled without damaging the houses, but there appears to be little doubt that the bombardment was, at times, intentionally directed against the private houses with a view of bringing pressure to bear on the civilian population. Such a practice—attacking those who cannot defend themselves—certainly appears to be contrary to the principle of modern warfare, and bombardments to produce psychological pressure cannot be excused, says Hall, and can only be accounted for as a survival from the practices which were formerly regarded as permissible, and which to a certain extent lasted till the beginning of the nineteenth century.

¹ J. M. Spaight, *op. cit.*, p. 162 ; H. M. Hozier, *Franco-Prussian War*, vol. ii, p. 71.

'For the present', he adds, 'it is sanctioned by usage',¹ and in every war since 1870, whether by inevitable accident or design, considerable damage has been done to the persons and property of ordinary peaceful citizens.

With the progress of aeronautics we shall probably see a further terror added to war, as it seems that in the future Tennyson's prophecy will be fulfilled in which the Poet :

Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rained
a ghastly dew
From the nation's airy navies grappling in the central
blue.

With the exception of Great Britain, no great European Power has ratified the Declaration agreed to at the Hague Conference in 1907, which prohibits, till the close of the Third Peace Conference, the discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons and airships.² It is, in my opinion, a lamentable commentary on the humanitarian sentiments so freely expressed by the delegates at this Conference, that this splendid opportunity of making a beginning in the limitation of military budgets, the increase of which they all so loudly deplored, was thus lost.

Before leaving the subject of bombardments, a few words are necessary in regard to the question of allowing

¹ *op. cit.*, p. 537.

² See *Hague Peace Conferences*, pp. 482-91. All the Powers have agreed that undefended towns, &c., are free from bombardments 'by any means whatsoever', which words were inserted to include the discharge of projectiles from airships (see *Hague Peace Conferences*, p. 490, and Note 4 on the same page as regards bombardments by naval forces). Though Great Britain has ratified the Declaration against discharging projectiles from balloons, this is only binding in case of war with other Powers signatory of the same Declaration.

what are called 'useless mouths' (*les bouches inutiles*)—that is, old men, women, and children—to leave a besieged town. The Hague Regulations are silent on the point. The notice which a commander is required to give before bombardment—though no period of delay is fixed—is some protection for the non-combatants, and such notice is clearly demanded by every requirement of humanity so as to enable some measures to be taken for the protection of the civilian population, especially women and children; but beyond this the Regulations are silent. There is no obligation imposed on the besieger, either by the written or unwritten laws of war, to allow any portion of the population to leave a besieged place even when a bombardment is about to commence. 'When the commander of a besieged place expels the non-combatants, in order to lessen the number of those who consume his stock of provisions, it is lawful, though an extreme measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten on the surrender,'¹ and instances of this have occurred in modern times. The whole matter is solely one for the commander of the besieging force, though when the intention is to take the town by assault, not to reduce it by famine, the retention of the civil population within the town means the infliction of much unnecessary suffering. The Japanese gave permission to the civilian population to leave Port Arthur before the bombardment, but throughout the Franco-German War, except when General von Werder granted a short armistice for some Swiss delegates to remove 2,000 homeless women and children from Strasburg, the Germans observed the full rigour of their war rights. The Americans before bombarding Santiago de Cuba in June 1898, gave forty-eight hours' notice and allowed the

¹ United States 'Instructions', Article 18.

exit of non-combatants. In the siege of Ladysmith, although non-combatants were not allowed to leave, an arrangement was made whereby they were placed in a camp outside the zone of fire, but they remained dependent for their supplies on the defenders of the besieged town. This subject, like so many connected with war, is one in which it is most difficult to harmonize military necessities and the dictates of humanity.

It is, however, as a rule, only a small proportion of the civilian population that is thus exposed to the danger of death or injury by direct military operations, but when a district is occupied by the invading army every inhabitant feels the pressure of war. The object of the invader, apart from winning victories over his adversary's troops, is to make his superiority felt by the whole population of the enemy State, and when the troops of the defenders have been expelled from a given area, and the territory is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army, an important legal change in the relation between the invader and the invaded takes place, as such territory is then said to be in the enemy's military occupation.

Until the middle of the eighteenth century, the invader treated the territory of his enemy as his own, but gradually the distinction between conquest and military occupancy was worked out, and by the end of the nineteenth century a series of rules was accepted and embodied in the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907. 'Territory is considered to be occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation applies only to the territories where such authority is established and can be exercised' (Art. 42). It appears certain that under the Hague

Regulations the practice pursued by the Germans in 1870 of deeming a whole canton of seventy-two square miles to be occupied if a patrol or small detachment passed through without resistance, can no longer be justified. 'Occupation on land is strictly analogous to blockade at sea ; and as blockades are not recognized unless they are effective, so occupation must rest on the effective control.'¹ Practically occupation amounts to this, that the territorial Government can no longer exercise its authority within the area of invasion, and the invader can set up his own governmental organization, or continue in office those of the expelled Government who are willing to serve. Recent wars provide us with examples of the working of the modern rules governing belligerent occupation which are contained in Articles 42-56 of the Hague Regulations.

The authority of the legitimate sovereign having been displaced, the occupant must take all steps in his power to re-establish and ensure public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. A combination of severity and conciliation is required which will at the same time allow the peaceful citizen to continue the pursuit of his ordinary avocation, so far as possible, while the occupant's position is not endangered. Order is to be maintained, and existing laws enforced as far as circumstances permit. A military administration is in practice at once set up. The occupant issues notices prohibiting and punishing with severity all offences against the army of occupation, and every act which may endanger the security of his troops. (I have already referred to the severity with which risings in occupied districts are always dealt.) The commander

¹ T. J. Lawrence, *International Law*, p. 433.

orders all arms and ammunition of every description to be given up, closes the public-houses either wholly or partially, forbids the assembly of groups of men in the street, requires all shutters to be removed from shops, orders all lights to be put out by a certain time, establishes a censorship on all letters, suppresses or restricts the publication of newspapers, restricts individuals in their freedom of movement, deports any whose presence he may consider dangerous to his army, and in a thousand different ways makes the ordinary citizen feel that the enemy is within his gates. The following Proclamation issued by General von Kummer at Metz on October 30, 1870, gives in a few sentences an example of the powers of an occupant :

‘ If I encounter disobedience or resistance, I shall act with all severity and according to the laws of war. Whoever shall place in danger the German troops, or shall cause prejudice by perfidy, will be brought before a council of war ; whoever shall act as a spy to the French troops or shall lodge or give them assistance ; whoever shows the road to the French troops voluntarily : whoever shall kill or wound the German troops or the persons belonging to their suite ; whoever shall destroy the canals, railways, or telegraph wires ; whoever shall render the roads impracticable ; whoever shall burn munitions and provisions of war ; and lastly, whoever shall take up arms against the German troops, will be punished by death. It is also declared that (1) all houses in which or from out of which any one commits acts of hostilities towards the German troops will be used as barracks ; (2) not more than ten persons shall be allowed to assemble in the streets or public houses ; (3) the inhabitants must deliver up all arms by 4 o’clock on Monday, October 31, at the Palais, rue

de la Princesse ; (4) all windows are to be lighted up during the night in case of alarm.'¹

The conversion into barracks of houses in which or out of which acts of hostilities had been committed was less severe than the treatment authorized by the British generals during the Boer War. Lord Roberts ordered the burning of farms for acts of treachery or when troops had been fired on from farm premises, and as a punishment for breaking up telegraph or railway lines or when they had been used as bases of operations for raids.²

The rules issued by the occupant are rules of Martial Law, and proceedings to enforce them are generally taken before a military tribunal. There is, I believe, a considerable misapprehension as to the meaning of Martial Law, not only among military officers but also among civilians. Martial Law might perhaps be more accurately called 'Military rule', or the 'Law of hostile occupation', as General Davis suggests.³ It was described by the Duke of Wellington as 'neither more nor less than the will of the general who commands the army. In fact, Martial Law means no law at all. Therefore the general who declares Martial Law, and commands that it shall be carried into execution, is bound to lay down distinctly the rules, and regulations, and limits according to which his will is to be carried out.' It is not, therefore, a secret written code of law which a commander produces from his pocket and declares to be the laws under which an occupied terri-

¹ H. M. Hozier, *Franco-Prussian War*, vol. ii, p. 124, cited by J. M. Spaight, op. cit., p. 338.

² *Parliamentary Papers*, 1900. Proclamations of F.-M. Lord Roberts (Cd. 426), p. 23.

³ *Elements of International Law* (3rd ed.), p. 333.

tory is to be governed. Martial Law in a hostile country consists of the suspension of the ordinary rules of law in so far as such suspension is called for by military necessities, and the substitution of military rule and force for the ordinary laws either in whole or in part.¹

The occupant is forbidden to place any compulsion on the inhabitants of occupied territory to take the oath of allegiance to him (H. R. Art. 45), but he may compel them to take an oath of neutrality, though even without this the inhabitants are under a duty of remaining neutral, and they forfeit their rights as non-combatants by any intermeddling in the war. The occupant must see that the family honour and rights, the lives of individuals and private property, as well as religious conviction and liberty of worship, are respected; but liberty of worship does not mean liberty to preach sermons inciting to continued warfare or hostility to the occupant. Many churches were closed by British officers during the Boer War in consequence of the political character of the sermons preached therein. Private property cannot be confiscated (Art. 46). The occupant may, however, find it necessary to make use of churches or schools as hospitals, and we shall shortly see that, though private property must not be confiscated, the occupant has a large licence in the matters of supplying his troops with all things needful for them. He may not confiscate, but he may commandeer. The occupant is also forbidden to interfere with the existing private rights of citizens of the occupied territory, for

¹ For examples of Proclamations of Martial Law during the Boer War see *Parliamentary Papers*, 1900 (Cd. 426), also chap. xi of Dr. Spaight's *War Rights on Land*. For a fuller treatment of Martial Law in relation to English law see A. V. Dicey, *The Law of the Constitution*, chap. viii.

he must not declare to be extinguished, suspended, or unenforceable in a court of law the rights and rights of action of the subject of the enemy State (Art. 23 (*h*)). There is some doubt as to the meaning of this prohibition, but this is the view which it is understood that the British Government takes as to its interpretation.¹

The services of the inhabitants of the occupied territories may be requisitioned by the occupant, if they are of such a nature as not to involve them directly in taking part in military operations against their own country (Art. 52). The interpretation which commanders put on this limiting clause is a lax one, but professional men, tradesmen, and artisans, for example medical men, chemists, engineers, electricians, butchers, bakers, smiths, &c., &c., may find that their services are demanded by the commanding officer in the locality. Some authorities hold that the occupant may resort to forced labour for the repair of roads, railways, and bridges, as such are required to restore the general condition of the country, even though their repair should mean a considerable strategic advantage to the troops of the occupying army. The belligerent is also forbidden, both in unoccupied and occupied districts, to compel the subjects of the other belligerent to take part in operations of war directed against their own country (Art. 23, last paragraph), and an occupant is also forbidden to compel the population of occupied territory to furnish information about his own country's army, or about its means of defence (Art. 44). The discussions on these articles at the Hague in 1907 make it clear in my opinion that these provisions forbid the

¹ On the meaning of this Article see *Hague Peace Conferences*, pp. 263-5; T. J. Lawrence, *op. cit.*, pp. 358-60; T. E. Holland, *Law Quarterly Review*, vol. xxviii (Jan., 1912), pp. 94-8.

impressment of persons to act as guides for the invading troops, and this view is supported by the Report made by the French Delegation to their Government. But all the Powers do not accept this latter Article. Austria, Germany, Japan, and Russia excluded it, on signing the Convention, but even so I think the practice is condemned in Article 23. However, it is by no means improbable that some of these Powers, by making a reservation of Article 44, did so in order to adhere to the practice, which has long obtained, of compelling inhabitants to act as guides to the invader's troops. This practice, and that of compelling men under threat of death to give information of military value, appear to me contrary to the whole spirit of the modern development of the laws of war; they are odious, and should disappear from all the military manuals of civilized States.¹

We thus see that there are many cases in which the personal services of ordinary private citizens may be requisitioned in occupied territory; their property is also liable to be requisitioned for the use of the occupying army. In addition to the payment of the ordinary taxes which the invader may levy for the benefit of the occupied district, the inhabitants may also be called upon to pay contributions in money in lieu of requisitions in kind. There are no less than three different Articles in the Hague Regulations which either prohibit pillage or forbid the confiscation of private property, but military necessities, though not over-ruling the strict letter of the prohibition, often bring about a situation which make these prohibitions sound unreal. Still they are exceptions, and the rule holds good. We have

¹ For discussions of these Articles see *Hague Peace Conferences*, pp. 265-8.

already seen that the actual destruction of private dwelling-houses and other buildings in private ownership may be occasioned by bombardment or other operations of war. But, in addition to destruction or damage caused by these means, the landowner may be deprived of the use of his land for camps, for fortifications, for entrenchments, or for the burial of the dead. Commanding officers in actual warfare do not ask permission of landowners to make use of the land as battle-fields, and promise not to damage the crops or disturb the game ; nor will the objection by fashionable watering-places, that military manœuvres interfere with summer visitors, receive any attention from the commander of an invading army. Houses, fences, woods are all liable to be demolished to provide materials for fortifications or to prevent the enemy from making use of them as cover, and landowners may never get any compensation where such destruction takes place as an operation of war. Further, private citizens are liable to have troops billeted on them or sick or wounded placed in their houses. In connexion with the requisitioning of the services of inhabitants to assist in the care of the sick and wounded, I may draw attention to the fact that the Geneva Conventions make no provision for the non-combatant inhabitants in districts where hostilities are in progress. 'These unfortunates frequently suffer severely from sickness and wounds in consequence of the military operations, and their case is then particularly distressing because they are generally without medical personnel or material for their proper treatment.'¹

Then as regards the personal property of the ordinary

¹ W. G. Macpherson, 'The Geneva Convention', *Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht und Bundesstaatsrecht*, vol. v, p. 260.

citizens, everything belonging to them which may be of direct use in war, such as guns, ammunition and all kinds of war-material, are always taken from the inhabitants, and particularly heavy penalties are always inflicted for the concealment of arms. All appliances, whether on land, at sea, or in the air, adapted for the transmission of news or for the transport of persons or goods, apart from cases governed by maritime law, may be seized even though belonging to private persons, but they are to be restored and indemnities regulated at the peace (Art. 53). Restoration will in a vast number of cases be an impossibility, and the compensation may be but a poor substitute for the thing taken. Money is but a poor compensation to a farmer if all his horses are requisitioned. This article therefore authorizes the seizure of all kinds of transport : horses, motor-cars, motor-boats, carts, bicycles, carriages, tram-cars, balloons, aeroplanes, river pleasure-steamers, canal-barges, and so forth—all may be seized by the occupant, as well as dépôts of arms and all kinds of war material, from the farmer's sporting rifle to the contents of the Elswick, Krupp or Creusot armament works. In all these cases the persons from whom articles are taken should obtain receipts, so that they may have evidence on which to base their claims for compensation when the war is over. But besides all these articles, which are from their nature of direct use in war, the commander of an occupied locality can order the inhabitants to provide everything necessary for the needs of his army, such as food, wines, tobacco, fuel, cloth, leather, stirrups, chains for horses and artillery and transport-wagons, &c., &c. Such requisitions are to be paid for as far as possible in ready money, and the price may be fixed by the commander, or if payment is not made he must give

receipts for whatever he takes (Art. 52). In this way the occupant may make the inhabitants of the occupied district contribute to the maintenance and upkeep of his army. The requisitions must be proportionate to the resources of the country, which means that the inhabitants are not to be left in a starving condition. In practice such requisitions are levied through the civil authorities, who will make representations if they consider the demands exorbitant; usually in modern warfare the attitude of commanders has been commendably reasonable. It is good policy.¹

It may often happen that a particular district does not possess the actual requirement of the army, whereas another does. In such cases the Commander-in-Chief levies contributions in money as far as possible in accordance with the assessments for ordinary taxes; the money thus raised from the whole district can be spent in that part which possesses the required article, and in this way the expense is spread over a wider area. Such contributions can only be levied for military necessities or for the administration of the territory (Art. 49); the occupant is therefore forbidden to exact money payments for the purpose of enriching his own treasury, but he is not forbidden to levy money payments by way of punishment of breaches of the laws of war.

It is impossible in the space of a single lecture to show in further detail the various ways in which pressure may be brought to bear in almost every direction on the ordinary civil population of an occupied or invaded district. I can say nothing of the hostages the invader may take to ensure the observance of the laws he has enacted, or of the fines he may impose, the destruction

¹ See J. M. Spaight, *op. cit.*, 405.

of buildings he may order, or the other punishments he may inflict for the infringement of his regulations or by way of reprisals; all these matters are writ large on the pages of the histories of recent wars.

Neither can I speak of the treatment which public property will receive at the hands of the invader, except to lay down the general principle that as regards the State property in land and buildings of a non-military character, the occupant must regard himself as being an administrator and usufructuary; that is, the property must be used with care so that its substance remains uninjured. Similarly, property belonging to municipal bodies and all public buildings devoted to religion, education, charity, art, science, and the like are to be treated as private property, and so must the moveable property of the State and provincial and municipal corporations except where it is of a character to be of use in war. Royal palaces, picture galleries, public libraries, museums and their contents would therefore be exempt from confiscation or injury. These subjects are, however, outside the scope of our inquiry. We are concerned with the private citizen.

I have now endeavoured to give some idea of the manner in which war affects the private citizen both as regards his person and property, and we are led to the conclusion that Lord Brougham's dictum that 'in the enlightened policy of modern times, war is not the concern of individuals but of governments' is very far from representing the whole truth. Much has been done during the past century to mitigate the horrors of war, particularly as regards the treatment of sick and wounded belonging to the belligerent forces, especially by the Geneva Convention of 1906, which for the first time gives an international recognition to the work

of Red Cross Societies, provided they are under due control: the lot of the private citizen has also been ameliorated by the acceptance of a code of laws for land warfare, by the introduction of the practice of payment for goods requisitioned for the hostile army, the prohibition of pillage and the definite recognition by States of the duty to provide for the protection of family life and honour and by the increasing influence of the public opinion of neutral States. But when all these ameliorations are taken into consideration, it remains evident that both in naval and land warfare the private citizen is still subject to great dangers and losses. Forced labour may be requisitioned, private property of every description can be commandeered for the use of the invading army, foodstuffs of all sorts compulsorily purchased, and several of the most powerful military States still insist on retaining the right—one of the most objectionable of the usages of war—of forcing non-combatant individuals to act as guides to the army of invasion.

We may speak of the ameliorations of the lot of the private citizen which have resulted from the growing sentiment of humanity, we may congratulate ourselves on the legal limitations imposed on commanders by International Law, but when all is said, and every legal rule obeyed, can a stern and successful commander be prevented from bringing psychological pressure to bear on the civil population by carrying out the war-policy advocated by General Sherman in the following passage?—‘The proper strategy consists in the first place in inflicting as telling blows as possible on the enemy’s army, and then in causing the inhabitants so much suffering that they must long for peace and force their governors to demand it. The people must be left

nothing but their eyes to weep with over the war.' 'War means fighting'—but it means much more. It involves starvation and untold miseries to men, women, and children who take no part in battles.

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